Uniform  with  this  Volume. 

¥ 

THE  NATION'S  NAVY. 

OUR   SHIPS   AND   THEIR  ACHIEVEMENTS. 

By  Charles  Morris. 
.     Cloth,  illustrated,  $1.50. 


"  This  is  one  of  the  books  that  deserve  an  immediate, 
as  well  as  a  lasting  popularity,  for  the  reason  that  its 
every  chapter  is  of  vital  and  telling  interest  and  instruc 
tion  to  all  who  keep  in  close  touch  with  the  eventful 
news  of  each  day  as  the  present  war  progresses.  Mr. 
Charles  Morris,  the  author,  tells  the  absorbing  story  of 
our  navy,  from  its  earliest  beginnings,  in  a  manner  that 
is  sure  to  win  the  respect  and  regard  of  every  reader 
for  the  successful  effort  of  the  writer,  as  well  as  an 
added  admiration  for  our  country  and  her  notable  his 
tory  among  the  nations  of  the  earth."  —  Boston  Courier. 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 


A  COMPLETE  HISTORY 
OF  THE  WAR  OF  1898 


BETWEEN 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  SPAIN 


BY 

CHARLES  MORRIS 

AUTHOR  OF  "THE  NATION'S  NAVY,"  "HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 
"  HISTORICAL  TALES,"  ETC. 


WITH  MAPS  AND  ILLUSTRATIONS 


PHILADELPHIA 

J.  B.  LIPP1NCOTT   COMPANY 
1899 


17 


COPYRIGHT,  1898, 

BY 
J.  B.  LIPPINCOTT  COMPANY. 


PREFACE 


THE  true  mission  of  the  United  States  may  be  held 
to  be  peace,  not  war ;  production,  not  destruction  ;  in 
dustry,  not  rapine.  But  even  to  the  most  peacefully 
inclined  of  nations  occasions  come  which  irresistibly 
demand  that  the  sword  shall  be  drawn  and  blows  be 
struck,  and  through  one  of  these  periods  of  violence 
this  country  has  just  passed.  It  has  had  to  deal  with 
a  nation  not  yet  in  the  nineteenth  century,  a  belated 
relic  of  the  mediaeval  age,  and  has  found  it  necessary  to 
employ  forcible  methods.  War  is  an  evil,  but  there  are 
greater  evils  only  to  be  met  by  war,  national  diseases  which 
only  the  strongest  remedies  can  cure.  *  Spain's  colonial 
system  has  been  such  a  disease,  one  with  which  only 
heroic  treatment  would  avail.  It  has  been  a  system  of 
despotism  and  enslavement,  of  the  suppression  of  insur 
rection  by  massacre  and  starvation,  and  of  obstinate  ad 
herence  to  methods  long  since  outlived  by  other  civilized 
nations.  The  state  of  affairs  had  grown  intolerable  when 
the  United  States  took  up  the  sword  for  the  relief  of  a 
starving  and  perishing  people,  and  began  a  war  based 
upon  the  highest  of  motives,  that  of  humane  sympathy 
and  the  succor  of  the  oppressed.  ' 

This  country  has  been  accused  of  a  selfish  greed  for 
the  territory  of  Spain  ;  but  it  may  be  safely  said  that  no 
purpose  of  territorial  aggrandizement  was  among  the 
motives  that  inspired  the  war.  All  wars  yield  unpre- 

M124132  5 


6  PREFACE. 

meditated  results,  and  the  principal  result  of  this  has 
been  to  place  under  the  control  of  the  United  States 
certain  island  possessions  which  obviously  cannot  be 
handed  back  to  Spain,  to  be  misgoverned  as  before,  and 
whose  people  are  incapable  of  self-government.  The 
United  States  must  retain  them  or  hand  them  over  to 
land-greedy  nations  which  stand  ready  to  seize  every 
shred  of  unappropriated  soil.  Some  of  them  she  has 
decided  to  hold  ;  but  it  may  be  repeated  that  this  result 
of  the  war  was  not  included  among  its  motives. 

The  war  has  been  regarded  with  interest  by  foreign 
nations  from  another  point  of  view.  For  years  past  the 
powers  of  instruments  of  destruction  have  been  steadily 
on  the  increase,  until  it  began  to  appear  as  if  war  would 
become  wholesale  butchery,  and  must  cease  as  some 
thing  too  terrible  to  be  contemplated.  This  war  has, 
therefore,  been  looked  upon  as  an  object-lesson  in  the  de 
structive  powers  of  magazine  rifles,  rapid-fire  guns,  tor 
pedo-tubes,  and  other  death-dealing  implements.  The 
result  has  been  to  prove  that  in  the  rush,  the  turmoil,  the 
nerve-strain  of  combat,  modern  weapons  are  apt  to  waste 
their  projectiles  upon  the  empty  air,  and  that  infantry 
may  still  charge  earthworks  and  rifle-pits  with  no  greater 
loss  of  life  than  in  former  wars.  In  naval  combat  the 
value  of  coolness  and  training,  as  compared  with  the 
opposite  qualities,  has  received  a  wonderful  demonstra 
tion  in  the  quick  and  complete  destruction  of  the  Spanish 
fleets  and  the  remarkable  immunity  of  American  ships 
and  men.  The  '  *  man  behind  the  gun' '  seems  of  more 
importance  than  the  gun  itself. 

But  a  preface  should  not  be  an  argument  or  an  ex 
ample  of  special  pleading,  and  we  may  conclude  by 
saying  that  in  these  less  than  four  months  of  war  the 


PREFACE.  7 

United  States  has  taken  a  new  position  before  the  world, 
a  higher  and  nobler  attitude.  Europe  has  suddenly  dis 
covered  that  we  are  more  than  a  nation  of  shopkeepers  ; 
that  we  are  a  people  who  can  strike  shrewdly  for  the 
right,  and  one  that  is  destined  to  be  a  leader  in  the  van 
of  human  progress,  an  example  to  the  world  of  the  value 
of  free  institutions,  peaceful  industries,  high  aspirations, 
and  moral  energies. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

SPAIN  AND  HER  COLONIES. 

PAGE 

Cruelty  of  the  early  Spaniards— Annihilation  of  the  natives 
— How  Cuba  was  colonized — Later  history  of  Cuba — 
Spain's  methods  of  administration — Commerce  forbidden 
— Character  of  office-holders— Insurrections  begin — The 
cruelties  of  the  Spanish  army — The  Captain-General  of 
Cuba  given  despotic  powers — Cuban  hatred  of  Spain — 
Attempts  at  insurrection — The  Lopez  invasion — The 
Quitman  project — Revolt  in  Spain — Condition  of  affairs 
in  Cuba — Oppression  of  the  islanders— Large  salaries  and 
perquisites  of  the  Spanish  officials— Frauds  and  fees — 
The  share  of  Spain — Disregard  of  Cuban  interests — The 
revolt  of  1868 — A  guerilla  war — The  character  of  the 
country — The  machete  as  a  weapon — Bush  fighting — The 
rainy  season — Desultory  warfare— Official  bulletins — The 
trocha  and  reconcentration — Outrages  in  Havana — Mas 
sacre  of  the  students — The  treaty  of  El  Zanjon — Promises 
of  reform  not  kept 21 

CHAPTER  II. 

RELATIONS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  TO  CUBA. 

Early  difficulties  with  Spain— Threatened  interference  of 
the  Holy  Alliance  between  Spain  and  the  revolting  colo 
nies — This  leads  to  the  Monroe  doctrine — The  United 
States  gives  warning  to  European  powers — Mexico  and 
Colombia  warned  to  keep  out  of  Cuba — The  United 
States  guarantees  Spain's  title  to  Cuba— Secretary  Ever 
ett's  ultimatum — Offer  to  purchase  Cuba — The  Black 
Warrior  affair — The  Ostend  conference— Buchanan's 

9 


io  CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

views — The  Virginius  affair— Protest  and  indemnity — 
President  Grant's  attitude— Injuries  to  American  com 
merce  47 

CHAPTER  III. 

CUBA  IN   INSURRECTION. 

Cubans  in  exile — The  work  of  the  clubs— Marti' s  efforts — 
The  outbreak  of  revolt — Maceo  and  Gomez  reach  the 
island — Death  of  Marti — Campos  appointed  governor- 
general— His  methods — How  the  insurgents  fought — 
Their  horsemanship— Life  in  a  Cuban  camp— Gomez  in 
command— His  troubles  and  despondency — Camaguey 
invaded— Gomez's  plan  of  campaign — A  war  of  skir 
mishes—The  battle  of  Bayamo— A  Cuban  constitution  and 
government— Maceo' s  activity — Progress  of  the  war  west 
ward—Its  destructive  character — Pinar  del  Rio  invaded 
—Campos  replaced  by  General  Weyler— Weyler's  repu 
tation  for  cruelty — His  inefficient  campaigning — Destruc 
tion  of  plantations — Maceo' s  operations — His  death — 
The  province  of  Pinar  del  Rio  pacified— Operations  of 
Weyler  in  Santa  Clara — Gomez's  waiting  game — General 
Garcia' s  capture  of  Victoria  de  las  Tunas— Indignation 
at  Weyler's  cruelty— He  is  recalled  and  replaced  by  Gen 
eral  Blanco — A  reform  administration — How  the  Cubans 
received  it 58 

CHAPTER  IV. 

THE  FORTS  AND  THE  TROCHAS. 

The  Spanish  ill-success  due  to  their  method  of  warfare — 
This  method  of  advantage  to  the  insurgents— Guerilla 
warfare  a  Spanish  habit— The  trocha  trusted  to— Suc 
cessive  trochas  built — Gomez  and  Maceo  treat  them 
with  disdain— Weyler's  trocha  from  Mariel  to  Majana 
described— The  trocha  from  Jucaro  to  Moron— The  mul 
titude  of  forts— The  Spanish  held  the  towns  and  forts, 
the  Cubans  the  country — Spain  on  the  defensive ;  no 
energetic  offensive  operations — Their  system  of  returning 
to  dinner — War  bulletins — Falsehoods  with  a  purpose  .  .  82 


CONTENTS.  ii 

CHAPTER  V. 

THE  RECONCENTRADOS  AND  THE  MILITARY   PRISONS. 

PAGE 

Weyler's  barbarity — The  reconcentrado  order — Its  disas 
trous  effect — Pacification  by  starvation — The  reconcen- 
trados  at  Jaruco — McKinley's  denunciation  of  the  cruelty 
displayed — What  Senator  Proctor  and  others  saw  in  Cuba 
— Incomunicado  imprisonment — General  Lee's  protests 
— Murder  of  Dr.  Ruiz— No  more  Americans  imprisoned 
— The  sufferings  of  Cuban  exiles — The  story  of  Evange- 
lina  Cisneros — Spanish  compared  with  Turkish  barbarity 
— A  butcher  of  men  feasted  in  Sagua — The  endless  con 
flagrations—An  intolerable  situation 92 


CHAPTER  VI. 

EVENTS  LEADING  TO  INTERVENTION. 

Efforts  to  prevent  expeditions  to  Cuba — The  Competitor 
prisoners — President  Cleveland's  message — Spain's  reply 
— General  Lee  sent  to  Havana — His  report — President 
McKinley's  action— Spain's  reply  to  Minister  Woodford 
— Intervention  for  charity — Spain's  financial  condition — 
The  hopeless  state  of  the  war — Lee's  opinion  of  the  in 
surgents—Increase  of  irritation — The  riot  in  Havana — 
The  Key  West  squadron— The,  De  Lome  letter— The 
Maine  in  Havana  harbor — The  explosion  and  its  result — 
Wide-spread  indignation — The  Court  of  Inquiry  and  its 
verdict — Active  preparations  for  war — Emergency  fund 
voted — New  ships  bought  and  ordered — Senator  Proctor's 
speech — The  feeling  in  Congress — McKinley's  pacific 
action — Lee  leaves  Havana — The  message  to  Congress 
— The  consular  reports— Warlike  resolution  of  Congress — 
Its  immediate  results— Spanish  methods — War  inevitable 
—Concentration  of  the  army — The  attitude  of  the  powers 
of  Europe 103 


12  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  VII. 

CUBA   UNDER   BLOCKADE. 

PAGE 

The  waiting  fleet  at  Key  West— A  night  of  signalling— The 
start  for  Cuba — The  first  prize — Establishment  of  the 
blockade— Peril  of  the  Paris— Blanco  and  the  Havanese 
— Prizes  of  the  fleet — Lieutenant  Rowan's  daring  journey 
—The  question  of  privateers— Spain's  declaration— Sec 
retary  Sherman  retires— The  Matanzas  ports  bombarded 
— The  Cape  Verde  fleet — The  flying  squadron — Bombard 
ment  of  forts  at  Cienfuegos  and  Cardenas — The  jour 
ney  of  the  Oregon— Complaints  from  Tampa— Attitude 
of  the  powers  of  Europe— Friendliness  of  Great  Britain  .  134 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

THE  SEA-FIGHT  AT  MANILA. 

The  Philippine  Islands— The  natives  rebel  against  Spain- 
Admiral  Dewey's  squadron  sent  to  Manila — First  news  of 
a  victory — General  Augustin's  proclamation — The  squad 
ron  in  the  bay— Passing  Corregidor  Island—Manila  in 
view— The  Spanish  ships  at  Cavite— How  they  were 
stationed — The  battle  begins — Submarine  mines — Fierce 
firing  on  both  sides— Poor  gunnery  of  the  Spanish- 
Terrible  results  of  the  American  fire— The  Reina  Cristina 
attacks  the  Olympia — Fatal  result — Fate  of  the  torpedo- 
boats— The  Spanish  ships  in  flames— Dewey  withdraws 
for  breakfast — Returns  and  completes  the  destruction  of 
the  Spanish  ships — Wonderful  result — No  American  killed 
—Heavy  loss  on  the  Spanish  side— Great  accuracy  of 
American  fire — Dewey  asked  not  to  bombard  the  city — 
Corregidor  Island  taken— Dewey's  despatch— Work  of 
the  Petrel — The  natives  in  Cavite— -Dewey  thanked  and 
rewarded  by  the  President  and  Congress— Ships  and 
troops  sent  to  his  aid 150 


CONTENTS.  13 

CHAPTER  IX. 

UNDER  FIRE  AT  CARDENAS  AND  CIENFUEGOS. 

PAGE 

Sailing  of  the  Cape  Verde  fleet— Preparations  along  the 
coast — The  mosquito  fleet— An  affair  at  Matanzas — In  the 
Bay  of  Cardenas— The  Winslow  disabled— Death  of  En 
sign  Bagley  and  his  companions — Escape  of  the  Winslow 
— Burial  of  the  victims— Grappling  for  the  cables  at  Cien- 
fuegos — Sharp  fire  and  return — The  cables  cut — The  light 
house  demolished— Other  efforts  to  cut  cables 170 

CHAPTER  X. 

THE  SEARCH   FOR  THE  SPANISH   FLEET. 

Admiral  Sampson's  squadron  seeks  San  Juan — Defences  of 
the  town — The  rounds  of  the  ships — The  bombardment 
— The  Terror  at  work — Results  of  the  engagement— The 
lessons  learned — The  hospital  ship  Solace — News  of  the 
Spanish  fleet — In  search  of  coal — Schley's  squadron  leaves 
Key  West — Reaches  Cienfuegos — No  trace  of  the  Spanish 
ships — The  Hawk  brings  news — Evidence  of  Cervera's 
movements  —  The  collier  Restormel  captured  —  Schley 
sails  for  Santiago — Location  of  this  city — Admiral  Cer 
vera's  ships — Bombardment  of  the  batteries — Presence 
of  the  ships  proved — Admiral  Sampson  arrives— The 
voyage  of  the  Oregon — Accident  of  the  Columbia — 
Failure  of  the  Gussie  expedition— The  newspaper  censor 
ship — The  Florida  lands  supplies  for  the  Cubans  ....  180 

CHAPTER  XL 

THE  HEROES  OF  THE  MERRIMAC. 

The  Merrimac — Hobson's  scheme— Preparation — Hosts  of 
volunteers — A  premature  start — The  actual  start — Powell 
and  the  launch— The  collier  goes  in— The  picket  boat- 
Opening  of  the  battery  fire — The  catamaran — Hobson's 
narrative — Saved  by  Cervera — News  sent  to  the  fleet — 
Prisoners  in  the  Morro — Schley's  opinion — Aid  from 
British  consul— The  exchange— Enthusiastic  reception  of 
Hobson  and  his  men 199 


14  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  XII. 

THE  FIRST  FIGHT  ON   CUBAN  SOIL. 

PAGE 

Schley's  scouts — Lieutenant  Blue's  exploit — A  torpedo-boat 
attack  —  Torpedoes  afloat  —  The  forts  bombarded  — 
Marines  landed  in  Guantanamo  Bay — A  Spanish  attack — 
Fighting  day  and  night — Death  of  Surgeon  Gibbs — The 
Sunday  attack — A  picturesque  scene — Cuban  allies — The 
Spanish  camp  attacked — Tricks  of  the  bush-fighters — 
Shelling  of  Caimanera— Work  of  the  dynamite  guns — 
The  channel  open— A  conference  on  Cuban  soil  ....  215 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

THE  ARMY  OF  INVASION. 

Organizing  an  army— Commanding  officers — Treatment  of 
the  soldiers  criticised — General  Alger's  remarks — Char 
acter  of  the  army — The  Rough  Riders — The  invading 
force — The  transports  sail  and  are  called  back — The  final 
start — Santiago  reached — A  landing  place  chosen — The 
Spanish  retreat— Landing  under  difficulties — The  army 
on  shore — Its  unready  condition — An  advance  movement 
— Skirmishing — Garcia' s  army  moved 227 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

THE  RAID   OF  THE   ROUGH   RIDERS. 

Advance  of  the  dismounted  cavalry— Wheeler's  reconnois- 
sance — The  country  and  the  roads — Spaniards  in  ambush 
—Plan  of  attack— The  climb  of  the  Rough  Riders— Fight 
ing  by  both  columns — A  dangerous  situation — Wood  and 
Roosevelt  charge— The  block-house  taken — Fight  of  the 
regulars— Incidents  of  the  battle — Its  results — A  Spanish 
comment 238 


CONTENTS.  15 


CHAPTER  XV. 

THE   BATTLE  OF  SANTIAGO. 

PAGE 

The  Cuban  roads — A  reconnoissance  —The  American  posi 
tion  and  supplies — Condition  of  the  troops — The  lines  of 
the  enemy— Shafter  orders  battle— The  lines  on  July  i— 
The  balloon  and  its  results — The  Spanish  positions  at  El 
Caney  and  San  Juan — The  wire-clipping  advance-guard 
—Lack  of  artillery— Attack  on  the  El  Caney  fort— The 
Spanish  rifle-pits— Chaffee's  charge — Fort  and  town  taken 
— Exposure  of  the  troops — Aguadores  attacked — The 
fight  at  San  Juan — Advance  of  the  troops — Wading  the 
San  Juan — Grimes's  battery  at  work— Exposure  and  loss 
of  the  Americans — An  impetuous  charge — The  hill  taken 
— Exhaustion  of  the  men — The  July  2  fight — The  Span 
ish  repulse — Dastardly  work  of  guerillas — Positions  on 
the  3d — Shafter  an  invalid — Gallantry  of  the  American 
soldiers 247 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

THE  FATE  OF  CERVERA'S  FLEET. 

The  doings  of  the  Terror — A  larger  blockade— The  fight 
at  Manzanillo— The  journey  of  Camara's  squadron — An 
eastern  squadron  formed — The  guard  on  Santiago  harbor 
— Bombardment  of  July  i  and  2 — Cervera's  plan  of  escape 
— Positions  of  American  ships  July  3 — The  flight  of  the 
Spanish  ships — Clearing  for  action — Rapid  work  of  the 
fleet— The  hot  fire  on  the  Brooklyn— Terrific  return— All 
the  fleet  in  action — The  Maria  Teresa  on  fire  and  beached 
— Fate  of  the  Almirante  Oquendo — The  Vizcaya  in  flames 
—Chase  of  the  Colon  by  the  Brooklyn  and  Oregon— The 
Colon  beached — The  Gloucester  sinks  the  torpedo-boats 
— Lessons  from  the  battle— The  effort  to  save  the  crews 
— Work  of  the  Iowa  and  the  Gloucester — Admiral  Cer- 
vera  on  the  Iowa — The  Reina  Mercedes  sunk — Brave 
deed  of  American  sailors 267 


16  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  XVII. 

THE  SIEGE  AND  FALL  OF  SANTIAGO. 

PAGE 

The  surrender  of  Santiago  demanded  and  declined — Non- 
combatants  leave  the  city — Food  supplied  them — The 
wounded  seek  Siboney — The  refugees  follow — Prepa 
rations  for  bombardment— The  American  lines — General 
Toral's  offer  to  capitulate  "with  honor" — Declined  and 
bombardment  begins — Unconditional  surrender  refused 
— A  tropical  rain-fall — General  Miles  arrives — The  burn 
ing  of  Siboney — Shafter's  offer  to  send  the  Spanish 
soldiers  back  to  Spain — Appeal  of  General  Linares — 
Toral  accepts  the  terms — Basis  of  capitulation  signed — 
Correspondence — The  territory  surrendered — Entering 
the  harbor — Slight  results  of  bombardment — Ceremonies 
of  the  surrender — Toral's  demeanor — Stars  and  Stripes 
float  over  Santiago 286 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

EVENTS  AFTER  THE  SURRENDER. 

Return  of  the  refugees — Good  feeling  between  the  victors 
and  the  vanquished — Castilian  cunning — Cleansing  the 
city — Contempt  for  the  Cubans — Garcia  takes  offence — 
Shafter's  explanation — Naval  events — Capitulation  of  gar 
risons — A  Spanish  contract — The  problem  of  the  sunken 
ships — The  Santiago  prison  record — Condition  of  the 
army — Treatment  of  the  wounded — Their  exposure  to 
the  weather — Rapid  increase  of  sickness — Dr.  Senn's 
statement — Testimony  of  Drs.  McCook  and  Krauskopf — 
The  War  Department  order— Roosevelt's  letter— The 
Round  Robin  communication — The  Porto  Rico  expe 
dition — Comments  of  the  press — Convalescent  camp — 
Scandalous  condition  of  the  transports — State  of  affairs 
at  Camp  Alger — Who  was  responsible  ? — Roosevelt  and 
Secretary  Alger 307 


CONTENTS.  17 

CHAPTER  XIX. 

THE   INVASION   OF   PORTO   RICO. 

PACK 

Dominating  influences  in  the  war — The  expedition  to  Porto 
Rico — The  Gloucester  in  the  harbor  of  Guanica — The 
town  occupied — The  port  of  Ponce  surrenders — Welcome 
to  the  American  flag — The  city  of  Ponce  occupied — 
Enthusiastic  greeting— General  Miles' s  proclamation — A 
skirmish  at  Yauco — Business  revives  at  Ponce — Mayor 
Magia's  proclamation — The  military  road  mined — Change 
of  plan — Guayama  taken — General  Stone's  advance — 
Capture  of  Coama  and  its  garrison — A  fight  near  Maya- 
guez— Cape  San  Juan — The  advance  on  Aibonito — An 
artillery  duel — News  of  peace  stops  hostilities — An  affair 
at  Manzanillo — The  daring  of  the  Mangrove — A  shell  in 
the  San  Francisco 334 

CHAPTER   XX. 

THE  SIEGE  OF   MANILA. 

The  Philippine  rebels — Investment  of  Manila — General 
Augustin  in  doubt — Aguinaldo's  proclamations — A  dec 
laration  of  independence — Desperate  situation  of  the 
Spaniards — Dewey's  demeanor — A  Ladrone  island  taken 
— Attitude  of  the  Germans — The  Irene  incident — Ameri 
can  expeditions  arrive — Want  in  the  city — General  Mer- 
ritt  arrives-— An  attack  by  the  Spaniards— Their  repulse — 
The  Monterey  arrives — Notice  sent  General  Jaudenes — 
Surrender  demanded  and  refused— Clearing  for  action — 
The  bombardment — Attack  by  the  troops— A  show  of 
resistance — The  American  flag  floats  over  Manila — Terms 
of  surrender — Flight  of  Augustin — The  final  event  of  the 
war 347 

CHAPTER  XXI. 

FROM  WAR  TO   PEACE. 

Singular  character  of  the  war — Its  effect  on  the  countries 
concerned — Events  in  Spain — A  revolution  threatened — 
The  financial  status  of  the  United  States— The  loan  and 

2 


i8  CONTENTS. 


PAGE 


tax — Great  development  of  commerce — The  Hawaiian 
annexation— Sailing  of  the  Philadelphia— Admiral  Miller 
raises  the  flag — Attitude  of  the  powers — Thoughts  of 
intervention— Great  Britain's  attitude— Spain's  only  hope 
—The  request  for  peace— M.  Cambon  represents  Spain— 
The  terms  accepted— A  protocol  prepared — Its  text — The 
ceremony  of  signing — The  news  sent  around  the  world  .  361 

CHAPTER  XXII. 

FINAL  CONSIDERATIONS. 

Hostile  relations  of  natives  and  Spaniards— The  future  of 
Cuba — The  commission  and  its  work — The  demands  of 
the  Philippine  natives — Naval  demonstration — Rewards 
to  the  heroes — Proposed  increase  of  the  navy — A  larger 
army  demanded — The  treatment  of  the  sick  soldiers — 
Effect  of  her  colonial  dominion  on  Spain — Possible  benefit 
from  the  loss  of  her  colonies — The  war  but  an  incident 
in  United  States  history — The  new  position  of  this  country 
before  the  world — Its  future  mission 375 


ILLUSTRATIONS 


The  Wreck  of  the  Maine Frontispiece. 

Map  of  the  West  Indies 25 

Map  of  the  Island  of  Cuba 40 

Cuban  Leaders 60 

Spanish  Commanders 80 

United  States  Naval  Commanders 120 

Map  of  Atlantic  Ocean 131 

President  McKinley  and  Secretaries  Long  and  Alger    .   .   .   142 

Map  of  the  Philippine  Islands 150 

Plan  of  the  Battles  at  Manila 157 

The  Annihilation  of  the  Spanish  Fleet  in  the  Harbor  of 

Manila 164 

Panoramic  View  of  the  Harbor  of  Santiago 192 

Map  of  Santiago  and  Vicinity 195 

Lieutenant  Hobson  on  the  Merrimac 202 

The  Marine  Bombardment  of  Santiago 210 

Soldiers  Going  on  Transports  at  Tampa 232 

Massachusetts  Volunteers  Landing  at  Siboney 237 

Infantry  Camp  at  Las  Guasimas 242 

The  Country  near  Santiago 252 

Plan  of  the  Battle  of  Santiago 262 

How  the  American  Soldiers  Fought  at  Santiago 266 

Cervera's  Fleet  Endeavoring  to  Escape.    American  Ships 

Firing 274 

19 


2o  ILLUSTRATIONS 

PAGE 

Wreck  of  the  Spanish  Cruiser  Almirante  Oquendo,  showing 

Effect  of  American  Fire 280 

The  Oregon,  just  after  her  Chase  of  the  Cristobal  Colon .   .   284 
Wounded  at  Siboney.    After  the  Rough  Riders'  Charge .   .   292 

United  States  Army  Commanders 297 

Soldier  Life  :  Washing  Clothes  in  Stream 310 

Map  of  the  Island  of  Porto  Rico 334 

At  the  Front,  near  Arroyo,  Porto  Rico 342 

Ox-Train  Disabled  in  the  Rough  Mud  Road  to  Adjuntas, 

Porto  Rico 344 

Map  of  Manila  and  Vicinity 354 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN. 

CHAPTER    I. 

SPAIN   AND   HER   COLONIES. 

ON  Sunday,  October  28,  1492,  Christopher  Colum 
bus,  sailing  southward  through  the  placid  Western  seas, 
gazed  with  eyes  of  delight  upon  the  shores  of  a  rich  and 
charming  island,  "the  most  beautiful  land,"  he  said, 
"  that  the  sun  ever  shone  upon  or  that  the  eyes  of  man 
ever  beheld."  Cubanacan,  the  land  "where  gold  is 
found, ' '  the  natives  called  it.  The  Spanish  were  liberal 
with  names,  calling  it  successively  Juana,  Fernandina, 
Santiago,  and  Ave  Maria.  None  of  these  titles,  how 
ever,  took  hold.  Cuba,  half  the  native  name,  prevailed, 
— about  the  only  relic  of  the  natives  that  survived  a 
half-century  of  Spanish  rule.  It  has  been  poetically 
designated  the  ' '  Pearl  of  the  Antilles, ' '  though  it  is  a 
pearl  whose  lustre  has  been  sadly  dimmed. 

It  is  not  without  warrant  that  we  begin  our  history  four 
centuries  back,  for  the  causes  of  the  nineteenth-century 
war  of  which  we  propose  to  treat  began  with  the  advent 
of  the  Spaniards  to  this  continent,  and  have  grown  with 
the  growth  of  their  dominion  in  the  New  World. 
Cruelty  and  oppression  marked  their  coming  to  Amer 
ica,  and  to  cruelty  and  oppression  was  due  their  final 
departure  from  its  shores.  The  whole  record  of  Spain 
on  this  continent,  in  fact,  has  been  one  of  inhumanity 

21 


22  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN. 

and  tyranny,  with  the  result  that  her  colonies  have,  one 
after  another,  been  driven  into  rebellion  and  won  inde 
pendence.  At  the  opening  of  the  nineteenth  century 
much  more  than  half  the  Western  Hemisphere  was  held 
by  the  strong  hand  of  Spain.  At  its  close  the  final 
remnants  of  this  splendid  colonial  dominion  were  falling 
from  her  enfeebled  grasp,  while  hardly  a  throb  of  pity 
beat  for  her  in  the  heart  of  the  world,  for  her  misfor 
tunes  were  felt  to  be  the  inevitable  consequences  of  her 
faults.  We  are  constrained,  therefore,  to  place  Spain 
in  witness  against  herself  by  a  brief  review  of  her  policy 
in  America,  seeking  to  show  that  the  war  of  1898  was 
the  culmination  of  a  chain  of  related  events  due  to  her 
persistently  oppressive  colonial  policy. 

It  was  a  brief  respite  from  suffering  for  the  natives  of 
Cuba  that  the  Spaniards  made  their  first  settlement  in 
the  neighboring  island  named  by  them  Hispaniola,  but 
now  known  as  Hayti.  This  island  was  peopled  by  a 
race  of  innocent  and  happy  natives,  who  welcomed  the 
white  strangers  as  deities,  though  they  were  soon  to 
regard  them  as  demons.  Under  the  cruel  rule  of  the 
new-comers  their  happy  lot  suddenly  ended.  Their 
liberty  was  quickly  exchanged  for  slavery,  and  so  ruth 
lessly  were  they  driven  to  severe  and  unaccustomed  toil 
that  within  a  generation  they  had  all  disappeared.  The 
entire  population  of  the  island  was  sacrificed  to  the 
cruelty  and  greed  of  its  new  lords. 

In  the  year  1502,  ten  years  after  the  discovery  of 
America,  Nicolas  de  Ovanda  became  governor  of  His 
paniola.  He  was  a  small,  fair-haired  man,  mild  of 
speech  and  courteous  in  demeanor  ;  yet  the  seven  years 
of  rule  of  this  cultured  Spaniard  were  so  filled  with 
horrors  that  one  shudders  at  his  very  name.  To  invite 


THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN.  23 

independent  chiefs  to  an  entertainment,  then  seize,  bind, 
and  burn  them  to  death,  was  a  mild  proceeding  under 
the  rule  of  the  soft-voiced  Ovanda.  Such  a  crew  of 
wretches  surely  never  came  together  as  those  that  deso 
lated  that  fair  island  while  under  his  control.  The 
life  of  an  Indian  slave  was  of  no  value.  The  natives 
were  plentiful  and  could  easily  be  replaced.  It  was 
cheaper  to  work  one  to  death  and  get  another  than  to 
treat  the  first  with  humanity  ;  and  the  whip  of  the  task 
master  rapidly  did  its  work.  At  times  the  natives  rose 
in  rebellion,  but  their  revolts  were  subdued  with  fright 
ful  savagery.  Some  were  burned  alive  at  the  stake, 
others  were  torn  to  pieces  by  fierce  bloodhounds.  The 
murder  of  a  Spaniard  was  revenged  by  chopping  off  the 
hands  of  fifty  or  sixty  Indians.  The  masters  of  the  isle 
made  a  sport  of  cruelty.  On  one  occasion  thirteen 
natives  were  hanged  so  that  their  toes  just  touched  the 
ground,  and  then  were  slowly  pricked  to  death  by  the 
sword-points  of  the  Spaniards.  Other  tales  of  almost 
unmentionable  cruelty  might  be  given,  but  it  must  suf 
fice  to  say  that,  fortunately  for  the  natives,  they  soon 
disappeared  under  this  rigorous  discipline,  and  the 
Spaniards  were  obliged  to  replace  them  with  negro 
slaves,  who,  as  they  had  to  be  paid  for,  were  treated 
with  more  humanity. 

This,  and  much  more  of  the  kind,  we  may  read  in  the 
pages  of  Las  Casas,  the  gentlest  and  most  humane  of 
his  race,  whose  pen  fairly  trembles  with  indignation  as 
he  writes.  This  apostle  of  humanity  spent  his  life  in 
vain  attempts  to  alleviate  the  condition  of  the  natives  of 
New  Spain,  and  died  after  a  life  of  earnest  but  largely 
useless  appeal.  It  was  not  the  cruelties  shown  in  His- 
paniola  alone  of  which  he  had  to  speak,  for  the  progress 


24  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

of  Spain  in  the  New  World  was  everywhere  marked  by 
a  trail  of  blood.  The  courage  of  Cortes  and  Pizarro  was 
sadly  vitiated  with  treachery  and  cruelty,  and  two  flour 
ishing  empires  were  overthrown,  hosts  of  their  people 
slain,  and  the  remainder  reduced  to  slavery,  that  a 
handful  of  adventurers  might  rise  to  power  upon  their 
misery.  De  Soto,  in  our  own  southern  territory,  with 
his  bloodhounds  and  chains,  was  as  faithless  and  cruel  ; 
and  the  whole  story  of  the  conquest  of  New  Spain  is  one 
that  it  is  best  not  to  dwell  upon  too  minutely.  In  the 
history  of  Mexico  we  are  told  that  the  rapacious  laws 
depopulated  towns,  and  that  it  mattered  little  whether 
a  tribe  was  an  ally  or  an  enemy,  since  the  work  of  the 
scourge  and  the  sword  led  to  the  same  end.  Revolt 
only  intensified  cruelty.  Death  in  the  mines  or  inhu 
manity  worse  than  death  in  the  fields,  we  are  told,  was 
the  lot  of  the  natives  under  the  rule  of  Spain. 

In  1511,  Don  Diego  Columbus,  son  of  the  discov 
erer,  determined  to  take  possession  of  Cuba,  Hispaniola 
having  become  nearly  exhausted  of  laborers  within  less 
than  twenty  years.  No  opposition  was  made  to  the 
invasion  except  by  a  chief  named  Hatuey,  a  fugitive 
who  had  lived  under  the  amenities  of  Spanish  rule  in 
Hispaniola.  His  opposition  was  useless,  and  he  was 
soon  in  the  hands  of  the  invaders,  who,  instead  of 
treating  him  as  an  honorable  captive,  condemned  him 
to  be  burned  alive  as  a  fugitive  slave.  While  the  fagots 
were  being  heaped  around  him,  a  Franciscan  friar  stood 
by  the  pile  and,  cross  in  hand,  besought  him  to  accept 
Christianity,  in  order  that  the  flames  which  consumed 
his  body  might  waft  his  soul  to  realms  of  endless  bliss. 

"Are  there  any  Spaniards  in  those  happy  realms?" 
asked  the  chief. 


'|H; 

^ftii  >\ '  r 

Ah:l^^«%  rt    ^ 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  25 

1  *  Yes, ' '  was  the  reply. 

'  *  Then  I  will  have  nothing  to  do  with  your  religion. 
I  will  not  go  to  a  place  where  I  may  meet  one  of  that 
accursed  race. ' ' 

No  long  period  passed  before  all  the  native  Cubans 
followed  their  intrepid  chief.  At  the  time  of  settlement 
they  are  said  to  have  numbered  more  than  three  hundred 
thousand.  Forty  years  afterwards  it  is  doubtful  if  one 
of  them  survived.  The  wars  they  waged  with  the 
Spaniards  ended  in  blood  and  torture.  Their  lot  in 
peace  was  worse  than  in  war.  The  sword  and  the  lash 
soon  did  the  work,  and  the  natives  vanished  from  the 
land.  The  methods  by  which  a  whole  population  can 
be  exterminated  in  a  generation  need  not  be  commented 
upon  ;  they  may  be  left  to  the  imagination  of  the  reader. 

The  subsequent  history  of  Cuba,  up  to  the  early  years 
of  the  nineteenth  century,  may  be  epitomized  in  a  few 
words.  Negro  slaves  succeeded  the  natives  as  laborers, 
and  grew  numerous  after  1580,  at  which  time  the  culti 
vation  of  tobacco  and  sugar-cane  began.  For  a  century 
and  a  half  after  1600  almost  perpetual  fear  brooded  over 
the  island.  The  French,  English,  and  Dutch,  and  the 
pirates  who  infested  the  waters  of  the  West  Indies,  in 
vaded  it  at  will.  Even  before  that  date  Havana  had 
been  twice  taken  and  burned  by  the  French.  In  1761 
it  was  besieged  by  the  English,  and  taken  after  an 
obstinate  resistance  of  more  than  two  months.  Cuba 
was  restored  to  Spain  in  the  following  year,  and  then 
first  began  to  be  prosperous.  At  its  first  census,  in 
J773>  its  population,  black  and  white,  numbered  only 
171,620.  At  its  latest  census  it  had  a  population  of 
over  1,600,000. 

The  history  of  Cuba  as  a  colony  is  at  one  with  that  of 


26  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

the  Spanish  colonies  as  a  whole.  Much  as  the  inhabi 
tants  of  the  British  colonies  in  America  objected  to  the 
methods  of  the  home  country,  they  enjoyed  a  high  state 
of  freedom  as  compared  with  the  people  of  New  Spain. 
The  latter  were  destitute  of  even  the  shadow  of  liberty, 
being  deprived  of  all  privileges,  civil,  political,  and 
religious.  While  the  British  colonists  made  their  own 
laws,  and  in  several  colonies  chose  their  own  governors, 
the  Spanish  colonists  were  under  the  absolute  dominion 
of  governors  appointed  by  the  crown,  and  were  as 
destitute  of  actual  liberty  as  the  slaves  in  their  fields. 
Spanish  officials  filled  every  place  of  power  or  profit, 
monopoly  and  restriction  were  the  principles  of  adminis 
tration,  and  the  people  were  kept  in  submission  by  a 
powerful  army  and  navy,  which  they  were  heavily  taxed 
to  maintain.  The  "taxation  without  representation" 
which  led  to  the  revolt  of  the  British  colonists  was  but  a 
mild  measure  of  oppression  as  compared  with  that  under 
which  the  people  of  Spanish  America  groaned. 

A  more  detailed  account  of  the  character  of  this 
tyranny  may  be  given,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  it  con 
tinued  in  Cuba  and  the  Philippine  Islands  until  the  year 
1898.  It  was  of  the  most  crushing  character.  The 
viceroys  and  captain-generals  who  were  appointed  by 
the  king  of  Spain  to  rule  over  his  dominions  in  America 
were  invested  with  despotic  power,  their  word  having 
the  force  of  absolute  law.  How  they  governed  may  be 
deduced  from  the  fact  that  each  of  them  went  back  to 
Spain  immensely  rich. 

Spain  looked  upon  her  colonies  as  sources  of  revenue 
only,  and  rivalled  the  rapacious  policy  of  her  captain- 
generals  and  other  colonial  officials.  Heavy  duties  were 
laid  alike  on  imports  and  exports,  and  trade  with  any 


THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN.  27 

other  nation  than  Spain  was  forbidden  under  the  severest 
penalties.  Any  merchant  captain  not  hailing  from  a 
Spanish  port,  and  even  Spanish  merchants  who  sought 
to  trade  without  official  permission,  were  punished  with 
death  if  they  dared  to  enter  a  colonial  harbor  of  Spain. 
The  sole  right  of  trading  with  his  colonies  was  sold,  near 
the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century,  by  the  king  to  the 
Philippine  Company,  an  association  of  merchants  trading 
with  the  West  and  the  East  alike,  and  privileged  to  fix 
the  rates  at  which  all  goods  might  be  sold.  To  trade 
without  license  from  these  merchants  was  a  crime  whose 
penalty  was  death.  The  colonists  were  forced  to  sell  and 
buy  their  goods  at  prices  fixed  for  them  by  this  company, 
whose  net  profits  were  usually  three  hundred  per  cent. 

The  tyranny  exercised  was  not  restricted  to  trade, 
but  covered  every  detail  of  life.  Literature  was  under 
a  strict  censorship,  and  no  book  could  be  imported 
without  the  permission  of  the  priests.  In  1810,  when 
the  revolution  in  Chili  and  Peru  began,  these  two 
colonies  owned  between  them  a  single  printing-press. 
Every  effort  was  made  to  prevent  intercourse  with  other 
countries,  and  even  a  native  of  Spain  could  not  visit  the 
colonies  unless  the  king  chose  to  grant  him  a  passport. 
The  colonists  were  under  a  similar  restriction.  They 
could  not  visit  Europe,  they  could  not  even  enter  a 
neighboring  colony,  without  special  permission  from  the 
captain-general  of  their  province.  At  home  they  were 
discriminated  against  in  favor  of  Spanish-born  immi 
grants,  who  occupied  all  the  official  positions  and  held 
them  with  the  sole  purpose  of  filling  their  pockets. 
Robbery,  under  the  disguise  of  fees  and  charges,  was 
the  prevalent  practice,  from  the  captain-general  down  to 
the  pettiest  official.  ' '  Robamos  todos1 '  ( * '  we  are  all 


28  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

thieves"),  a  functionary  of  high  rank  is  said  to  have 
openly  remarked  ;  and  it  may  well  be  questioned  if  any 
other  colonies  in  the  history  of  the  world  have  been  so 
shamefully  misgoverned  as  those  of  Spain.  This  state 
of  affairs  yielded  its  natural  result.  In  the  year  1800 
Spain  was  the  unquestioned  owner  of  all  South  America 
except  Brazil  and  Guiana,  and  of  all  North  America  ex 
cept  the  United  States  east  of  the  Mississippi  and  the 
British  possessions  of  the  north.  In  1825  her  sole  pos 
sessions  consisted  of  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico,  two  islands 
whose  combined  area  is  about  equal  to  that  of  the  State 
of  Pennsylvania.  Tyranny  had  driven  the  colonists  into 
general  revolt,  and  they  had  won  their  liberties  by  the 
sword, — such  of  them  as  remained  alive  after  Spain  had 
worked  her  will. 

The  effort  of  Spain  to  subdue  her  insurgent  colonists 
was  marked  by  a  savage  cruelty  unknown  in  any  other 
wars  of  the  century.  The  Spanish  official  records  admit 
that  eighty  thousand  persons  were  executed,  many  of 
them  being  put  to  death  with  the  refinements  of  cruelty. 
The  records  of  the  insurgents  claim  that  fully  a  quarter 
of  a  million  were  thus  dealt  with,  in  addition  to  the  mul 
titude  slaughtered  in  cold  blood  by  the  Spanish  soldiers, 
who  destroyed  every  city  and  town  the  people  of  which 
were  suspected  of  sympathy  with  the  rebels.  We  have 
a  striking  example  of  the  Spanish  method  of  suppressing 
insurrection  in  an  official  despatch  of  General  Morillo,  in 
which  he  refers  to  his  dealings  with  the  inhabitants  of 
the  city  of  Santa  Fe  de  Bogota. 

"  Every  person  of  either  sex,"  he  writes,  "who  was 
capable  of  reading  or  writing  was  put  to  death.  By 
thus  cutting  off  all  who  are  in  any  way  educated  I  hope 
effectually  to  check  the  spirit  of  the  revolution." 


THE   WAR   WITH   SPAIN.  29 

Fortunately  for  the  people  of  this  city,  the  Spanish 
restrictions  on  education  and  literature  had  prevented 
the  arts  of  reading  and  writing  from  being  widely  dissem 
inated.  We  are  further  told  that  all  who  had  held  official 
positions  in  the  local  administration,  who  were  related  to 
insurgents,  or  were  distinguished  for  their  talents  and 
attainments,  were  thrown  into  prison,  from  which  they 
were  taken  only  to  be  hanged  or  shot, — husbands  being 
thus  put  to  death  in  the  presence  of  their  wives,  and  chil 
dren  in  the  presence  of  their  parents.  All  this  might  be 
difficult  to  believe  but  for  the  fact  that  we  have  had 
similar  examples  in  our  own  day  in  General  Weyler's 
methods  of  suppressing  insurrection.  The  spirit  that 
finds  enjoyment  in  the  bull-fight  seems  to  have  infected 
the  whole  nature  of  the  Spanish  race. 

The  loss  of  all  her  colonies  upon  the  mainland  might 
have  taught  Spain  that  her  colonial  policy  was  a  false 
one.  Great  Britain  learned  this  lesson  well,  but^Spain 
seemed  past  profiting  by  experience,  and  maintained  in 
her  few  remaining  possessions  the  mediaeval  methods 
that  had  cost  her  a  continent.  In  1808  Cuba  gained  the 
title  of  "The  Ever- faithful  Isle,"  in  consequence  of  the 
members  of  its  provincial  council  taking  an  oath  to  pre 
serve  the  island  for  their  sovereign,  who  had  been  de 
posed  by  Napoleon.  This  sovereign  rewarded  them  in 
the  true  Spanish  manner,  by  making  the  powers  of  the 
captain-general  more  autocratic,  if  possible,  than  before, 
giving  him  an  authority  equal  to  that  of  the  Sultan  </ 
Turkey  or  the  Russian  Czar. 

In  1825,  the  Spanish  king  issued  a  decree  which  put 
Cuba  practically  under  martial  law.  Incensed  by  the 
loss  of  all  his  dominions  upon  the  mainland,  and  even  of 
Hispaniola,  the  earliest  possession  of  Spain  in  the  New 


30  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

World,  he  took  a  step  for  the  prevention  of  rebellion  in 
the  '  *  Ever- faithful  Isle' '  that  seemed  studiously  designed 
to  drive  the  colonists  into  revolt.  We  may  quote  from 
this  astonishing  decree : 

"His  Majesty,  the  King,  our  Lord,  desiring  to  obviate 
the  inconveniences  that  might,  in  extraordinary  cases, 
result  from  a  division  of  command,  and  from  the  inter 
ferences  and  prerogatives  of  the  respective  officers,  for 
the  important  end  of  preserving  in  that  precious  island 
his  legitimate  sovereign  authority  and  the  public  tran 
quillity  through  proper  means,  has  resolved,  in  accord 
ance  with  the  opinion  of  his  council  of  ministers,  to  give 
to  your  Excellency  the  fullest  authority,  bestowing  on  you 
all  the  powers  which  by  the  royal  ordinances  are  granted 
to  the  governors  of  besieged  cities. 

"Inconsequence  of  this,  His  Majesty  gives  to  your 
Excellency  the  most  ample  and  unbounded  power,  not 
only  to  send  away  from  the  island  any  persons  in  office, 
whatever  their  occupation,  rank,  class,  or  condition, 
whose  continuance  therein  your  Excellency  may  deem 
injurious,  or  whose  conduct,  public  or  private,  may  alarm 
you,  replacing  them  with  persons  faithful  to  His  Majesty 
and  deserving  of  all  the  confidence  of  your  Excellency  ; 
but  also  to  suspend  the  execution  of  any  order  whatso 
ever,  or  any  general  provision  made  concerning  any 
branch  of  the  administration,  as  your  Excellency  may 
think  most  suitable  to  the  royal  service." 

This  is,  with  few  alleviations,  the  supreme  law  in  Cuba 
to-day,  whose  governor  has  the  absolute  power  of  the 
commander  of  a  besieged  city.  We  need  hardly  ask 
what  effect  such  a  decree  would  have  had  upon  the  people 
of  any  Anglo-Saxon  colony.  In  Cuba  its  result  has 
been  to  produce  a  bitter  spirit  of  revolt  and  an  incurable 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  31 

hatred  of  Spanish  rule.  One  writer  tells  us  that  ' '  there 
is  no  hatred  in  the  world  to  be  compared  to  that  of  the 
Cuban  for  Spain  and  everything  Spanish. ' '  The  Creole 
detests  the  Spaniard,  whom  he  looks  upon  as  an  alien 
thief,  coming  to  rob  him  of  the  revenues  of  his  island 
and  to  oppress  and  annoy  him  by  petty  and  illegal  exac 
tions  for  which  he  has  no  redress.  The  Spaniard,  on  the 
other  hand,  treats  the  Creole  with  disdain,  taunts  him  with 
cowardice  and  thriftlessness,  and  looks  upon  him  as  a 
degenerate  being,  born  but  to  fill  the  coffers  of  Spain 
and  swell  with  gold  the  purses  of  her  officials.  Feelings 
and  acts  like  these  are  the  seeds  of  rebellion,  and  we 
cannot  be  surprised  that  Cuba  has  made  successive  efforts 
to  gain  her  liberty. 

As  early  as  1823  an  insurrection  was  attempted  by  a 
secret  political  society  known  as  the  ' '  Soles  de  Bolivar. ' ' 
But  the  plot  was  discovered,  and  its  leaders — such  -f 
them  as  did  not  escape  by  flight — were  taught  how  Sp;r'n 
deals  with  rebels.  In  1826,  a  plan  to  invade  Cuba  was 
laid  by  Cuban  refugees  in  Mexico  and  Colombia,  Sim  ;  > 
Bolivar,  the  South  American  liberator,  being  asked  to 
lead  it ;  but,  for  reasons  to  be  given  in  the  next  chaptt  r, 
nothing  came  of  it.  In  1827-29,  a  secret  society  knov  < 
as  the  '  *  Black  Eagle' '  was  organized  by  the  refugees  in 
Mexico,  who  sought  to  gain  recruits  in  the  United  States. 
This  also  failed,  and  its  supporters  in  Cuba  fell  into  the 
tender  hands  of  Spain. 

The  next  attempt  at  insurrection  took  place  in  1844. 
This  was  a  movement  of  the  slaves  on  the  sugar  planta 
tions  around  Matanzas,  or  rather  the  suspicion  of  a 
movement,  for  nothing  was  known  about  it  except  such 
evidence  as  could  be  obtained  from  witnesses  under  tor 
ture.  It  is  well  known  what  evidence  of  this  kind  is 


32  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

worth,  yet  it  led  to  the  conviction  of  more  than  thirteen 
hundred  people,  of  whom  seventy-eight  were  shot  and 
the  rest  otherwise  punished.  Only  a  few  of  these  were 
slaves. 

A  few  years  afterwards  the  celebrated  Lopez  invasion 
took  place.  Narciso  Lopez  was  a  Venezuelan  by  birth 
who  had  risen  to  a  high  rank  in  the  Spanish  army  and 
had  lived  long  in  Cuba,  for  whose  freedom  he  gained  an 
ardent  desire.  He  organized  an  insurrection  in  the 
island,  but  was  obliged  to  flee  for  his  life.  Seeking  New 
York,  he  made  that  city  a  centre  for  sympathetic  appeals, 
and  in  1 849  sought  to  return  with  a  small  party  to  Cuba. 
He  was  prevented  by  the  United  States  authorities,  but 
in  the  following  year  he  succeeded  in  reaching  the  island 
with  a  force  of  six  hundred  volunteers.  He  landed  at 
Cardenas,  but  no  aid  and  support  came  to  him  from  the 
Cubans,  and  he  was  driven  back  to  his  ship,  which  a 
Spanish  man-of-war  chased  to  Key  West. 

In  1851,  Lopez  started  again,  now  with  four  hundred 
and  fifty  men,  sailing  in  the  steamer  Pampero  from  New 
Orleans.  He  landed  at  Playitas,  thirty  miles  from  Havana. 
It  was  his  hope  to  find  support  from  Cuban  rebels,  some 
of  whom  had  taken  to  the  field,  but  he  quickly  found 
himself  confronted  by  a  superior  force  of  Spanish  troops. 
With  the  main  body  of  invaders  Lopez  sought  the  inte 
rior,  leaving  his  second  in  command,  a  Kentuckian  named 
Crittenden,  to  bring  up  the  supplies  with  the  rear-guard. 
Both  parties  were  in  a  short  time  vigorously  attacked. 
Crittenden' s  party,  reduced  by  the  fire  of  the  foe  to  fifty 
men,  were  captured  and  shot.  Lopez  and  his  followers 
succeeded  in  reaching  the  interior,  where,  no  longer 
al  le  to  fight,  they  wandered  miserably  in  the  thick  woods 
without  food  or  shelter,  suffering  severely  from  the  pur- 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN.  33 

suit  of  the  foe  and  finding  no  Cuban  aid.  One  by  one 
the  fugitives  fell  into  Spanish  hands,  Lopez  among  the 
last.  He  was  executed,  but  his  American  followers,  after 
a  term  of  imprisonment,  were  set  free. 

A  second  invasion  was  planned  in  1854,  General 
Quitman,  of  Mississippi,  being  its  leader.  This  was 
organized  in  connection  with  a  revolutionary  movement 
in  Cuba,  but,  like  all  previous  movements  of  the  kind, 
it  came  to  grief.  The  leaders  in  the  island  were  betrayed 
into  the  hands  of  their  enemies,  seized,  and  incontinently 
put  to  death,  and  the  would-be  invaders  deemed  it  wise 
to  stay  at  home.  And  thus  affairs  went  on  until  1868, 
when  the  long-repressed  rebellious  sentiment  in  the  island 
finally  broke  out  in  open  insurrection. 

For  the  inciting  cause  of  this  revolt  we  must  go  to 
Spain.  For  years  that  country  had  presented  a  dismal 
picture  of  faction  and  intrigue,  while  its  queen,  Isabella 
II.,  had  won  the  abhorrence  of  the  people  by  the  un 
blushing  dissoluteness  of  her  life.  A  strong  party  of 
reform  grew  under  these  conditions,  and  at  length,  not 
able  to  put  an  end  to  the  disorders  by  quiet  means,  over 
turned  the  government  by  a  successful  revolt.  The 
queen,  on  September  30,  1868,  fled  to  France,  'rorn 
which  she  was  never  to  return  to  the  throne,  and  several 
years  passed  before  a  settled  government  was  established 
in  the  Spanish  realm.  This  state  of  affairs  offered  an 
opportunity  to  the  revolutionists  in  Cuba  of  which  they 
were  quick  to  take  advantage.  On  October  10.  ten 
days  after  the  flight  of  the  queen,  they  issued  a  declara 
tion  of  independence,  and  took  to  the  field  prepared  to 
fight  for  their  freedom. 

Before  speaking  of  the  incidents  of  the  war  that  fol 
lowed,  a  fuller  review  of  the  influences  leading  to  it  seems 

3 


34  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

in  place.  These  were  of  two  kinds, — financial  and  polit 
ical.  Cuba  had  been,  under  the  despotic  decree  of  1825, 
for  nearly  half  a  century  in  a  state  of  siege.  Spain  in 
Cuba  was  like  an  army  encamped  in  the  midst  of  a  con 
quered  people.  All  the  soldiers  were  Spanish  except 
the  members  of  the  body  known  as  Cuban  Volunteers, 
the  National  Guard  of  the  island,  and  these  were  care 
fully  recruited  from  Spanish  sympathizers.  The  people 
of  Cuba  became  divided  into  two  parties, — the  Insular es 
and  the  Peninsulares, — the  Islanders  and  the  Spaniards, 
or  those  in  sympathy  with  them.  Out  of  the  latter  grew 
the  Volunteers,  nearly  all  of  them  active  politicians  and 
of  great  power  and  influence  in  the  affairs  of  the  island. 
Even  the  captain-general  stood  in  some  awe  of  this 
powerful  body  ;  and  in  1870  the  Volunteers  went  so  far 
as  to  arrest  and  send  back  to  Spain  Cap  tain- General 
Dulce,  of  whose  actions  they  did  not  approve. 

As  for  the  people  of  Cuba,  they  were  completely  dis 
franchised.  After  1825  no  legislative  assembly,  either 
provincial  or  municipal,  existed  in  the  island.  At  an 
earlier  date  the  officials  of  the  cities  held  some  control 
over  taxes  and  expenditures,  but  these  powers  were  now 
all  lost.  No  vestige  remained  of  a  popular  assembly, 
t'-'al  by  jury,  independent  tribunals,  the  right  to  vote,  or 
the  right  to  bear  arms  ;  in  fact,  no  right  of  any  kind 
was  left ;  the  will  or  the  whim  of  the  captain-general 
was  the  absolute  law.  And  the  Cubans  were  not  alone 
disfranchised  ;  they  were  rarely  permitted  to  hold  any 
oifice  of  honor,  trust,  or  emolument  in  the  island.  Some 
Cubans  did  hold  office,  but  they  gained  their  positions 
through  utter  servility  to  the  ruling  powers. 

This  preference  given  to  Spaniards  over  Cubans  was  a 
bitter  pill  for  the  natives  of  the  island  to  swallow.  All 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN.  35 

the  power  was  wielded  by  the  people  of  one  country 
over  those  of  another,  the  sole  interest  of  the  ruling  class 
being  that  of  the  highwayman  in  his  victim.  The  offi 
cials  went  to  Cuba  with  the  one  purpose  of  filling  their 
purses  and  returning  to  Spain  to  enjoy  their  gains. 
Some  small  offices  in  remote  districts  might  be  filled 
by  natives  of  the  island,  but  those  of  higher  emolument 
were  wanted  for  the  sons  of  Spain.  It  was  in  this  way 
that  the  statesman  or  politician  at  the  head  of  affairs  in 
the  home  government  paid  his  political  debts.  Spain 
did  not  provide  offices  enough  for  these  worthies,  and 
Cuba  was  filled  with  them.  Doubtless  it  was  deemed 
presumptuous  on  the  part  of  the  natives  to  expect  posi 
tions  which  cabinet  officers  at  home  needed  for  their 
useful  friends. 

The  financial  causes  of  the  insurrection  were  imme 
diately  connected  with  the  political.  The  office-holders 
sought  only  to  retrieve  their  broken  fortunes,  and  in  this 
they  usually  succeeded — by  fair  means  or  foul.  They 
had  given  important  services  to  the  leaders  in  Spain, 
and  could  demand  large  salaries.  The  captain-general 
was  paid  $50,000  a  year,  double  the  salary,  at  that  time, 
of  the  President  of  the  United  States.  The  governor  of 
each  province  had  $12,000,  twice  the  sum  paid  to  the 
prime  minister  of  Spain.  The  archbishops  of  Havana 
and  Santiago  each  received  an  annual  stipend  of  $18,000. 
And  so  downward  in  the  same  extravagant  ratio  ranged 
the  salaries. 

But  the  officials  were  not  so  easily  satisfied.  The 
"perquisites"  often  more  than  doubled  the  salaries. 
Wholesale  robbery,  in  the  form  of  illegal  fees  and 
charges,  everywhere  prevailed.  All  this  was  no  secret, 
but  no  captain-general  ever  sought  to  prevent  it.  He 


36  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

was  either  the  leader  of  the  robbers  himself  or  was 
powerless  to  overcome  the  deeply  intrenched  system. 
These  official  brigands  went  to  Cuba  for  booty,  and  were 
not  to  be  balked  in  their  design. 

It  was  openly  known  that  at  least  forty  per  cent,  were 
added  to  the  custom-house  charges  at  Havana  by  illegal 
fees.  The  officials  at  Santiago  were  less  scrupulous  ; 
they  exacted  fully  seventy  per  cent.  These  officials 
were  changed  with  discouraging  frequency.  At  every 
ministerial  crisis  in  Spain — which  came  at  times  semi- 
annually — a  new  batch  of  hungry  political  servitors  was 
sent  to  make  their  fortunes  in  Cuba  by  rapacity  and 
corruption  of  every  kind.  The  custom-house  was  but 
one  of  their  fields  of  industry.  Fees  were  everywhere 
to  be  picked  up.  We  may  instance  one  of  the  methods 
employed.  A  planter  might  make  his  return  for  the 
income-tax  at  ten  thousand  dollars.  The  tax-collector 
would  blandly  give  him  to  understand  that  this  was  too 
low  a  rating,  and  that  he  proposed  to  assess  him  at  fif 
teen  thousand  dollars.  The  planter,  afraid  to  protest 
too  strongly  against  this  arbitrary  assessment,  might 
suggest  a  compromise  at  twelve  thousand  five  hundred 
dollars.  The  result  of  the  operation  would  be  a  rating 
on  the  books  at  ten  thousand  dollars  and  a  fee  for  the 
astute  collector  of  the  tax  on  the  extra  two  thousand 
five  hundred  dollars.  Possibly  the  assessment  of  fifteen 
thousand  dollars  might  not  have  been  too  much.  Under 
such  a  system  the  government  is  sure  to  be  one  of  the 
chief  sufferers,  for  its  interest  is  the  last  thing  considered. 

Spain  was  as  rapacious  as  her  officials.  Cuba  had 
long  served  her  as  a  money-bag.  In  the  effort  to  sup 
press  the  revolutions  on  the  mainland,  the  ' '  ever-faithful 
isle"  has  been  obliged  to  supply  a  lion's  share  of  the 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  37 

funds.  The  tariff,  alike  on  imports  and  exports,  was 
kept  high  enough  to  yield  the  largest  revenue  of  which 
the  island  was  capable,  if  not  increased  to  an  extent 
that  threatened  to  put  an  end  to  commerce  altogether. 
Spain  could  no  longer  keep  the  trade  of  Cuba  for  her 
own  merchants  and  manufacturers  by  the  old  method  of 
putting  to  death  any  foreign  navigator  who  dared  to 
enter  a  port  of  her  colonies,  but  she  sought  to  achieve 
the  same  result  by  a  system  of  differential  duties  which 
discriminated  severely  against  foreign  goods. 

As  for  the  revenue  produced,  we  have  seen  where 
much  of  it  went.  The  sovereign  of  Spain  would  have 
preferred  to  keep  a  large  share  of  it  for  himself,  but  he 
was  powerless  in  the  hands  of  the  officials,  with  their 
strong  political  "  pull,"  and  had  to  content  himself  with 
what  they  left  unappropriated.  Yet,  whatever  these 
harpies  might  absorb,  it  was  felt  necessary  that  the 
crown  should  have  a  fairly  liberal  share,  and  this  could 
best  be  secured  by  more  sharply  tightening  the  screws  on 
the  island.  In  1857  the  revenue  yielded  by  Cuba  was 
$17,960,000.  By  1867  *t  had  been  largely  forced  up, 
and  it  was  proposed  to  increase  it  to  over  $40,000,000. 
This  was  more  than  the  islanders  could  possibly  pay, 
and  only  a  portion  of  it  was  collected.  Yet  every  effort 
was  made  to  squeeze  the  last  drop  of  life-blood  from  the 
suffering  colony. 

Some  further  statistics  may  be  of  service.  The  people 
of  Cuba  were  forced  to  pay  the  interest  on  the  public 
debt  of  Spain  at  the  rate  of  $6. 39  per  capita,  while  the 
rate  paid  by  the  home  people  was  only  $3. 23.  The  cost 
of  living  was  so  increased  by  the  high  duties  that,  while 
four  hundred  pounds  of  bread  per  capita  were  annually 
consumed  in  Spain,  fifty-four  pounds  were  all  that  a 


38  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN. 

Cuban  could  afford  to  buy.  A  letter  from  Europe,  even 
if  prepaid,  had  to  pay  twenty-five  cents  at  the  Cuban 
post-office,  and  if  delivered,  twelve  and  a  half  cents 
more  were  exacted. 

One  necessary  result  of  the  methods  of  administration 
pursued  was  that  the  home  interests  of  the  island  had 
to  be  sadly  neglected.  The  cities  were  overloaded  with 
debt  and  unable  to  meet  the  most  essential  expenses. 
The  streets  remained  uncleaned,  garbage  was  not  col 
lected,  a  dozen  important  functions  were  left  undone. 
No  money  could  be  diverted  to  pay  teachers,  and  the 
schools  were  closed.  Havana  had  the  only  asylum  for 
the  insane  on  the  island,  and  elsewhere  this  class  of  un 
fortunates  had  to  be  kept  in  the  cells  of  the  common 
jails.  In  every  way  the  revenues  of  Cuba  were  em 
ployed  for  the  benefit  of  Spain  and  her  needy  sons, 
and  the  interests  of  the  islanders  were  left  out  of  the 
account. 

It  was  this  state  of  affairs  in  Cuba  which  gave  rise  to 
the  revolution  of  1868.  A  revolt  had  been  secretly 
planned  months  before  the  revolution  in  Spain,  but  the 
outbreak  in  that  country  and  the  flight  of  the  queen  pre 
cipitated  it.  On  October  10,  1868,  Carlos  M.  de  Ces- 
pedes,  a  lawyer  of  Bayamo,  issued  a  declaration  of  in 
dependence  from  Spain,  and  took  to  the  field  at  the 
head  of  an  army  amounting  to  one  hundred  and  twenty- 
eight  half-armed  men.  But  he  had  the  country  at  his 
back.  His  appeal  to  the  people  that  ' '  we  are  in  danger 
of  losing  our  property,  our  lives,  and  our  honor  under 
further  Spanish  dominion"  struck  home  to  the  Cuban 
heart,  and  at  the  end  of  a  few  weeks  Cespedes  headed 
a  force  of  fifteen  thousand  men,  ill  supplied  with  arms 
and  equipments,  it  is  true,  but  stout  of  heart  and  earnest 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  39 

in  purpose.  A  constitution  was  drawn  up  and  promul 
gated  on  April  10,  1869.  This  provided  for  a  repub 
lican  government  and  the  immediate  abolition  of  slavery. 
A  legislature  was  chosen,  which  met  and  elected  Ces- 
pedes  president. 

The  war  that  followed  was  one  that  cannot  be  dealt 
with  in  the  ordinary  manner.  We  can  give  no  pictu 
resque  description  of  marches,  battles,  and  campaigns. 
It  was  a  war  of  irregulars,  not  of  regulars  ;  of  bush 
fighting,  not  of  contests  in  the  open  field  ;  of  guerrilla 
skirmishes,  not  of  set  battles.  * ( The  pomp  and  circum 
stance  of  glorious  war' '  were  sadly  wanting,  and  forest 
ambushes,  sudden  attacks  and  retreats,  and  sharp  affrays 
that  led  to  nothing  formed  the  staple  of  the  affair.  The 
Cubans  were  bold  and  daring,  and  for  the  first  two  years 
proved  successful  in  nearly  every  engagement.  But 
they  had  no  expectation,  with  their  lack  of  arms  and 
dearth  of  supplies,  of  triumphing  over  Spain,  whose 
power  of  furnishing  fresh  troops,  armed  with  the  best 
modern  weapons,  gave  her  the  ascendency  in  the  open 
country  and  kept  the  patriots  confined  to  the  bush. 
Their  one  hope  was  to  wear  out  their  enemy,  and  make 
the  war  so  costly  for  Spain  that  sheer  lack  of  means 
would  in  the  end  force  her  to  retire  from  the  contest  in 
despair. 

That  we  may  better  understand  the  character  of  this 
war,  something  must  be  said  of  the  country  in  which  it 
was  fought.  Despite  the  fact  that  Cuba  has  been  settled 
for  nearly  four  centuries,  two-thirds  of  it  remain  unculti 
vated,  and  half  its  area  is  covered  with  forest  and  thicket. 
The  lowlands  of  the  coast  in  the  wet  season  are  turned 
into  swamps  of  tenacious  black  mud,  impassable  to  the 
traveller.  Underbrush  everywhere  fills  the  forest,  so 


40  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

thick  and  dense  that  it  can  be  traversed  only  with  the 
aid  of  the  machete.  High  bushes  and  thick  grasses 
cover  much  of  the  dry  plains,  forming  a  close  jungle  that 
also  calls  for  the  sharp  edge  of  the  machete,  that  tool  of 
the  Cuban  farmer  and  weapon  of  the  Cuban  warrior. 

The  machete  is  a  formidable  instrument  in  the  hands 
of  the  countrymen  of  Cuba.  Its  handle,  usually  of  horn, 
fits  upon  a  perfectly  straight  blade  from  twenty-four  to 
thirty  inches  long,  as  heavy  as  a  cleaver,  and  with  an 
edge  kept  almost  at  razor  sharpness.  The  corn-scythe 
of  the  American  farmer  is  not  unlike  it,  but  the  machete 
is  heavier,  and  its  outer  instead  of  its  inner  edge  is  the 
cutting  one.  To  the  Cubans  skilled  in  its  use  as  an  im 
plement  to  hew  a  way  through  the  jungle  and  under 
growth  it  is  a  weapon  that  takes  the  place  of  the  sword 
in  war,  and  with  which  they  can  decapitate  an  enemy  as 
easily  as  they  can  shear  through  a  sapling. 

Through  the  centre  of  the  island  passes  a  mountain 
range,  broken  at  intervals,  but  extending  from  end  to 
end,  and  in  the  east  turning  and  following  the  southern 
coast  past  Santiago  de  Cuba  to  Cape  Cruz.  The  range 
is  highest  in  the  eastern  section,  where  it  presents  rugged 
summits  over  six  thousand  five  hundred  feet  in  height, 
though  its  average  elevation  is  not  over  two  thousand 
two  hundred  feet.  The  wooded  heights  of  the  moun 
tains,  the  recesses  of  the  densely-grown  forests,  and  the 
depths  of  the  grassy  jungle  have  furnished  secure  lurk 
ing-places  for  the  Cuban  insurrectionists  in  all  their  out 
breaks,  to  which  they  could  retire  at  will  and  from 
which  they  could  break  at  unexpected  points  upon  the 
foe.  To  retire  to  the  ' '  long  grass, ' '  to  use  a  common 
Cuban  phrase,  was  to  gain  safety  from  pursuit,  and  an 
ambushed  host  might  lie  unseen  and  unheard  in  these 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN.  41 

secure  retreats  while  an  army  passed  by  not  many  feet 
away.  In  short,  Cuba  is  a  paradise  for  the  bush-fighter, 
and  all  the  contests  in  that  island  have  taken  the  form  of 
guerrilla  warfare,  with  its  unpremeditated  affrays  and  lack 
of  definite  results. 

The  war  with  which  we  are  concerned  took,  in  part, 
the  form  of  a  hunt  for  the  insurgents,  in  which  the 
Spanish  soldiers  were,  perhaps,  none  too  eager  to  find 
them,  since  they  usually  learned  that  they  had  ' '  caught 
a  Tartar. ' '  In  this  exercise  the  Cuban  Volunteers  took 
little  part.  They  employed  themselves  in  police  and 
garrison  duties,  leaving  the  work  in  the  field  to  the 
Spanish  soldiers,  of  whom  during  the  ten  years  of  war 
not  less  than  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  were  sent 
to  the  island.  Of  these  more  than  one- half  met  their 
death,  largely  through  disease. 

While  Cuba  is  very  ill  adapted  by  nature  to  regular 
warfare,  it  was  rendered  more  so  by  the  inefficiency  of 
the  military  authorities.  The  roads  are  abominable ;  even 
those  near  Havana  itself  being  mere  tracks  with  deep 
ruts  and  holes.  For  half  the  year,  during  the  hot  and 
rainy  season,  campaigning  was  pursued  under  frightful 
difficulties,  and  from  May  to  November  warlike  opera 
tions  in  great  part  ceased.  At  the  opening  of  a  campaign 
the  custom  was  to  convey  a  force  by  land  or  sea  to  a 
point  near  which  the  insurgents  were  supposed  to  lurk  ; 
then,  drawing  up  the  force  in  narrow  columns,  to  cut  a 
pathway  into  the  forest.  If  the  insurgents  were  met,  a 
few  shots  were  apt  to  end  the  affray, — the  troops  finding  it 
judicious  to  retire  or  the  rebels  seeking  some  new  retreat. 

Often  the  enemy  could  not  be  found  at  all,  and  the 
troops  wandered  for  days  or  weeks  in  vain  search  for  a 
rebel  in  arms.  Their  spies  served  them  poorly,  while 


42  THE  AVAR  WITH  SPAIN. 

the  sympathy  of  the  people  kept  the  insurgents  well 
advised  of  every  movement  of  the  troops.  As  for  starv 
ing  out  the  rebels,  that  was  out  of  the  question.  The 
wild  fruits  of  the  earth,  the  yams,  sweet  potatoes,  ba 
nanas,  and  other  productions  which  they  could  readily 
cultivate  in  forest  clearings,  kept  them  well  supplied. 
The  soil  of  Cuba  is  so  prolific  that  a  crop  planted  to-day 
may  yield  food  in  plenty  within  two  months,  while  the 
country-people  were  ever  ready  to  supply  their  friends 
in  the  field. 

The  only  way  to  overcome  the  insurgents  would  have 
been  to  intersect  their  haunts  with  a  net-work  of  roads, 
laying  bare  their  lurking-places,  and  to  pursue  them 
with  remorseless  energy  from  lair  to  lair.  But  this  was 
not  the  Spanish  idea  of  campaigning  ;  it  was  certainly 
not  that  of  the  officers,  to  whom  the  allurements  of  the 
towns  were  too  enticing  to  be  long  deserted  ;  while  the 
leaders  doubtless  found  an  inducement  to  prolong  the 
war  in  their  share  of  the  Cuban  spoils. 

The  Spanish  official  bulletins  during  this  war  were 
curious  affairs.  One  officer  with  his  battalions  had 
' (  come  up  with  an  insurgent  band  far  away  in  some  spot 
above  Guantanamo,  in  the  district  of  Santiago  de  Cuba. 
To  attack  the  rebels  and  to  completely  rout  them  was 
for  the  heroic  Spanish  troops  one  and  the  same  thing. 
They  killed  many  of  them,  wounded  many  more,  and 
took  fourteen  horses  and  one  rifle."  Again,  an  affray 
yielded  the  Spaniards  <(six  prisoners  and  a  mule."  In 
another  affair  the  valiant  troops  captured  two  prisoners 
and  three  fire-arms,  while  forty  women  and  children 
were  taken.  This  is  neither  magnificent  nor  is  it  war. 
Nor  were  the  outrages  which  were  perpetrated  on  the 
non-combatants  war  in  any  modern  sense  of  the  word. 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  43 

It  cannot  be  said  that  the  insurgents  were  any  more 
daring  than  the  troops.  Only  once  in  four  years  of 
war  did  they  make  an  open  attack.  Then  they  swooped 
down  suddenly  upon  Holguin,  an  inland  town  of  San 
tiago  de  Cuba.  But  here  they  contented  themselves  with 
plundering  the  inhabitants,  and  withdrew  without  waiting 
for  the  troops. 

The  government  adopted  methods  similar  to  those 
with  which  we  have  recently  become  very  familiar.  The 
trocha,  of  which  so  much  has  been  said  of  late  years, 
was  tried, — a  military  cordon  being  drawn  across  the 
island  from  side  to  side  with  the  hope  of  hemming  in  the 
insurrection.  It  proved  as  useless  then  as  it  has  done 
since.  Reconcentration,  General  Weyler's  later  system 
of  warfare,  was  also  attempted, — the  whole  population  of 
one  large  district  being  huddled  together  under  guard 
in  the  little  town  of  St.  Espiritu.  The  result  was,  as  it 
has  been  since  :  a  dozen  diseases  assailed  the  poor  cap 
tives,  and  they  as  well  as  their  guards  died  in  multitudes. 
Thus  the  population  was  murdered,  the  country  was  de 
vastated,  the  cattle  were  slaughtered,  the  crops  and 
dwellings  were  burned,  everything  was  done  but  to  put 
down  the  rebellion,  which  held  its  own  despite  these 
measures  of  repression. 

Outrages  were  common.  The  rule  on  both  sides  was 
to  kill  their  prisoners  without  discrimination.  Powder 
and  shot  could  not  be  wasted  for  such  purposes  ;  the 
machete  did  the  work, — unless  torture  was  preferred. 
Women  fared  as  badly  as  men  ;  even  children  were  not 
spared  :  a  carnival  of  cruelty  and  bloodshed  ravaged  the 
island.  In  March,  1869,  a  party  of  young  men,  who 
had  foolishly  displayed  the  Cuban  flag  and  sung  patriotic 
songs  at  a  theatre  and  a  cafe"  in  Havana,  were  set  upon 


44  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN. 

by  the  Volunteers,  who  poured  volleys  into  both  places, 
heedless  of  whom  they  might  kill.  In  1871  an  affair 
took  place  which  attracted  wide  attention.  The  graves  of 
some  soldiers  at  the  cemetery  had  been  defaced,  and  a 
number  of  students  were  seized  as  the  criminals,  dragged 
before  a  lynch-law  tribunal  of  Volunteers,  and  ordered  to 
be  shot.  Fifteen  thousand  Volunteers  turned  out  and 
executed  the  eight  boys  in  defiance  of  the  captain- 
general.  Indignation  at  this  outrage  spread  through 
the  world  ;  even  the  Spanish  Cortes  censured  it ;  but  no 
one  was  punished.  The  Volunteers  were  too  powerful 
to  be  called  to  account.  There  were  eighty  thousand 
of  them  in  Cuba. 

The  insurrection  continued  active  until  1871,  in  which 
year  a  large  number  of  the  insurgents  in  Central  Cuba 
surrendered  on  condition  that  their  lives  should  be  spared. 
General  Agramonte,  their  leader,  refused  to  yield,  and 
kept  up  the  war  for  two  years  more,  when  he  was  killed. 
President  Cespedes  was  deposed  in  1873,  and  was  soon 
after  killed  by  the  Spaniards.  He  was  succeeded  by 
Salvador  Cisneros  (formerly  the  Marquis  de  Santa  Lucia), 
who  was  elected  president  again  in  the  revolt  of  1895. 
The  war  dragged  on  until  1878.  By  that  time  both 
parties  were  thoroughly  worn  out,  and  neither  saw  any 
hope  of  success.  General  Martinez  de  Campos,  com 
mander  of  the  Spanish  forces,  finding  hostilities  un 
availing,  now  resorted  to  negotiation.  Terms  of  peace 
were  offered  and  accepted,  and  the  war  came  to  an  end 
in  February,  1878.  The  treaty  is  known  as  that  of  El 
Zanjon,  from  the  place  near  which  it  was  concluded. 

The  terms  of  this  treaty  were  the  following  :  Full  par 
don  was  granted  to  all  who  had  been  engaged  in  the 
war,  and  freedom  to  the  slaves  who  had  taken  part  in  it. 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  45 

Every  one  who  wished  was  at  liberty  to  leave  the  island, 
the  Spanish  government  agreeing  to  furnish  him  with  the 
means.  Under  this  clause,  Maximo  Gomez,  one  of  the 
Cuban  leaders,  sought  a  new  home  in  San  Domingo, 
there  to  bide  his  time  until  1895.  Many  others  left  their 
native  land,  not  caring  to  remain  within  Spanish  reach. 
The  island  of  Cuba  was  to  be  granted  the  same  privi 
leges  as  were  enjoyed  by  the  island  of  Porto  Rico, 
— namely,  the  right  of  representation  in  the  Spanish 
Cortes. 

Radical  reforms  in  the  administration  of  Cuba  were 
promised  and  expected  ;  the  island  was  divided  into  its 
present  provinces  ;  provisional  assemblies  were  instituted, 
and,  as  has  been  said,  representation  in  the  Cortes  was 
granted.  But  the  captain-general  remained  an  irrespon 
sible  despot,  and  all  these  so-called  reforms  were  manip 
ulated  in  the  interest  of  the  Spanish  party.  Everything 
soon  fell  back  into  its  old  state.  The  debt  continued  to 
grow,  taxation  was  as  heavy  as  ever,  the  officials  were  as 
corrupt,  the  salaries  and  perquisites  as  high.  The  debt 
of  Cuba  began  in  1864  with  an  issue  of  $3,000,000.  In 
1891  it  had  increased  to  $175,000,000.  Of  this  great 
sum  hardly  a  dollar  had  been  spent  on  the  island.  The 
peculations  continued.  In  1895  it  was  asserted  by  a 
Spanish  newspaper  that  the  custom-house  frauds  in  Cuba 
since  1878  had  amounted  to  $100,000,000. 

There  has  been  only  one  substantial  measure  of  reform 
in  Cuba  within  the  century.  A  bill  was  passed  in  1870 
providing  for  the  gradual  abolition  of  slavery.  The  work 
of  abolition  was  completed  in  1886  by  an  act  which  finally 
put  an  end  to  this  long-established  institution.  This 
reform  was  hardly  a  free-will  offering,  but  a  necessary 
result  of  the  conditions  arising  from  the  war  ;  and  though 


46  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN. 

the  blacks  were  set  free,  the  whites  were  as  stringently 
controlled  as  ever.  The  decree  of  1825,  which  likened 
Cuba  to  a  besieged  city,  was  revoked  about  1870  ;  but 
the  captain-general  (or  the  governor-general,  as  he  was 
now  entitled)  retained  all  his  old  power,  and  could  play 
the  autocrat  as  much  as  ever.  In  1895  another  measure 
of  reform  was  passed,  a  council  of  administration  being 
established,  half  chosen  by  the  crown,  half  elected  by 
the  provinces.  But  as  the  governor  was  given  the  power 
to  suspend  any  member  likely  to  make  trouble,  or  to 
suspend  the  whole  council  if  he  chose,  this  was  not  likely 
to  serve  a  very  useful  purpose,  except  as  a  handy  tool  of 
tyranny. 

If  it  had  possessed  any  element  of  value,  it  came  too 
late.  The  Cubans,  incensed  at  the  broken  promises  of 
Spain  and  seeing  no  hope  of  redress  under  Spanish  rule, 
again  declared  for  liberty  and  once  more  raised  the 
standard  of  revolt. 


CHAPTER    II. 

RELATIONS   OF  THE  UNITED   STATES   TO    CUBA. 

CUBA,  as  was  long  ago  said  by  an  American  states 
man,  is  by  nature  an  outpost  of  the  United  States,  and 
it  has  long  been  held  that  ' '  manifest  destiny' '  demands 
its  annexation  to  this  country.  Seventy-five  years  ago 
Jefferson  said  that  ' '  the  addition  of  Cuba  to  our  confed 
eracy  is  exactly  what  is  wanted  to  bound  our  power  as  a 
nation  to  the  point  of  its  utmost  interest, ' '  and  this  sen 
timent  has  been  widely  entertained.  The  relations  of 
amity  between  the  United  States  and  Spain  have  fre 
quently  been  strained  through  the  aggressive  acts  of 
Spanish  colonial  agents.  As  long  ago  as  the  beginning 
of  the  nineteenth  century  the  efforts  of  the  authorities  at 
New  Orleans  to  close  the  Mississippi  to  American  com 
merce  almost  precipitated  war.  At  a  later  date  border 
troubles  with  Florida  caused  a  suspension  of  diplomatic 
relations  with  Spain,  lasting  from  1808  to  1815.  In  the 
end,  West  Florida  was  taken  by  force,  the  uncivilized 
methods  of  Spanish  colonial  administration  having  ren 
dered  the  situation  intolerable.  In  1819,  Florida  was 
obtained  by  purchase,  and  the  long-existing  border  diffi 
culties  were  brought  to  an  end.  Meanwhile,  in  1810, 
the  revolution  in  Spanish  America  had  begun.  Injury 
was  done  by  Spain  to  the  commerce  of  the  United  States 
during  the  war,  but  redress  was  stoutly  resisted,  and  only 
granted  after  seven  years'  negotiations.  Payment  of  the 

47 


48  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN. 

indemnity  was  made  in  the  usual  dilatory  fashion  of 
Spain. 

In  July,  1818,  Richard  Rush,  United  States  minister 
to  England,  was  told  by  Lord  Castlereagh  that  Spain 
had  requested  that  country  to  mediate  between  her  and 
her  rebellious  colonies,  with  the  co-operation  of  the  Holy 
Alliance, — a  compact  of  the  despotic  powers  of  Europe 
formed  after  the  fall  of  Napoleon,  though  it  was  never 
made  manifest  in  what  the  holiness  of  this  alliance  con 
sisted.  Rush  said  in  reply  that  the  United  States  would 
take  no  part  in  any  intervention  for  peace  ' '  if  its  basis 
were  not  the  independence  of  the  colonies." 

This  plain  declaration  ended  the  matter  until  1823,  in 
which  year  Rush  found  reason  to  believe  that  the  Holy 
Alliance  was  laying  plans  to  aid  Spain  in  her  struggle 
with  her  colonies.  England  had  now  shifted  in  the  oppo 
site  direction,  refused  to  join  the  alliance  in  these  plans, 
and  suggested  opposition  on  the  part  of  the  United 
States.  This  was  the  state  of  affairs  which  led  to  the 
celebrated  Monroe  Doctrine,  in  which  this  country  first 
clearly  formulated  the  policy  in  relation  to  European 
interference  in  America  which  it  has  since  vigorously 
maintained. 

Monroe  began  by  asking  Jefferson  for  his  opinion  as  to 
what  was  proper  in  the  crisis.  The  venerable  author  of 
the  Declaration  of  Independence  replied  briefly  but  for 
cibly,  saying  that  it  should  be  a  leading  principle  of  the 
United  States  * '  never  to  suffer  Europe  to  interfere  with 
cisatlantic  affairs."  Monroe  placed  this  opinion  before 
his  cabinet,  by  which  body  it  was  fully  indorsed.  This 
it  was  that  led  to  the  doctrine  which  later  events  have 
made  famous.  It  will  suffice  here  to  quote  one  of  its 
most  significant  passages : 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  49 

"We  declare  that  we  should  consider  any  attempt 
[of  the  allied  powers]  to  extend  their  system  to  any 
portion  of  our  hemisphere  as  dangerous  to  our  peace  and 
safety. ' ' 

This  general  declaration  of  principles  was  followed  by 
statements  of  American  policy  directly  relating  to  Cuba. 
The  close  of  the  struggle  for  independence  in  Spanish 
America  left  Spain  devoid  of  any  colonies  in  this  part  of 
the  world  except  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico.  Avaricious  eyes 
were  being  turned  upon  these.  There  was  reason  to  dis 
trust  France  and  England,  while  Mexico  and  Colombia 
made  open  preparations  for  invasion,  as  mentioned  in 
the  preceding  chapter.  It  was  time  for  the  United  States 
to  act. 

There  was  no  hesitation  or  loss  of  time  in  doing  so. 
The  opinion  was  everywhere  held  in  this  country  that 
the  interests  of  the  United  States  demanded  the  main 
tenance  of  the  status  quo  in  Cuba.  This  was  officially 
indicated  in  1825  in  the  decided  declaration  that  the 
United  States  could  not  see  with  equanimity  the  island 
pass  into  the  possession  of  any  European  power  what 
ever.  Henry  Clay,  secretary  of  state,  put  this  declara 
tion  into  plainer  language  still,  sending  a  despatch  to 
our  minister  to  Russia  in  which  it  was  distinctly  stated 
that  the  United  States  would  not  * '  allow  and  permit' ' 
Cuba  to  pass  into  the  hands  of  any  foreign  power.  This 
threatening  ultimatum  put  an  end  to  all  projects  of  in 
terference  on  the  part  of  England,  France,  or  the  Holy 
Alliance. 

American  powers  remained  to  be  warned  off.  In  1821, 
a  congress  had  been  suggested  for  the  purpose  of  form 
ing  a  close  union  between  the  Spanish  states  of  Central 
and  South  America.  This,  known  as  the  Panama  Con- 

4 


50  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN. 

gress,  met  in  1825.  The  freeing  of  the  islands  of  Cuba 
and  Porto  Rico  from  Spain  was  openly  placed  upon  the 
platform  of  the  congress,  in  consequence  of  which 
Mexico  and  Colombia  began,  as  has  been  stated,  to 
organize  an  expedition  for  the  invasion  of  Cuba.  This 
the  United  States  was  not  willing  to  permit.  The  hor 
rors  of  the  San  Domingo  massacre  were  fresh  in  memory, 
and  those  countries  were  informed,  in  polite  phrase,  that 
if  an  invasion  should  lead  to  a  race  war  between  blacks 
and  whites,  the  United  States  would  feel  obliged  to  in 
terfere.  They  were,  therefore,  requested  to  delay  the 
expedition  that  they  were  fitting  out. 

In  Congress  it  was  declared  by  Senator  Hayne  that 
the  United  States  would  not  permit  the  Spanish  Amer 
ican  states  to  ' '  take  or  to  revolutionize' '  Cuba.  Other 
members  suggested  that  threats  should  be  tried  if  advice 
or  remonstrance  failed.  No  overt  action  was  needed, 
however.  Diplomacy  ended  the  difficulty.  Mexico  and 
Colombia  deemed  it  wise  to  withdraw  from  their  pro 
jected  enterprise. 

The  United  States  had  thus  virtually  guaranteed  to 
defend  the  title  of  Spain  to  Cuba  against  any  other 
power  in  Europe  or  America.  The  guarantee  as  re 
garded  American  states  was  made  openly  in  1830,  when 
Martin  Van  Buren,  secretary  of  state  under  Jackson, 
declared  that  Mexico 'would  not  be  allowed  to  acquire 
Cuba.  As  for  European  powers,  a  similar  declaration 
was  made  by  every  secretary  of  state  from  Clay  to 
Webster.  The  latter,  under  date  of  October  22,  1851, 
wrote  to  the  Spanish  Minister  Sartiges  as  follows  :  "The 
government  of  France  and  those  of  other  European 
countries  were  long  since  officially  apprised  by  this  gov 
ernment  that  the  United  States  could  not  see  without 


THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN.  51 

concern  that  island  transferred  by  Spain  to  any  other 
European  state." 

In  1852,  a  proposition  was  made  to  the  United  States, 
on  the  part  of  France  and  Great  Britain,  to  the  effect 
that  each  of  those  three  parties  should  bind  itself  not  to 
acquire  Cuba,  nor  suffer  any  other  power  to  do  so.  The 
United  States  declined  to  enter  into  any  such  conven 
tion,  and  Secretary  Everett,  in  a  despatch  to  Minister 
Crampton,  decisively  laid  down  the  position  of  this 
country  as  regarded  Cuba.  His  statement  contained 
three  clauses  :  First,  that  the  United  States  would  per 
mit  no  foreign  interference,  European  or  American,  in 
the  island  of  Cuba  ;  second,  that  it  would  join  in  no 
agreement  with  European  powers  respecting  the  island  ; 
third,  that  it  would  not  bind  itself  not  to  take  the  island 
if  this  should  become  necessary  through  its  condition 
under  Spanish  rule. 

"But,"  he  continued,  "the  President  would  con 
sider  its  acquisition  by  force,  except  in  a  just  war  with 
Spain  (should  an  event  so  gravely  to  be  deprecated  ever 
take  place),  as  a  disgrace  to  the  civilization  of  the  age." 

This  was  certainly  plain  enough.  Nearly  half  a  cen 
tury  ago  the  United  States  had  definitely  formulated  its 
position,  and  Spain  had  accepted  it  as  a  guarantee  to 
her  title  in  Cuba, — viz.,  that  the  destiny  of  the  island 
must  be  determined  by  the  United  States,  and  could  be 
left  to  no  foreign  power  whatever.  This  country  had 
also  virtually  pledged  itself  not  to  interfere,  unless  the 
character  of  Spanish  rule  in  the  island  or  other  suffi 
cient  cause  should  lead  to  a  just  war  with  Spain. 

Previous  to  this  declaration,  however,  a  strong  feeling 
in  favor  of  the  acquisition  of  Cuba  had  arisen  in  the 
Southern  States,  whose  leaders  were  moved  by  a  desire 


52  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

to  gain  more  slave  territory.  For  the  same  reason  this 
movement  met  with  opposition  in  the  North.  In  1848, 
James  Buchanan,  secretary  of  state  under  President 
Polk,  authorized  in  the  name  of  the  President  an  offer 
to  Spain  of  $100,000,000  for  the  purchase  of  Cuba. 
This  offer  was  indignantly  refused  by  Spain,  and  the 
negotiation  ended  almost  as  quickly  as  it  had  begun. 
Soon  afterwards  the  Lopez  invasion  took  place.  It 
found  sympathizers  and  adherents  in  the  South,  many 
Americans  joining  the  expedition.  The  execution  of 
Crittenden's  fifty  men  led  to  such  a  show  of  indignation 
that  when  the  remainder  of  the  party  was  captured  the 
military  authorities  in  Cuba  found  it  convenient  to  con 
fine  their  executions  to  Lopez  and  his  Cubans,  the  Ameri 
cans  being  released  after  a  term  of  severe  imprisonment. 

Another  event  that  aroused  much  excitement  in  this 
country  took  place  in  1850.  The  Black  Warrior,  a 
steamer  plying  between  New  York  and  Mobile,  which 
was  in  the  habit  of  stopping  at  Havana  to  land  and 
receive  passengers  and  mail,  but  not  to  take  on  or 
discharge  freight,  was  seized  on  a  charge  of  violating 
the  customs  regulations  She  had  on  board  nine  hun 
dred  and  sixty  bales  of  cotton,  and  in  strict  accordance 
with  the  stringent  revenue  laws  at  that  port  should 
have  shown  a  manifest  of  her  cargo.  But  this  would 
have  been  a  mere  form,  as  none  of  it  was  moved  ;  and 
therefore,  to  save  time  and  trouble,  she  was  entered  and 
cleared  as  '  *  in  ballast. ' '  This  had  taken  place  no  less 
than  thirty-six  times  before,  the  revenue  officers  knowing 
the  facts  and  consenting,  and  it  was  in  accordance  with 
a  written  general  order  of  the  Cuban  authorities. 

Yet  on  the  occasion  in  question  the  vessel  was  seized 
for  alleged  violation  of  law,  its  cargo  confiscated  and 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  53 

taken  on  shore,  and  a  fine  of  twice  its  value  laid  against 
the  vessel.  Captain  Bullock  refused  to  pay  any  fine, 
protested  against  the  whole  proceeding,  and  when  the 
customs  authorities  forcibly  opened  the  hatches,  he 
hauled  down  his  colors,  took  them  with  him,  and  left 
the  vessel  in  the  hands  of  the  authorities  as  a  Spanish 
prize.  He  and  his  crew  and  passengers  made  their 
way  home  by  other  vessels  to  the  United  States. 

This  violent  and  uncalled-for  action  raised  a  storm  in 
the  United  States.  The  feeling  was  strongly  warlike  ; 
but  the  difficulty  was  settled  by  negotiation,  Spain 
agreeing  to  pay  an  indemnity  of  $300,000,  and  doing 
so  after  five  years'  delay.  The  feeling  of  resentment 
was  added  to  by  the  action  of  England  and  France  after 
the  failure  of  the  Lopez  invasion.  They  sent  orders  to 
their  admirals  in  the  West  Indies  to  prevent  by  force 
any  new  attempt  of  filibusters  to  land  on  the  island. 
Mr.  Crittenden,  then  acting  secretary  of  state,  emphat 
ically  intimated  that  any  attempt  by  these  countries 
to  exercise  police  powers  in  American  waters  might  lead 
to  serious  complications.  The  orders  to  the  admirals 
were  withdrawn. 

The  Black  Warrior  affair  and  the  attitude  of  the 
European  powers  named  had  their  natural  effect  in 
creating  a  strong  annexation  sentiment  in  this  country, 
which  was  greatly  strengthened  by  the  desire  then  enter 
tained  in  the  South  to  extend  the  area  of  slavery.  It 
gave  rise  to  a  second  attempt  to  take  the  island  by  force, 
— the  General  Quitman  enterprise  of  1854,  already  re 
ferred  to.  A  secret  society  devoted  to  the  same  purpose, 
the  ' '  Order  of  the  Lone  Star, ' '  was  organized  in  New 
Orleans,  its  membership  early  in  1853  being  twenty- 
eight  thousand. 


54  THE   WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

But  the  chief  method  depended  upon  to  gain  the 
island  was  that  of  purchase,  and  in  this  two  Presidents 
from  the  North,  Pierce  and  Buchanan,  took  a  leading 
part.  President  Pierce  proposed  the  annexation  of  Cuba 
by  purchase  early  in  his  term.  The  most  decided  move 
in  this  direction,  however,  was  the  celebrated  Ostend 
Conference.  Under  the  inspiration  of  the  President's 
desire,  three  leading  American  statesmen,  Mr.  Buchanan, 
Mr.  Mason,  and  Mr.  Soule",  United  States  ministers 
respectively  to  England,  France,  and  Spain,  met  at 
Ostend,  the  result  of  their  deliberations  being  the 
Ostend  Manifesto,  in  which  the  purchase  of  Cuba  for 
$120,000,000  was  strongly  recommended,  with  the 
further  declaration  that  in  no  event  should  the  island  be 
permitted  to  become  subject  to  any  other  European 
power  than  Spain. 

Buchanan,  on  reaching  the  Presidency,  continued  to 
advocate  the  acquisition  of  Cuba,  asking  for  an  appro 
priation  for  its  purchase  in  his  first  message,  and  con 
tinuing  to  do  so  in  later  messages.  "It  is  required," 
he  said  in  1860,  "by  manifest  destiny  that  the  United 
States  should  possess  Cuba,  not  by  violence,  but  by 
purchase  at  a  fair  price. ' '  If  the  offer  was  not  accepted, 
he  did  not  see  how  a  collision  could  be  avoided.  But 
neither  Pierce,  Buchanan,  nor  the  Ostend  confreres 
could  induce  Congress  to  act,  and  no  offer  was  made  to 
Spain.  After  1860,  more  vital  interests  at  home  put  an 
end  to  the  scheme  until  1868,  when  the  subject  of  Cuban 
annexation  was  discussed  in  the  American  Senate,  but 
no  action  was  taken. 

The  insurrection  of  1868-78  again  brought  the  subject 
of  Cuban  annexation  into  prominence.  The  shooting  of 
the  students  at  Havana  in  1871  sent  a  thrill  of  indigna- 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  55 

tion  throughout  the  United  States,  which  was  succeeded 
by  a  decidedly  warlike  feeling  in  1873  in  consequence  of 
the  celebrated  Virginius  affair.  The  Virginius  had  been 
a  blockade-runner  during  the  Civil  War.  She  was  cap 
tured  and  sold  at  New  York  to  John  F.  Patterson,  an 
American  citizen.  From  1870  to  1873  this  vessel  was 
engaged  in  West  Indian  waters,  under  control  of  a 
Cuban  junta,  in  whose  interest  she  occasionally  visited 
the  coast  of  Cuba.  On  October  31,  1873,  while  hovering 
off  the  Cuban  coast  with  a  cargo  of  arms  for  the  insur 
gents,  she  was  chased  and  captured  by  the  Spanish 
cruiser  Tornado,  and  brought  the  next  day  into  the 
harbor  of  Santiago  de  Cuba.  There  were  one  hundred 
and  fifty-five  persons  on  board,  mainly  with  Spanish 
names,  though  a  considerable  number  of  them  had 
American  names. 

The  Virginius  carried  the  flag  of  the  United  States, 
and  was  chartered  and  cleared  as  an  American  vessel. 
She  had,  therefore,  the  right  to  protection  as  such  until 
her  claim  to  show  these  colors  had  been  disproved. 
Mr.  Schmitt,  the  American  vice-consul  at  Santiago, 
made  a  prompt  assertion  of  this  right,  and  also  de 
manded  proper  treatment  for  any  American  citizens  on 
board  ;  but  the  provincial  governor  treated  him  with 
great  lack  of  courtesy,  and  declared  that  the  prisoners 
were  pirates,  and  should  be  dealt  with  as  such.  He  even 
refused  to  the  consul  the  use  of  the  cable  to  Kingston, 
Jamaica. 

A  court-martial  to  try  the  prisoners  was  hastily  sum 
moned.  They  were  as  hastily  condemned,  and  a  series  of 
shootings  began,  fifty-three  of  them  having  been  tried 
and  executed  by  the  morning  of  the  8th  of  November. 
On  that  morning  the  British  war-ship  Niobe,  which  had 


56  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

been  summoned  in  haste  from  Kingston  by  the  British 
consul,  entered  the  harbor  of  Santiago,  and,  so  it  is  said, 
Captain  Lorraine  threatened  to  bombard  the  town  unless 
the  executions  were  stopped  at  once.  There  was  no 
more  shooting. 

The  tone  assumed  by  the  governor  of  Santiago  was 
copied  by  the  Spanish  minister  of  state  when  General 
Sickles,  United  States  minister  to  Spain,  entered  his 
protest  against  these  sanguinary  proceedings.  The 
minister  was  so  defiant  that  General  Sickles  demanded 
his  passports,  whereupon  Senor  Carvajal  changed  his 
tone,  and  agreed  to  give  up  the  vessel  and  the  surviving 
prisoners,  salute  the  American  flag,  and  punish  the  per 
petrators  of  the  massacre.  This  ended  the  affair.  The 
Virginius  had  no  right  to  fly  the  American  flag,  but 
could  not  well  be  called  to  account  for  her  fraud,  since 
she  and  all  on  board  went  to  the  bottom  in  a  storm  off 
Cape  Fear  on  their  way  to  the  United  States.  Indem 
nity  was  paid  to  the  families  of  American  and  British 
citizens  who  had  been  executed,  but  the  sanguinary 
governor  was  never  punished. 

Citizens  of  the  United  States  suffered  in  other  ways 
from  the  arbitrary  methods  of  the  Spaniards,  and  much 
irritation  was  occasioned,  but  the  government  showed 
no  disposition  to  interfere.  Hamilton  Fish,  secretary  of 
state,  in  a  letter  to  Caleb  Cushing,  minister  to  Spain,  in 
1875,  spoke  strongly  of  the  barbarous  and  useless  char 
acter  of  the  warfare,  saying  further,  ' '  No  effective  steps 
have  been  taken  to  establish  reforms  or  remedy  abuses, 
and  the  effort  to  suppress  the  insurrection  by  force  alone 
has  been  a  complete  failure."  He  hinted  that  the  time 
was  at  hand  when  it  might  be  necessary  to  intervene. 

President  Grant,  in  his  message  of  1875,  reviewed  the 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  57 

situation,  but  without  recommending  any  definite  action, 
and  the  government  seemed  disposed  to  move  with 
great  caution.  The  mild  suggestions  made  were  wasted 
on  Spain.  No  attention  was  paid  to  them,  and  the 
insurrection  dragged  on  until  both  parties,  worn  out 
with  the  useless  struggle,  consented  to  peace. 

Some  further  injuries  were  done  to  American  com 
merce.  Three  whaling  vessels  were  fired  upon  and  held 
for  a  time,  their  crews  being  treated  with  the  usual 
brutality  by  Spanish  officials.  But  these  troubles,  like 
former  ones,  were  settled  by  the  payment  of  an  indem 
nity,  and  the  two  countries  continued  in  a  state  of  irrita 
tion,  but  without  a  show  of  open  hostility,  until  the  El 
Zanjon  treaty  of  peace  put  an  end  to  the  cause  of  dissat 
isfaction.  From  that  time  until  1895  things  went  on 
smoothly.  The  blank  disregard  of  its  engagements  on 
the  part  of  Spain  was  not  satisfactory  to  the  American 
sense  of  honor,  but  however  the  Cubans  themselves 
might  chafe  under  the  injustice  done  them,  the  people  of 
this  country  settled  down  and  watched  calmly  the  course 
of  events,  with  its  slow  but  unseen  drift  towards  war. 


CHAPTER  III. 

CUBA   IN   INSURRECTION. 

THE  end  of  the  war  of  1868-78  was  followed  by  the 
exile,  voluntary  or  involuntary,  of  a  large  number  of 
Cubans,  many  of  whom  found  new  homes  in  the  United 
States,  others  in  the  Spanish-American  republics  and 
non- Spanish  West  India  Islands.  Among  these  were 
Maximo  Gomez,  the  brothers  Antonio  and  Jose1  Maceo, 
and  others  of  the  prominent  leaders  in  the  rebellion. 
Despite  the  pacific  terms  of  the  capitulation,  these  men 
deemed  it  safest  not  to  remain  within  reach  of  Spain, 
particularly  after  seeing  how  that  country  juggled  with 
its  promised  reforms.  The  number  of  Cubans  in  the 
United  States  is  said  to  have  been  forty  thousand,  while 
there  were  large  numbers  elsewhere,  all  inspired  by 
active  hostility  to  Spain. 

The  spirit  of  revolution  was  never  permitted  to  die 
out  in  the  hearts  of  these  exiles.  Revolutionary  clubs 
or  juntas  were  formed,  until  about  one  hundred  and  forty 
of  these  existed  in  North  and  South  America  and  the 
West  Indies.  For  several  years  before  1895  these  clubs 
were  busily  engaged  in  collecting  money,  buying  war- 
supplies,  and  laying  plans.  Cuban  workmen  in  the 
United  States  offered  to  give  one-tenth  of  their  earnings 
towards  the  fund.  There  were  fire-arms  on  the  island, 
concealed  since  1878.  Others  were  smuggled  in.  Every 
available  step  of  preparation  was  made,  and  the  revolu- 
58 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  59 

tionists  impatiently  awaited  a  suitable  opportunity  to 
institute  a  new  rebellion. 

The  chief  organizer  of  these  movements  was  a  Cuban 
named  Jose"  Marti,  then  in  New  York.  Born  in  Cuba, 
he  had  studied  at  Seville,  graduated  at  Madrid,  and 
become  a  political  convict  at  Havana,  finally  finding  a 
refuge  in  the  United  States.  Taking  advantage  of  the 
business  depression  of  1894  in  Cuba  and  the  lack  of 
employment  on  the  sugar  estates,  hundreds  of  men 
being  idle  through  the  closing  of  the  mills,  Marti  fixed 
the  date  of  February  24,  1895,  f°r  the  outbreak  of  the 
proposed  rebellion,  and  notified  the  clubs  in  Cuba  of  his 
plan.  He  promised  to  bring  them  aid  from  outside,  and 
for  this  purpose  chartered  three  vessels,  the  Lagonda, 
the  Amadis,  and  the  Baracoa,  which  were  loaded  with 
war-material.  This  expedition  failed,  being  stopped  by 
the  United  States  authorities  at  Fernandina,  Florida. 
About  the  end  of  January,  1895,  Marti  made  his  way  to 
San  Domingo,  where  he  entered  into  communication 
with  the  old  soldier  Maximo  Gomez,  who  had  taken  a 
leading  part  in  the  previous  war,  and  was  now  over 
seventy  years  of  age.  Consultations  were  also  held  with 
the  Maceos,  then  in  Costa  Rica,  and  with  other  leaders 
of  the  late  rebellion. 

On  the  appointed  day,  February  24,  1895,  the  citi 
zens  of  Havana  were  startled  by  the  report  that  the 
public  order  had  been  disturbed, — a  band  of  rebels, 
twenty-four  in  number,  having  appeared  in  arms  at 
Ybarra,  in  the  province  of  Matanzas.  Other  small 
bands  defied  the  authorities  in  other  sections  of  the 
island.  Yet  the  affair  at  first  seemed  no  more  serious 
than  a  negro  riot,  and  very  unlikely  to  make  way  against 
the  twenty  thousand  Spanish  troops  in  the  island  and 


60  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

the  sixty  thousand  Volunteers  enrolled.  Governor- 
General  Calleja  hastened  to  declare  martial  law  in  the 
provinces  affected,  and  the  outbreaks  in  Matanzas  and 
Santa  Clara  were  soon  put  down.  This  was  not  the  case 
in  the  province  of  Santiago  de  Cuba,  a  thinly-settled, 
mountainous,  and  densely-wooded  district,  admirably 
adapted  for  the  guerrilla  warfare  which  the  insurgents 
proposed  to  wage. 

The  plans  of  the  conspirators  in  this  province  included 
wide-spread  conflagrations  and  the  extermination  of  the 
Spanish  officials  and  soldiery,  including  the  resident 
governor.  Though  these  sanguinary  plans  were  not 
carried  out,  the  activity  of  the  rebels  in  arms  soon  con 
vinced  the  authorities  that  the  affair  was  more  serious 
than  they  had  supposed,  and  early  in  March  seven 
thousand  troops  were  sent  over  from  Spain  to  reinforce 
those  in  the  island,  of  whom  less  than  half  were  effective. 
Of  the  thirteen  gunboats  on  patrol  duty  along  the  coast, 
no  more  than  seven  were  in  condition  for  use.  The 
commissary  arrangements  were  so  bad  as  seriously  to 
hamper  the  movements  of  the  troops,  and  for  a  time  the 
insurgents  had  it  largely  their  own  way,  raiding  and 
plundering  the  plantations  of  loyalists,  and  vanishing 
into  the  woods  and  mountains  on  the  appearance  of  the 
troops.  Many  of  the  plantation  hands  joined  them,  and 
their  numbers  rapidly  increased  until  there  were  several 
thousand  men  in  arms. 

They  were  as  yet,  however,  without  experienced 
leaders  ;  but  early  in  April,  Antonio  Maceo,  with  his 
brother  and  twenty-two  others  of  the  exiles  who  had 
taken  part  in  the  former  war,  arrived  from  Costa  Rica, 
landing  near  Baracoa,  not  far  from  the  eastern  extremity 
of  the  island.  Their  progress  inward  proved  a  danger- 


^^gfl^ 


Ctd 


THE   WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  61 

ous  one.  Intercepted  by  a  party  of  Spanish  cavalry, 
they  had  a  brisk  fight,  Maceo  finally  getting  away  with 
a  bullet-hole  through  his  hat.  For  ten  days  the  party 
made  its  way  through  the  country,  now  seeking  places 
of  concealment,  now  forced  to  fight,  and  trusting  to  the 
wild  fruits  of  the  woodland  for  food.  So  alert  were  the 
Spanish  patrols  that  in  the  end  Maceo  was  left  with  only 
two  or  three  of  his  original  companions.  With  these  he 
fell  in  with  a  band  of  rebels,  by  whom  he  was  enthusias 
tically  received. 

Maceo,  an  educated  mulatto,  had  gained  a  high  repu 
tation  for  daring  and  ability  during  the  former  conflict, 
his  influence  being  great  with  the  negro  contingent  of 
the  rebellion.  He  was  the  only  one  of  the  leaders  who 
had  refused  to  concur  in  the  capitulation  of  Zanjon,  con 
tinuing  in  arms  for  two  months,  and  finally  leaving  the 
country  without  signing  the  treaty  of  peace.  He  now 
put  himself  at  the  head  of  the  insurgents  in  the  district 
he  had  reached,  and  in  several  sharp  brushes  with  the 
Spanish,  in  which  he  more  than  held  his  own,  he  proved 
that  the  rebellion  had  at  length  gained  an  able  leader. 

Shortly  afterwards  Jos6  Marti,  the  acknowledged  head 
of  the  insurrection,  reached  Cuba  from  San  Domingo, 
Maximo  Gomez  and  several  others  coming  with  him. 
They  landed  on  the  southern  coast,  in  a  district  filled 
with  the  pickets  and  patrols  of  the  enemy,  and  for  two 
days  they  were  in  great  danger,  hiding  in  caves  on  the 
coast.  On  the  evening  of  the  third  day,  with  five  fol 
lowers,  they  reached  a  camp  of  the  rebel  army,  where 
they  were  received  with  an  enthusiasm  equal  to  that 
which  had  greeted  Maceo. 

The  arrival  of  these  experienced  leaders  inspirited  the 
Cuban  patriots,  many  of  whom  now  joined  the  ranks, 


62  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

until  the  patriot  army  numbered  more  than  six  thousand 
men,  and  bolder  operations  became  possible.  It  was 
arranged  that  Marti  should  return  to  the  United  States 
and  seek  further  aid  for  the  revolutionists,  leaving  the 
command  in  the  able  hands  of  Gomez,  who  was  to  ad 
vance  to  his  old  battle-ground  of  Camaguey,  the  Cuban 
name  for  the  province  of  Puerto  Principe,  while  Maceo 
and  the  others  remained  in  Santiago  de  Cuba  to  recruit 
their  forces. 

Marti  accompanied  Gomez  some  distance  on  his  way, 
and  on  seeking  to  return  was  met  by  a  body  of  troops, 
before  whose  fire  he  fell  dead.  Gomez,  who  came  to  his 
aid,  was  slightly  wounded,  and  was  borne  by  his  men 
from  the  field.  The  corpse  of  Marti  was  embalmed  by 
the  Spaniards  and  taken  to  the  city  of  Santiago  de  Cuba, 
where  it  was  given  honorable  burial.  Thus  early  in  the 
war  perished  the  fomenter  and  organizer  of  the  insur 
rection,  for  which  he,  with  his  associates,  is  said  to  have 
collected  a  fund  of  more  than  a  million  dollars. 

The  rapid  growth  of  the  insurrection  soon  satisfied  the 
Spanish  authorities  in  the  home  government  that  Calleja 
was  not  the  man  for  the  situation,  and  Premier  Canovas 
had  him  removed,  appointing  in  his  place  Martinez  Cam 
pos,  who  had  the  prestige  of  having  put  an  end  to  the 
previous  war,  and  was  looked  upon  as  the  ablest  general 
of  Spain.  He  reached  the  island  about  the  middle  of 
April,  landing  at  the  port  of  Guantanamo  with  reinforce 
ments  numbering  twenty-five  thousand  men. 

Great  hopes  were  entertained  by  the  Spanish  party 
that  the  new  governor-general  would  quickly  end  the 
war.  He  took  hold  of  affairs  with  energy,  while  at  the 
same  time  he  sought  to  conciliate  the  people,  giving  em 
ployment  to  the  laboring  population  on  the  roads,  and 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  63 

otherwise  trying  to  alleviate  the  prevailing  distress.  His 
standard  of  action,  however,  was  above  that  of  his  agents, 
and  things  soon  went  wrong.  As  for  the  revolutionists, 
they  quickly  made  it  apparent  that  they  were  not  to  be 
disarmed  by  a  show  of  leniency,  and  their  numbers  in 
creased  until  over  ten  thousand  were  in  the  field,  perhaps 
three-fourths  of  them  armed  with  rifles,  though  cartridges 
were  not  abundant.  The  war  went  on  in  the  fashion  of 
1868.  There  was  no  such  thing  as  a  battle,  though 
skirmishes  were  of  almost  daily  occurrence.  In  most  of 
these  affairs  the  Spaniards  largely  outnumbered  their 
opponents,  and  were  far  superior  to  them  in  equipments. 
The  insurgents,  therefore,  fought  principally  from  am 
bush,  being  little  affected  in  their  consciences  by  the 
constant  reproach  of  the  Spaniards  that  they  would  not 
stay  still  long  enough  to  be  killed.  They  were  past- 
masters  in  the  act  of  vanishing,  and  were  so  thoroughly 
familiar  with  all  the  by-paths  and  mountain  fastnesses  of 
the  island  that  pursuit  was  usually  idle.  It  was  their 
purpose  to  wear  out  and  worry  out  their  foes,  and  in  this 
they  showed  excellent  skill. 

It  may  be  said  here  that  the  strength  of  the  insurgents 
lay  largely  in  their  horses.  They  were  admirable  horse 
men,  riding  like  Cossacks  or  cowboys,  and  far  superior 
in  this  respect  to  the  Spanish  cavalry,  few  of  whom  were 
trained  to  the  saddle.  Many  stories  are  told  of  women 
who  rode  in  their  ranks  and  wielded  the  machete  even 
more  fiercely  than  the  men,  and  there  is  little  doubt  that 
these  stories  have  some  foundation  in  truth.  The  favorite 
mode  of  fighting  by  the  insurgents  was  to  harass  the 
Spanish  troops  with  a  skirmish  fire,  in  which  they  sought 
to  pick  off  the  officers  by  sharpshooting  ;  then,  if  the 
opportunity  presented,  they  would  dash  forward  in  a 


64  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN. 

wild  cavalry  charge,  machete  in  hand,  and  seek  to  make 
havoc  in  the  ranks  of  the  foe.  The  Maceos  excelled  in 
this  mode  of  fighting. 

As  regards  the  character  of  their  horses,  we  are  told 
by  a  newspaper  correspondent  who  visited  one  of  their 
camps :  ' '  Horses  are  tethered  about  everywhere,  and 
stand  unsheltered,  rain  or  shine.  They  are  fed  on  rushes, 
or  colla,  for  no  other  grain  is  to  be  had,  and  a  sore-backed, 
sorry  lot  they  are,  though  tough  and  tireless  as  our  own 
bronchos. ' ' 

A  further  extract  may  fitly  be  made  from  the  picturesque 
account  given  by  this  writer,  Mr.  Grover  Flint,  corre 
spondent  of  the  New  York  Journal.  He  says  : 

"CAMP  SABANAS,  near  Sagua,  April  i,  1896. — This 
is  a  real  insurgent  camp.  About  me,  as  I  write,  are 
standing  its  swarthy  guards,  with  the  silver  star  on  their 
hat-rims  and  rifles  in  their  hands.  It  is  a  permanent 
camp,  with  a  little  hospital.  Dr.  Francisco  Domingues, 
of  Havana,  is  stationed  here  as  a  special  agent  of  Gen 
eral  Maximo  Gomez,  not  only  to  attend  to  the  wounded, 
but  to  forward  despatches  to  the  chiefs  of  insurgent  divi 
sions  throughout  the  Matanzas  province. 

"The  camp  lies  in  a  forest  among  the  foot-hills  that 
rise  from  either  side  of  the  valley,  reaching  from  the  coast 
to  the  interior  of  the  island.  High  mountains  and 
swamps,  green  with  rushes  and  cane,  protect  it  on  all 
sides  but  one.  On  this  side  a  narrow  trail  zigzags  for  a 
league  in  the  woods,  barely  missing  morasses  and  pitfalls. 
Twenty  well-armed  men  could  hold  that  trail  against  a 
regiment.  The  camp  itself  is  tropical  and  picturesque. 
It  is  a  plateau,  thickly  overgrown  with  stunted  trees  and 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  65 

towering  palms,    reached  by  little  paths   cut  with  the 
machete. 

4 '  The  insurgents  live  in  small  huts  or  wikyups, — '  jack 
als'  they  call  them  here, — built  of  boughs  and  saplings 
and  thatched  with  palm-leaves.  Rebels  against  Spain 
must  sleep  in  hammocks,  for  the  ground  sweats  in  the 
Cuban  jungle,  and  white  men  cannot  sleep  on  it  and  live. 
At  night  strange  birds  sing,  queer  animals,  like  over 
grown  rats,  look  at  you  from  the  trees,  and  great  land- 
crabs  scurry  into  their  holes  at  your  approach.  .  .  . 

' '  The  camp-guard  consists  of  fifty  men,  exclusive  of 
negro  camp-servants,  armed  only  with  machetes.  .  .  . 
Guards  and  patrols  watch  the  trail  leading  from  the  val 
ley,  and  no  one  is  allowed  to  leave  without  a  pass  from 
the  commander.  Squads  of  men  ride  through  the  coun 
try  at  night  in  search  of  the  '  plateados, '  those  blood 
thirsty  robbers  who  were  the  terror  of  the  country  early 
in  the  war,  but  who  have  been  almost  suppressed  by  the 
insurgents.  When  the  plateado  is  caught,  he  is  brought 
into  camp  and  hanged  to  the  nearest  tree. 

* '  It  is  odd  to  find  soldiers  with  camp-servants  to  fetch 
water,  cut  wood,  and  perform  the  acts  of  personal  ser 
vice  ;  but  the  men  are  active  and  quick  to  take  the  saddle 
on  sudden  alarm,  as  I  have  seen  on  several  occasions 
since  my  arrival.  For  simplicity,  the  life  is  like  that  of 
Marion's  men  in  our  American  Revolution.  No  coffee, 
no  bread  ;  heated  sugar  and  water  at  daybreak,  sweet 
potatoes  and  stewed  beef  at  noon,  and  stewed  beef  and 
sweet  potatoes  at  night.  Beans  and  rice  are  luxuries. 
Sugar-cane,  sweet  and  nutritious,  does  for  bread.  We  eat 
with  our  fingers  and  knives  down  here,  with  bits  of  palm- 
bark  for  plates.  Food  is  plentiful  or  scarce  according  to 
the  country  and  to  circumstances.  That  there  is  no 

5 


66  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

scarcity  now  is  proof  that  the  sympathy  of  the  native 
population  is  with  the  insurrection.  No  man  is  so  poor 
that  he  cannot  cheerfully  give  food  for  the  army.  This 
proves,  also,  the  truth  of  the  saying  here  that  the 
Spaniard  owns  only  the  ground  he  stands  on.  The 
news  of  every  movement  of  the  Spaniards  is  quickly 
reported. ' ' 

The  death  of  Marti  left  Gomez  at  the  head  of  the  in 
surrectionary  movement.  But  the  old  rebel  leader  did 
not  find  himself  in  comfortable  surroundings.  After  the 
death  of  Marti,  he  wrote  despondently  :  ' '  From  that 
moment  my  position  became  considerably  worse.  I 
was  without  health,  without  troops,  without  arms." 
Though  determined  on  the  invasion  of  Camaguey,  he 
made  the  movement  '  *  sick  not  only  in  body,  but  in  soul 
as  well."  He  had  abundant  reason  for  depression. 
"The  people  of  Camaguey,"  he  was  informed,  "wanted 
no  war. ' '  To  rid  themselves  of  their  unwelcome  visitor, 
they  offered  to  find  him  the  means  to  leave  the  country, 
and  proposed  to  make  him  re-embark  by  force  if  he 
would  not  do  so  of  good  will. 

A  still  more  dangerous  phase  of  the  situation  was  the 
attitude  assumed  by  his  men,  who  did  not  relish  being 
led  out  of  their  province  into  new  and  strange  districts. 
One  morning  his  escort  drew  up  their  horses  to  a  halt, 
declaring  that  they  would  go  no  farther,  and  demanding 
to  be  led  back  to  their  native  province. 

"  It  cost  me  trouble  to  reduce  them  to  obedience,'1 
writes  Gomez.  * '  Three  days  later, ' '  he  continues,  * '  a 
traitor  presented  himself  to  the  enemy  and  informed  him 
of  my  situation,  and  again  my  escort  insisted  upon  their 
proposition  not  to  follow  me.  In  vain  their  own  officer 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  67 

in  command  interposed  his  authority  ;  the  soldiers  re 
fused  to  obey.  Then,  indignant,  I  rebuked  them 
severely,  calling  them  disloyal  and  bad  companions. 
'  Return  to  the  East,'  said  I  to  them.  '  I  alone  will  go 
to  Camaguey.'  ' 

General  Borrero  addressed  them  still  more  indignantly. 
* '  General  Gomez  is  a  foreigner, ' '  he  said,  '  *  who  has 
come  to  help  us  in  this  holy  war,  and  you  wish  to  aban 
don  him  while  sick  and  pursued  by  the  enemy.  If  that 
is  the  way  you  act,  then  the  whole  world  can  say  with 
reason  that  you  are  cowards." 

This  and  more  of  the  same  kind  of  argument  finally 
induced  the  soldiers  to  go  on ;  but  Gomez  was  ' '  troubled 
with  the  most  terrible  doubts."  His  hopes  revived  on 
learning  that  Campos  had  ' '  urged  that  his  march  should 
be  stopped  at  all  hazards, ' '  for,  if  he  entered  Camaguey, 
Spain  might  consider  her  cause  lost. 

The  period  spoken  of  was  that  of  the  greatest  depres 
sion  in  the  old  soldier's  career.  His  invasion  of  Ca 
maguey  proved  highly  successful,  the  Spaniards  being 
beaten  at  every  point,  while  abundant  spoil  fell  into 
the  hands  of  the  patriots,  and  they  had  every  reason  for 
encouragement. 

Gomez  now  developed  his  plan  of  campaign.  The 
patriot  bands  were  given  the  following  general  orders  : 
They  were,  first,  to  attack  the  small  posts  held  by  the 
Spaniards,  making  every  effort  to  obtain  arms,  and  setting 
free  every  prisoner  who  would  deliver  his  weapons  ; 
second,  they  were  to  cut  all  railway  and  telegraph  lines  ; 
third,  they  were  to  keep  on  the  defensive,  and  to  retreat 
in  small  groups  unless  they  had  the  advantage  ;  fourth, 
all  forts  or  buildings  from  which  any  resistance  was  made 
were  to  be  destroyed  ;  fifth,  all  crops  of  sugar-cane 


68  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

and  all  sugar-mills  were  to  be  destroyed  unless  their 
owners  contributed  to  the  Cuban  war-fund  ;  sixth,  the 
farmers  were  forbidden  to  send  any  food  to  the  cities 
without  paying  taxes  on  the  same  to  the  insurgents. 

Campos  took  steps  to  counteract  the  insurgent  plan  by 
ordering  the  division  of  certain  regiments  into  detach 
ments  to  protect  the  sugar-estates,  while  other  detach 
ments  were  stationed  along  the  railroads  and  placed  on 
every  moving  train.  He  further  ordered  an  attack  to  be 
made  on  every  band  of  rebels  encountered  that  did  not 
more  than  three  times  outnumber  the  troops,  directing 
his  officers  to  set  free  all  who  surrendered,  and  to  pro 
vide  convoys  for  food  sent  to  the  towns. 

The  war  in  1895  was  one  of  skirmishes  innumerable, 
only  a  single  affair  reaching  the  dignity  of  a  battle. 
This  was  of  interest  from  the  fact  that  Maceo  and  Cam 
pos  were  the  opposing  leaders.  Maceo  had  greatly 
annoyed  his  foes  by  attacks  on  train-loads  of  supplies  for 
the  fortified  town  of  Bayamo,  in  the  district  of  Santiago 
de  Cuba,  and  it  was  deemed  necessary  to  drive  him 
from  the  field.  Several  Spanish  columns  were  put  in 
movement  against  him  from  different  quarters.  Campos 
led  one  of  these,  a  force  of  fifteen  hundred  men,  from 
Manzanillo,  and  on  July  13  came  upon  the  foe,  about 
two  thousand  seven  hundred  strong,  well  posted  on  a 
stock-farm  several  miles  from  Bayamo.  The  plan  of 
Maceo  was  to  attack  the  centre  division,  under  Campos, 
but  by  an  error  the  assault  was  made  on  the  advance 
guard,  led  by  General  Santocildes,  upon  which  fell  a 
sharp  fire  from  the  wooded  hill-sides.  Santocildes  fell 
dead,  and  a  rebel  bullet  tore  the  heel  from  the  boot  of  the 
governor-general. 

The  confusion  in  the  Spanish  ranks,  due  to  the  fall  of 


THE   WAR   WITH   SPAIN.  69 

Santocildes,  convinced  Maceo  that  they  had  lost  some 
important  officer,  and  he  at  once  made  a  vigorous 
machete  charge,  hoping  to  win  a  decisive  victory.  He 
was  repulsed.  But  Campos,  finding  the  situation  critical, 
felt  obliged  to  draw  up  his  whole  force  into  a  hollow 
square,  using  as  breastworks  the  wagons  and  the  dead 
horses  and  mules.  For  several  hours  the  Cubans  raged 
around  this  strong  formation,  the  Spaniards  being  saved 
from  a  disastrous  rout  only  by  the  presence  and  the 
generalship  of  Campos.  An  assault  had  been  made  on 
the  rear-guard  early  in  the  affray,  Maceo  hoping  to 
capture  the  ammunition-train.  But  these  troops  de 
fended  themselves  vigorously  and  fought  their  way  to 
the  main  body,  where  they  aided  in  the  formation  of  the 
square.  The  Spaniards  finally  succeeded  in  reaching 
Bayamo,  having  suffered  heavily  in  the  fight  and  been 
pursued  to  the  environs  of  the  town.  Maceo' s  lack  of 
artillery  saved  them  from  total  destruction,  and  Campos 
did  not  venture  to  leave  his  place  of  refuge  until  he  had 
gathered  around  him  a  powerful  force. 

The  advance  of  Gomez  into  Camaguey  brought  him 
into  communication  with  the  venerable  Salvador  Cis- 
neros,  who  had  discarded  his  title  of  Marquis  de  Santa 
Lucia  to  accept  the  presidency  of  the  Cuban  republic 
during  the  former  insurrection,  and  was  as  ardent  a 
revolutionist  as  ever.  Marti  had,  upon  landing  in  Cuba, 
issued  a  call  for  a  constitutional  convention,  in  conse 
quence  of  which  Cisneros  and  other  Cuban  leaders  had 
come  together,  twenty  representatives  being  sent  from 
the  provinces  and  twenty  from  the  army.  The  conven 
tion  met  on  September  13,  1895,  adopted  a  constitution 
on  the  1 6th,  and  on  the  i8th  elected  the  following  execu 
tive  officers  : 


70  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

PRESIDENT,  Salvador  Cisneros  Betancourt 
VICE-PRESIDENT,  Bartolome  Maso. 
SECRETARY  OF  STATE,  Rafael  Portuondo. 
SECRETARY  OF  WAR,  Carlos  Roloff. 
SECRETARY  OF  THE  TREASURY,  Severo  Pina. 
GENERAL-IN-CHIEF,  Maximo  Gomez. 
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL,  Antonio  Maceo. 

Cuba  was  divided  by  this  constitution  into  five  states. 
Laws  were  passed  regulating  various  government  affairs, 
establishing  post-offices,  providing  for  the  collection  of 
taxes,  etc. ,  the  whole  forming  a  fairly  complete  govern 
ment  on  paper,  though  one  few  of  whose  functions  could 
be  exercised.  The  tradition  is  that  the  seat  of  govern 
ment  was  fixed  at  Cubitas,  a  mythical  station  on  a 
mountain- top,  approachable  only  by  a  spiral  track, 
which  a  corporal's  guard  could  defend  against  an  army. 
But  this  stronghold  probably  existed  only  in  imagina 
tion,  and  the  government  seems  to  have  been  a  per- 
ambulatory  one,  though  having  its  head-quarters  in  the 
Cubitas  mountain  district. 

At  the  end  of  the  constitutional  two  years'  term  of 
office,  in  October,  1897,  a  new  government  was  elected, 
Bartolome  Maso  being  now  chosen  President,  Dr.  Do 
mingo  M.  Capote  Vice- President,  and  Jose  B.  Aleman 
Secretary  of  War.  Various  other  departmental  officers 
were  chosen,  General  Gomez  was  reappointed  Com- 
mander-in-Chief,  and  Calixto  Garcia  was  appointed 
Lieutenant-General. 

In  November,  1895,  Maceo  left  Santiago  de  Cuba  to 
join  Gomez,  who  had  made  his  way  westward  into 
the  province  of  Santa  Clara,  where,  on  November  19 
and  20,  he  fought  a  severe  battle  at  Taguasco,  in  which 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  71 

he  gained  a  decided  advantage  over  General  Valdez  and 
his  men.  The  much- vaunted  trocha  lay  in  Maceo's 
way,  but  he  made  short  work  of  it.  He  simulated  an 
attack  on  this  line  of  defence,  and,  as  soon  as  the 
Spaniards  were  concentrated  upon  the  threatened  point, 
he  crossed  an  unprotected  part  of  the  line  without  firing 
a  shot  or  losing  a  man. 

Campos  had  concentrated  twenty-five  thousand  troops 
in  Santa  Clara,  but  these  failed  to  keep  back  the  insur 
gents,  who  shrewdly  availed  themselves  of  their  old 
guerrilla  tactics,  advancing  in  small  columns,  which  held 
the  enemy  in  check  by  pretended  attacks,  while  the 
main  body  slipped  onward  with  its  pack-trains.  In  this 
way  the  provinces  of  Santa  Clara  and  Matanzas  were 
successfully  crossed  and  that  of  Havana  entered,  the 
war  being  by  this  daring  movement  brought  nearly  to 
the  gates  of  the  capital.  Gomez  had  succeeded  in  ob 
taining  a  few  pieces  of  artillery,  and  the  insurgent  army 
no  longer  felt  obliged  to  lurk  in  the  woods  and  the  long 
grass. 

During  the  year  1895  the  Spanish  government  had 
sent  more  than  one  hundred  thousand  troops  across  the 
ocean,  to  which  the  Volunteers  added  a  strong  contin 
gent  available  for  garrison  duty.  But  there  had  been 
heavy  losses  through  disease  and  combat,  and  the  hos 
pitals  were  full  of  the  sick.  It  is  impossible  to  say  how 
many  rebels  were  in  the  field.  They  have  been  variously 
estimated  at  from  thirty  thousand  to  fifty  thousand,  but 
may  have  been  considerably  less  in  number.  This  is 
certain,  the  present  war  was  a  far  more  serious  affair 
than  the  former  one,  while  the  methods  adopted  by  the 
Cuban  leaders  were  more  destructive  of  the  Spanish 
strength  and  less  easy  to  overcome.  As  the  year  pro- 


72  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

gressed  towards  its  end,  the  orders  of  Gomez  were  more 
fully  carried  out.  Trains  were  wrecked  and  bridges 
blown  up  with  dynamite,  tracks  were  torn  up  and  tele 
graph  lines  cut,  contributions  were  forced  from  the 
planters  to  secure  their  crops  from  the  torch,  and  taxes 
were  collected  upon  food-supplies  sent  to  the  cities. 

Fighting  went  on  almost  daily,  but  it  was  of  the  old 
kind.  The  insurgents  would  not  fight  unless  they  had 
the  advantage  in  number  or  position.  Every  foot  of 
ground  was  known  to  them,  while  nearly  the  whole 
population  served  them  as  spies.  All  the  negroes  and 
most  of  the  whites  were  their  friends,  and  they  had 
timely  warning  of  every  movement  of  their  foes.  The 
Spanish  outposts  and  columns  were  perpetually  exposed 
to  sudden  and  sharp  assaults,  the  Cuban  soldiers  making 
off  before  an  effective  blow  could  be  dealt  them  in  return. 

By  the  end  of  the  year  the  Cuban  forces  were  firmly 
established  in  Havana  province,  where  they  gained  rein 
forcements  from  the  negro  field-hands  and  Cuban  youths. 
The  bandits,  of  whom  a  considerable  number  had  arisen, 
taking  toll  from  both  parties  alike,  were  hanged  by  the 
insurgents  wherever  captured.  The  fighting  was  princi 
pally  done  by  Maceo,  Gomez  occupying  himself  in  the 
more  effective  work  of  depriving  Spain  of  the  sinews  of 
war  by  burning  cane-fields  and  destroying  railroads. 

In  January,  1896,  a  still  further  advance  was  made, 
Maceo  leading  his  men  into  Pinar  del  Rio,  the  most 
westerly  province  of  Cuba,  into  which  insurrection  had 
never  before  made  its  way.  Thus  within  a  year  the 
Cuban  revolution  had  spread  from  end  to  end  of  the 
island,  the  Spanish  being  left  in  possession  only  of  the 
cities,  whilo  all  the  country  was  in  insurgent  hands  or  in 
a  state  of  turmoil  and  insecurity.  Gomez  marched 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  73 

where  he  would  and  burned  the  crops  of  planters  who 
sought  to  grind  their  cane,  until  the  sky  around  the 
capital  was  filled  with  smoke  by  day  and  lurid  at  night 
with  the  flames  of  blazing  fields. 

The  campaign  of  Campos  had  proved  an  utter  failure. 
But,  despite  the  severe  criticism  to  which  he  was  ex 
posed,  he  refused  to  depart  from  his  humane  policy  and 
make  war  upon  non-combatants.  In  consequence,  the 
demand  for  his  recall  and  replacement  by  a  man  who 
would  conduct  the  war  with  less  regard  to  the  feelings 
of  the  people  grew  urgent,  and  at  length  was  responded 
to.  He  was  ordered  home,  and  sailed  for  Spain  January 
17,  1896,  leaving  General  Sabis  Marin  in  temporary 
authority  until  his  successor  should  arrive. 

We  may  somewhat  briefly  conclude  our  record  of 
the  events  of  the  war  before  describing  more  particularly 
the  system  upon  which  it  was  conducted  and  the  peculi 
arly  Spanish  method  of  dealing  with  a  colonial  revolu 
tion.  The  new  governor-general,  General  Valeriano 
Weyler  y  Nicolau,  Marquis  of  Tenerife,  to  give  him  his 
full  title,  reached  Havana  February  10,  1896,  greatly  to 
the  satisfaction  of  the  ultra-Spanish  party,  who  now 
looked  to  see  vigorous  methods  introduced  and  the 
island  quickly  swept  clear  of  the  scum  of  rebellion  which 
had  swept  over  it  from  end  to  end.  They  were  destined 
to  disappointment.  The  Weyler  trumpet  was  blown 
very  loudly,  but  its  noise  proved  only  empty  air. 

General  Weyler  had  won  the  deep  hatred  of  the 
Cubans  by  the  atrocious  deeds  which  he  was  said  to 
have  committed  in  Camaguey  during  the  former  war. 
In  his  military  career  during  the  disturbances  in  Spain 
and  in  the  African  war  against  the  Moors  he  was  a 
favorite  lieutenant  of  the  brutal  chief  Valmaseda,  under 


74  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

whom  he  gained  a  reputation  for  barbarous  cruelty. 
His  fame  in  this  direction  preceded  him  to  Cuba,  and 
his  career  there  fully  sustained  his  reputation,  the  cruelty 
exercised  towards  the  helpless  non-combatants  having 
rarely  been  surpassed  in  the  history  of  war. 

At  present,  however,  we  propose  to  deal  only  with 
warlike  events,  leaving  methods  to  be  considered  later. 
Governor- General  Weyler  began  by  promising  to  clear 
the  provinces  near  Havana  of  rebels  in  arms  and  let 
peaceful  industry  take  its  course.  He  was  not  long  in 
discovering  that  he  had  a  bold  and  active  enemy  to  deal 
with.  Hardly  had  he  entered  upon  his  office  when 
Maceo  returned  from  Pinar  del  Rio  and  swooped  down 
on  the  city  of  Jaruco,  which  he  looted  and  burned. 
Gomez  joined  him,  and  the  two  resumed  their  former 
course,  burning  cane,  exacting  tribute,  and  otherwise 
disturbing  the  enemy.  The  Cuban  leaders  had  an 
nounced  in  December,  1895,  their  purpose  to  stop  pro 
duction  and  commerce,  and  thus  deprive  the  Spanish 
government  of  the  revenues  of  the  island.  In  carrying 
out  this  policy  Gomez  had  made  his  march  through  the 
rich  sugar  districts,  destroying  as  he  went  and  leaving 
ashes  and  desolation  behind  him.  Maceo  had  wreaked 
similar  ruin  in  the  wealthy  tobacco  districts  of  Pinar  del 
Rio,  burning  and  destroying  and  forcing  the  helpless 
laborers  either  to  join  his  ranks  or  seek  subsistence  in 
the  cities.  The  work  of  ' '  concentration' '  was  thus 
began  by  the  insurgents  themselves. 

Weyler' s  warlike  energy  proved  to  be  more  show  than 
substance.  He  sent  his  infantry  to  pursue  the  cane- 
burning  insurgents,  but  beyond  the  murder  of  non- 
combatants  little  was  accomplished.  He  sent  troops 
into  Pinar  del  Rio,  where  they  met  no  great  opposition, 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  75 

and  the  world  was  informed  that  this  province  was  paci 
fied.  Yet  his  proclamation  had  hardly  been  made  before 
Maceo  was  back  there  again.  On  March  13,  1896,  the 
dashing  mulatto  leader  had  entered  and  burnt  the  port 
of  Batabano,  on  the  southern  coast,  and  before  Weyler's 
troops  could  reach  him  he  was  in  the  *  *  pacified' '  prov 
ince.  Here  he  made  his  head-quarters  in  the  mountains 
and  bade  defiance  to  all  the  power  of  Spain. 

Now  was  the  time  for  Weyler  to  show  his  military 
skill,  but  in  this  he  signally  failed.  Instead  of  pursuing 
his  defiant  foe  persistently  with  cavalry  and  using  bodies 
of  infantry  to  occupy  the  country  and  cut  off  his  retreat, 
he  wasted  his  strength  in  the  old  exercise  of  trocha- 
building,  extending  a  defensive  line  across  the  island 
from  Mariel  to  Majana,  a  work  which  it  took  two  months 
to  construct  and  fifteen  thousand  soldiers  to  guard,  a 
force  sufficient,  one  would  think,  to  have  cleared  the 
province  of  insurgents. 

Meanwhile,  Maceo  held  the  province  almost  unop 
posed.  By  May  I  only  four  fortified  cities  were  left  to 
Spain  in  its  southern  part,  and  these  were  crowded  with 
refugees.  Weyler  refused  to  do  anything  to  aid  these 
unfortunates,  and  the  operating  columns  which  he  sent 
into  the  province  were  defeated  in  almost  every  engage 
ment.  Gomez  meanwhile  withdrew  his  forces  to  Cama- 
guey,  where,  with  five  hundred  followers,  he  met  and 
defeated  General  Castillanos  with  two  thousand  troops. 
Two  hundred  men  were  killed  and  wounded  on  the  side 
of  the  Spaniards,  while  the  insurgents  had  but  ten  killed 
in  this  affair. 

Though  Maceo  showed  a  humane  disposition,  Bermu- 
dez,  one  of  his  lieutenants,  an  ex-bandit,  established  a 
reign  of  terror  in  the  district  controlled  by  him,  murder- 


76  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

ing  men  on  the  slightest  pretext,  and  forcing  the  inhabi 
tants  to  seek  refuge  in  the  fortified  places  until  the 
country  was  practically  depopulated.  The  autumn  cam 
paign  was  opened  by  Weyler  in  person,  he  marching 
into  Pinar  del  Rio  at  the  head  of  thirty  thousand  men, 
with  the  determination  of  starving  or  driving  out  the  foe. 
While  he  did  not  succeed  in  this  purpose,  the  province, 
through  the  double  destruction  achieved  by  the  Cubans 
and  the  Spanish,  was  rendered  incapable  of  supporting 
a  large  force,  and  Maceo's  negro  followers  dwindled 
away.  In  consequence,  leaving  his  slender  following 
under  Rius  Rivera,  the  daring  leader  passed  in  a  boat 
around  Weyler  s  trocha  into  Havana  province,  having 
sent  orders  in  advance  for  a  concentration  of  the  Cuban 
forces  in  this  and  Matanzas  province.  While  waiting 
for  these  forces,  on  December  4,  1896,  he,  with  his  few 
followers,  was  fired  on  by  soldiers  in  ambush,  and  fell, 
mortally  wounded.  Dr.  Zertucha,  of  his  staff,  is  charged 
with  having  treacherously  led  him  into  this  ambuscade, 
though  this  is  far  from  certain.  Thus  perished  the 
most  daring  warrior  of  the  Cuban  conflict.  His  eight 
brothers  had  all  died  before  him  in  the  struggle  for 
Cuban  freedom.  His  body  was  recovered  from  the 
enemy  after  a  desperate  fight ;  his  valiant  soul  was  lost 
to  the  cause. 

The  death  of  Maceo  and  the  capture  of  Rivera,  which 
soon  after  took  place,  practically  put  an  end  to  military 
operations  in  Pinar  del  Rio,  and  on  January  n,  1897, 
Weyler  proclaimed  that  the  three  western  provinces 
were  pacified  and  the  rebellion  confined  to  the  eastern 
section  of  the  island.  Gomez  had  withdrawn  into  Cama- 
guey,  where  he  held  his  own,  the  members  of  the  Cuban 
government  being  with  him.  After  announcing  that  the 


THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN.  77 

provinces  were  ' '  pacified, ' '  Weyler  set  out  to  pacify 
them.  Pinar  del  Rio  was  actively  patrolled  by  his 
troops,  and  he  entered  upon  a  campaign  through  Ma- 
tanzas.  Here  he  met  with  no  insurgents  in  arms,  but 
treated  the  country-people  as  rebels,  ruthless  devastation 
marking  his  line  of  march.  The  decree  of  concentra 
tion  which  he  had  issued  was  vigorously  enforced,  the 
country-people  being  driven  into  the  towns,  their  dwel 
lings  burned,  and  everything  destroyed  that  could  in 
any  way  aid  or  shelter  the  insurgents.  All  those  against 
whom  the  shadow  of  suspicion  rested  were  killed  on  the 
spot  and  set  down  as  rebels  slain  in  battle  in  the  absurd 
bulletins  which  Weyler  constantly  issued.  Eventually, 
disturbed  by  the  protests  in  the  United  States  against 
his  barbarity,  he  issued  an  order  that  no  sentence  of 
death  should  be  carried  out  without  his  signature.  But 
this  did  not  put  an  end  to  the  bulletins  of  battles  in 
which  a  Spaniard  or  two  were  wounded  and  ten  or  more 
rebels  killed,  and  which  at  once  excited  the  derision  of 
the  world  and  the  indignation  of  those  who  believed  that 
these  so-called  engagements  were  really  massacres  of 
unarmed  '  *  pacificos. ' '  Weyler  was  rapidly  earning 
contempt  by  his  rodomontade  and  hatred  by  his  cruelty. 
The  Spanish  army  reached  the  city  of  Santa  Clara  in 
February,  1897.  Here,  finding  no  large  body  of  insur 
gents  to  oppose  his  progress,  Weyler  sent  out  columns 
of  infantry  to  burn  and  destroy,  afterwards  crossing  the 
province  back  and  forth  to  see  if  his  orders  had  been 
well  obeyed.  By  the  end  of  the  month  his  troops  had 
reached  the  fertile  valleys  of  the  mountains  between 
Santa  Clara  and  Trinidad,  a  region  in  which  the  Cubans 
had  large  supplies.  Their  system  of  government  em 
braced  a  prefectures ,  it  being  the  duty  of  the  prefect  in 


78  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

each  district  to  claim  control  of  all  supplies,  using  them 
for  the  troops  as  needed  and  paying  the  owners  in  re 
ceipts  for  the  goods  taken.  This  system  had  been  well 
organized  in  the  district  mentioned,  and  the  troops 
found  here  herds  of  cattle,  which  they  drove  away  ; 
coffee-  and  potato-plants,  which  they  destroyed  ;  and 
hospitals,  which  they  burned.  Non-combatants  were 
forced  to  take  to  the  woods.  If  captured,  they  were 
killed  or  taken  with  the  women  and  children  to  fortified 
towns,  there  to  suffer  the  slower  death  of  starvation. 

Gomez,  meanwhile,  was  playing  a  waiting  game, 
knowing  that  the  fury  of  Weyler's  assault  would  soon 
subside.  He  had  no  commissary  department,  and  his 
men  were  divided  up  into  small  bands,  coming  and 
going  much  as  they  pleased,  planting  and  gathering 
their  rapidly  growing  crops,  and  simply  keeping  within 
call  that  they  might  concentrate  in  the  main  camps  if 
any  movement  in  force  should  be  undertaken.  During 
their  longer  marches,  they  had  to  trust  to  their  chance 
of  living  off  the  country.  The  two  eastern  provinces  of 
Santiago  de  Cuba  and  Puerto  Principe  continued  in 
their  hands  throughout  the  war.  The  only  district  held 
by  the  Spaniards  in  Santiago  province  was  that  of 
Bayamo,  and  this  was  retained  only  at  severe  cost  in 
lives  and  strenuous  effort.  The  cutting  of  the  railroad 
to  the  north  more  than  once  reduced  the  garrison  of 
Bayamo  to  the  verge  of  starvation,  while  the  supplies 
which  it  obtained  by  boat  up  the  Rio  Cauto  were  inter 
fered  with  by  the  insurgents,  who  in  January,  1897,  blew 
up  a  Spanish  gunboat  in  that  river  with  a  torpedo 
operated  by  means  of  an  electric  wire  from  the  bordering 
woods.  It  was  the  effort  to  hold  this  town  that  led  to  the 
battle  between  Maceo  and  Campos,  already  described. 


THE   WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  79 

The  principal  demonstrations  of  the  insurgents  during 
1897  were  made  by  the  forces  under  General  Calixto 
Garcia,  like  Gomez  a  veteran  of  the  ten-years'  war,  and 
now  second  in  command.  He  had  reached  Cuba  from 
the  United  States  in  the  spring  of  1897.  The  only 
military  operation  of  the  year  on  the  part  of  the  insur 
gents  that  calls  for  particular  attention  was  the  capture 
by  Garcia  of  the  strongly  fortified  post  of  Victoria  de 
las  Tunas,  northwest  of  Bayamo,  September  30.  The 
siege  of  this  place  continued  for  three  days,  during  which 
the  Spanish  commander  was  slain  and  forty  per  cent,  of 
the  garrison  were  killed  or  wounded,  the  remainder  sur 
rendering.  Garcia' s  success  must  be  attributed  to  his 
possession  of  artillery,  he  having  two  heavy  and  six 
rapid-fire  guns,  which  were  handled  by  American  artil 
lerymen.  One  of  the  latter  estimated  the  spoils  of  the 
victory  to  be  ' '  twenty-one  forts,  over  a  thousand  rifles, 
a  million  rounds  of  ammunition,  and  two  Krupp  can 
non."  The  post  had  been  declared  impregnable  by 
Weyler,  and  its  fall  exposed  him  to  severe  criticism  in 
Madrid. 

In  truth,  Weyler  had  been  losing  ground  with  the 
home  government  throughout  the  year.  The  indigna 
tion  roused  in  the  United  States  by  his  cruelty  had  pro 
duced  a  feeling  of  uneasiness  in  Spain,  whose  people 
seemed  far  more  affected  by  this  protest  than  by  the 
cruelty  itself.  And  it  was  growing  evident  that  Wey 
ler' s  severity  was  little  more  effective  than  Campos' s 
clemency.  The  rebels  continued  unsubdued,  the  high- 
sounding  war-bulletins  were  being  derided  in  foreign 
newspapers  as  transparent  fictions,  and  there  was  im 
minent  danger  that  the  era  of  Weylerism  might  provoke 
armed  intervention  from  the  United  States. 


8o  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

Canovas,  the  prime  minister  who  had  appointed  Wey- 
ler,  continued  to  sustain  him,  but  the  Liberal  party  in 
Spain  was  gaining  power  at  the  expense  of  the  Conser 
vatives,  and  on  August  6,  1897,  the  assassination  of 
Canovas  by  an  Anarchist  left  Weyler  without  support  in 
the  administration.  After  a  brief  interval  the  Liberals 
came  into  power  on  October  4,  under  their  leader  Sagasta, 
one  of  whose  first  acts  was  to  order  Weyler  home.  The 
chief  reason  offered  for  this  step  was  ' '  the  deplorable 
condition  of  the  sick  and  wounded  soldiers  arriving  from 
Cuba."  In  fact,  the  principal  losses  to  Spain  during  the 
war  in  Cuba  had  been  from  disease,  the  field  operations 
being  largely  a  series  of  inconsequential  skirmishes  with 
little  loss  to  either  side. 

Weyler' s  successor  was  General  Ramon  Blanco,  late 
governor-general  of  the  Philippine  Islands,  and  a  man 
of  very  different  character  from  his  predecessor.  He 
reached  Havana  October  31,  1897,  and  at  once  attempted 
to  put  into  effect  the  milder  policy  which  had  been  de 
cided  upon  at  Madrid.  He  had  announced,  (<  My  policy 
will  never  include  concentration.  I  fight  the  enemy,  not 
women  and  children.  One  of  the  first  things  I  shall  do 
will  be  to  greatly  extend  the  zones  of  cultivation,  and 
allow  the  reconcentrados  to  go  out  of  the  towns  and  till 
the  soil. ' ' 

But  it  was  easier  to  promise  than  to  perform.  The 
starving  reconcentrados  were  in  no  condition  to  wait 
until  nature  should  return  food  in  exchange  for  their 
labor.  The  amnesty  proclamation  issued  by  Blanco  was 
unheeded  by  the  insurgents.  They  had  lost  all  faith  in 
Spanish  clemency,  and  did  not  propose  to  lay  down  their 
arms.  The  autonomous  administration  which  he  sought 
to  establish  was  a  similar  failure.  The  insurgents  would 


Adm.  Patricio  Montojo 


Gen.  Linares 


Adm.  Pascual  Cervera 


Gen.  Ramon  Blanco 


Gen.  Yaleriano  Weyler  Gen.  Martin,^  eje tC 

SPANISH    COMMANDERS  ^ 


THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN.  81 

have  no  autonomy.  ' '  Independence  or  death' '  was  their 
sole  demand.  Gomez  issued  a  warning  that  any  person 
coming  to  his  camps  with  offers  of  autonomy  should  be 
shot  as  a  spy  ;  and  this  severe  order  was  carried  out  in 
the  case  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Ruiz,  who  sought  the 
camp  of  General  Aranguren  and  persisted  in  offering 
autonomy  to  the  men  after  being  warned  of  the  conse 
quences.  Aranguren,  although  his  personal  friend, 
ordered  him  to  execution.  That  decisive  event  put  an 
end  to  the  scheme  of  home  rule  under  a  Spanish  gov 
ernor-general. 

With  the  offers  of  amnesty  and  home  government  was 
mingled  an  attempt  to  bribe  the  Cuban  leaders  to  desert 
their  men.  This  met  with  a  still  less  favorable  recep 
tion,  and  several  of  those  who  sought  to  tempt  the 
leaders  to  dishonor  were  dealt  with  as  Ruiz  had  been. 

Meanwhile  the  war  had  fallen  back  into  its  old  condi 
tion  of  outpost  skirmishes  and  indecisive  conflicts,  and 
to  all  appearance  the  task  of  putting  down  the  insurrec 
tion  was  no  more  advanced  than  in  the  spring  of  1895, 
though  Spain  had  sent  two  hundred  thousand  soldiers  to 
Cuba  and  had  almost  fallen  into  bankruptcy  through 
her  futile  efforts.  Thus  events  drifted  on  into  the  year 
1898. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE  FORTS  AND  THE  TROCHAS. 

THE  account  of  the  leading  events  of  the  insurrection 
given  in  the  preceding  chapter  is  but  half  the  story.  The 
methods  of  conducting  the  war  by  the  Spaniards  were 
there  little  more  than  hinted  at,  it  being  deemed  advisable 
to  reserve  them  for  a  more  detailed  separate  description. 
This  it  is  proposed  to  give  in  the  present  chapter.  Why 
it  is  that  an  army  of  more  than  two  hundred  thousand 
regulars,  with  a  contingent  force  of  some  sixty  thousand 
volunteers,  could  be  held  at  bay  for  three  years  by  a 
body  of  insurgents  certainly  never  numbering  over  fifty 
thousand,  and  most  of  the  time,  in  all  probability,  far 
below  that  number,  and  this  in  an  island  of  comparatively 
small  dimensions,  is  a  mystery  which  has  sorely  puzzled 
the  lookers-on.  It  seems  evident  that  there  has  been 
something  radically  wrong  in  the  conduct  of  the  war  by 
its  three  successive  generals,  for  such  strenuous  efforts 
on  the  part  of  Spain  to  yield  such  meagre  results.  A 
consideration  of  the  mode  in  which  the  war  was  conducted 
may  serve  to  make  more  apparent  the  cause  of  Spain's 
signal  failure. 

Certainly,  no  very  decisive  result  can  ever  be  looked 
for  from  guerrilla  warfare.  As  a  defensive  expedient, 
adopted  to  protract  a  combat,  it  has  its  uses,  and  the 
Cubans,  with  their  inferior  forces,  were  wise  in  employ 
ing  it.  They  had  no  hope  of  mastering  Spain  in  the 
field,  but  entertained  a  reasonable  expectation  of  wearing 
82 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  83 

her  out  in  the  bush,  and  of  forcing  her  at  length  to  retire 
from  the  contest  through  sheer  lack  of  money  and  men. 
These  hardy  bush-rangers  preferred  to  let  disease  do  its 
work  on  the  unacclimated  lives  of  Spain  and  save  their 
small  supply  of  cartridges  for  sheer  necessity.  The  yel 
low  fever  could  be  trusted  as  a  more  effective  ally  of  their 
cause  than  the  Mauser  rifle. 

But  why  the  Spanish  commanders  adopted  the  same 
mode  of  warfare  is  difficult  of  comprehension,  unless  it 
be  that  this  is  the  intuitive  Spanish  idea  of  war.  In  the 
early  years  of  the  nineteenth  century,  during  the  Napo 
leonic  contests,  the  Spanish  forces  conducted  war  in  the 
guerrilla  method.  In  its  closing  years  they  adopted 
the  same  method  in  their  contest  with  the  Cuban  insur 
rectionists.  In  all  their  wars  of  the  century,  in  fact,  the 
guerrilla  system  seems  to  have  held  predominance  ;  and 
it  may  be  that  Spain's  loss  of  all  her  American  colonies 
was  due  to  a  lack  of  breadth,  boldness,  and  energy  of 
movement  in  dealing  with  the  rebel  forces.  The  Spanish 
soldier  does  not  want  in  courage,  but  the  Spanish  com 
mander  seems  sadly  lacking  in  military  genius. 

With  a  quarter  of  a  million  of  men  at  their  command, 
Campos  or  Weyler  should,  one  would  think,  have  been 
able  to  construct  a  net-work  of  military  roads  from  end 
to  end  of  the  island  with  no  more  effort  than  was  ex 
pended  in  building  forts  and  trochas.  And  with  such 
facilities  provided  for  rapid  movements  in  force  they 
should  certainly  have  succeeded  in  keeping  the  small 
bodies  of  insurgents  in  check  and  in  penetrating  all 
their  lurking-places.  It  is  easy,  of  course,  for  civilian 
generals  to  win  battles  on  paper,  and  the  easier  the  less 
they  are  familiar  with  the  facts  of  the  situation  ;  yet  it 
may  be  taken  as  beyond  question  that  if  the  Spanish 


84  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

troops  had  been  replaced  by  an  American,  British, 
German,  or  French  army,  with  almost  any  one  of  the 
skilled  commanders  now  in  those  armies,  the  mode  of 
campaigning  and  the  result  would  have  been  far  different 
from  those  which  Spain  has  to  show. 

The  trocha  and  the  fort,  trusted  to  by  Spain  as  her 
principal  means  of  success,  seem  to  have  been  her  prin 
cipal  causes  of  failure.  An  account  of  these  expedients, 
upon  which  so  much  dependence  was  placed,  comes  next 
in  course.  The  trocha  is  simply  a  passage-way  made 
across  a  country  without  regard  to  its  topography  or  its 
other  roads.  The  word  trocha  means  trench,  and  sus 
tains  this  meaning  in  some  of  the  military  lines  con 
structed  in  Cuba,  though  not  in  all.  The  idea  of  the 
trocha  was  first  conceived  in  the  insurrection  of  1868-78 
as  a  military  cordon  across  the  island,  with  detached 
forts  at  short  intervals,  its  purpose  being  to  hem  in  the 
insurrectionists  and  confine  them  to  a  limited  region  of 
the  island, — a  purpose  in  which  it  signally  failed. 

This  original  trocha  crossed  the  island  between  the 
provinces  of  Puerto  Principe  and  Santa  Clara,  the  dis 
tance  across  at  this  point  being  less  than  fifty  miles  and 
the  country  elevated  but  little  above  sea-level,  the  moun 
tains  here  sinking  into  the  plain.  The  flanks  of  this 
military  line  rested  in  the  tangled  mangrove  swamps  of 
the  coast.  The  forts  were  garrisoned,  and  small  detach 
ments  of  troops  occupied  the  spaces  between  ;  but  the 
device  proved  of  little  value,  Gomez,  as  if  in  derision, 
crossing  it  with  his  wife  and  servants. 

Campos  no  sooner  took  command  in  1895  than  he 
revived  the  idea  of  confining  his  foes  by  a  trocha,  con 
structing  it  across  the  same  region  as  before,  fifty  thou 
sand  men  being  employed  in  the  task.  It  was  barely 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN.  85 

finished  when  Gomez  crossed  it  at  Sancti  Spiritus  and 
carried  the  war  into  Santa  Clara.  Maceo  followed  him, 
as  already  stated,  by  means  of  a  feigned  attack,  and 
Campos,  thinking  his  trocha  too  far  from  the  capital, 
built  a  second,  this  extending  between  Las  Cruces  and 
Las  Lajas  and  skirting  the  great  salt  marsh  of  Zapata. 
It  proved  as  ineffectual  as  the  former,  and  Campos  found 
it  expedient  to  continue  his  retreat,  defending  his  rear 
by  a  third  trocha,  which  crossed  the  island  between 
Matanzas  and  La  Broa  Bay,  a  distance  of  only  twenty- 
eight  miles.  This  line  had  a  new  means  of  defence,  it 
being  traversed  by  the  railroad  from  Havana  to  Bata- 
bano,  on  whose  tracks  were  placed  a  series  of  perambu- 
latory  forts  in  the  form  of  freight-cars  plated  with  boiler 
iron  and  pierced  with  loop-holes  for  rifles.  All  the  rail 
roads  were  provided  with  similar  cars,  which  were  sent 
with  all  passenger  trains  and  kept  in  motion  night  and 
day.  But  Gomez  and  Maceo  showed  their  appreciation 
of  the  Spanish  general' s  device  by  crossing  the  ' '  iron 
dead-line"  with  all  their  forces  without  firing  a  shot. 
Then  they  rode  back  and  tore  up  some  three  miles  of 
the  railroad  track,  "Just  to  let  the  Spaniards  know," 
said  Gomez,  * c  that  we  have  noticed  their  toy. ' ' 

Weyler,  on  coming  into  power,  accepted  the  idea  of 
the  trocha  as  a  valuable  inheritance  from  his  predecessor, 
and  soon  after  reaching  the  island  set  his  men  to  con 
structing  one  to  the  westward  of  Havana,  with  the 
expectation  of  shutting  up  Maceo  in  Pinar  del  Rio. 
This  extended  from  Mariel,  about  twenty-five  miles  from 
the  capital,  to  Majana,  on  the  southern  coast,  a  distance 
of  about  twenty  miles.  He  also  made  one  on  the  old 
line  between  Jucaro  and  Moron,  in  the  western  part  of 
the  province  of  Puerto  Principe. 


86  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

The  trocha  upon  which  Weyler  depended  to  cut  the 
rebel  army  in  two  and  shut  up  Maceo  effectually  in  Pinar 
del  Rio  can  be  described  in  a  few  words.  In  construct 
ing  this  military  line  the  forest  and  dense  underbrush 
were  cut  down  through  a  width  of  from  one  hundred  to 
eight  hundred  yards.  Along  this  passage-way  a  barbed- 
wire  fence  nearly  four  feet  high  was  erected,  behind 
which  the  sentinels  were  posted.  Forty  yards  back  of 
it  was  a  trench  three  feet  wide  and  four  feet  deep,  with  a 
breastwork  of  palmetto  logs.  Fifty  yards  farther  back 
were  the  log  houses  which  served  as  quarters  for  the 
troops.  These  were  built  at  intervals  of  from  five  hun 
dred  to  eight  hundred  yards,  being  constructed  of  logs 
with  dressed  lumber  on  the  outside.  A  narrow  opening 
ran  round  the  fort  to  permit  firing,  and  near  the  top  was 
an  opening  three  feet  wide  to  admit  the  air.  Each  fort 
had  a  garrison  of  about  one  hundred  men,  the  whole 
line  being  guarded  by  about  fifteen  thousand  soldiers. 
A  platform  of  palm-boards,  eight  feet  wide,  was  built 
where  the  line  penetrated  the  swamp,  the  huts  being 
there  erected  on  piles.  The  soldiers  never  left  the  forts 
or  platform  to  explore  the  swamp,  but  fired  upon  every 
person  they  saw  near  the  line,  taking  it  for  granted  that 
all  intruders  were  enemies.  It  was  through  the  swamp 
that  the  insurgents  usually  passed  the  line.  Maceo 
made  the  passage  that  led  to  his  death  by  aid  of  a 
boat. 

The  trocha  from  Jucaro  to  Moron  presented  some  differ 
ences,  the  ditch  being  absent.  The  cleared  space  through 
the  tropical  forest  was  here  some  fifty  miles  long  and 
about  two  hundred  yards  wide,  the  felled  trees  being 
piled  up  along  the  two  sides  of  the  roadway  in  parallel 
rows  to  a  height  of  six  feet  or  more.  No  man  could 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  87 

cross  this  breastwork  of  jagged  roots  and  branches  with 
out  difficulty,  and  no  horse  could  make  its  way  across. 
A  military  railroad  extended  the  whole  length  of  the 
cleared  space,  on  one  side  of  which  was  the  line  of  forts, 
and  beyond  this  the  barbed-wire  fence.  On  the  two 
sides  were  the  barriers  of  fallen  trees,  with  the  jungle 
beyond. 

There  were  three  kinds  and  sizes  of  forts  along  the 
trocha, — large  ones  half  a  mile  apart,  smaller  block 
houses  midway  between  these,  and  in  each  of  the  quarter- 
mile  intervals  three  little  forts  of  mud  and  planks,  each 
surrounded  by  a  ditch  and  holding  five  men.  The 
barbed  wire  was  closely  interlaced,  there  being  over 
four  hundred  yards  of  wire  to  every  twelve  yards  of 
posts.  Entrance  to  the  larger  forts  was  obtainable  only 
by  the  aid  of  ladders,  which  could  be  raised  from  the 
inside  ;  and  there  was  provided  an  overhanging  story 
with  loop-holes  through  which  the  defenders  could  fire 
down  upon  a  foe  below.  The  Spaniards  also  distributed 
bombs  along  the  trocha,  each  with  an  explosive  cap  to 
which  five  or  six  wires  were  attached,  so  that  they  might 
be  exploded  by  any  one  striking  a  wire.  This  was  a 
device  that  seemed  likely  to  prove  as  dangerous  to  the 
defenders  as  to  their  enemies. 

As  to  the  utility  of  the  trochas,  Consul- General  Lee 
tells  us  that  they  cost  a  large  amount  of  money  and  were 
in  the  end  practically  abandoned  as  useless.  They  had 
the  serious  defect  of  absorbing  a  large  force  of  men  for 
their  defence,  to  this  extent  diminishing  the  effective 
Spanish  army. 

A  second  Spanish  military  measure,  the  fort  (aside 
from  those  along  the  trochas),  added  seriously  to  the 
depletion  of  the  force  effective  for  field  duty.  In  the 


88  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

words  of  Richard  Harding  Davis,*  the  Spaniards,  as 
soon  as  the  revolution  broke  out,  * '  began  to  build  tiny 
forts,  and  continued  to  add  to  these  and  improve  those 
already  built,  until  now  the  whole  island,  which  is  eight 
hundred  miles  long  and  averages  eighty  miles  in  width, 
is  studded  as  thickly  with  these  little  forts  as  is  the  sole 
of  a  brogan  with  iron  nails.  .  .  .  These  forts  now  stretch 
all  over  the  island,  some  in  straight  lines,  some  in  circles, 
and  some  zigzagging  from  hill-top  to  hill-top  ;  some 
within  a  quarter  of  a  mile  of  the  next,  and  others  so  near 
that  the  sentries  can  toss  a  cartridge  from  one  to  the 
other." 

Within  these  forts  and  the  fortified  towns  and  cities 
the  Spaniards  held  absolute  possession.  Outside  them — 
that  is,  in  all  the  rest  of  the  country — the  Cubans  were 
masters  of  the  situation,  not  in  fixed  possession,  but 
able  to  make  it  uncomfortable  for  any  intruders  on  their 
domain.  The  towns  were  surrounded  by  successive 
circles  of  forts,  with  detached  ones  farther  out,  no  person 
being  allowed  to  leave  a  town  without  a  pass,  or  to  enter 
one  without  giving  a  satisfactory  account  of  himself. 
Any  one  venturing  outside  the  circle  without  authority 
rendered  himself  a  rebel,  and  was  likely  soon  to  be  made 
1 '  food  for  powder. ' ' 

In  all,  Cuba  possessed  two  thousand  or  more  such 
forts,  structures  impervious  to  rifle-shots  and  loop-holed 
for  service.  They  stood  upon  every  commanding  place 
and  formed  a  feature  in  the  landscape  hardly  second  to 
the  royal  palm,  that  dominating  characteristic  of  Cuban 
scenery.  With  the  long  range  of  their  rifles  the  Spanish 
soldiery  could  command  a  wide  reach  of  territory  from 

*  "  Cuba  in  War  Time." 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  89 

these  strongholds,  but  they  were  such  wretched  marks 
men  that  the  insurgents  had  little  fear  in  venturing  close 
up.  The  marksmanship  on  either  side,  indeed,  had 
little  to  boast  of. 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  Spaniards  were  specially  active 
in  defensive  measures.  These  were  well  enough  in 
themselves,  but  of  little  value  in  suppressing  an  insur 
rection  unless  supplemented  by  active  offensive  opera 
tions.  From  their  forts  one  would  think  it  should  have 
been  their  policy  to  follow  the  enemy  and  give  him 
battle  wherever  found,  but  this  is  an  idea  that  does  not 
seem  to  have  deeply  penetrated  the  Spanish  cerebrum. 
Bodies  of  guerrillas  and  columns  of  troops  left  the  forts 
often  enough,  but  they  seemed  to  regard  it  as  their  duty 
to  fall  back  upon  their  strongholds  every  night.  If  they 
encountered  a  body  of  the  enemy,  a  fusillade  would 
follow  ;  but  to  pursue  a  flying  enemy  did  not  form  a 
part  of  their  policy,  and  instead  of  encamping  on  the 
ground  and  following  the  retreating  foe  the  next  day, 
they  invariably  retreated  after  the  battle  to  the  shelter  of 
a  neighboring  town  or  circle  of  forts.  Their  excuse  for 
this  was  that  they  were  afraid  of  being  decoyed  into  an 
ambush,  or  that  they  could  not  forsake  their  wounded 
to  pursue  the  enemy.  A  force  of  as  many  as  a  thousand 
soldiers  might  carry  back  a  few  wounded  men,  making 
this  their  sole  pretense  for  a  return. 

In  truth,  there  is  good  reason  to  believe  that  the 
Spanish  officers  were  not  eager  to  end  the  rebellion,  and 
that  much  of  the  failure  of  Campos  and  Weyler  was  due 
to  the  character  of  the  tools  they  had  to  handle.  The 
officers  preferred  to  have  the  war  go  on,  as  they  received 
double  pay  while  on  foreign  service,  while  promotion 
was  much  more  rapid  than  in  times  of  peace.  Orders 


90  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

and  crosses  are  also  freely  distributed,  often  for  small 
service.  They  seem  to  have  emulated  the  civil  officials 
in  forcing  loans  or  fees  from  planters  and  others,  and  are 
believed  to  have  kept  for  themselves  a  large  part  of  the 
pay  of  their  men.  The  government  suffered  from  their 
peculations,  it  being  a  common  practice  to  report  a  con 
siderable  consumption  of  rations  and  expenditure  of 
cartridges  * '  in  service, ' '  when  perhaps  only  a  few  huts 
had  been  burned  and  the  command  had  come  back  in 
time  for  dinner.  The  officers  played  constantly  into  one 
another's  hands  in  thus  hoodwinking  the  government. 
Such  is  the  strange  Spanish  sense  of  honor.  A  soldier 
may  be  quite  ready  to  die  for  his  country,  but  is  quite 
as  ready  to  rob  it. 

In  illustration  of  the  character  of  the  officers'  reports, 
some  extracts  from  war-bulletins  may  be  of  interest. 
Here  is  a  typical  Spanish  story  : 

"The  Guadalajara  battalion,  while  marching  to  San 
Miguel,  met  a  party  of  six  hundred  rebels,  commanded 
by  Aguirre  and  Morejon.  A  fierce  fight  ensued,  result 
ing,  it  is  said,  in  the  rebels  being  so  thoroughly  beaten 
that  they  fled  demoralized  from  the  field.  The  rebel 
loss  was  stated  to  have  been  sixty,  including  fourteen 
killed.  The  Spanish  troops  were  reported  to  have  lost 
one  officer  and  three  soldiers  wounded. ' ' 

The  Cubans  tell  this  story  with  a  difference  : 

"The  affair  was  similar  to  others  in  which  '  Pacifi- 
cos,'  or  peaceful  citizens,  have  been  killed  by  Spanish 
troops.  Fourteen  of  the  dead  are  said  to  have  been 
employe's  on  estates,  and  not  insurgents.  On  the 
Spanish  side  none  were  killed  and  only  three  wounded, 
while  the  Cuban  dead  exceeded  thirty. ' ' 

Numerous  examples  of  this  kind  might  be  quoted  in 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  91 

which  the  discrepancy  of  losses  was  so  great  as  to  be 
come  ridiculous.  It  was  easier  to  lie  than  to  fight  We 
quote  again  : 

4  *  Colonel  Hernandez  reports  having  a  fight  with  the 
rebel  bands  of  Masso  and  Acea  near  San  Felipe.  The 
enemy  occupied  strong  positions,  but  were  attacked 
with  great  vigor  by  the  troops,  and  finally  fled,  leaving 
seven  dead  upon  the  field.  The  troops  had  five  men 
wounded. ' ' 

' '  Colonel  Moncado  reports  having  had  several  en 
gagements  with  rebel  bands  near  Cienfuegos,  in  which 
the  enemy  had  four  men  killed  and  seventy  wounded, 
and  the  Spanish  troops  had  five  wounded.  * ' 

* '  The  official  report  of  the  fight  on  the  Fermina 
ranch,  near  Jovellanos,  states  that  the  rebels  lost  eight 
killed  ;  the  troops  lost  seven  wounded.  The  Spaniards 
pursued  the  rebels  and  in  skirmishes  killed  eighteen, 
without  loss  to  themselves. ' ' 

These  preposterous  stories  were  probably  not  told 
through  sheer  love  of  lying  and  trust  in  human  gulli 
bility.  The  officers  probably  had  another  object  in 
view  in  reporting  so  few  of  their  troops  killed,  that  of 
keeping  the  names  of  the  dead  on  the  pay-rolls  and 
pocketing  their  pay.  Such  is  said  to  have  been  one  of 
the  methods  in  which  those  who  were  chiefly  responsible 
for  protracting  the  war  managed  to  make  it  profitable  to 
themselves. 


CHAPTER    V. 

THE   RECONCENTRADOS   AND    THE   MILITARY   PRISONS. 

IN  the  present  chapter  we  propose  to  consider  the 
principal  causes  of  American  interposition  in  the  war, 
this  being  the  savage  Weylerian  policy  of  concentration 
and  the  barbarous  treatment  of  American  citizens  in 
Spanish  prisons.  General  Weyler  paved  the  way  for 
intervention  in  his  famous  "  Reconcentrado"  order. 
Finding  the  rebels  when  he  came  to  the  government 
stationed  in  every  part  of  the  island,  and  failing  to  dis 
possess  them  as  he  had  engaged  to  do,  he  sought  to 
starve  them  out  by  cutting  off  what  he  supposed  to  be 
their  main  source  of  food-supply.  By  laying  waste  the 
country,  and  depriving  them  of  the  food  they  had  been 
obtaining  from  the  country-people,  he  fancied  that  he 
could  through  sheer  starvation  force  them  into  sub 
mission. 

The  result  was  one  without  a  parallel  in  the  military 
history  of  the  nations, — the  deliberate  enforcement  of  a 
plan  of  action  which  brought  starvation  to  the  bulk  of 
the  inhabitants  of  a  country,  and  which  had  no  just 
claim  of  efficacy  to  warrant  it.  All  the  pacificos,  as 
the  non-combatants  were  called,  were  ordered  into  the 
cities  and  towns, — namely,  the  old  men,  women,  and 
children,  as  the  brutal  order  forced  most  of  the  young 
men  into  the  rebel  ranks.  All  their  food-plants  were 
then  uprooted,  their  dwellings  burned,  and  their  animals 
driven  away.  The  helpless  people  were  gathered  within 
92 


THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN.  93 

a  line  drawn  one  hundred  and  fifty  yards  around  a  town, 
or  were  collected  around  the  forts.  They  were  thus  in 
a  great  measure  prevented  from  tilling  the  ground  ;  they 
had  no  means  of  obtaining  food  beyond  the  little  the 
town-people  could  spare  in  charity  ;  death  by  bullet  was 
their  lot  if  they  ventured  to  cross  the  dead-line,  and 
death  by  disease  or  starvation  was  inevitable  if  they 
remained. 

* 4  War  is  war, ' '  was  Weyler'  s  excuse  for  this  barbar 
ous  order  ;  but  the  order  was  in  no  proper  sense  a  war 
necessity,  since  its  effect  was  to  drive  the  able-bodied 
into  the  fields  to  fight  and  leave  the  helpless  behind  to 
die.  It  was  * '  worse  than  a  crime,  it  was  a  blunder, ' ' 
for  it  failed  in  its  original  purpose,  the  insurgents  prov 
ing  able  to  find  what  food  they  required,  and  having 
little  need  of  the  shelter  of  the  burned  huts.  The  order 
failed  to  distress  those  against  whom  it  was  aimed,  while 
it  brought  the  deepest  misery  to  thousands  of  inno 
cent  and  helpless  people  who  were  crowded  into  the 
towns,  without  food  or  shelter,  and  under  most  unsani 
tary  conditions.  As  a  result,  disease  and  starvation  vied 
with  each  other  in  sweeping  them  away,  until,  in  the 
words  of  Consul-General  Lee,  of  the  four  hundred  thou 
sand  innocents  herded  where  they  could  obtain  no  food 
no  less  than  two  hundred  thousand  died  of  starvation. 
Small-pox,  yellow  fever,  and  other  dread  diseases  aided 
hunger  in  this  fearful  work,  the  people  being  forced  to 
live  amid  a  filth  which  in  that  hot  climate,  especially  in 
the  rainy  season,  could  not  but  cause  pestilence  to  run 
rampant  over  the  land. 

General  Weyler  had  issued  a  reconcentration  decree 
upon  his  arrival  in  Havana.  This  it  was  not  convenient 
to  put  into  effect  at  that  time,  and  it  was  deferred  until 


94  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

he  took  the  field  in  person  against  Maceo,  when  a  new 
decree  was  promulgated,  under  date  of  October  21, 
1896.  He  gave  the  pacificos  eight  days  to  come  in  to 
the  fortified  places,  stating  that  all  who  remained  in  the 
country  after  that  interval  should  be  treated  as  enemies, 
— that  is,  should  be  killed  wherever  found.  Zones  of 
cultivation  were  marked  off,  adjoining  the  towns  and 
villages,  which  the  pacificos  were  to  have  permission  to 
cultivate  ;  but  this  part  of  the  decree  seems  never  to 
have  been  carried  out,  or  so  imperfectly  as  to  be  useless. 
Such  is  the  statement  of  travellers,  who  also  state  that 
low-lying  and  swampy  ground  was  selected  for  the 
reconcentrados, — the  most  insalubrious  situations  that 
could  well  be  chosen. 

In  Jaruco,  as  described  by  Richard  Harding  Davis, 
the  filth  lay  ankle- deep  in  streets  and  plaza,  and  made 
its  way  into  a  church  which  was  occupied  as  a  barrack. 
The  pacificos  occupied  closely-built  rows  of  huts,  holding 
from  four  to  six  persons  each,  while  ten  feet  away  were 
cavalry- barracks,  occupied  by  sixty  men  with  their 
horses,  and  left  in  a  state  of  dangerous  uncleanliness.  No 
one  was  vaccinated,  and  small-pox  swept  like  a  con 
suming  fire  through  huts  and  barracks  alike.  Decency 
of  any  kind  was  out  of  the  question.  Utter,  hopeless 
dejection  was  the  aspect  of  the  pacificos,  most  of  .whom 
were  incapable  from  weakness  of  cultivating  the  ground 
and  waiting  for  the  slow  return  in  food.  Gaunt,  hollow- 
eyed,  half-clad  in  rags,  they  sat  listless  and  hopeless, 
too  dejected  even  to  lift  their  eyes  when  money  or  food 
was  handed  them.  At  Cardenas  he  saw  '  *  babies  with 
the  skin  drawn  so  tightly  over  their  little  bodies  that  the 
bones  showed  through  as  plainly  as  the  rings  under  a 
glove.  They  were  covered  with  sores,  and  they  pro- 


THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN.  95 

tested  as  loudly  as  they  could  against  the  treatment  that 
the  world  was  giving  them,  clinching  their  fists  and  sob 
bing  with  pain  when  the  sore  places  came  in  contact 
with  their  mothers'  arms. ' ' 

As  time  went  on  the  horrors  of  the  situation  increased. 
President  McKinley,  in  his  message  of  April  n,  1898, 
states  that  a  year  earlier  reconcentration  had  been  ex 
tended  over  all  but  the  two  eastern  provinces,  more  than 
three  hundred  thousand  of  the  country-people  being 
herded  in  the  vicinity  of  the  towns,  without  shelter  or 
means  of  support,  poorly  clad,  and  under  most  unsani 
tary  conditions. 

' '  As  the  scarcity  of  food  increased  with  the  devasta 
tion  of  the  depopulated  areas  of  production,"  he  con 
tinues,  * '  destitution  and  want  became  misery  and  star 
vation.  Month  by  month  the  death-rate  increased  in 
alarming  ratio.  By  March,  1897,  according  to  conserva 
tive  estimates  from  official  Spanish  sources,  the  mortality 
among  the  reconcentrados  from  starvation  and  the  dis 
eases  thereto  incident  exceeded  fifty  per  cent,  of  their 
total  number.  No  practical  relief  was  accorded  to  the 
destitute.  The  overburdened  towns,  already  suffering 
from  the  general  dearth,  could  give  no  aid.  So-called 
zones  of  cultivation  that  were  established  within  the  im 
mediate  area  of  effective  military  control  about  the  cities 
and  fortified  camps  proved  illusory  as  a  remedy  for  the 
suffering.  The  unfortunates,  being  for  the  most  part 
women  and  children,  or  aged  and  helpless  men  enfeebled 
by  disease  and  hunger,  could  not  have  tilled  the  soil 
without  tools,  seed,  or  shelter,  to  provide  for  their  own 
support  or  for  the  supply  of  the  cities.  Reconcentration 
worked  its  predestined  result.  As  I  said  in  my  message 
of  last  December,  it  was  not  a  civilized  warfare,  it  was 


96  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

extermination.  The  only  peace  it  could  beget  was  that 
of  the  wilderness  and  the  grave. ' ' 

In  March,  1898,  a  party  of  Congressmen  visited  Cuba 
with  a  partly  official  purpose,  that  of  seeing  for  them 
selves  and  reporting  to  the  government  the  actual  con 
dition  of  affairs  in  the  island.  Among  them  were 
Senators  Proctor  of  Vermont,  Gallinger  of  New  Hamp 
shire,  and  Thurston  of  Nebraska.  What  they  saw  and 
described  in  eloquent  language  to  Congress  was  of  a 
soul-harrowing  character.  Their  description  of  the  hope 
less,  unspeakable  misery  of  the  famishing  reconcentrados 
and  the  frightfully-desolated  condition  of  one  of  the  most 
fertile  islands  under  the  sun  roused  the  American  people 
as  they  had  rarely  been  aroused  before,  awakening  a 
pity  and  indignation  which  rendered  speedy  intervention 
inevitable.  So  great,  to  one  of  sympathetic  nature,  was 
the  shock  of  the  suffering  observed,  that  the  wife  of 
Senator  Thurston,  who  was  in  delicate  health,  received 
her  death-stroke  from  the  dreadful  scenes  witnessed  by 
her  on  this  journey. 

The  result  of  it  all  was,  that  while  General  Weylerwas 
living  in  the  utmost  luxury  at  Havana,  and  boasting  of 
being  surrounded  by  conditions  of  wealth  and  ease  un 
equalled  in  the  land  (we  quote  from  an  interview  reported 
by  Mrs.  Masterson),  nearly  or  quite  a  quarter  of  a  million 
of  human  beings  were  perishing  of  starvation  and  disease, 
the  result  of  his  brutal  order,  and  under  conditions  of 
misery  too  horrible  to  contemplate. 

This  was  not  the  only  barbarity  practised.  That  meted 
out  to  the  * '  suspects' '  was  quite  as  brutal.  The  mass 
of  these  were  disposed  of  summarily  by  the  aid  of  the 
rifle-shot  or  the  machete.  But  many  were  thrown  into 
prison,  and  kept  there  under  maddening  conditions. 


THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN.  97 

being  held  incomunicado  ("without  communication") 
in  dark  little  cells,  where  for  days  and  months  they  were 
not  permitted  to  hear  a  human  voice,  have  book  or  paper 
to  read,  or  any  alleviation  of  their  suffering.  Among 
them  were  a  considerable  number  of  American  citizens, 
men  of  Cuban  birth  who  had  become  naturalized  in 
this  country,  and  some  of  them  of  American  ancestry. 
Among  these  were  the  Competitor  prisoners,  a  number 
of  men  captured  on  the  filibustering  vessel  of  that  name, 
who  had  been  taken  May  8,  1896,  tried  by  a  Spanish 
court  organized  to  convict,  and  sentenced  to  death  on  the 
testimony  of  the  captain  of  the  Spanish  gunboat  that  had 
made  the  capture.  The  execution  of  this  unjust  sentence 
was  prevented  by  the  intervention  of  the  United  States, 
but  the  prisoners  were  kept  in  a  state  of  painful  imprison 
ment  until  the  end  of  Weyler's  term  of  office. 

Consul-General  Lee  earnestly  and  vigorously  protested 
against  the  detention  of  American  citizens  under  such 
circumstances  as  a  violation  of  the  treaty  between  the 
United  States  and  Spain,  which,  he  stated,  limited  im 
prisonment  incomunicado  to  seventy-two  hours.  Weyler 
replied  that  his  declaration  of  martial  law  superseded  the 
treaty  ;  a  claim  which  Lee  strenuously  denied.  Ameri 
cans,  he  stated,  had  been  arrested  without  any  declared 
charges  and  without  the  knowledge  of  their  friends  and 
relatives,  and  put  in  little  eight-by-ten  cells,  dark  and  with 
floors  of  stone,  where  they  were  kept  for  days,  seeing 
none  but  their  jailers  and  speaking  to  no  one.  Lee  pro 
tested  that  every  man  was  by  law  considered  innocent 
until  he  had  been  proved  guilty,  but  he  found  it  diffi 
cult  to  penetrate  Weyler's  thick  moral  cuticle  with  the 
arguments  usually  effective  among  civilized  people. 

A  final  case  came  when  Dr.  Ruiz,  an  American  dentist 
7 


98  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

of  Guanabacoa,  a  town  about  four  miles  from  Havana, 
was  arrested,  with  others  of  the  place,  in  consequence  of 
an  insurgent  attack  on  a  railroad  train.  It  was  charged 
that  the  rebels  had  received  information  from  these  pris 
oners.  Dr.  Ruiz  could  easily  have  disproved  this,  but 
he  was  given  no  opportunity  to  do  so,  being  thrown  into 
prison  and  kept  there  for  three  hundred  and  sixty  hours. 
He  was  an  athletic  man,  in  perfect  health,  but  the  hor 
rors  of  the  incomunicado  prison- cell  crazed  him.  While 
calling  pitifully  for  his  wife  and  children,  he  was  struck 
on  the  head  with  the  baton  of  a  brutal  jailer,  and  died  in 
consequence. 

This  cruel  act,  which  could  not  be  concealed,  caused 
widespread  indignation,  and  General  Lee  determined 
that  such  treatment  of  United  States  citizens  should 
cease.  Finding  that  another  American,  named  Scott, 
was  in  prison  under  similar  conditions,  he  demanded  his 
release  in  words  whose  import  there  was  no  mistaking. 
Weyler  complied  ;  and  from  that  time  forward  every 
American  arrested  was  turned  over  to  General  Lee,  who 
sent  all  such  to  the  United  States. 

This  respite  applied  only  to  Americans.  Cuban  sus 
pects  had  no  alleviation  of  their  sufferings  except  the 
final  one  that  came  from  the  fusillade  of  the  firing-party. 
Of  those  who  escaped  execution,  many  suffered  exile 
under  aggravating  circumstances.  A  letter  from  Senor 
Carpio  says  of  the  Cuban  exiles  who,  disembarking  at 
Cadiz,  were  sent  on  foot  to  the  distant  castle  of  Figueras  : 
' '  The  unfortunate  exiles  pass  here  barefooted  and  bleed 
ing,  almost  naked  and  freezing.  At  every  town,  far 
from  finding  rest  from  their  fatigue,  they  are  received 
with  all  sorts  of  insults  ;  they  are  scoffed  and  provoked. 
I  have  two  sons  who  are  fighting  against  the  Cuban 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN.  99 

insurgents,  but  this  does  not  prevent  me  from  de 
nouncing  those  who  ill-treat  their  prisoners.  I  have 
witnessed  such  outrages  upon  the  unfortunate  exiles  that 
I  do  not  hesitate  to  say  that  nothing  like  it  has  ever 
occurred  in  Africa." 

The  act  of  barbarity  of  the  Spanish  authorities  that 
excited  most  interest  in  the  United  States  was  the  im 
prisonment  of  Evangelina  Cisneros,  a  beautiful  and  cul 
tured  girl  related  to  the  venerable  president  of  the  Cuban 
republic.  The  interest  in  her  fate  was  largely  increased 
by  the  romance  attending  her  escape.  She  was  arrested 
upon  some  slight  suspicion,  incarcerated  for  months 
among  prisoners  of  the  criminal  and  degraded  class,  and 
subjected  to  such  indignities  as  to  arouse  a  world- wide 
demand  for  her  release  or  a  mitigation  of  her  sufferings. 
The  queen-regent  of  Spain  was  applied  to,  but  declined 
to  interfere.  Finally,  the  publisher  of  the  New  York 
Journal,  who  had  been  one  of  the  most  active  advocates 
for  her  release,  decided  upon  more  radical  measures. 
He  sent  Mr.  Carl  Decker,  a  reporter  of  his  staff,  to 
Havana  to  aid  her  in  escaping.  Mr.  Decker  was  suc 
cessful  in  this  perilous  enterprise.  On  the  night  of 
October  6,  1897,  Miss  Cisneros  escaped  with  his  aid 
through  the  broken  bars  of  her  cell  window,  and  soon 
after,  disguised  as  a  boy,  passed  the  Spanish  officials 
unsuspected  to  the  deck  of  an  American  vessel.  In  this 
she  was  conveyed  to  the  United  States,  where  she  was 
received  with  a  decided  ovation. 

We  have  not  completed  the  story  of  Spanish  barbarity. 
General  Lee  says  that  it  is  ' '  difficult  to  comprehend  the 
cruelties  and  enormities  of  Spanish  rule,  especially  during 
the  last  few  years,"  and  this  remark  is  well  borne  out  by 
the  facts.  The  Turkish  barbarities  in  Bulgaria,  which 


ioo  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN. 

called  for  Russian  intervention  and  brought  on  a  war 
that  almost  swept  the  Turkish  empire  from  the  map  of 
Europe,  and  the  later  barbarities  in  Crete,  which  resulted 
in  European  intervention  between  the  combatants,  were 
in  no  sense  worse  than  those  which  forced  the  govern 
ment  of  the  United  States  to  intervene  between  the 
combatants  in  Cuba.  Despite  the  accusation  made  in 
Europe  that  selfish  interest  was  at  the  basis  of  the 
American  intervention,  it  could  easily  be  shown  that  the 
provocation  here  was  quite  as  great  as  in  similar  cases  in 
Europe,  and  the  cruelties  as  marked  as  those  in  Armenia, 
which  the  selfish  fears  of  European  statesmen  permitted 
to  go  on  unchecked. 

We  have  already,  perhaps,  said  sufficient  concerning 
the  massacres  of  Cubans  by  the  Spanish  soldiery  under 
the  guise  of  war.  In  evidence  of  this,  Leslie' s  Illustrated 
Weekly  published  in  December,  1896,  a  picture  showing 
the  corpses  of  six  Cuban  pacificos,  firmly  bound,  their 
bodies  mutilated  by  machetes,  and  their  faces  hacked 
out  of  all  human  aspect.  The  portrait  was  also  given  of 
their  murderer,  Benito  Cerreros,  who  had  found  them 
working  in  a  field  near  Sagua,  had  murdered  them,  and 
then  brought  their  bodies  to  town  and  had  them  photo 
graphed.  His  claim  was  that  he  had  killed  them  in 
battle  ;  but  he  had  been  stupid  enough  to  forget  to 
remove  from  their  arms  and  legs  the  ropes  that  told  the 
truth  of  the  story. 

The  people  of  Sagua  celebrated  by  a  public  dinner 
another  victory  of  this  worthy.  A  colonel  in  the  insur 
gent  army  who  was  dying  of  consumption  had  captured 
a  Spanish  spy,  whom  he  had  set  free  on  condition  of 
bringing  him  some  medicine  from  Sagua.  An  American 
was  with  him  in  the  hut  in  which  he  lay  concealed.  The 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  101 

spy  proved  a  traitor,  and  revealed  the  hiding-place  of 
the  Cuban  to  Cerreros,  who  sought  the  hut  with  abundant 
care  for  his  own  safety,  as  he  took  with  him  no  less  than 
forty-four  men.  These  shot  the  two  inmates  through 
the  windows,  and  then  hacked  their  bodies  with  machetes. 
It  was  in  recognition  of  this  gallant  exploit  that  the 
Spanish  sympathizers  of  Sagua  tendered  the  victor  a 
dinner. 

These  will  serve  as  examples  of  barbarities  of  which 
there  seem,  unfortunately,  to  have  been  far  too  many 
instances  in  Cuba.  While  these  cruelties  to  the  people 
were  in  progress,  those  to  the  land  continued  night  and 
day,  the  smoke  of  its  torment  being  forever  in  the  air. 
Both  parties  were  active  in  this  work  of  desolation  ;  the 
result  being  that  the  smoke  of  burning  buildings  and 
cane-fields  hung  heavily  everywhere.  In  railroading 
through  the  country  the  heat  of  burning  districts  would 
at  times  render  the  journey  intolerable,  sparks  and  cin 
ders  coming  through  every  open  car-window,  while  in 
the  distance  the  flames  of  burning  buildings  could  be 
seen  ascending  redly  towards  the  sky. 

The  Spaniards  burned  the  dwellings  of  the  pacificos 
and  the  Cubans  the  cane  and  tobacco  crops  and  the 
sugar-mills,  and  between  them  they  turned  a  fertile 
country  into  a  desert  of  ashes.  The  grinding  of  cane 
was  not  prevented  by  the  Cubans  alone,  since  Weyler 
seems  to  have  secretly  aided  them  in  this.  Suspecting 
that  the  planters  were  playing  a  double  game,  and 
assisting  the  insurgents  in  secret  while  professing  to  be 
strongly  in  favor  of  Spain  in  public,  he  took  covert 
steps  to  prevent  grinding.  Consistency  would  not  let 
him  forbid  it  openly,  but  it  was  easy  to  stop  it  by  arrest 
ing  the  laborers  as  suspects,  seizing  the  draught  oxen  for 


102  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

army  use,  and  by  other  methods, — the  result  being  that 
the  planters  who  were  seemingly  under  Spanish  protec 
tion  were  placed  in  as  serious  straits  as  those  exposed  to 
the  operations  of  the  insurgents. 

Nothing  more  seems  necessary  to  say  in  depicting 
what  President  McKinley  truthfully  designated  as  an 
"intolerable  situation,"  and  in  showing  the  need  of 
intervention  of  some  strong  party  to  prevent  the  com 
batants  from  destroying  one  another  by  the  cruelest  of 
means,  and  utterly  ruining  the  fair  island  on  which  they 
were  conducting  a  strife  that  they  sadly  miscalled  ' '  war. ' ' 
And  as  the  United  States  stood  guarantee  for  Spain  that 
no  other  nation  should  set  hostile  foot  on  her  island 
colony,  the  task  of  suppression  remained  for  this  country 
to  take  in  hand,  in  the  sacred  name  of  humanity. 


CHAPTER   VI. 

EVENTS   LEADING   TO   INTERVENTION. 

'  THE  cruelty  with  which  the  war  between  Spain  and 
the  Cuban  insurgents  was  conducted  was  viewed  with 
intense  indignation  in  the  United  States,  while  Spam's 
seeming  inability  to  suppress  the  insurrection  led  to 
many  demands  for  intervention  by  the  press  and  people 
of  this  country.  The  inhumanity  of  the  combatants, 
and  particularly  of  the  Spaniards,  increased  as  the  war 
went  on,  and  the  government  of  the  United  States  was 
strongly  urged  to  interfere.  It  was  variously  suggested 
that  the  insurgents  should  be  treated  as  belligerents, 
that  their  republic  should  be  recognized,  and  that  Spain 
should  be  asked  to  sell  Cuba.  But  nothing  beyond 
suggestion  came  of  all  this  ;  the  time  was  not  ripe  for 
action. 

Meanwhile  the  government  of  this  country  was  kept 
busy  in  efforts  to  enforce  its  neutrality  laws.  The  revo 
lutionary  Cuban  Junta  in  New  York  was  actively  at  work 
collecting  funds  and  equipping  relief-expeditions,  and  a 
considerable  number  of  vessels  became  engaged  in  efforts 
to  land  men  and  munitions  of  war  on  the  shores  of  Cuba. 
Both  the  United  States  and  Spain  endeavored  to  pre 
vent  this,  but  met  with  indifferent  success.  Many  of 
the  expeditions  from  American  ports  succeeded  in  elud 
ing  the  vigilance  of  the  authorities  and  getting  away 
with  their  contraband  cargoes.  Many  others  were 
stopped,  but  in  very  few  instances  could  satisfactory 

103 


io4  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

evidence  of  an  intention  to  break  the  law  be  obtained. 
Only  two  of  the  captains  of  filibustering  vessels  were 
convicted,  Captain  J.  H.  Wiborg,  of  the  Horsa,  and 
Captain  John  H.  Hart,  of  the  Laurada.  The  latter, 
sentenced  for  a  term  of  imprisonment,  was  pardoned  by 
President  McKinley  after  the  war  with  Spain  began. 

In  January,  1896,  General  Calixto  Garcia  sought  to 
take  a  large  quantity  of  military  supplies  and  three  hun 
dred  men  to  Cuba.  His  vessel,  the  Hawkins,  foundered 
off  Long  Island,  fortunately  losing  only  five  of  its  men. 
He  made  a  second  attempt  on  March  15  with  the  Ber 
muda,  and  this  time  succeeded  in  reaching  Cuba  and 
landing  part  of  his  supplies.  He  was  at  once  given  a 
prominent  command  in  the  Cuban  army  of  independence. 

Spain,  which  had  the  highest  interest  in  checking 
these  expeditions,  was  singularly  unsuccessful  in  doing 
so.  Of  the  many  vessels  which  reached  the  Cuban 
coast  the  Spanish  patrol-fleet  succeeded  in  capturing 
only  one,  the  Competitor,  which  left  Key  West  April 
23,  1896,  and  was  taken  near  Esperanza,  on  the  northern 
coast.  The  supplies  had  been  landed  before  the  Spanish 
patrol-boat  appeared  ;  but  the  bulk  of  them  were  aban 
doned,  the  men  escaping  into  the  interior  with  the  ex 
ception  of  seven,  who  were  taken  prisoners.  These 
were  Alfred  Laborde,  captain  of  the  vessel ;  William 
Gildea,  its  sailing-master ;  Ona  Melton,  a  newspaper 
correspondent ;  Dr.  Vezia,  the  physician  of  the  expedi 
tion  ;  a  Cuban  named  Moza,  and  two  sailors.  None  of 
them  except  the  sailors  sought  to  escape,  they  not 
fancying  that  they  had  committed  any  serious  crime. 
The  Spanish  authorities  thought  otherwise.  All  of 
them  except  Moza,  who  volunteered  evidence  for  the 
crown,  were  sentenced  to  death,  and  would  have  been 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  105 

summarily  executed  but  for  the  intervention  of  Consul- 
General  Lee.  They  were  rigorously  imprisoned  under 
incomunicado  conditions  for  eighteen  months,  being 
finally  released  by  General  Blanco. 

In  December,  1896,  the  war  being  then  nearly  two 
years  old,  and  having  seemingly  fallen  into  a  state  of 
hopeless  decrepitude,  while  the  Weylerian  cruelty  and 
incapability  had  become  strikingly  evidenced,  the  first 
open  declaration  of  the  United  States  government  was 
made  in  President  Qeveland's  annual  message  to  Con 
gress.  In  this  he  reviewed  the  situation  at  considerable 
length,  stating  the  various  propositions  which  had  been 
made  for  recognition  of  Cuban  belligerency  or  inde 
pendence,  or,  all  other  methods  failing,  of  interven 
tion,  even  at  the  cost  of  a  war  with  Spain.  The  Presi 
dent  did  not  think  that  any  of  these  measures  was  yet 
demanded  by  the  situation,  and  stated  that  this  govern 
ment  had  intimated  to  Spain  that  if  a  satisfactory  system 
of  home  rule  were  offered  the  islanders  the  United 
States  would  guarantee  its  execution,  since  nothing  less 
would  overcome  the  distrust  of  the  insurgents.  This 
offer  Spain  had  failed  to  accept. 

"  It  should  be  added,"  he  continued,  "that  it  cannot 
be  reasonably  assumed  that  the  hitherto  expectant  atti 
tude  of  the  United  States  will  be  indefinitely  maintained. 
.  .  .  By  the  course  of  events  we  may  be  driven  into 
such  an  unusual  and  unprecedented  condition  as  will  fix 
a  limit  to  our  patient  waiting  for  Spain  to  win  the  con 
test,  either  alone  and  in  her  own  way  or  by  our  friendly 
co-operation."  He  remarked  further  that  if  nothing 
remained  but  useless  sacrifice  of  human  life  and  utter 
desolation  of  the  subject-matter  of  the  conflict,  "  a  situa 
tion  will  be  presented  in  which  our  obligations  to  the 


io6  THE   WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

sovereignty  of  Spain  will  be  superseded  by  higher  obli 
gations,  which  we  can  hardly  hesitate  to  recognize  and 
discharge. ' ' 

The  scarcely  veiled  threat  under  these  diplomatic 
utterances  proved  anything  but  palatable  to  Spain,  and 
Prime-Minister  Canovas  quickly  put  himself  on  record 
by  declaring  that  Spain  would  under  no  circumstances 
grant  Cuba  a  system  of  autonomy  similar  to  that  of 
Canada.  "  No  concession  of  any  kind,"  he  said,  "will 
be  made  until  the  insurrection  in  Cuba  is  put  under  con 
trol.  Spain  is  strong  enough  to  carry  on  the  campaign 
in  Cuba  and  the  Philippine  Islands  until  peace  is  re 
stored,  no  matter  how  long  the  struggle  may  last." 

This  declaration  put  an  end  to  all  hope  of  an  accom 
modation.  Spain,  or  at  least  her  representatives  in 
Cuba,  had  shown  a  marked  incapability  of  doing  any 
thing  of  the  kind  promised,  and  the  gates  of  a  peaceful 
settlement  were  deliberately  closed  by  the  hands  of  the 
over-confident  Spanish  premier.  The  insurrectionary 
war  was  left  to  drift  on  in  its  old  inconsequential  way, 
with  but  a  single  end  in  view,  that  of  final  forced  inter 
vention  on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  since  there 
seemed  no  hope  that  Spain  would  retire  of  herself  from 
the  futile  contest. 

Previous  to  the  date  of  Cleveland's  message  he  had 
sent  General  Fitzhugh  Lee  to  Havana  as  United  States 
consul-general,  largely  with  the  purpose  of  observing 
and  reporting  upon  the  state  of  affairs.  A  resolution 
recognizing  the  Cubans  as  belligerents  had  passed  Con 
gress,  and  at  that  time  lay  before  the  President.  It  was 
his  doubt  what  action  to  take  in  this  contingency  that 
induced  him  to  despatch  Lee  upon  his  errand.  A  week's 
observation  enabled  the  quick-sighted  Virginian  to  de- 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  107 

cide  that  there  was  no  immediate  prospect  of  either 
party's  winning,  and  that  meanwhile  the  island  was 
being  reduced  to  an  ash-heap,  property  widely  destroyed, 
commerce  extinguished,  and  life  taken  on  both  sides 
under  circumstances  of  great  aggravation.  The  injury 
to  commerce  was  causing  great  loss  to  American  mer 
cantile  interests  and  to  the  people  of  the  United  States. 

He  found  in  the  state  of  the  country  and  the  people 
much  to  provoke  the  Cubans  and  little  evidence  that 
judicious  measures  were  being  taken  for  their  subjuga 
tion.  While  less  than  half  a  century  before  Cubans  had 
owned  most  of  the  property  and  wealth  of  the  country, 
now  the  Spaniards  were  the  wealthy  class, — doubtless  in 
consequence  of  the  supremacy  given  them  by  the  govern 
ment.  Public  enterprise  was  sadly  lacking.  There 
were  no  highways,  scarcely  any  country  roads,  no 
canals,  and  no  telegraphs  except  along  some  of  the  rail 
roads.  Of  the  latter  none  had  been  built  by  Spanish 
enterprise.  The  soldiers  were  as  ill  fitted  for  effective 
operations  as  the  country  was  ill  adapted  to  military 
movements.  They  were  poorly  drilled,  disciplined,  and 
organized  ;  their  pay  was  small  and  often  failed  to  reach 
them  ;  their  clothing  was  poor  ;  their  officers  exposed 
them  heedlessly  to  all  conditions  of  temperature  and 
weather.  As  a  result  they  had  become  feeble,  listless, 
liable  to  disease,  and  unfit  for  active  campaigning.  Such 
was  the  state  of  affairs  which  gave  its  tone  to  President 
Cleveland's  message. 

Early  in  his  administration  President  McKinley  took 
similar  steps  to  ascertain  the  state  of  affairs  on  the  island, 
special  reports  being  ordered  from  the  consuls  at  the 
several  cities.  These  confirmed  the  unofficial  advices  of 
the  terrible  lack  of  sanitary  conditions  under  which  the 


io8  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

reconcentrados  dwelt  and  the  misery  and  starvation  to 
which  they  were  exposed,  and  the  absence  of  effort  on 
the  part  of  Governor- General  Weyler  for  their  relief. 
Among  the  sufferers  were  many  naturalized  citizens  of 
the  United  States,  for  whose  relief  the  President  sent  a 
special  message  to  Congress,  asking  for  an  appropriation 
of  $50,000  to  provide  them  with  food  and  medicine  or 
to  transport  them  to  this  country.  Fewer  American  citi 
zens  were  found  than  had  been  reported,  and  the  food 
provided  did  not  reach  them  without  difficulty,  as  Spanish 
jealousy  threw  obstacles  in  the  way  of  its  distribution. 

On  June  16,  1897,  General  Stewart  L.  Woodford  was 
appointed  United  States  minister  to  Spain,  with  instruc 
tions  from  the  executive  to  inform  that  country  that,  in 
the  opinion  of  the  United  States,  the  war  ought  to  have 
ended,  and  asking  it  to  name  a  date  before  the  month  of 
December,  1897,  when  it  would  end.  The  reply  of  the 
Spanish  cabinet  was  that  no  such  date  could  be  named, 
but  that  they  would  spare  no  efforts  to  bring  the  war  to  a 
speedy  termination.  They  said  further,  that  it  would 
have  ended  long  before  but  for  aid  given  by  filibusters 
from  the  United  States.  This  statement,  with  its  impli 
cation  of  disregard  of  neutral  obligations,  created  con 
siderable  irritation  in  American  official  circles,  in  view  of 
the  fact  that  this  country  had  spent  some  $2,000,000  in 
the  effort  to  check  Cuban  expeditions,  and  had  in  no 
sense  failed  in  its  duty. 

The  coming  of  General  Blanco  with  his  scheme  of 
reform  created  a  temporary  hope  that  peace  might 
result,  a  hope  which  vanished  when  the  insurgents  utterly 
refused  to  accept  autonomy  or  amnesty  from  Spain  and 
shot  the  tempters  who  came  to  them  bribe  in  hand. 
The  scheme  of  autonomy  did  not  propose  to  abolish  the 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  109 

autocratic  office  of  governor -general,  under  which  no 
true  liberty  could  exist,  and  it  would  have  left  Cuba 
saddled  with  a  war-debt  far  beyond  her  power  to  sustain. 
The  rebels  in  arms  refused  to  have  anything  to  do  with 
so  feeble  and  colorless  a  system  of  home  government, 
and  the  autonomous  administration  attempted  by  Blanco 
proved  a  weak  and  futile  expedient,  its  officials  being 
mere  puppets,  with  no  influence  outside  of  Spanish  garri 
sons.  The  effort,  indeed,  to  establish  a  democracy 
under  the  shadow  of  an  autocracy  must  have  proved 
useless  under  any  circumstances,  and  the  Cubans  had  no 
intention  of  trusting  a  second  time  to  the  good  faith  of 
Spain. 

In  his  message  to  Congress  of  December,  1897,  Presi 
dent  McKinley  stated  in  impressive  words  the  record  of 
our  relations  with  Cuba,  spoke  of  the  horrors  of  the  war 
then  raging  in  the  island,  and  indicated  that  the  time 
might  come  when  we  would  be  obliged  to  interfere. 
That  time  was  much  nearer  at  hand  than  he  dreamed  of. 
In  truth,  matters  on  the  island  were  not  improving,  and 
the  weakness  of  the  ruling  powers  was  becoming  daily 
more  declared.  General  Blanco  had  withdrawn  Weyler's 
concentration  order,  but  his  action  came  too  late.  The 
evil  was  past  remedy.  In  the  words  of  General  Lee, 
1 '  In  the  first  place,  these  people  have  no  place  to  go  to  ; 
their  houses  have  been  burned  down  ;  there  is  nothing 
but  the  bare  land  left,  and  it  would  take  them  two 
months  before  they  could  raise  the  first  crop.  In  the 
next  place,  they  are  afraid  to  go  out  from  the  lines  of  the 
towns,  because  the  roving  bands  of  Spanish  guerrillas,  as 
they  are  called,  would  kill  them.  So  they  stick  right  in 
the  edges  of  the  town,  just  like  they  did,  with  nothing 
to  eat  except  what  they  can  get  from  charity. ' ' 


i  io  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

This  condition  of  affairs  gave  rise  to  President  Mo 
Kinley's  next  action,  which  was  an  intervention  in  the 
form  of  charity.  He  proposed  now  to  extend  aid  to  all 
the  sufferers,  not  to  limit  it  to  American  citizens,  as  be 
fore.  On  December  24,  1897,  he  issued  an  appeal  to 
the  American  people,  inviting  contributions  for  the  succor 
of  the  starving  sufferers,  and  on  the  8th  of  January,  1898, 
announced  the  formation  of  a  Central  Cuban  Relief  Com 
mittee  under  the  auspices  of  the  American  National  Red 
Cross  Society.  Clara  Barton,  president  of  this  society, 
just  returned  from  her  relief-work  in  Armenia,  made  her 
way  to  Cuba  to  control  this  new  duty  of  benevolence, 
and  a  vast  quantity  of  supplies  was  sent  to  relieve  the 
needs  of  the  sufferers.  Goods  and  money  to  the  value 
of  more  than  $200,000  were  donated,  and  the  relief,  at 
first  confined  to  Havana  and  the  other  large  cities,  grad 
ually  extended  to  all  the  towns  where  suffering  existed. 
Thousands  of  lives  were  saved  by  this  late  but  welcome 
charitable  aid. 

Spain,  however,  in  her  usual  manner,  threw  difficul 
ties  in  the  way,  objecting  to  the  fact  that  some  of  the 
smaller  war-vessels  of  the  United  States  were  employed 
in  carrying  relief-supplies,  and  rendering  it  necessary 
to  employ  other  vessels  for  that  purpose.  She  also 
showed  her  animus  by  requesting  that  Consul- General 
Lee,  whose  plain  truth-telling  had  given  offence,  should 
be  recalled.  To  this  the  United  States  government 
declined  to  accede,  and  Spain  withdrew  the  request. 

The  activity  of  the  Americans  in  their  work  of  mercy 
had  its  effect  upon  the  dulled  moral  consciousness  of 
Spain.  All  American  citizens  in  prison  were  released, 
and  mercy  was  granted  to  certain  Cuban  prisoners  who 
lay  under  sentence  of  death.  Blanco  had  been  author- 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  in 

ized  to  sign  a  credit  of  $100,000  for  the  relief  of  the 
suffering.  An  equal  sum  was  granted  at  a  later  date, 
and  pacificos  were  sent  to  rebuild  the  small  towns  that 
had  been  destroyed.  But  the  suffering  people  seem  to 
have  derived  little  benefit  from  the  tardy  benevolence  of 
Spain. 

Meanwhile  the  Spanish  home  government  was  as 
energetic  as  ever  in  its  efforts  to  end  the  war, — and  as 
unsuccessful.  Money  was  borrowed  freely  from  any  one 
who  would  lend,  until  the  country  reached  the  verge  of 
bankruptcy  and  the  money-lords  of  Europe  closed  their 
purses  against  appeals  from  Spain.  In  addition  to  her 
funded  debt  of  $1,200,000,000,  one-third  of  which  was 
due  to  foreign  capitalists,  she  had  a  floating  debt  of 
$200,000,000,  and  a  Cuban  guarantee  debt  of  $350,- 
000,000,  bearing  interest  at  five  and  six  per  cent.,  yet 
very  greatly  depreciated  in  value.  These  $550,000,- 
ooo  had  been  spent  in  the  Cuban  war,  and  the  weight 
of  this  debt  would  have  been  laid  upon  Cuba  in  the 
event  of  subjugation.  It  would  have  constituted  an 
overwhelming  burden. 

Spain  was  not  only  bankrupt  in  money,  but  was  be 
coming  so  in  men.  The  youth  of  the  land  had  been 
sent,  sorely  against  their  will,  across  the  ocean  to  feed 
the  army  in  Cuba  until  exhaustion  in  this  direction  was 
at  hand.  And  the  discouraging  feature  of  it  all  was 
that  this  proved  to  be  largely  waste  effort.  The  degree 
of  activity  under  Campos  and  Weyler,  falsely  directed 
as  it  had  been,  vanished  under  Blanco,  who  suffered 
the  war  to  lag  in  his  efforts  to  induce  the  insurgents  to 
accept  his  measures  of  autonomy  and  amnesty. 

The  positive  rejection  of  these  by  the  insurgents  left 
Spain  in  a  hopeless  state.  Of  the  great  army  which 


ii2  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

she  had  sent  to  Cuba,  many  thousands  had  been  swept 
away  by  the  dread  scourge  of  yellow  fever,  and  thou 
sands  more  were  in  a  condition  of  unfitness  for  service. 
Of  those  who  had  escaped  the  hospital  and  the  grave 
fully  one-half  were  distributed  among  the  multitudes  of 
little  forts  that  covered  the  island,  and  were  useless  for 
any  effective  operation.  Of  the  remainder,  many  were 
needed  for  duties  that  rendered  them  unavailable  for 
field  operations, — such  as  guarding  the  railroads  and 
the  sugar-plantations.  On  the  other  hand,  the  insur 
gents  seemed  capable  of  continuing  the  war  indefinitely. 
They  needed  no  money,  and  the  swift-growing  roots 
supplied  them  with  food.  Arms  and  ammunition  were 
their  most  pressing  needs. 

' '  Whatever  may  be  said  about  old  General  Gomez, ' ' 
remarked  General  Lee,  ' '  he  is,  in  my  humble  opinion, 
fighting  the  war  in  the  only  way  it  can  be  fought, — 
scattering  his  troops  out ;  because  to  concentrate  would 
be  to  starve,  having  no  commissary-train  and  no  way 
to  get  supplies.  They  come  in  sometimes  for  the 
purpose  of  making  some  little  raid  where  he  thinks  it 
will  do  something  ;  but  he  has  given  orders,  so  I  have 
always  been  informed,  not  to  fight  in  masses,  not  to 
lose  their  cartridges  ;  and  sometimes,  when  he  gets  into 
a  fight,  each  man  is  ordered  not  to  fire  more  than  two 
cartridges.  The  way  the  insurgents  do  is  this  :  they 
have  little  patches  of  sweet  potatoes — everything  grows 
there  abundantly  in  a  short  time — and  Irish  potatoes  and 
fruits.  They  drive  their  pigs  and  cattle  into  the  valleys 
and  hill-sides,  and  they  use  those  and  scatter  out.  The 
insurgents  plant  crops  in  many  parts  of  the  island." 

Their  system  of  warfare  was  to  keep  out  of  the  reach 
of  Spanish  bullets  and  to  save  their  own,  so  far  as  was 


THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN.  113 

consistent  with  their  policy  of  incessantly  annoying  the 
enemy.  This  method,  in  common  with  the  destruction 
of  the  resources  of  the  island,  must  in  the  end  have 
forced  Spain  to  give  up  the  fight  through  utter  exhaus 
tion.  The  trocha  and  the  fort  had  failed.  Reconcen- 
tration  had  done  far  more  harm  than  good.  The  horrors 
o"f  the  firing-party  and  the  military  fusillade  had  no  effect 
on  the  enemy  in  arms.  The  power  of  Spain  had  been 
frittered  away  in  piecemeal  operations,  and,  as  there  was 
no  indication  of  the  adoption  of  more  effective  methods, 
the  strife  in  Cuba  in  the  beginning  of  the  year  1898 
seemed  in  a  stage  of  absolute  hopelessness  so  far  as 
Spain  was  concerned. 

Meanwhile  the  irritation  between  Spain  and  the 
United  States  was  daily  increasing.  The  two  govern 
ments  seemed  on  the  surface  in  accord,  but  the  very 
evident  sympathy  for  the  insurgents  among  the  people 
of  the  United  States  aroused  hot  indignation  in  Spain, 
and  threats  of  war  with  this  country  were  freely  uttered 
by  the  populace  and  the  papers.  This  feeling  extended 
to  Cuba.  There  were  three  parties  in  that  island, — the 
revolutionary  separatists,  who  desired  complete  inde 
pendence  ;  the  autonomists,  who  wished  for  home  rule  ; 
and  the  Spanish  party,  who  opposed  changes  in  the 
existing  condition  of  affairs,  bitterly  objected  to  Blanco 
and  his  reforms,  and  looked  upon  the  recall  of  Weyler 
as  a  fatal  confession  of  weakness  by  Spain. 

With  the  incoming  of  1898  affairs  rapidly  approached 
a  crisis.  Early  in  the  year  the  Spanish  government, 
through  its  minister,  De  Lome,  intimated  that  it  would 
be  agreeable  to  Spain  if  the  charitable  people  of  the 
United  States  should  contribute  for  Cuban  relief,  and  if 
money  and  supplies  were  sent  to  the  American  consuls 

8 


H4  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

to  be  forwarded  and  distributed  under  their  charge.  But 
this  relief  proposition  was  not  kindly  received  by  the 
people  of  Spain,  and  was  furiously  objected  to  by  the 
conservative  party  in  Cuba,  who  looked  upon  it  as  the 
entering- wedge  for  American  intervention.  The  dissatis 
faction  grew  so  great  that  it  gave  rise  on  January  12  to 
a  riotous  outbreak  in  the  streets  of  Havana.  Though 
this  seemed  chiefly  directed  against  two  newspapers  that 
favored  autonomy,  Blanco  deemed  it  necessary  to  send 
a  strong  body  of  troops  to  protect  the  American  con 
sulate.  And  the  fidelity  of  these  could  not  be  greatly 
trusted,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  many  of  the  rioters  wore 
Spanish  uniforms,  showing  that  the  hostile  feeling  was 
deeply  intrenched  in  the  army. 

The  United  States  government  had  been  previously 
informed  by  Consul- General  Lee  of  the  critical  state  of 
affairs  in  Havana.  It  was  well  aware,  also,  that  Spain 
was  covertly  preparing*  for  war,  having  taken  steps  in  the 
latter  part  of  1897  to  increase  her  naval  strength  by  pur 
chasing  ships  in  other  European  countries.  Measures 
of  this  kind,  whose  threatening  character  was  apparent, 
were  not  calculated  to  allay  the  irritation  existing  in  the 
United  States,  and  the  riots  at  Havana  were  quickly  fol 
lowed  by  a  significant  act  on  the  part  of  the  government, 
— the  North  Atlantic  Squadron  of  the  navy  being  ordered 
to  rendezvous  at  Key  West  and  the  Dry  Tortugas.  The 
squadron  reached  Florida  on  the  2oth,  and  was  joined 
there  by  the  battle-ship  Maine,  which  on  the  25th  was 
ordered  to  Havana  harbor,  ostensibly  on  a  friendly  visit, 
but  probably  with  a  view  to  protection  of  the  American 
residents  in  case  of  a  renewal  of  the  riots.  Other  steps 
were  taken  which  indicated  preparation  for  possible  hos 
tilities,  orders  being  sent  to  United  States  vessels  in  for- 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN.  115 

eign  waters  to  be  ready  to  sail  for  home  at  short  notice. 
Commodore  Dewey,  in  command  of  the  squadron  at 
Hong  Kong,  was  advised  to  hold  himself  in  readiness  to 
sail  to  the  Atlantic.  All  these  measures  were  significant 
of  coming  war.  In  return  for  the  visit  of  the  Maine,  the 
Spanish  cruiser  Vizcaya  was  ordered  to  the  United 
States,  and  reached  New  York  harbor  shortly  after  the 
wrecking  of  the  Maine.  She  was  received  there  with 
every  courtesy. 

The  strained  relations  were  greatly  added  to  by  an 
event  that  took  place  in  early  February.  Senor  Don 
Enrique  de  Lome,  Spain's  representative  at  Washing 
ton,  had  written  a  confidential  letter  to  Sefior  Canalejas, 
whom  Sagasta  had  sent  to  Havana  to  make  a  quiet  in 
vestigation  of  the  situation.  This  letter  failed  to  reach 
the  hands  for  which  it  was  intended,  being  stolen  from 
the  mail  by  a  Cuban  sympathizer  in  the  Havana  post- 
office,  probably  on  account  of  its  bearing  the  stamp  of  the 
Spanish  legation  on  the  envelope.  By  him  it  was  sent 
to  the  Cuban  Junta  in  New  York,  whose  members,  per 
ceiving  its  value  to  their  cause,  had  photographed  copies 
made,  which  they  gave  to  the  public  press.  The  origi 
nal  was  sent  to  the  State  Department  at  Washington. 

The  publication  of  this  letter  raised  a  storm.  It  was 
bitterly  insulting  to  President  McKinley,  of  whom  it 
spoke  as  a  "low  politician,"  who  catered  to  the  rabble. 
It  proposed  that  the  question  of  commercial  relations 
should  be  agitated,  "even  though  only  for  effect,"  and 
indicated  that  the  Spanish  government  was  insincere  and 
playing  a  double  part  in  its  negotiations.  The  letter 
further  acknowledged  that  the  military  operations  of 
Spain  had  been  failures,  and  seemed  likely  to  continue 
so.  The  war  dragged  on  tediously,  it  admitted,  and  in- 


ii6  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

timated  that  if  Spain  could  conquer  Cuba  at  all  she 
would  be  ruined  in  the  effort. 

This  letter  rendered  De  Lome's  position  in  Washing 
ton  untenable.  He  was  not  slow  in  perceiving  this,  and 
hastened  to  cable  his  resignation  before  Minister  Wood- 
ford  could  have  an  opportunity  to  demand  his  with 
drawal.  De  Lome  lost  no  time  in  leaving  the  country 
in  which  he  had  so  suddenly  brought  his  usefulness  to 
an  end.  He  was  succeeded  in  March  by  Sefior  Polo, 
whose  father  had  represented  Spain  in  Washington 
many  years  before. 

The  turning-point  in  the  tide  of  events  came  on  the 
night  of  the  i5th  of  February,  1898.  The  battle-ship 
Maine  then  lay  in  all  seeming  security  in  Havana  harbor, 
where  she  swung  at  anchor  about  five  hundred  yards 
from  the  arsenal  and  two  hundred  yards  from  the 
floating  dock.  About  two  hundred  yards  away  lay  the 
American  Ward  Line  steamer  City  of  Washington,  and 
a  little  farther  off  the  Spanish  cruiser  Alfonso  XII. 
This  vessel  had  saluted  the  Maine  with  great  display  of 
amity  upon  her  entrance  to  the  harbor,  and  had  been 
greeted  with  equal  courtesy,  each  displaying  the  national 
ensign  of  the  other  and  saluting  with  thirteen  guns. 

The  night  of  the  i5th  was  one  of  intense  darkness. 
The  crew  of  the  Maine  were  asleep  in  their  quarters. 
Captain  Sigsbee  was  in  bed  in  his  cabin,  and  the  ex 
ecutive  officer,  Lieutenant-Commander  Richard  Wain- 
wright,  was  smoking  in  his  quarters,  when,  at  the  hour  of 
nine-forty,  the  silence  was  broken  by  a  terrific  explosion. 
The  great  vessel  was  lifted  as  if  she  had  been  a  leaf 
floating  on  the  waves,  and  in  an  instant  was  rent  and 
torn  almost  out  of  all  semblance  to  a  ship-of-war.  As 
the  reverberation  of  the  explosion  died  away,  the  dark- 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  117 

ness  was  broken  by  a  great  flame  that  burst  from  the 
ruined  ship  and  illuminated  the  harbor  far  and  near. 
On  shore  the  shock  of  the  explosion  had  extinguished 
the  electric-lights,  thrown  down  many  of  the  telegraph- 
poles,  and  shaken  the  whole  city  front. 

This  dreadful  event  was  met  with  great  coolness  and 
courage  by  the  officers  of  the  Maine.  Wainwright,  the 
executive  officer,  was  in  an  instant  on  his  feet,  struck 
a  match,  for  darkness  prevailed  in  his  quarters,  and 
hurried  to  the  captain's  cabin.  He  found  him  unin 
jured,  though  the  explosion  had  hurled  him  from  his 
berth  to  the  floor.  Hurrying  to  the  deck,  the  captain 
at  once  gave  orders  to  a  seaman  to  flood  the  magazine, 
which  contained  some  five  tons  of  powder.  The  man 
did  so,  but  failed  to  return.  He  had  fallen  a  victim  to 
the  catastrophe  which  had  slain  so  many  of  his  com 
rades.  The  explosion  had  wrecked  the  forward  part  of 
the  ship,  immediately  under  the  quarters  of  the  men, 
most  of  whom  were  instantly  killed,  while  that  portion 
of  the  ship  was  frightfully  shattered. 

Meanwhile  the  whole  city  had  been  aroused,  and 
people  were  running  to  the  water-front  to  learn  the 
cause  of  the  terrible  shock.  It  was  now  easy  to  per 
ceive,  for  the  darkness  was  effectually  broken.  In 
addition  to  the  glare  from  the  burning  Maine,  a  number 
of  search-lights  were  turned  on  the  dark  surface  of  the 
waters,  and  electric-lights  glowed  on  shore  and  ships. 
With  the  utmost  haste  boats  were  lowered  from  the  two 
neighboring  steamers  and  rowed  to  the  wreck  of  the 
Maine,  where  every  effort  to  render  service  was  made. 
Thirty-seven  of  the  wounded  men  were  rescued  by  the 
boats  of  the  Spanish  ship  and  twenty-four  by  those  of 
the  City  of  Washington. 


Ii8  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

Captain  Sigsbee  did  not  for  a  moment  lose  his  self- 
possession  and  worked  diligently  to  rescue  the  remnants 
of  his  crew.  In  this  his  officers  actively  aided  him. 
Such  of  the  boats  of  the  Maine  as  had  escaped  destruc 
tion  were  filled  with  the  wounded,  who  were  taken  to 
the  hospitals  in  Havana,  where  every  care  was  given 
them,  General  Blanco  lending  all  his  influence  to  the 
work  of  mercy.  Of  the  ship's  company  of  three  hun 
dred  and  fifty-three  only  forty- eight  escaped  without 
injury.  Captain  Sigsbee  was  the  last  man  to  leave  the 
ship,  going  in  the  launch  to  the  Alphonso  XII.,  where 
he  thanked  the  captain  and  officers  for  their  active  aid. 
He  then  went  to  the  City  of  Washington,  arriving  about 
midnight,  and  meeting  there  Consul-General  Lee  and 
others  of  prominence. 

At  three  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  February  16, 
President  McKinley  was  awakened  to  hear  a  message  of 
startling  import  which  had  just  been  received  from 
Captain  Sigsbee.  It  described  the  frightful  disaster  in 
the  most  temperate  language  : 

"SECRETARY  OF  THE  NAVY, 

4 'Washington,  D.C. 

4 '  Maine  blown  up  in  Havana  harbor  at  nine-forty 
to-night  and  destroyed.  Many  wounded  and  doubtless 
more  killed  or  drowned.  Wounded  and  others  on  board 
Spanish  man-of-war  and  Ward  Line  steamer.  Send 
light-house  tenders  from  Key  West  for  crew  and  the 
few  pieces  of  equipment  above  water.  None  had 
clothing  other  than  that  upon  him.  Public  opinion 
should  be  suspended  until  further  report.  All  officers 
believed  to  be  saved.  Jenkins  and  Merritt  not  yet  ac 
counted  for.  [These  two  proved  to  have  been  lost.] 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN.  119 

Many    Spanish    officers,     including    representative    of 
General  Blanco,  now  with  me  to  express  sympathy. '  * 

"SlGSBEE." 

The  suspension  of  opinion  asked  for  by  Captain  Sigs- 
bee  was  not  accorded  by  the  people,  whose  indignation 
was  extreme  on  learning  of  the  terrible  event.  The 
general  opinion,  aided  by  statements  concerning  the 
appearance  of  the  vessel  as  she  lay  in  the  mud  of  Havana 
harbor,  was  that  the  loss  of  the  Maine  was  not  due  to 
the  explosion  of  her  own  magazines,  as  the  Spaniards 
maintained,  but  that  she  had  been  blown  up  by  a  mine 
beneath  her  hull,  and  that  the  disaster  was  not  the  result 
of  accident,  but  of  Spanish  malignity.  The  fact  that 
among  the  numerous  expressions  of  sympathy  from 
foreign  powers  were  cabled  messages  from  General 
Blanco,  the  Spanish  cabinet,  and  the  Queen  of  Spain 
did  not  suffice  to  change  the  public  opinion  or  to  allay 
the  excitement.  No  one  thought  that  any  of  these  had 
anything  to  do  with  the  explosion,  but  many  believed 
that  Spanish  officials  were  in  some  way  concerned  in  it ; 
and  this  feeling  grew,  instead  of  subsiding,  as  time 
went  on. 

A  plot  of  ground  in  the  cemetery  at  Havana  was 
given  for  the  interment  of  the  victims,  nineteen  of  whom 
were  buried  there  with  the  greatest  show  of  honor  and 
sympathy,  fifty  thousand  people  crowding  the  streets 
and  paying  respect  to  the  dead.  Shortly  after  the  de 
struction  of  the  Maine,  the  Spanish  cruiser  Vizcaya,  as 
already  stated,  reached  the  harbor  of  New  York,  where 
she  was  placed  under  close  guard  by  federal  and  city 
authorities  to  prevent  any  injury  to  her  through  revenge. 
She  remained  there  for  a  brief  period  and  then  set  sail 


120  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

for  Cuba,  full  courtesy  and  consideration  being  shown 
her  officers  while  in  New  York. 

The  Maine  was  the  oldest  battle-ship  of  the  American 
navy.  While  second-rate  in  size,  being  of  less  than  7000 
tons  displacement,  she  was  a  fine  and  powerful  ship,  and 
had  been  built  at  a  cost  of  $2,500,000,  which  expendi 
ture  had  been  greatly  added  to  by  the  cost  of  her  arms 
and  equipments.  In  addition  to  the  total  destruction  of 
the  ship  itself  was  the  loss  of  two  hundred  and  sixty-six 
lives,  including  those  who  died  from  their  wounds  and 
the  two  officers  named  in  Captain  Sigbee's  message, 
who  had  hastened  to  their  posts  of  duty  on  being  aroused 
by  the  explosion  and  had  perished  in  consequence. 
This  state  of  affairs  gave  rise  to  a  natural  feeling  of  re 
sentment  in  the  minds  of  the  American  people,  which 
quickly  deepened  to  a  thirst  for  revenge  and  a  feverish 
impatience  which  could  scarce  await  the  deliberate  move 
ments  of  a  committee  of  investigation.  Had  the  general 
feeling  been  accepted,  the  country  would  have  been 
plunged  into  war  at  once,  but  the  government  was  less 
hasty  in  its  decision,  feeling  that  investigation  should 
precede  action,  and  that  it  remained  to  be  shown  whether 
the  disaster  was  due  to  the  explosion  of  an  external 
mine  or  of  the  ship's  own  magazines.  A  naval  Court  of 
Inquiry  was  therefore  appointed  by  the  Navy  Depart 
ment,  consisting  of  Captain  W.  T.  Sampson  of  the 
Iowa,  Captain  F.  C.  Chadwick  of  the  New  York,  Lieu 
tenant-Commander  W.  P.  Potter  of  the  New  York, 
and  Lieutenant-Commander  Adolph  Marix  of  the  Ver 
mont. 

Divers  were  sent  with  all  convenient  despatch  to 
Havana  harbor  to  examine  the  condition  of  the  sunken 
hull  and  furnish  evidence  for  the  committee  to  act  upon. 


Rear-Adm.  Winfield  Scott  Schle 


Rear-Adm.  George  Dewey  Rear-Adm.  William  T.  Sampson 


Capt.  Charles  E.  Clark  Capt.  Johu  \V.  P.iilip 

UNITED    STATES    NAVAL   COMMANDERS 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  121 

The  investigation  proceeded  with  a  deliberation  that  was 
exasperating  to  the  mass  of  the  people,  who  had  formed 
their  opinion  without  waiting  for  the  evidence.  A 
thorough  examination  was  made  of  the  condition  of  the 
wreck.  Here,  though  no  trace  of  a  submarine  mine 
could  be  found,  there  were  abundant  indications  that 
some  powerful  explosive  had  been  set  off  below  the  hull 
of  the  ship  which  had  force  sufficient  to  cause  a  frightful 
distortion  of  her  hull  and  practically  to  break  her  in 
two. 

The  evidence  presented  before  the  court  was  very 
voluminous,  the  testimony  covering  twelve  thousand 
type-written  pages.  Every  item  of  evidence  was  thor 
oughly  considered  and  sifted.  A  unanimous  decision 
of  the  court  was  reached  March  21,  1898,  after  more 
than  four  weeks  of  deliberation.  The  verdict,  as  sum 
marized,  was  as  follows  :  ' '  That  the  loss  of  the  Maine 
was  not  in  any  respect  due  to  fault  or  negligence  on  the 
part  of  any  of  the  officers  or  members  of  her  crew  ;  that 
the  ship  was  destroyed  by  the  explosion  of  a  submarine 
mine,  which  caused  the  partial  explosion  of  two  or  more 
of  her  forward  magazines  ;  and  that  no  evidence  has 
been  obtainable  fixing  the  responsibility  for  the  destruc 
tion  of  the  Maine  upon  any  person  or  persons." 

This  decision,  given  to  the  public  on  March  25,  was 
in  full  accord  with  the  opinion  almost  universally  enter 
tained  by  the  American  people.  The  long-continued 
investigation  by  our  divers  was  followed  by  a  hasty  one 
ordered  by  Spain,  which  took  only  a  day  or  two  for  its 
completion,  and  resulted  in,  judging  from  its  rapidity, 
what  may  have  been  a  predetermined  decision,  that  the 
cause  of  the  explosion  was  wholly  internal.  A  settle 
ment  of  the  question  by  arbitration  was  demanded. 


122  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

This,  under  the  aggravating  circumstances  of  the  case, 
the  United  States  government  was  in  no  mood  to  accord. 
Efforts  were  made  to  recover  the  heavy  guns  and  other 
valuable  material  from  the  wreck,  but  these  proved  in 
great  part  futile,  and  the  shattered  hulk,  as  a  coffin  for 
the  gallant  crew,  was  permitted  to  sink  into  the  soft  and 
deep  mud  of  the  bottom  of  Havana  harbor. 

The  Maine  was  not  to  perish  unavenged.  The  hostile 
feeling  of  the  people  was  reflected  in  the  government, 
and  active  preparations  were  made  by  the  War  and 
Navy  Departments  for  possible  war.  Movements  in  this 
direction  had  been  made  early  in  the  year.  They  were 
intensified  by  the  Maine  horror.  The  fortifications  of 
the  coast  were  strengthened,  war-material  was  collected 
and  distributed  with  energy,  recruiting  went  on  for  all 
branches  of  the  service,  and  the  greatest  activity  was 
manifested  in  adding  to  the  strength  of  the  navy.  The 
ship-yards  engaged  on  government  work  were  kept  busy 
day  and  night.  All  vessels  needing  repair  were  hurried 
into  the  dry-docks.  The  old  monitors  at  League  Island 
were  overhauled  with  all  haste.  A  fleet  of  auxiliary 
cruisers  was  added  to  the  regular  naval  force,  including  a 
number  of  the  largest  and  fastest  passenger-steamers.  A 
naval  officer  was  hurried  to  Europe  to  purchase  suitable 
war-ships  found  for  sale  in  foreign  ship-yards,  and  large 
numbers  of  the  smaller  cannon  and  a  great  quantity  of 
ammunition  were  bought  abroad.  Of  the  several  vessels 
purchased  only  one  came  into  important  use  during  the 
war,  the  New  Orleans  (formerly  the  Amazonas),  a  fine 
cruiser  obtained  from  Brazil.  The  Buffalo  (formerly  the 
Nictheroy),  a  dynamite  gunboat  obtained  from  the  same 
source,  proved  of  little  utility.  Two  small  cruisers  were 
purchased  in  England,  the  Topeka  and  the  Albany,  the 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  123 

latter  being  detained,  as  the  war  had  begun  before  she 
could  be  removed  from  her  English  port. 

Anticipating  the  decision  of  the  Court  of  Inquiry,  Con 
gress  did  not  wait  for  its  verdict,  but  on  the  gth  of 
March,  at  the  request  of  the  President,  voted  $50,000,000 
as  an  emergency  fund  for  the  national  defence.  This 
money  was  at  once  employed  in  purchasing  ships  and 
war-material  at  home  and  abroad,  and  in  adding  to  the 
strength  of  the  army,  a  bill  being  passed  for  the  recruit 
ing  of  two  regiments  of  artillery,  to  be  employed  in 
manning  the  heavy  guns  in  the  forts  along  the  coast. 

Captain  William  T.  Sampson  was  put  in  command  of 
the  fleet  at  Key  West,  with  the  rank  of  acting  rear- 
admiral,  while  a  "Flying  Squadron"  was  organized  at 
Hampton  Roads,  under  the  command  of  Commodore 
Winfield  Scott  Schley,  with  the  armored  cruiser  Brooklyn 
as  flag-ship,  the  battle-ships  Massachusetts  and  Texas, 
and  the  cruisers  Columbia  and  Minneapolis,  the  fastest 
afloat  in  the  navies  of  the  world. 

In  addition  to  the  ships  purchased  and  subsidized, 
work  on  the  battle-ships  under  contract,  five  in  number, 
was  hastened,  and  a  naval  bill  was  passed  by  Congress 
carrying  an  unusually  large  addition  to  the  navy, 
embracing  three  battle-ships,  four  monitors,  twelve  tor 
pedo-boats,  and  sixteen  torpedo-boat  destroyers.  This 
provision  was  made  without  any  reference  to  the  hostile 
relations  with  Spain,  but  simply  in  response  to  the  war 
sentiment  abroad  and  the  general  feeling  that  our  navy 
was  too  weak  for  the  possible  needs  of  the  nation. 

On  March  17,  Senator  Proctor  made  a  speech  before 
Congress,  in  which  he  described,  with  the  simple  elo 
quence  of  facts,  the  terrible  scenes  of  destitution  he  had 
witnessed  in  his  visit  to  Cuba,  of  which  we  have  already 


124  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

spoken.  The  horrors  of  the  reconcentration  policy  were 
depicted  by  him  with  a  clearness  never  before  realized 
by  the  people,  and  his  words  sent  a  shudder  of  horrified 
feeling  from  end  to  end  of  the  land.  Senators  Gallinger 
and  Thurston  added  their  testimony  to  his,  arousing  the 
deep  indignation  not  only  of  the  people,  but  of  Congress, 
whose  members  had  not  before  fully  appreciated  the 
condition  of  affairs  in  Cuba.  From  all  sides  came  fer 
vent  appeals  from  people  and  press  for  the  relief  of  the 
starving  inhabitants  of  the  desolated  island.  The  $50,- 
000,000  appropriation  for  defence  had  been  passed  by  a 
unanimous  vote.  But  preparation  for  war,  not  for  de 
fence,  was  now  demanded,  since,  aside  from  the  disaster  to 
the  Maine,  it  was  felt  that  the  barbarous  policy  of  Spain 
had  rendered  war  inevitable.  The  decision  of  the  Maine 
Court  of  Inquiry,  which  quickly  followed,  and  was  trans 
mitted  by  the  President  to  Congress,  with  an  accompany 
ing  message,  on  March  28,  added  fuel  to  the  flame  and 
roused  the  House  to  a  grim  determination  which  no 
advocate  of  the  policy  of  peace  could  restrain.  Speaker 
Reed  in  vain  attempted  to  hold  it  back  The  Senate  was 
equally  bent  on  war.  The  disaster  to  the  Maine  was 
but  a  match  touched  to  the  powder  of  public  sentiment. 
War  must  have  come  without  it  if  Spain  did  not 
change  her  policy,  and  this  she  showed  no  intention  of 
doing.  The  terrible  spectacle  of  nearly  a  quarter  of  a 
million  of  unoffending  people  dying  of  sheer  starvation 
was  more  than  the  moral  sentiment  of  the  American 
people  could  endure.  Spain  would  not  succor  the 
people  and  could  not  conquer  the  insurgents.  Nothing 
remained  but  for  the  United  States  to  intervene. 

Meanwhile  President  McKinley  endeavored  to  avert 
hostilities.     On  March  27  he  submitted  a  proposition 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  125 

to  Spain,  asking  that  country  to  grant  an  amnesty  to 
the  insurgents,  to  continue  till  October  i,  during  which 
time  the  United  States  would  conduct  negotiations  for 
peace.  He  also  asked  that  steps  should  be  taken  for 
the  return  of  the  reconcentrados  to  their  farms,  promis 
ing  that  the  United  States  would  relieve  their  wants  until 
they  were  able  to  support  themselves.  This  communica 
tion  met  the  usual  fate  of  negotiations  with  Spain.  An 
evasive  and  unsatisfactory  reply  was  returned,  deferring 
the  immediate  cessation  of  hostilities  and  proposing  a 
scheme  for  '  *  preparing  peace. ' '  The  offer  of  aid  to  the 
reconcentrados  was  accepted,  and  a  proposition  to  arbi 
trate  the  Maine  affair  was  added. 

The  President  had  made  his  final  effort.  Spain's  pol 
icy  of  procrastination  could  no  longer  be  endured.  He 
now  turned  the  matter  over  to  Congress,  preparing  a 
special  message,  in  which  the  whole  question  at  issue  was 
considered  and  the  situation  delineated  from  its  various 
points  of  view.  Congress  was  asked  for  legislation.  This 
message  was  ready  April  4,  but  was  kept  back  for  a  week 
to  give  time  for  the  American  consuls  and  other  citizens 
to  leave  Cuba.  It  was  sure  to  cause  violent  excitement 
in  the  Cuban  cities,  and  might  give  rise  to  riotous  as 
saults  on  the  consulates,  and  the  safety  of  American  res 
idents  counselled  delay.  On  April  9  Consul- General  Lee 
left  Havana.  There  were  no  hostile  demonstrations  by 
the  people,  but  General  Blanco  treated  him  with  marked 
discourtesy,  and  the  soldiers  on  guard  at  the  palace  were 
permitted  to  act  in  an  insulting  manner.  Many  other 
Americans  left  the  Cuban  ports,  few  or  none  remaining, 
and  on  April  1 1  the  message  of  the  President  was  sent 
to  Congress,  a  final  decision  on  the  question  of  peace 
or  war  being  left  to  that  body.  There  was  added  to 


126  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

the  document,  in  the  form  of  a  postscript,  the  statement 
that  Spain  had  just  granted  the  amnesty  asked  for, — as 
usual,  too  late. 

We  have  already  quoted  from  this  message.  A  fur 
ther  quotation  will  be  in  place.  "  The  efforts  of  Spain," 
it  said,  *  *  added  to  the  horrors  of  the  strife  a  new  and 
inhuman  phase  happily  unprecedented  in  the  modern 
history  of  civilized  Christian  people.  The  policy  of  de 
vastation  and  concentration  inaugurated  on  October  21, 
1896,  in  the  province  of  Pinar  del  Rio,  was  thence  ex 
tended  to  embrace  all  of  the  island  to  which  the  power 
of  the  Spanish  arms  was  able  to  reach  by  military  occupa 
tion  or  by  military  operations.  The  peasantry,  including 
all  dwellers  in  the  open  agricultural  interior,  were  driven 
into  the  garrisoned  towns  or  isolated  places  held  by 
troops.  The  raising  and  movement  of  provisions  of 
all  kinds  were  interdicted.  The  fields  were  laid  waste, 
dwellings  unroofed  or  fired,  mills  destroyed,  and,  in  short, 
everything  that  could  desolate  the  land  and  render  it 
unfit  for  human  habitation  or  support  was  commanded 
by  one  or  other  of  the  contending  parties  and  executed 
by  all  the  powers  at  their  disposal. ' ' 

The  President  described  in  thrilling  language  the  re 
sults  of  this  terrible  policy,  with  the  frightful  destitution, 
misery,  and  starvation  to  which  it  had  given  rise,  say 
ing  that  ' '  The  only  peace  it  could  beget  was  that  of 
the  wilderness  and  the  grave."  There  had  arisen  in 
consequence  what  he  designated  as  an  "intolerable  sit 
uation."  "The  only  hope  of  relief  and  repose,"  he 
said,  ' '  from  a  condition  which  can  no  longer  be  endured 
is  the  enforced  pacification  of  Cuba.  In  the  name  of 
humanity,  in  the  name  of  civilization,  in  behalf  of  en 
dangered  American  interests,  which  give  us  the  right 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  127 

and  the  duty  to  speak  and  to  act,  the  war  in  Cuba  must 
stop."  In  view  of.  the  facts  presented,  Congress  was 
asked  to  authorize  the  President  to  take  measures  for 
the  termination  of  hostilities  and  to  secure  a  stable  gov 
ernment  in  Cuba,  '  *  and  to  use  the  military  and  naval 
forces  of  the  United  States  as  may  be  necessary  for  these 
purposes."  Evidently  the  President  had  given  up  all 
hope  of  peace,  for  these  words  meant  war. 

In  addition  to  his  message,  President  McKinley  trans 
mitted  to  Congress  an  extensive  series  of  reports  received 
from  the  American  consuls  in  Cuba  during  the  preceding 
year  in  reference  to  the  treatment  of  the  reconcentrados. 
These  had  been  asked  for  by  Congress  on  February  14, 
but  the  sinking  of  the  Maine  on  the  following  day  had 
put  them  out  of  sight,  and  they  were  only  now  trans 
mitted  to  the  legislative  bodies.  They  fully  confirmed 
all  that  had  been  stated  by  General  Lee,  Senator  Proc 
tor,  and  others  in  regard  to  the  inhuman  treatment  of  the 
unarmed  people  by  Spain,  and  furnished  ample  confirma 
tion  of  all  that  the  President  had  said,  and  an  argument 
for  war  on  the  highest  grounds  on  which  a  resort  to  arms 
can  be  based,  those  of  humanity  and  the  preservation  of 
the  moral  standard  of  mankind. 

An  impassioned  debate  followed  the  reception  of  the 
message  and  continued  for  several  days.  In  this  scarcely 
a  voice  was  raised  for  peace.  The  vast  majority  of  the 
members  were  bent  upon  war,  the  question  at  issue 
being  that  of  the  recognition  or  non-recognition  of  the 
republic  of  Cuba,  on  which  a  prolonged  disagreement 
was  developed  between  the  Senate  and  the  House.  This 
question  was  finally  shelved,  and  on  April  19  the  two 
bodies  of  Congress  united  upon  the  following  joint  reso 
lution,  which  was  approved  by  the  President  on  the  2Oth  : 


128  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

' '  JOINT  RESOLUTION  foi  the  recognition  of  the  inde 
pendence  of  the  people  of  Cuba,  demanding  that  the 
government  of  Spain  relinquish  its  authority  and  gov 
ernment  in  the  island  of  Cuba,  and  withdraw  its  land 
and  naval  forces  from  Cuba  and  Cuban  waters,  and 
directing  the  President  of  the  United  States  to  use  the 
land  and  naval  forces  of  the  United  States  to  carry  these 
resolutions  into  effect. 

1 '  WHEREAS,  The  abhorrent  conditions  which  have 
existed  for  more  than  three  years  in  the  island  of  Cuba, 
so  near  our  own  borders,  have  shocked  the  moral  sense 
of  the  people  of  the  United  States,  have  been  a  disgrace 
to  Christian  civilization,  culminating,  as  they  have,  in 
the  destruction  of  a  United  States  battle-ship,  with  two 
hundred  and  sixty-six  of  its  officers  and  crew,  while  on 
a  friendly  visit  in  the  harbor  of  Havana,  and  cannot 
longer  be  endured,  as  has  been  set  forth  by  the  Presi 
dent  of  the  United  States  in  his  message  to  Congress  of 
April  n,  1898,  upon  which  the  action  of  Congress  was 
united  ;  therefore, 

* '  Resolved,  By  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representa 
tives  of  the  United  States  of  America  in  Congress  as 
sembled, 

"  i.  That  the  people  of  the  island  of  Cuba  are,  and 
of  right  ought  to  be,  free  and  independent. 

' '  2.  That  it  is  the  duty  of  the  United  States  to  de 
mand,  and  the  government  of  the  United  States  does 
hereby  demand,  that  the  government  of  Spain  at  once 
relinquish  its  authority  and  government  in  the  island  of 
Cuba,  and  withdraw  its  land  and  naval  forces  from  Cuba 
and  Cuban  waters. 

"3.  That  the  President  of  the  United  States  be,  and 
he  hereby  is,  directed  and  empowered  to  use  the  land 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  129 

and  naval  forces  of  the  United  States  and  to  call  into 
the  actual  service  of  the  United  States  the  militia  of  the 
several  States  to  such  an  extent  as  may  be  necessary  to 
carry  these  resolutions  into  effect. 

"4.  That  the  United  States  hereby  disclaims  any 
disposition  or  intention  to  exercise  sovereignty,  juris 
diction,  or  control  over  said  island  except  for  the  pacifi 
cation  thereof,  and  asserts  its  determination,  when  that 
is  accomplished,  to  leave  the  government  and  control  of 
the  island  to  its  people." 

There  could  be  but  one  outcome  from  these  resolutions. 
No  one  dreamed  for  a  moment  that  Spain  would  accede 
to  the  conditions  offered  her.  In  truth,  she  was  quick 
to  act.  She  was  to  be  given  until  noon  of  the  23d  for 
an  answer,  but  on  the  2oth  Senor  Polo,  the  Spanish 
minister,  asked  for  his  passports  and  left  Washington. 
General  Woodford,  the  American  minister  at  Madrid, 
was  not  given  an  opportunity  to  present  the  ultimatum 
of  the  United  States  to  the  government  of  Spain,  his 
passports  being  sent  him  before  he  had  time  to  act. 
Spain  thus  took  the  initiative  in  inaugurating  the  war. 
Woodford  left  Madrid  on  the  night  of  the  2ist,  not 
without  some  efforts  at  violence  on  the  part  of  the  ex 
cited  people.  On  April  24  Spain  issued  a  declaration  of 
war.  On  the  25th  Congress  passed  a  resolution  that  war 
between  the  United  States  and  Spain  ' '  is  declared  to 
exist,  and  to  have  existed,  since  April  21."  After  a 
period  of  thirty- three  years  of  peace  and  prosperity  war 
had  again  come  to  the  great  republic  of  the  West. 

War  was  in  the  air  long  before  it  was  declared.  The 
verdict  of  the  Maine  Court  of  Inquiry,  taken  in  con 
nection  with  Spain's  denial  and  repellant  attitude,  had 
rendered  hostilities  inevitable  unless  some  radical  change 

9 


1 30  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

should  take  place  in  the  demeanor  of  the  Spanish  gov 
ernment  and  in  the  situation  in  Cuba.  Of  such  changes 
there  was  no  indication.  Spain  was  actively  engaged  in 
efforts  to  purchase  ships  and  munitions  of  war,  and  in 
other  preparations  for  hostilities.  Nothing  was  being 
done  in  Cuba,  other  than  to  permit  American  charity  to 
aid  the  suffering.  In  early  April,  1898,  the  Spanish 
cabinet,  either  shamed  into  action  by  the  activity  of 
American  benevolence  or  for  effect,  voted  three  million 
pesetas — more  than  $600,000 — for  the  aid  of  the  starving 
reconcentrados.  That  this  succor  would  reach  them  was 
very  questionable.  The  soldiers  were  in  almost  as  pitia 
ble  a  state  as  the  pacificos.  General  Lee,  questioned 
concerning  this  subject  on  April  12  by  the  Senate  Com 
mittee  on  Foreign  Relations,  replied  :  ' '  I  do  not  believe 
$600,000  in  supplies  will  be  given  to  these  people  and 
the  soldiers  left  to  starve.  They  will  divide  it  up  here 
and  there — a  piece  taken  off  here  and  a  piece  taken  off 
there.  The  condition  of  the  reconcentrados  out  in  the 
country  is  just  as  bad  as  in  General  Weyler's  day, 
except  as  it  has  been  relieved  by  supplies  from  the  United 
States." 

Whatever  effect  such  a  belated  act  of  charity  was  likely 
to  produce,  it  came  too  late  to  check  the  tide  of  hostile 
feeling.  Like  all  Spanish  yieldings  to  the  pressure  of 
circumstances,  it  was  delayed  until  its  force  was  spent. 
In  every  reform  proclaimed  by  Spain  in  Cuban  affairs 
the  fatal  fault  of  procrastination  appeared.  Manana  (to 
morrow)  should  be  taken  as  the  national  motto  of  Spain. 
In  no  instance  that  can  be  named  has  a  reform  measure 
been  offered  except  under  the  absolute  pressure  of  events, 
and  all  such  have  been  vitiated  by  conditions  which 
would  quickly  have  negatived  their  effect.  Such  was 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  131 

the  case  with  the  various  Blanco  reforms.  The  natives 
remembered  too  well  the  result  of  the  Zanjon  capitula 
tion  to  accept  any  pacification  on  the  same  terms.  The 
appropriation  for  relief  was  like  all  the  other  steps  of 
reform, — it  came  too  late.  In  the  state  of  affairs  then 
existing,  it  was  like  Dame  Partington's  effort  to  keep 
back  the  ocean  with  a  broom. 

In  fact,  for  a  month  before  the  declaration  of  war  such 
a  result  of  the  controversy  had  become  inevitable.  There 
was  talk  of  friendly  intervention  of  the  nations  of  Europe, 
and  the  representatives  of  six  of  the  great  powers  made 
an  official  call  upon  the  President  in  the  interests  of 
peace.  The  courteous  but  decisive  reply  of  the  Execu 
tive  put  a  final  end  to  all  efforts  in  this  direction.  At 
tempts  to  influence  Spain  to  withdraw  from  her  hostile 
attitude  were  also  made,  but  without  effect.  The  affair 
had  gone  too  far  to  be  checked  without  a  resort  to  arms. 

Meanwhile,  preparations  for  hostilities  went  on  with 
all  activity.  In  addition  to  the  movements  of  the  fleet 
mentioned,  the  battle-ship  Oregon  was  ordered  to  the 
Atlantic,  and  left  San  Francisco  on  March  19  for  a  long 
journey  around  the  South  American  continent.  She 
was  accompanied  in  part  of  her  course  by  the  gunboat 
Marietta.  The  activity  displayed  in  the  navy  was  now 
paralleled  in  the  army.  Orders  were  issued  on  April  15 
for  the  concentration  of  the  troops  at  different  points  in 
the  South,  six  regiments  of  cavalry  and  the  light  bat 
teries  of  five  regiments  of  artillery  being  ordered  to 
rendezvous  at  Chickamauga,  where  a  military  camp  was 
established.  Eight  regiments  of  infantry  were  set  in 
motion  for  New  Orleans,  seven  for  Tampa,  Florida,  and 
seven  for  Mobile  ;  making  a  total  force  of  twenty  thou 
sand  men.  During  the  week  ending  April  18  the  troops 


I32  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

of  the  regular  army  began  moving  rapidly  by  rail  towards 
these  camps. 

This  movement  had  been  under  contemplation  for 
some  time,  its  purpose  being  to  acclimate  the  troops  to 
a  climate  approaching  the  tropical  ;  but  it  had  been  de 
layed  in  view  of  the  expense  entailed  and  with  the  hope 
that  an  accommodation  might  be  reached.  But  with  the 
near  approach  of  war,  immediate  action  became  neces 
sary,  and  the  army  was  set  in  rapid  motion,  converging 
from  all  points  upon  the  new  camps  in  the  South.  The 
whole  army  was  under  the  command  of  Major-General 
Nelson  A.  Miles,  its  several  divisions  being  under  Major- 
General  J.  R.  Brooke  and  Brigadier- Generals  W.  B. 
Shafter,  J.  J.  Coppinger,  and  J.  F.  Wade. 

While  the  United  States  was  thus  actively  preparing 
for  the  threatened  war,  Spain  was  no  less  active.  Her 
agents  were  abroad  purchasing  war-material  in  the 
other  countries  of  Europe  and  seeking  to  obtain  war 
ships  that  had  been  built  for  other  nations.  In  the  latter 
effort  she  was  unsuccessful,  and  no  additions  were  made 
to  her  fleet.  A  squadron  embracing  some  of  the  finest 
vessels  in  her  navy  was  sent  to  the  Cape  Verde  Islands, 
in  preparation  for  a  rapid  run  across  the  Atlantic  should 
necessity  demand.  Thus  the  two  nations  stood  at  bay, 
while  actively  preparing  for  what  seemed  an  inevitable 
strife. 

The  powers  of  Europe  looked  on  meanwhile  with 
much  apprehension,  not  knowing  to  what  complications 
a  war  might  lead.  Yet  they  had  no  warrant  for  inter 
vention.  It  could  not  be  denied  that  the  highest  in 
terests  of  morality  sustained  the  United  States  in  its 
course.  On  the  other  hand,  Spain  was  preparing  to 
fight  for  its  colonies,  as  any  of  these  nations  would  have 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  133 

done.  The  loss  of  the  Maine  was  an  added  provocation 
sufficient  to  have  plunged  any  of  these  powers  into  war. 
In  consequence,  the  European  governments  confined 
themselves  to  amicable  efforts,  which  proved  of  no  avail 
in  preventing  the  appeal  to  arms. 


CHAPTER    VII. 

CUBA   UNDER    BLOCKADE. 

FOR  three  weary  months  the  North  Atlantic  Squadron 
of  the  United  States  navy  had  lain  in  the  waters  south 
of  Florida,  lazily  falling  and  lifting  as  the  tide  ebbed 
and  flowed,  while  impatience  for  action  on  the  part  of 
the  crews  deepened  until  almost  into  a  passion.  Cap 
tain  William  T.  Sampson,  appointed  acting  rear-admiral, 
was  in  command,  his  flag-ship  being  the  armored  cruiser 
New  York.  The  fleet  included  in  addition  the  battle 
ships  Iowa  and  Indiana,  the  double-turreted  monitors 
Puritan,  Terror,  Miantonomah,  and  Amphitrite,  the 
cruisers  Montgomery,  Marblehead,  Cincinnati,  and  De 
troit,  and  a  considerable  number  of  gunboats,  torpedo- 
boats,  and  accessory  craft.  On  the  evening  of  April  21, 
1898,  the  flag-ship  swung  at  anchor  about  seven  miles 
out  from  Key  West,  flanked  by  the  two  great  battle 
ships,  while  the  inner  harbor  presented  an  animated 
picture  with  its  throng  of  monitors,  cruisers,  and  smaller 
craft, — the  larger  vessels  at  anchor,  the  smaller  ones 
gliding  about  on  various  errands. 

Dulness  and  calm  rested  upon  the  ships,  as  it  had 
rested  for  weeks  past.  Men  and  officers  lounged  about 
the  decks  or  sought  relaxation  in  the  neighboring  town. 
But  as  the  night  wore  on  a  change  appeared.  A  special 
boat  from  the  flag-ship  called  back  to  their  ships  all 
those  on  shore,  and  by  midnight  the  show  of  gold  braid 
and  blue  jackets,  which  had  long  been  familiar  sights  in 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  135 

the  streets  of  the  Gulf  port,  had  disappeared.  At  the 
mast-heads  of  the  New  York  and  her  consorts  signal- 
lights  flashed  and  flickered,  their  vari-colored  gleams  con 
veying  significant  orders  to  the  ships  in  shore.  From 
the  latter  flashed  back  replies,  and  during  the  night  a 
conversation  in  points  of  fire  was  kept  up  through  the 
air,  telling  but  one  thing  to  the  interested  observers, 
that  the  long  wait  was  at  an  end  and  great  events  were 
in  train. 

Over  the  wires  had  come  from  Washington  the  start 
ling  words  :  ' '  War  is  declared. ' '  With  them  came  to 
the  admiral  of  the  fleet  orders  for  an  immediate  blockade 
of  the  Cuban  coast,  and  at  break  of  day  on  the 
22d  smoke  was  seen  to  pour  densely  from  the  black- 
mouthed  stacks,  anchors  were  cheerily  drawn  from 
their  holding-ground,  the  lazy  swinging  of  the  ships  was 
exchanged  for  active  motion,  and  lively  hope  chased 
despondency  from  the  faces  of  the  crews.  At  the  earliest 
hour  of  dawn  the  final  signals  burned  in  letters  of  light 
above  the  ships,  and  some  of  the  vessels  of  the  fleet  were 
already  gliding  out  of  the  harbor.  Shortly  before  six 
o'  clock  the  flag-ship  was  seen  moving  slowly  outward, 
the  Iowa  and  Indiana  following  on  either  side.  In  the 
harbor  the  remaining  ships  were  all  astir,  with  the  ex 
ception  of  the  Puritan,  the  Terror,  and  some  smaller 
boats,  which  remained  behind  to  take  on  water  and  coal. 
Gradually  the  fleet  grew  smaller  and  less  distinct,  and 
one  by  one  the  vessels  vanished  in  the  blue  distance. 
The  time  of  expectation  was  over  ;  that  of  action  had 
begun.  The  ships  were  on  their  way  to  carry  the  mes 
sage  of  war  to  Cuba's  verdant  shores.  The  first  fruits 
of  the  new  dispensation  were  seen  when  a  flash  broke 
from  the  side  of  the  gunboat  Nashville,  and  a  cannon- 


136  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

ball  ruffled  the  water  in  front  of  a  passing  steamer  at 
whose  mast-head  flew  the  Spanish  flag.  A  second  shot 
was  necessary  before  the  Spanish  captain  took  the  hint 
and  hove  to  his  vessel.  In  a  brief  time  she  had  veered 
and  was  making  her  way  to  Key  West  in  charge  of  a 
prize  crew.  The  vessel  proved  to  be  the  merchantman 
Buena  Ventura,  laden  with  lumber  from  Texas.  The 
captain  had  hoisted  his  flag  as  a  salute,  not  knowing  that 
war  was  declared. 

Before  nightfall  the  blockade  of  the  Cuban  coast  had 
begun,  and  Havana,  at  the  bottom  of  whose  harbor  lay 
the  sunken  Maine,  was  feeling  the  stress  of  war.  On 
the  same  day  President  McKinley  announced  to  the 
powers  of  the  world  that  Havana  and  the  neighboring 
ports  were  under  blockade,  and  that  commercial  inter 
course  with  them  must  be  suspended.  The  blockade, 
as  proclaimed,  extended  from  Cardenas  to  Bahia  Honda 
on  the  north  coast,  a  distance  of  about  one  hundred  and 
sixty  miles.  On  the  south  coast  it  was  limited  to  the 
single  port  of  Cienfuegos. 

While  these  events  were  in  progress,  a  note  of  alarm 
came  from  across  the  seas.  The  great  steamer  of  the 
American  Line,  the  Paris,  which  had  been  chosen  as 
part  of  our  auxiliary  fleet,  lay  at  Southampton,  Eng 
land,  with  orders  to  sail  for  the  United  States  on  the 
22d.  Fears  were  entertained  that  this  noble  ship  might 
be  made  a  Spanish  prize,  and  rumors  were  rife  that 
cruisers  from  Spain  were  prowling  about  in  her  expected 
route.  The  anxiety  did  not  subside  until  the  Paris 
loomed  up  in  American  waters,  safe  from  capture  and 
without  having  seen  a  hostile  sail. 

In  Havana,  on  the  same  day,  defiance  was  being  cast 
in  the  face  of  the  Americans.  On  the  night  before,  the 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN.  137 

public  buildings  and  many  private  residences  had  been 
decorated  with  the  national  colors,  and  an  illumination  of 
the  city  followed,  as  though  the  occasion  was  one  of  fes 
tivity.  The  next  morning  the  people,  wearing  ribbons 
of  the  Spanish  colors,  gathered  densely  in  the  square 
opposite  the  palace,  sending  a  committee  to  the  gov 
ernor-general  to  tender  their  estates  and  their  lives  in 
aid  of  the  national  cause,  for  which  they  pledged 
themselves  to  fight  to  the  bitter  end.  General  Blanco 
thanked  them  in  the  name  of  the  king  and  the  governing 
powers,  and  made  a  speech  to  the  people  in  which  he 
assured  them  that  he  would  lead  them  to  victory. 

"  Otherwise  I  shall  not  live,"  he  said.  "Do  you 
swear  to  follow  me  to  the  fight  ?' ' 

"  Yes,  yes,  we  do  !"  shouted  the  throng. 

*  *  Do  you  swear  to  give  the  last  drop  of  blood  in  your 
veins  before  letting  a  foreigner  stamp  his  foot  on  the 
land  we  discovered  and  place  his  yoke  on  the  people  we 
civilized  ?' ' 

' 'Yes,  yes,  we  do  !" 

"The  enemy's  fleet  is  almost  at  Morro  Castle,  almost 
at  the  shores  of  Havana.  We  will  throw  them  into  the 
sea." 

Just  where  the  people  whom  Spain  had  civilized  were 
to  be  found  General  Blanco,  in  his  enthusiasm,  neglected 
to  state.  But  he  sought  to  make  his  words  good  on  the 
following  day  by  opening  fire  from  Morro  Castle  on  the 
flag-ship  of  the  American  fleet.  On  the  24th  Morro 
fired  again  on  the  American  ships.  It  was  a  futile  waste 
of  powder  and  shot,  which  was  not  accorded  the  honor 
of  a  reply.  The  projectiles  had  sunk  uselessly  into  the 
waves.  During  this  fusillade  the  fleet  was  engaged  in 
making  prizes.  On  the  23d  the  New  York  brought  to 


138  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

bay,  after  an  exciting  chase,  the  Spanish  freight- steamer 
Pedro,  the  Porter  captured  the  steamer  Mathilde,  and 
the  Helena  made  prize  of  the  fine  steamer  Miguel  Jover. 
Four  more  prizes  were  taken  on  the  following  day,  and 
by  the  end  of  a  week  the  number  of  prizes  had  more 
than  doubled,  their  value  aggregating  upwards  of  $3,000,  - 
ooo.  The  mail-steamer  Montserrat,  laden  with  eighteen 
large  guns  and  $800,000  in  silver,  and  having  on  board 
one  thousand  Spanish  troops,  was  fortunate  in  discov 
ering  the  lion  in  her  path,  and  doubled  back  when  near 
Havana,  landing  her  cargo  and  troops  at  the  distant  port 
of  Santiago  de  Cuba. 

The  Cuban  insurgents  were  not  long  in  receiving  the 
glad  tidings  that  a  powerful  ally  was  coming  to  their  aid. 
For  three  years  they  had  kept  the  field  with  desperate 
determination,  but  almost  hopeless  of  help  from  without. 
Now  the  long-prayed-for  message  of  hope  and  success 
was  brought  to  their  camps,  a  gallant  American  soldier 
risking  danger  and  death  in  the  perilous  enterprise. 
Before  war  was  declared,  before  the  President's  message 
had  reached  Congress,  Lieutenant  Andrew  S.  Rowan, 
of  the  United  States  army,  had  left  Washington  on  a 
mission  to  the  Cubans  in  arms.  Starting  from  the  cap 
ital  on  April  9,  he  reached  Kingston,  Jamaica,  on  the 
23d,  and  crossed  from  that  island  to  Cuba  in  a  little 
sailing-boat,  handled  by  a  man  whom  the  daring  lieuten 
ant  familiarly  designated  his  "pirate"  and  who  was 
thoroughly  familiar  with  the  waters  of  those  seas.  The 
movements  of  the  Spanish  patrol-boats  were  well  known 
to  him,  and  he  succeeded  in  landing  Lieutenant  Rowan 
while  the  coast  was  clear. 

The  danger  of  the  enterprise  was  great,  the  coast  being 
patrolled  by  land  and  sea,  while  if  taken  he  would  prob- 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN.  139 

ably  have  been  executed  as  a  spy.  But  he  was  met  by 
Cubans  and  escorted  to  the  mountains  in  the  vicinity  of 
Santiago,  making  his  way  in  a  few  days  to  General  Gar 
cia' s  camp,  then  at  Bayamo,  where  he  was  greeted  with 
the  highest  enthusiasm.  This  interior  stronghold,  which 
the  Spanish  troops  had  held  against  Cuban  assault 
since  the  beginning  of  the  war,  had  been  evacuated  by 
them  on  April  28.  It  was  immediately  occupied  by  the 
insurgents,  who  doubtless  looked  upon  this  withdrawal 
of  their  foe  as  the  first  signal  of  the  good  time  coming. 
Lieutenant  Rowan  had  been  charged  by  the  Presi 
dent  with  a  secret  mission  to  General  Garcia,  with 
whom  he  had  a  long  interview,  laying  plans  for  a  future 
co-operation  of  the  allied  forces.  On  his  return  to  the 
coast  he  was  accompanied  by  General  Collazo  and  Col 
onel  Hernandez,  of  the  Cuban  army,  as  envoys  to  the 
United  States.  Three  guides  completed  the  party,  which 
risked  the  perils  of  the  sea  in  a  small  boat.  The  first 
morning  out  they  came  in  sight  of  Admiral  Sampson's 
squadron,  but  made  no  attempt  to  board  the  ships.  The 
next  day  they  were  picked  up  by  a  sponging-sloop  and 
carried  to  Nassau,  New  Providence,  whence  the  adven 
turous  party  made  its  way  to  the  United  States.  Thus 
ended  in  success  the  first  of  those  daring  enterprises 
through  which  Americans  won  reputation  for  boldness 
and  courage  during  the  war.  Through  it  the  President 
received  valuable  information  concerning  the  numbers 
and  condition  of  the  Cuban  army  and  the  state  of  affairs 
in  the  interior.  Major-General  Miles  gave  the  following 
tribute  to  Rowan' s  courage  :  *  *  This  was  a  most  perilous 
undertaking,  and  in  my  judgment  Lieutenant  Rowan 
performed  an  act  of  heroism  and  cool  daring  that  has 
rarely  been  excelled  in  the  annals  of  warfare." 


140  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

The  events  described  at  the  seat  of  war  were  paralleled 
by  as  active  ones  at  the  seat  of  the  government.  An 
army  bill  was  passed  by  Congress  on  April  22  providing 
for  a  temporary  increase  of  the  army,  in  response  to 
which,  on  the  following  day,  the  President  issued  a  proc 
lamation  calling  for  one  hundred  and  twenty-five  thousand 
volunteers  to  serve  for  two  years,  and  to  be  apportioned 
among  the  States  and  Territories  in  accordance  with 
their  populations.  The  proclamation  was  enthusiastically 
responded  to  from  all  parts  of  the  country,  the  National 
Guards  of  the  several  States  hastening  to  offer  their 
services,  while  there  were  thousands  ready  to  fill  up 
vacancies  and  to  swell  out  the  depleted  columns  of  the 
regular  army,  so  as  to  bring  every  regiment  up  to  its  full 
official  strength.  Far  more  offered,  indeed,  than  the 
government  was  ready  to  accept,  and  a  most  rigid  sys 
tem  of  health  inspection  was  inaugurated,  in  order  that 
none  but  those  in  a  state  of  full  health  and  capable  of 
enduring  the  hardships  of  campaigning  in  a  tropical 
island  should  be  enrolled.  The  result  was  to  give  the 
government  one  of  the  most  physically  perfect  armies 
that  had  ever  been  put  in  the  field. 

A  question  of  world-wide  importance  had  meanwhile 
arisen,  that  concerning  privateering.  Spain  had  not 
signed  the  Declaration  of  Paris  abolishing  privateering, 
and  stood  free  to  cover  the  ocean  with  swift  vessels  to 
prey  on  American  commerce.  In  such  an  obsolete 
mode  of  warfare,  even  if  the  United  States  government 
had  met  Spain  by  issuing  letters  of  marque,  this  country 
would  have  been  at  a  serious  disadvantage,  on  account 
of  the  vast  preponderance  of  American  commerce  over 
that  of  Spain.  But  it  had  no  such  purpose  in  view,  and 
Spain,  while  formally  reserving  the  right  to  send  out 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  141 

privateers,  deemed  it  unwise  to  put  it  in  exercise,  in  view 
of  the  irritation  such  a  course  would  have  caused  in  the 
nations  whose  friendship  she  desired  to  preserve.  Her 
declaration  of  the  existence  of  war  therefore  took  the 
following  form  : 

"  CLAUSE  i.  The  state  of  war  existing  between  Spain 
and  the  United  States  annuls  the  treaty  of  peace  and 
amity  of  October  17,  1795,  and  the  protocol  of  January 
12,  1877,  and  all  other  agreements,  treaties,  or  conven 
tions  in  force  between  the  two  countries. 

' '  CLAUSE  2.  From  the  publication  of  these  presents, 
thirty  days  are  granted  to  all  vessels  of  the  United  States 
anchored  in  our  harbors  to  take  their  departure  free  of 
hindrance. 

*  *  CLAUSE  3.  Notwithstanding  that  Spain  has  not  ad 
hered  to  the  Declaration  of  Paris,  the  government,  re 
specting  the  principles  of  the  law  of  nations,  proposes  to 
observe,  and  hereby  orders  to  be  observed,  the  following 
regulations  of  maritime  law  : 

* '  First.  Neutral  flags  cover  the  enemy' s  merchandise, 
except  contraband  of  war. 

'  *  Second.  Neutral  merchandise,  except  contraband  of 
war,  is  not  seizable  under  the  enemy's  flag. 

"  Third.  A  blockade  to  be  obligatory  must  be  effec 
tive, — viz.,  it  must  be  maintained  with  sufficient  force  to 
prevent  access  to  the  enemy's  littoral. 

4 '  Fourth.  The  Spanish  government,  upholding  its  right 
to  grant  letters  of  marque,  will  at  present  confine  itself 
to  organizing,  with  the  vessels  of  the  mercantile  marine, 
a  force  of  auxiliary  cruisers  which  will  co-operate  with 
the  navy,  according  to  the  needs  of  the  campaign,  and 
will  be  under  naval  control. 

"Fifth.     In  order  to  capture  the  enemy's  ships  and 


I42  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

confiscate  the  enemy's  merchandise  and  contraband  of 
war  under  whatever  form,  the  auxiliary  cruisers  will 
exercise  the  right  of  search  on  the  high  seas  and  in  the 
waters  under  the  enemy's  jurisdiction,  in  accordance 
with  international  law  and  the  regulations  which  will  be 
published. 

' '  Sixth.  [Defines  what  is  included  in  contraband  of 
war,  naming  weapons,  ammunition,  equipments,  engines, 
and,  in  general,  all  the  appliances  used  in  war.] 

"  Seventh.  To  be  regarded  and  judged  as  pirates,  with 
all  the  rigor  of  the  law,  are  captains,  masters,  officers, 
and  two-thirds  of  the  crew  of  vessels  which,  not  being 
American,  shall  commit  acts  of  war  against  Spain,  even 
if  provided  with  letters  of  marque  issued  by  the  United 
States." 

Spain  thus  took  the  initiative  in  declaring  war,  this 
proclamation  being  issued  on  April  24,  while  the  declara 
tion  of  the  United  States,  as  already  stated,  was  issued 
on  the  25th.  Both  were  merely  formal  declarations  of 
the  war  which  had  existed  since  the  2ist.  On  the  day 
of  the  declaration,  Secretary  of  State  John  Sherman 
retired  from  his  post  in  the  Cabinet,  being  incapacitated 
by  age  and  feebleness  to  perform  the  onerous  duties  of 
the  office  in  times  of  war.  William  R.  Day,  the  assistant 
secretary,  was  appointed  to  the  vacant  post.  The  other 
Cabinet  officers  whose  duties  were  specially  affected  by 
the  declaration  of  war  were  Russell  A.  Alger,  Secretary 
of  War  ;  John  D.  Long,  Secretary  of  the  Navy  ;  and 
Lyman  T.  Gage,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury. 

For  five  days  the  blockading  fleet  lay  off  Havana,  the 
great  ships  seven  or  eight  miles  from  shore,  the  smaller 
ones  occasionally  venturing  nearer,  confining  themselves 
strictly  to  blockading  duties,  and  seizing  all  Spanish 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  143 

vessels  that  incautiously  ventured  within  their  reach. 
On  shore  the  soldiers  of  Spain  were  kept  busy  in  build 
ing  and  strengthening  batteries,  a  form  of  activity  of 
which  Admiral  Sampson  did  not  approve,  and  with 
which  he  concluded  to  interfere.  On  the  morning  of 
the  2yth  the  flag-ship  steamed  along  the  coast  to  Matan- 
zas,  a  sea-port  city  some  fifty  miles  to  the  east  of  Havana. 
Near  the  entrance  to  the  harbor  she  was  met  by  the 
Puritan  and  the  Cincinnati,  on  blockade  duty  at  that 
point.  The  wind  blew  freshly  and  the  waves  poured  in 
sheets  of  green  water  over  the  low  bow  and  stern  of  the 
monitor  as  she  followed  in  the  wake  of  the  New  York. 
Admiral  Sampson  stood  on  the  bridge  of  the  flag-ship 
carefully  surveying  the  shore,  where  evidence  appeared 
that  the  Spanish  troops  were  actively  engaged  in  build 
ing  what  seemed  to  be  a  sand  battery,  on  which  several 
guns  had  been  mounted.  The  admiral  thought  that  a 
lesson  was  needed.  The  signal  call  of  ' '  general  quar 
ters"  was  given,  and  with  alacrity  the  men  rushed  to 
their  guns.  For  more  than  thirty  years  the  United 
States  navy  had  not  fired  a  hostile  shot.  Now  a  new 
record  was  to  be  made. 

Reaching  a  situation  about  four  thousand  yards  distant 
from  Punta  Gorda,  where  the  new  earthwork  appeared, 
the  helm  of  the  flag-ship  was  put  to  starboard  and  the 
bugler  sounded  the  signal,  ' '  Commence  firing. ' '  Re 
sponse  was  instant.  From  "Waist,"  the  gunner's  name 
for  the  eight-inch  gun  amidships  on  the  port-side,  came 
a  loud  roar  and  a  shock  that  shook  the  great  ship  from 
stem  to  stern.  The  shell  struck  a  little  to  the  right  of 
the  earthwork,  where  a  small  cloud  of  dust  testified  to 
the  fall  of  the  first  shot  fired  at  an  enemy  from  a  ship  of 
the  new  American  navy.  Two  others  followed,  the  third 


144  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

landing  in  the  very  centre  of  the  earthwork,  the  dense 
cloud  that  rose  being  evidence  of  the  perfect  accuracy  of 
the  aim.  These  three  shots  were  followed  by  a  broad 
side  from  all  the  guns  that  could  be  brought  to  bear, — 
eight-inch  and  four-inch  guns  hurling  their  projectiles 
together  upon  the  obtrusive  work. 

So  far  the  New  York  had  been  engaged  alone.  But 
the  Puritan  and  the  Cincinnati  were  vigorously  sig 
nalling  for  permission  to  fire.  ( '  All  right ;  tell  them  to 
go  ahead,"  said  the  admiral  on  learning  their  request. 
They  lost  no  time  in  taking  part  in  the  work. 

The  bombardment  had  not  been  without  a  return.  At 
Quintas  de  Recreo,  on  the  east  of  the  harbor,  seven 
thousand  yards  from  the  New  York,  was  a  fort  armed 
with  four  8-inch  guns,  whose  shots  were  coming  towards 
the  flag-ship,  though  falling  very  short.  Sampson  now 
directed  his  fire  on  this  fort.  The  Puritan  did  the  same, 
while  the  Cincinnati  continued  to  attend  to  the  earth 
work.  Five  minutes  sufficed  to  silence  the  fort,  and  the 
New  York  again  turned  her  guns  on  the  sand  battery. 
At  1.15  P.M.,  nineteen  minutes  after  the  affair  began, 
the  admiral  signalled  to  * '  cease  firing, ' '  and  the  brief 
engagement  came  to  an  end. 

About  three  hundred  shots  had  been  fired  during  this 
initial  engagement,  with  few  returns  from  the  shore,  no 
shot  hitting  any  of  the  ship:?.  The  effect  on  shore  was 
not  apparent,  other  than  that  the  forts  were  silenced  and 
seemingly  deserted.  From  Madrid  came  the  report  that 
the  Spanish  loss  consisted  of  * '  one  mule, ' '  a  sarcastic 
tribute  to  American  gunnery  that  elicited  much  mirth 
from  our  ill-wishers  on  the  other  side  of  the  ocean.  Leav 
ing  the  Puritan  and  the  Cincinnati  to  look  after  Matanzas, 
the  New  York  headed  for  Havana.  The  affair  had 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  145 

amounted  to  little  more  than  useful  target-practice,  its 
chief  utility  being  its  evidence  of  the  accuracy  of  American 
gunnery.  All  that  need  further  be  said  about  it  is  to  note 
the  eagerness  displayed  by  the  sailors  at  the  opportunity 
to  fight,  four  sick  men  springing  from  their  cots  at  the 
first  shot  and  rushing  to  their  stations  at  the  guns.  It 
was  with  bitter  disappointment  that  they  returned  when 
ordered  back  to  the  sick-bay. 

While  the  United  States  navy  had  thus  actively  en 
gaged  in  hostilities,  that  of  Spain  was  not  quite  idle. 
In  number  of  ships  that  country  fairly  equalled  the 
United  States.  It  was  inferior  in  strength,  though  it 
had  a  number  of  vessels  of  good  fighting  capacity. 
Several  of  the  best  of  the  Spanish  ships,  comprising 
four  swift  armored  cruisers  and  a  number  of  torpedo- 
boat  destroyers,  had  assembled  in  the  days  preceding 
the  declaration  of  war  at  St.  Vincent  harbor,  Cape 
Verde  Islands.  A  second  fleet,  of  inferior  strength,  lay 
at  Manila,  in  the  Philippines  ;  and  a  third,  of  consider 
able  numerical  strength,  yet  embracing  few  ships  in 
good  condition  for  duty,  was  at  the  port  of  Cadiz,  Spain. 
It  was  to  the  Cape  Verde  fleet  that  the  principal  attention 
was  paid  on  the  American  side.  There  was  much  appre 
hension  that  the  powerful  ships  of  this  fleet  might  make 
a  sudden  dash  across  the  Atlantic  and  attack  some  of 
our  seaport  cities,  few  of  which  were  well  defended, 
while  some  were  in  serious  need  of  forts  and  guns. 

To  guard  against  this  possible  danger,  the  ' '  Flying 
Squadron,"  under  Commodore  Winfield  Scott  Schley, 
was  held  ready  at  Newport  News.  It  included  the 
battle- ships  Massachusetts  and  Texas,  the  armored 
cruiser  Brooklyn,  Commodore  Schley' s  flag-ship,  and 
the  protected  cruisers  Minneapolis  and  Columbia.  The 

10 


146  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

latter  were  kept  patrolling  the  coast,  in  which  duty  was 
also  engaged  a  "Northern  Patrol  Squadron,"  under 
Admiral  Howell,  consisting  of  the  subsidized  passenger- 
steamers  renamed  the  Yankee,  Dixie,  Prairie,  and  Yo- 
semite.  The  harbor-defence  ram  Katahdin  was  included 
in  this  squadron,  while  the  thirteen  old  monitors,  relics 
of  the  Civil  War,  were  being  hastily  refitted  for  harbor 
duty.  As  fast  as  they  could  be  made  serviceable  they 
were  sent  to  various  harbors  to  aid  in  their  defence. 

The  Cape  Verde  Islands  are  a  Portuguese  colony, 
and  the  continuance  of  the  Spanish  fleet  in  the  harbor 
of  St.  Vincent  became  inadmissible  after  Portugal  had, 
following  most  of  the  nations  of  Europe,  proclaimed 
neutrality  between  the  combatants.  Admiral  Cervera, 
in  command  of  the  fleet,  was  warned  to  leave,  and  on 
April  29  the  squadron  set  sail.  It  consisted  of  the 
first-class  armored  cruisers  Cristobal  Colon,  Almirante 
Oquendo,  Infanta  Maria  Teresa,  and  Vizcaya,  and  the 
three  torpedo-boat  destroyers  Furor,  Terror,  and  Pluton. 
The  whole  comprised  a  formidable  fleet,  which,  if  directed 
against  some  of  the  less  protected  American  sea-board 
cities,  might  cause  immense  damage.  The  activity  of 
the  patrolling  ships  was  in  consequence  redoubled  ; 
mines  were  laid  in  the  various  harbor  approaches,  and 
guns  were  mounted  as  rapidly  as  possible  on  sea-coast 
defences  ;  and  apprehension  of  possible  danger  threat 
ened  to  interfere  seriously  with  the  business  of  sea-side 
resorts  during  the  coming  summer. 

Apprehensions  of  this  kind,  however,  had  no  effect  on 
the  activity  of  the  blockading  fleet.  On  the  29th  of 
April  the  batteries  at  Cienfuegos,  on  the  southern  Cuban 
coast,  were  bombarded  by  the  cruiser  Marblehead,  and 
on  the  same  day  the  gunboat  Nashville,  which  had  made 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  147 

the  first  prize  of  the  war,  added  to  her  record  by  the 
capture  of  the  Spanish  steamer  Argonauta,  laden  with 
troops,  arms,  and  ammunition  and  seeking  an  open  port. 
The  prizes  made  up  to  this  time  consisted  of  vessels  that 
had  left  harbor  before  war  was  declared  and  whose  cap 
tains  were  unaware  of  the  state  of  affairs. 

On  the  30th  the  forts  at  Cabanas,  near  Havana,  were 
attacked  and  demolished  by  the  cruiser  New  York,  and 
on  the  same  day  came  the  welcome  tidings  that  the 
Oregon  and  Marietta,  which  for  weeks  had  been  making 
their  way  along  the  many  thousands  of  miles  of  South 
American  coast,  were  in  the  harbor  of  Rio  Janeiro, 
having  progressed  safely  that  far  on  their  long  route. 
Much  the  most  dangerous  stage  of  their  journey  lay 
before  them  still.  Before  the  Oregon  could  reach  the 
North  Atlantic  Squadron,  to  which  she  was  accredited, 
the  Cape  Verde  squadron  might  be  in  her  track,  way 
laying  her  on  the  open  seas  or  in  the  West  India  chan 
nels.  The  Oregon  was  more  powerful  than  any  one  of 
these  ships,  but  four  against  one  are  frightful  odds,  and, 
though  she  might  have  given  a  good  account  of  herself 
against  the  whole  fleet,  a  lively  degree  of  uneasiness  con 
cerning  her  prevailed.  It  could  not  then  be  conjectured 
that  the  Oregon  was  thereafter  to  meet  and  fight  this 
fleet  under  circumstances  far  different  from  those  sur 
mised. 

The  activity  in  the  navy  was  paralleled  by  that  in  the 
army.  A  powerful  force  of  United  States  regular  troops 
began  to  assemble  at  Tampa,  Florida,  a  point  chosen  for 
its  nearness  to  Cuba.  The  purpose  of  this  movement 
was  believed  to  be  an  early  descent  upon  Cuba,  and  ex 
pectation  of  stirring  events  in  the  near  future  was  enter 
tained.  These  troops,  however,  were  illy  provided  with 


148  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN, 

military  supplies,  and  the  hoped-for  invasion  was  neces 
sarily  deferred  ;  the  conditions  being  such  as  are  apt  to 
arise  in  the  hasty  mobilization  of  an  army,  particularly 
where  large  deficiencies  in  number  have  to  be  made  up 
by  raw  recruits.  The  difficulties  were  in  the  main  the 
results  of  a  sudden  change  from  a  state  of  peace  to  one 
of  war,  and  the  necessity  of  making  rapid  provision  for 
the  requirements  of  a  large  army.  Much  fault  was  found 
with  the  government  for  alleged  slowness  of  action  and 
neglect  of  the  troops,  and  bitter  comments  were  made 
on  the  appointment  of  staff-officers  through  seeming 
political  influence.  These  complaints  were  not  without 
warrant,  though  they  were  exaggerated,  no  allowance 
being  made  for  the  difficulty  under  which  the  War  De 
partment  labored  in  the  sudden  necessity  of  obtaining 
and  forwarding  a  vast  quantity  of  supplies.  In  reality, 
no  nation  under  similar  circumstances  could  have  made 
more  rapid  progress  in  preparing  for  war. 

We  have  already  spoken  of  the  efforts  of  the  powers  of 
Europe  to  effect  an  accommodation  between  the  United 
States  and  Spain.  When  war  had  actually  begun,  they 
quickly  took  sides  with  one  or  the  other  of  the  com 
batants.  France  and  Germany  became  strong  adherents 
of  Spain,  their  newspapers  vigorously  denouncing  the 
United  States,  though  the  governments  remained  passive. 
This  attitude  was  supposed  to  be  due,  on  the  part  of 
France,  to  the  Spanish  debt  being  largely  owing  to  citi 
zens  of  that  country.  With  Germany  it  was  ascribed  to 
a  commercial  rather  than  a  pecuniary  cause,  the  United 
States  tariff  having  aroused  deep-seated  hostility  in  the 
agrarian  party  of  that  country.  Austria  also  favored 
Spain,  though  her  press  was  less  aggressive.  In  Italy 
the  tide  of  public  opinion  seems  to  have  run  most 


THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN.  149 

strongly  in  favor  of  the  United  States  ;  while  Russia  was 
non-committal,  an  occasional  press  utterance  indicating 
some  degree  of  animosity  to  the  United  States. 

The  remaining  leading  power,  Great  Britain,  from  the 
start  took  strong  sides  with  the  United  States,  evincing 
an  unexpected  warmth  of  friendliness  and  a  strong  desire 
to  ally  herself  with  this  country.  It  was  shrewdly  held 
by  many  that  self-interest  was  at  the  bottom  of  this 
seemingly  exaggerated  show  of  amity  ;  but  such  was 
hardly  the  case  with  the  people,  who  were  strongly  pro- 
American.  The  press,  with  very  few  exceptions,  sus 
tained  this  country,  and  the  opposing  papers  in  a  few 
months  veered  around,  probably  through  the  influence 
of  public  opinion. 

Whatever  the  underlying  motive  in  the  British  heart, 
this  earnest  display  of  friendliness  was  of  much  service 
to  the  United  States.  It  tied  the  hands  of  our  enemies 
on  the  Continent,  who  feared  that  any  hostile  act  would 
result  in  an  alliance  between  the  two  great  Anglo-Saxon 
nations.  Some  active  efforts  at  interference  might  have 
been  made  but  for  this  haunting  fear.  Great  Britain 
stood  as  a  buffer  between  us  and  our  opponents,  she  re 
fusing  to  co-operate  in  any  steps  of  interference.  The 
union  of  the  English-speaking  peoples  was  a  result 
which  none  of  them  wished  to  bring  about. 


CHAPTER    VIII. 

THE   SEA-FIGHT   AT   MANILA. 

THE  story  of  the  war  now  leads  us  to  a  far  remote 
locality,  one,  in  fact,  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  earth, 
that  extensive  archipelago  lying  east  of  Indo-China 
known  as  the  Philippine  Islands.  These  islands,  proba 
bly  more  than  fourteen  hundred  in  number,  though  only 
a  few  of  them  are  large  enough  to  be  of  importance,  have 
been  in  the  possession  of  Spain  almost  as  long  as  Cuba. 
They  were  discovered  by  Magellan  in  1521,  but  were 
not  made  a  Spanish  colony  until  1569.  Manila,  the 
capital,  was  founded  two  years  afterwards.  The  natives, 
eight  millions  or  more  in  number,  were  not  so  summarily 
disposed  of  as  those  of  Cuba,  but  of  late  years  their 
lot  has  been  still  more  severe  than  that  of  the  modern 
Cubans,  they  being  oppressed  in  exasperating  and  cruel 
ways,  and  treated  so  badly  that  their  hatred  of  the 
Spaniards  has  become  quite  equal  to  that  felt  by  the 
Cubans, — it  could  not  well  be  greater. 

In  1896,  under  the  incitement  of  news  of  the  Cuban 
insurrection,  the  natives  of  the  Philippines  rebelled 
against  their  masters,  fighting  fiercely  for  their  liberty 
until  near  the  end  of  1897.  With  this  rebellion  we  have 
no  direct  concern.  It  will  suffice  to  say  that  the  insur 
gents  proved  very  difficult  to  subdue,  and  that  they 
were  treated  with  revolting  cruelty  by  the  Spaniards 
when  taken  prisoners.  Finally,  in  December,  1897,  the 
Spanish  authorities  adopted  the  method  they  had  em- 
150 


MAP  OF  THE 

PHILIPPINE 
ISLANDS 

SCALE  OF  MILES 


S,i,tlt  Calv  0        50        100 

Hashee  Channel 


Banntanct  Channel 
"BABUYAN 

~o     /ICAMIGUIN  I. 
51         fft-  Enyano 

;A, 
Vle'an 


PARAGUA   8LANDB«,, 


BalabacStrait 

BALAMBANGAN   I.          M1XDORO 
>npanm<i>i!/i<j  Pf.,  BANGUEY  I. 


SEA 

Zaniboanga'^ 

B  AS  I  LA 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  151 

ployed  in  Cuba  in  1878,  entering  into  communication 
with  General  Emilio  Aguinaldo,  the  leader  in  the  insur 
rectionary  movement,  and  promising  to  inaugurate  an 
extensive  system  of  reforms  if  he  would  bring  the  insur 
rection  to  an  end.  A  large  sum  of  money  was  also 
promised  to  the  principal  insurgents.  The  offer  was  ac 
cepted,  and  Aguinaldo  and  others  retired  to  Hong  Kong 
with  their  share  of  the  subsidy.  Spain,  as  usual,  failed 
to  keep  her  word.  The  remainder  of  the  money  was 
not  paid.  The  leaders  who,  trusting  in  Spanish  faith, 
had  remained  in  the  islands,  were  seized  and  executed. 
The  promised  reforms  were  ignored,  the  governor-gen 
eral  denying  that  he  had  pledged  himself.  As  a  result, 
before  two  months  had  passed  the  rebels  were  once 
more  in  arms.  The  country  was  soon  again  in  turmoil, 
the  anger  of  the  insurgents  being  particularly  directed 
against  the  priests,  to  whose  influence  they  ascribed  the 
dishonesty  of  the  Spanish  authorities.  ' '  No  quarter  to 
the  priests' '  was  the  sentiment  with  which  they  went  to 
war.  They  had  long  and  bitter  scores  with  these  ecclesi 
astics  to  wipe  out. 

At  the  opening  of  the  war  little  thought  was  given  by 
the  people  of  the  United  States  to  this  far-off  possession 
of  Spain.  But  the  government  had  it  in  mind.  A 
small  fleet,  under  the  command  of  Commodore  George 
Dewey,  lay  at  Hong  Kong,  China,  consisting  of  the 
cruisers  Olympia,  Baltimore,  Raleigh,  and  Boston,  the 
gunboats  Concord  and  Petrel,  and  the  despatch-boat 
McCulloch.  The  declaration  of  war  rendered  the  con 
tinuance  of  this  fleet  in  a  neutral  port  inadmissible  under 
the  rules  of  international  law,  and  orders  for  its  departure 
were  given  by  the  British  authorities.  It  sailed  on 
April  26,  bound,  not  for  an  American  port,  in  accord- 


152  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

ance  with  the  instructions  earlier  sent  it,  but  for  the 
Philippine  Islands,  under  orders  from  Washington  to 
attack  the  Spanish  fleet  at  Manila  and  * '  capture  or 
destroy  it."  On  the  same  day  Spain  made  its  first 
and  only  prize  during  the  war,  the  American  bark 
Saranac,  taken  by  the  gunboat  El  Cano  at  Iloilo,  a 
Philippine  port.  On  May  2  came,  by  way  of  Madrid,  an 
exciting  report  to  the  effect  that  the  United  States  fleet 
had  attacked  and  partly  destroyed  the  Manila  fleet  of 
Spain.  The  cutting  of  the  cable  put  an  end  to  further 
news,  and  for  a  week  the  American  nation  remained  in 
suspense.  It  then  was  gladdened  by  a  despatch  from 
Commodore  Dewey,  saying  that  he  had  destroyed  the 
entire  Spanish  fleet  without  the  loss  of  a  single  life  on 
his  side. 

Dewey' s  despatch,  which  was  laconic  in  form  but 
crowded  with  meaning,  is  a  historical  document  well 
worthy  of  giving  in  full  : 

"MANILA,  May  i. — Squadron  arrived  at  Manila  at 
daybreak  this  morning.  Immediately  engaged  the 
enemy  and  destroyed  the  following  Spanish  vessels  : 
Reina  Cristina,  Castilla,  Don  Antonio  de  Ulloa,  Isla  de 
Luzon,  Isla  de  Cuba,  General  Lezo,  Marquis  de  Duero, 
Cano,  Velasco,  Isla  de  Mindanao,  a  transport,  and 
water-battery  at  Cavite.  The  squadron  is  uninjured  and 
only  a  few  men  are  slightly  wounded.  Only  means  of 
telegraphing  is  to  American  consul  at  Hong  Kong.  I 
shall  communicate  with  him.  DEWEY." 

The  story  of  the  victory  is  one  of  the  most  glorious  in 
the  annals  of  the  American  navy.  On  April  27  the 
squadron  left  Mirs  Bay,  some  thirty  miles  from  Hong 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  153 

Kong,  to  which  it  had  sailed  the  day  before.  It  was 
accompanied  by  two  colliers,  the  Nanshan  and  the 
Zafiro,  which  Dewey  had  purchased  and  which  were 
loaded  with  ten  thousand  tons  of  coal.  The  Monocacy, 
a  corvette  of  the  old  navy,  was  left  behind,  as  of  no  use 
in  modern  naval  war,  her  officers  and  crew  being  dis 
tributed  among  the  other  vessels.  The  flag-ship  was  the 
Olympia,  Captain  C.  V.  Gridley  commanding,  one  of 
the  finest  cruisers  in  the  American  navy,  her  armament 
consisting  of  four  8-inch  slow-fire,  ten  5-inch  rapid-fire, 
and  fourteen  6- pounder  guns.  The  other  cruisers  were 
little  behind  her  in  power  of  armament  and  weight  of 
projectiles. 

Straight  across  the  China  Sea  sailed  the  fleet,  heavy 
weather  forcing  the  war- vessels  to  slow  up  to  about  eight 
knots  speed,  on  account  of  the  deeply  laden  colliers, 
which  plunged  heavily  through  the  waves.  On  the 
evening  of  the  first  day  out  the  news  of  the  declaration 
of  war  was  read  to  the  crews,  followed  by  a  proclama 
tion  of  the  most  inflammatory  character  which  had  been 
issued  to  the  people  by  the  governor-general  of  Manila. 
This  described  the  Americans  as  heretic  vandals,  who 
were  coming  to  rob  their  churches  and  insult  their 
women,  and  was  full  of  uncomplimentary  sayings  about 
the  invaders  and  warm  appeals  to  the  people  of  Manila 
to  defend  their  city  to  the  death.  Its  bombast  elicited 
the  derisive  laughter  of  the  men,  while  enthusiastic 
cheers  for  the  American  flag  indicated  their  patriotic 
temper. 

We  append,  as  of  some  interest,  an  extract  from  this 
proclamation  : 

"The  North  American  people,  constituted  of  all  the 
social  excrescences,  have  exhausted  our  patience  and 


154  THE   WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

provoked  war  with  their  perfidious  machinations,  with 
their  acts  of  treachery,  with  their  outrages  against  the 
law  of  nations  and  international  conventions. 

' '  The  struggle  will  be  short  and  decisive.  The  God 
of  Victories  will  give  us  one  as  brilliant  as  the  justice  of 
our  cause  demands.  Spain,  which  counts  upon  the 
sympathies  of  all  the  nations,  will  emerge  triumphantly 
from  the  new  test,  humiliating  and  blasting  the  adven 
turers  from  those  States  that,  without  cohesion  and 
without  a  history,  offer  to  humanity  only  infamous  tra 
ditions  and  the  ungrateful  spectacle  of  Chambers  in 
which  appear  united  insolence  and  defamation,  coward 
ice  and  cynicism. 

1  'You  will  not  allow  the  faith  you  profess  to  be  made 
a  mock  of,  impious  hands  to  be  placed  on  the  temple  of 
the  true  God,  the  images  you  adore  to  be  thrown  down 
by  unbelief.  The  aggressors  shall  not  profane  the  tombs 
of  your  fathers,  they  shall  not  gratify  their  lustful  pas 
sions  at  the  cost  of  your  wives'  and  daughters'  honor, 
or  appropriate  the  property  that  your  industry  has  ac 
cumulated  as  a  provision  for  your  old  age.  No  ;  they 
shall  not  perpetrate  any  of  the  crimes  inspired  by  their 
wickedness  and  covetousness,  because  your  valor  and 
patriotism  will  suffice  to  punish  and  abase  the  people 
that,  claiming  to  be  civilized  and  cultivated,  have  ex 
terminated  the  natives  of  North  America  instead  of 
bringing  to  them  the  life  of  civilization  and  of  prog 
ress. 

"Philippines,  prepare  for  the  struggle,  and,  united 
under  the  glorious  Spanish  flag,  which  is  ever  covered 
with  laurels,  let  us  fight  with  the  conviction  that  victory 
will  crown  our  efforts,  and  to  the  calls  of  our  enemies 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  155 

let  us  oppose  with  the  decision  of  the  Christian  and  the 
patriot  the  cry  of  *  Viva  Espana  !' 

' '  Your  General, 
"  BACILIO  AUGUSTIN  DAVILA. 
"MANILA,  23d  April,  1898." 

The  island  of  Luzon,  the  largest  of  the  Philippines, 
and  the  one  on  which  Manila  is  situated,  was  sighted  by 
the  fleet  on  the  morning  of  Saturday,  April  30,  at 
Bolinao  Cape,  about  one  hundred  and  ten  miles  from 
the  entrance  to  Manila  Bay.  Here  the  land  rose  green 
and  beautiful  under  the  morning  sunlight,  faint  blue  lines 
in  the  distance  indicating  the  mountains  of  the  interior. 
In  the  afternoon,  when  about  thirty  miles  north  of  Ma 
nila  Bay,  the  squadron  approached  another  deep  inden 
tation  in  the  coast,  known  as  Subig  Bay,  in  which  it  was 
possible  that  some  part  of  the  Spanish  fleet  might  lie. 
The  Boston  and  Concord  led  the  way  as  this  harbor  was 
neared.  They  were  soon  followed  by  the  Baltimore,  the 
remainder  of  the  fleet  proceeding  slowly  as  these  pioneers 
dashed  ahead  at  full  speed.  In  the  late  afternoon  they 
returned,  reporting  that  they  had  explored  Subig  Bay, 
finding  there  only  some  insignificant  coasting  craft. 

At  about  5.15  P.M.  the  squadron  came  to  a  halt,  and 
a  council  of  war  was  held  on  the  flag-ship,  in  which  it 
was  decided  to  enter  Manila  Bay  during  the  darkness  of 
that  night.  Getting  under  way  again,  the  ships  jogged 
on  at  a  four-knot  speed,  in  order  that  the  harbor  en 
trance  might  not  be  reached  until  the  night  was  well 
advanced.  Active  preparations  were  meanwhile  made 
for  battle,  all  impedimenta  that  could  be  spared  from  the 
decks  being  thrown  overboard,  while  mess-chests  and 
tables,  chairs,  and  other  woodwork  from  between  decks 


156  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

were  also  set  afloat.  Other  steps  of  precaution  were 
hastily  taken,  the  life-boats  being  wrapped  in  canvas  to 
prevent  splinters  flying,  and  buoyant  objects  placed 
where  they  would  float  and  serve  as  life-rafts  in  case  the 
ship  went  down.  There  were  unpleasantly  suggestive 
preparations  for  the  care  of  the  wounded,  which  brought 
grim  looks  to  the  faces  of  the  men.  This  was  no  holi 
day  excursion  upon  which  they  were  bound. 

As  the  ships  moved  on  the  battle-ports  were  put  up, 
and  every  light  was  hidden  except  those  that  shone 
astern,  a  small  electric-light  glowing  from  each  as  a 
guide  to  the  next  in  line.  The  chart-rooms  were  sealed 
and  every  effort  was  made  to  darken  the  ships.  Invol 
untarily  every  one  moved  stealthily  about  the  decks. 
Word  was  passed  to  the  men  that  the  bay  of  Manila 
would  be  entered  during  the  night,  and  many  a  face 
grew  stern  with  grim  determination  as  the  import  of  this 
message  was  understood.  A  half  moon  lit  the  sky,  but 
it  was  hidden  under  masses  of  gray  cloud.  Everything 
favored  the  hope  entertained  of  stealing  in  unseen  past 
the  forts  that  guarded  Corregidor  Island,  in  the  entrance 
to  the  bay. 

About  11.30  P.M.  two  dark  headlands  could  be  seen 
looming  up,  showing  black  against  the  shifting  clouds 
that  veiled  the  moon.  In  the  intervening  space  lay  a 
smaller  mass,  the  fortified  isle  whose  guns  commanded 
the  ship  channels.  The  speed  was  increased  to  eight 
knots,  and  one  by  one  the  ships  glided  round  the 
northern  headland,  and  the  Olympia,  followed  by  her 
consorts,  steered  for  the  centre  of  the  southern  and 
wider  channel.  Soon  Corregidor  Island  lay  abeam  of 
the  leading  ship.  The  Spanish  sentinels  seemed  still 
wrapped  in  slumber. 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  157 

A  faint  light  now  flashed  and  died  out  on  the  island 
shore,  and  a  rocket  shot  into  the  air.  The  invading 
fleet  had  been  discovered.  But  no  shot  came,  and  the 
foremost  ships  were  well  past  the  island  before  a  flash  of 
flame  gleamed  through  the  darkness,  followed  by  the 
boom  of  a  heavy  gun,  and  a  shell  went  whistling  over 
head  clear  of  the  ships.  The  Raleigh  replied  with  a 
5-inch  gun,  the  Boston  and  Concord  followed,  and  the 
McCulloch  sent  in  a  six-pound  projectile.  After  a  shot 
or  two  more  from  shore  the  batteries  relapsed  into 
silence,  possibly  from  the  effects  of  some  of  the  shells 
dropped  in  their  midst,  and  the  fleet  moved  on,  the 
colliers  hugging  the  land  close  and  escaping  unharmed. 
The  forts  had  been  safely  passed  and  the  harbor-entrance 
won.  Speed  was  now  slowed  down,  and  the  men  flung 
themselves  on  the  decks  beside  their  guns  to  snatch  an 
interval  of  sleep.  It  was  known  that  Manila  would  not 
be  reached  until  early  dawn.  One  casualty  had  oc 
curred.  Chief -Engineer  Randall,  of  the  McCulloch,  was 
overcome  by  a  nervous  shock,  of  probably  apoplectic 
character,  and  at  two  o'  clock  he  died.  It  was  the  only 
death  on  the  American  side  during  that  eventful  day. 

As  the  fleet  glided  onward  the  distant  lights  of  Manila 
came  into  view.  The  bay  is  a  deep  one  ;  Cavite,  the 
naval  station  of  the  capital,  being  seventeen  miles  from 
its  mouth  and  Manila  still  further  in.  Lieutenant  Cal 
kins,  the  navigator  of  the  Olympia,  carried  the  fleet  up 
through  the  dark  harbor  with  commendable  boldness  and 
success.  At  four  o'clock  the  men  were  roused,  and  a 
frugal  meal  of  coffee  and  hardtack  was  served  out  to 
them,  the  officers  joining  in  the  repast.  The  first  signs 
of  dawn  were  visible  in  the  sky  about  4. 30,  when  Manila 
was  some  six  miles  away.  There  lay  a  group  of  shipping, 


158  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

but  these  were  made  out,  as  the  sun  rose  behind  the  city, 
to  be  merchant-ships,  not  the  war-vessels  of  which  the 
cruisers  were  in  search.  On  went  the  fleet  in  close 
battle  array,  the  Olympia  leading,  the  Baltimore,  Raleigh, 
Petrel,  Concord,  and  Boston  following  in  succession. 

Passing  to  the  northward  of  the  capital  and  turning 
south,  the  keen  eyes  of  Commodore  Dewey  caught  sight 
of  his  predestined  prey,  the  Spanish  fleet,  grouped  in 
the  little  bay  of  Cavite.  Here  the  Spaniards  had  a  well- 
equipped  navy-yard,  known  as  Cavite  Arsenal,  protected 
by  forts  and  under  the  command  of  Rear-Admiral  Patri- 
cio  Montojo,  who  was  also  commander-in-chief  of  the 
squadron.  His  flag-ship  was  the  Reina  Cristina,  a  3500- 
ton  cruiser,  carrying  twenty  guns  which  ranged  from 
6.2-inch  to  3-pounders.  The  others  included  the  3300- 
ton  cruiser  Castilla,  four  smaller  cruisers,  the  Don  An 
tonio  de  Ulloa,  Velasco,  Isla  de  Cuba,  and  Isla  de  Luzon, 
and  the  gunboats  General  Lezo,  Marquis  del  Duero,  and 
El  Correo,  with  a  transport,  the  Isla  de  Mindanao.  Of 
these,  the  Velasco  was  under  repair  and  her  guns  were 
mounted  in  earthworks  in  the  harbor.  There  were  also 
four  torpedo-boats. 

The  Spanish  squadron  was  in  every  respect  inferior  to 
its  enemy,  the  ships  being  of  less  tonnage  and  lighter 
armament.  In  open  sea  they  would  not  have  had  a 
moment's  chance.  But  flanked  by  shore  batteries,  as 
they  were,  the  conditions  were  far  more  equalized.  And 
the  Spaniards  had  the  advantage  of  an  exact  knowledge 
of  distances  in  the  harbor,  while  the  Americans  were  in 
ignorance  of  distance  and  soundings  and,  unable  to  use 
range-finders  with  effect,  at  a  marked  disadvantage  in 
opportunities  for  sure  marksmanship.  Their  principal 
advantage  lay  in  the  fact  that  the  men  knew  how  to  use 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  159 

the  guns,  being  trained  to  shoot  straight  and  to  make 
every  shot  tell.  This  was  a  training  which  the  Spanish 
gunners  sadly  lacked,  and  which  had  a  remarkable  effect 
upon  the  issue  of  the  combat. 

With  the  flag  of  the  American  Union  flying  at  the 
masthead  of  every  ship,  the  squadron  moved  steadily  on, 
passing  the  Manila  forts  at  the  distance  of  several  miles. 
The  great  guns  of  the  forts  boomed  out  as  they  advanced, 
but  there  was  no  reply  except  a  brace  of  shots  from  the 
Concord.  The  commodore  had  another  object  in  view, 
and  did  not  wish  to  hurl  destruction  into  the  crowded 
city  behind  the  forts.  As  they  advanced,  the  fleet  of 
the  enemy  came  plainly  into  view.  Its  position  may  be 
briefly  described. 

At  Cavite  a  spit  of  land  projects  out  into  the  bay,  its 
curved  shores  enclosing  a  body  of  water  known  as  Bakor 
Bay.  Batteries  occupied  the  extremity  of  the  peninsula, 
between  which  and  Cavite  Arsenal,  on  the  inner  shore, 
lay  extended  the  Spanish  ships,  crossing  the  mouth  of 
Bakor  Bay  from  east  to  west,  the  line  ending  in  shoal 
water  near  the  shore.  Farther  in,  behind  the  arsenal 
boom,  lay  the  gunboats  of  the  fleet.  Each  end  of  the 
line  was  protected  by  shore  batteries  mounted  with  6- 
and  8-inch  guns. 

Fronting  this  squadron,  at  a  distance  of  three  or  four 
miles,  the  American  ships  swept  down  in  the  order  above 
named.  The  little  McCulloch  kept  farther  away,  as  a 
guard  to  the  transports  which  were  placed  under  her 
care.  On  the  bridge  of  the  Olympia  Dewey  stood  ex 
posed,  with  Flag-Captain  Lamberton  by  his  side,  and 
maintained  this  position  as  the  ship  swept  on  through  the 
storm  of  shot  and  shell  which  soon  hurtled  from  the 
Spanish  guns.  Captain  Gridley,  commander  of  the  flag- 


160  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

ship,  took  his  position  within  the  conning-tower,  lest 
some  unlucky  shot  should  sweep  away  all  the  executive 
officers  of  the  ship.  This  daring  of  Commodore  Dewey 
is  said  to  have  been  equalled  by  that  of  Admiral  Montojo 
of  the  Spanish  squadron.  He  also  is  credited  with  occu 
pying  the  bridge  of  his  ship  during  the  fight,  and,  when 
one  end  of  it  was  wrecked  by  a  shell,  taking  his  station 
on  the  other  end. 

The  shore  batteries  began  the  engagement,  opening 
on  the  American  ships  while  still  out  of  range.  As  the 
Olympia  moved  steadily  onward,  a  new  peril  threatened 
her, — two  submarine  mines  were  exploded  in  her  front. 
Fortunately,  Spanish  nervousness  had  set  them  off  too 
soon  and  their  force  was  uselessly  expended  on  the  water. 
How  many  more  of  these  dreaded  instruments  of  destruc 
tion  might  lie  in  their  path  no  man  could  guess,  but 
Dewey  had  been  with  Farragut  in  the  Mississippi  and 
was  not  the  man  to  halt  for  the  unseen. 

The  ships  swept  on  until  about  forty-five  hundred  yards 
away,  the  Spanish  fire  growing  continuous.  But  not  a 
ship  was  struck,  and  they  steamed  onward  grim  and 
silent,  with  the  men  at  the  guns  waiting  in  strained  im 
patience  for  the  battle-signal  to  be  given,  and  disdainful 
of  the  shots  that  were  uselessly  tearing  up  the  waters  of 
the  bay.  ' '  Remember  the  Maine  !' '  came  in  an  unpre 
meditated  cry  from  the  lips  of  one  stern  sea-dog,  and  in 
an  instant  it  was  taken  up  and  ran  throughout  the  ship. 
It  was  the  war-cry  of  the  first  battle  of  the  new  American 
navy. 

"You  may  fire  when  ready,  Gridley,"  said  the  com 
modore  at  length  ;  and  in  echo  to  his  words  an  8-inch 
shell  from  the  forward  turret  of  the  Olympia  went  scream 
ing  through  the  air.  The  hour  was  5.33.  The  guns 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  161 

of  the  Baltimore  and  Boston  followed,  and  by  5.40  a 
continuous  stream  of  projectiles  was  pouring  in  towards 
the  Spanish  ships.  The  difference  in  effect  of  the  fire  of 
the  two  fleets  was  remarkable.  The  Spanish  shells  flew 
high  or  struck  the  water  before  reaching  the  ships  ; 
hardly  one  of  them  touched  its  mark,  while  few  from 
the  American  guns  went  astray.  The  effect  was  soon 
evident.  The  ships  of  Spain  were  being  rent  and  torn 
and  their  men  hurled  prostrate  in  death,  while  scarcely  a 
trace  of  damage  was  visible  on  an  American  hull. 

There  were  narrow  escapes.  One  fragment  of  a  shell 
struck  the  bridge- gratings  of  the  Olympia  ;  another 
passed  just  under  where  Commodore  Dewey  stood,  tearing 
a  hole  in  the  deck.  Chaplain  Frazier  was  looking  out 
of  a  gun-port  when  a  shell  struck  the  ship's  side  within 
a  yard.  His  head  was  withdrawn  just  in  time  to  save  it 
from  being  blown  off.  As  the  fight  went  on,  other  shots 
found  a  mark.  One  entered  the  port  quarters  of  the 
Boston  and  burst  in  the  state-room  of  Ensign  Dodridge, 
setting  it  in  flames.  A  second  had  similar  effect  on  the 
port  hammock-netting.  The  Baltimore  was  shot  through 
and  through  by  a  shell,  which  fortunately  struck  no  one 
in  its  career.  Another  ripped  up  the  main  deck,  disabled 
a  6-inch  gun,  and  exploded  a  box  of  ammunition,  which 
wounded  eight  men.  Strange  to  relate,  these  were  the 
only  men  injured  during  the  whole  battle,  and  none  of 
them  was  seriously  hurt. 

Sweeping  down  parallel  to  the  Spanish  line,  the 
American  fleet,  on  reaching  the  end  of  its  course, 
swung  round  in  a  long  ellipse  and  moved  back  over  the 
same  route,  now  opening  fire  from  its  starboard  batteries. 
Six  times  in  succession,  as  the  hours  moved  on,  the 
long  line  of  ships  moved  over  this  course,  pouring  in 

ii 


162  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

shot  and  shell  as  they  went,  the  boom  of  the  great 
guns  breaking  at  intervals  through  the  continuous  rattle 
of  the  rapid-fire  guns,  which  poured  out  their  projectiles 
in  what  seemed  a  continuous  sheet  of  flame. 

The  Spanish  ships,  which  had  been  in  a  measure  un 
prepared  for  this  assault,  hastened  to  get  up  steam,  and 
soon  clouds  of  black  smoke  were  pouring  from  their 
funnels.  As  the  American  squadron  started  upon  its 
third  course,  the  Spanish  admiral,  with  a  daring  equal  to 
that  of  his  foes,  headed  his  flag-ship,  the  Reina  Cris- 
tina,  straight  for  his  principal  opponent,  steaming  gal 
lantly  out,  as  if  with  the  intention  of  running  the  Olympia 
down.  It  was  a  desperate  attempt.  At  once  the  whole 
array  of  ships  turned  their  guns  on  this  single  antagonist, 
tearing  and  rending  her  frightfully  with  shot  and  shell. 
As  she  came  nearer,  the  storm  of  projectiles  became  so 
terrific  that  Admiral  Montojo  saw  that  his  ship  would  be 
annihilated  if  he  continued  his  perilous  movement.  He 
therefore  swung  her  sharply  round  and  started  shoreward. 
Just  as  he  did  so,  an  8-inch  shell  from  the  Olympia 
struck  the  Reina  Cristina  squarely  in  the  stern,  and 
drove  inward  through  the  length  of  the  ship,  rending 
through  every  obstruction,  and  wrecking  the  aft  boiler 
and  blowing  open  the  deck  in  its  explosion.  This  one 
shell  proved  the  flag-ship' s  fate.  Men  lay  dead  through 
out  its  course,  and  clouds  of  white  smoke  soon  snowed 
that  the  ship  was  in  flames.  For  half  an  hour  longer  she 
kept  up  the  fight,  but  the  fire  started  in  her  continued 
to  burn  until  she  sank.  It  was  now  seven  o'clock. 

Early  in  the  engagement  another  effort  was  made  to 
destroy  the  Olympia.  Two  torpedo-boats  came  swiftly 
out  and  halted  under  the  fire  of  the  war-ships  until  their 
hoped-for  prey  should  come  within  torpedo-reach.  On 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  163 

came  the  flag-ship  until  but  eight  hundred  yards  distant. 
Then,  as  the  daring  little  foes  held  their  ground,  she 
stopped  and  signalled  for  a  concentrated  fire  on  those 
dreaded  terrors  of  the  seas.  In  a  moment  they  were  the 
centre  of  a  rain  of  shell,  whipping  the  water  around  them 
until  they  were  forced  to  turn  and  flee.  As  they  did  so 
a  shell  struck  one  of  them  fairly,  and  the  daring  craft 
was  seen  to  plunge  headlong  under  the  sea.  The  other 
managed  to  reach  cover,  but  was  beached  and  deserted 
by  her  crew.  Still  another  bold  advance  was  made  from 
the  Spanish  fleet,  this  time  by  a  gunboat,  which  slipped 
out  and  made  for  the  McCulloch,  probably  hoping  to 
destroy  the  transports.  This  effort  also  failed.  The  shot 
became  so  hot  around  her  that  she  quickly  drew  back 
to  her  lurking-place.  Meanwhile  the  batteries  at  Manila, 
distant  as  they  were,  were  keeping  up  a  steady  fire  upon 
the  ships.  No  return  was  made  by  the  fleet,  but  in  the 
end  Dewey  sent  a  message  to  the  governor-general  that 
this  fire  must  be  stopped  or  the  city  would  be  shelled. 
The  threat  proved  effectual.  No  more  shells  came  from 
the  Manila  forts. 

After  four  runs  had  been  made  at  a  distance  of  four 
thousand  or  five  thousand  yards,  Lieutenant  Calkins,  the 
navigator  of  the  Olympia,  told  the  commodore  that  he 
believed  it  would  be  safe  to  take  the  ships  nearer  the 
enemy,  with  the  lead  going  to  test  the  depth  of  the 
water.  Two  more  runs  were  therefore  made  within  two 
thousand  yards  of  the  Spanish  fleet.  At  this  distance 
all  the  guns  told,  even  the  6-pounders  reaching  their 
mark,  and  the  effect  on  the  enemy  became  terribly 
severe  ;  three  of  their  ships  were  in  full  flames,  their  fire 
had  slackened,  and  it  was  evident  that  the  victory  was 
practically  won. 


164  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

But  the  men  were  becoming  exhausted  by  the  strain. 
For  two  hours  they  had  been  engaged,  with  little  more 
than  a  cup  of  coffee  to  sustain  them.  At  7.35,  there 
fore,  Dewey  ceased  firing  and  withdrew  the  squadron 
for  breakfast.  What  harm  had  been  done  to  his  ships 
was  not  known,  but  when  the  word  passed  through  the 
fleet  that  not  a  ship  had  been  damaged  or  a  man  killed, 
involuntary  cheers  broke  out.  The  gun-captains  knew 
that  there  was  a  very  different  story  to  tell  for  the  enemy, 
who  had  fought  with  a  courage  worthy  of  a  better 
fate. 

At  1 1. 1 6,  the  men  having  had  their  breakfast  and  a 
few  hours'  rest,  the  ships  returned  to  the  attack,  the 
Baltimore  leading  the  way  and  the  Olympia  following, 
with  Dewey  occupying  the  perilous  position  on  the 
bridge  which  he  had  maintained  throughout.  As  they 
came  within  range,  nearly  the  whole  Spanish  fleet  was 
seen  to  be  in  flames,  the  flag-ship  burning  fiercely. 
Again  shells  were  poured  upon  the  devoted  ships,  the 
Spaniards  still  firing,  but  with  less  energy  than  before. 
By  noon  their  fire  had  nearly  ceased.  At  12.30  the 
squadron  ceased  firing,  the  batteries  being  silenced  and 
the  Spanish  ships  sunk,  burnt,  and  deserted.  Every 
flag  had  gone  down  except  one  that  floated  above  a 
small  fortification  in  the  distance.  The  transport  Isla  de 
Mindanao  was  still  afloat,  but  a  few  shots  through  its 
helpless  hulk  soon  set  it  in  flames. 

At  12.40  the  squadron  withdrew  towards  Manila, 
having  finished  its  work,  the  little  Petrel  being  left  to 
complete  the  destruction  of  the  gunboats  which  lay 
within  the  interior  harbor.  Lieutenant  Hughes,  with 
an  armed  boat's  crew,  set  fire  to  these,  and  soon  they 
were  vying  in  flame  with  the  larger  vessels  outside. 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  165 

Warning  was  sent  to  Governor- General  Augustin,  the 
author  of  the  grandiloquent  proclamation  of  a  week 
before,  that  the  port  of  Manila  was  under  blockade,  and 
that  at  a  single  shot  from  his  batteries  at  any  American 
ship  the  city  would  be  laid  in  ashes. 

The  victory  had  been  one  without  parallel  in  the  whole 
history  of  naval  warfare.  For  three  or  four  hours  the 
American  ships  had  been  exposed,  within  easy  range, 
to  a  hot  fire  from  the  Spanish  fleet  and  forts,  and  yet  all 
that  fiery  storm  had  failed  to  kill  a  single  man  or  to  do 
serious  injury  to  a  single  ship.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
Spanish  fleet  had  ceased  to  exist.  Its  burnt  remnants 
lay  on  the  bottom  of  the  bay.  In  men  the  loss  had  been 
as  severe  as  in  ships.  General  Augustin  gave  their  num 
ber  at  six  hundred  and  eighteen.  It  was  probably  near 
a  thousand,  the  Reina  Cristina  alone  having  one  hundred 
and  fifty  killed,  the  captain  among  them.  During  the 
battle,  Admiral  Montojo  had  been  obliged  to  shift  his 
flag  from  the  burning  flag-ship  to  the  little  Isla  de  Cuba. 
This,  too,  was  soon  destroyed,  the  admiral  being  wounded, 
though  not  seriously.  The  forts  had  suffered  as  severely 
as  the  ships,  being  knocked  into  shapeless  heaps  of  earth 
and  their  garrisons  killed  or  put  to  flight.  The  remark 
able  difference  in  result  was  due  to  the  skilful  manoeu 
vring  of  the  American  fleet  and  the  accurate  handling 
of  its  guns,  as  compared  with  the  wretched  gunnery  of 
the  Spaniards,  who  seemed  incapable  of  hitting  a  ship 
in  motion.  A  French  official  account  spoke  of  the 
American  fire  as  ' '  for  accuracy  and  for  rapidity  some 
thing  awful. ' ' 

For  a  week  previously  Manila  had  been  on  the  verge 
of  a  panic.  Now  terror  and  confusion  prevailed.  Flight 
was  impossible,  since  it  would  have  been  into  the  hands 


i66  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

of  the  insurgents,  who  had  been  greatly  emboldened  by 
the  news  of  the  war,  and  swarmed  in  the  surrounding 
country.  It  was  not  known  but  that  Dewey  would  turn 
his  guns  on  the  city  and  batter  it  to  the  earth.  General 
Augustin's  proclamation  had  prepared  the  citizens  for 
the  wildest  excesses  on  the  part  of  the  victorious  foe, 
and  they  were  in  a  state  of  pitiable  dismay. 

In  the  afternoon  of  May  i  Dewey' s  ship  was  boarded 
by  the  British  consul,  who  requested  the  victor,  in  view 
of  the  many  foreigners  in  the  city,  represented  by  the 
consuls  of  twenty-one  different  governments,  not  to 
bombard  the  place.  Dewey  promised  on  condition  that 
the  military  supplies  of  Manila  should  be  delivered  to 
him,  with  coal  for  his  ships  and  the  control  of  the  cable 
to  Hong  Kong.  General  Augustin,  threatened  by 
enemies  on  all  sides,  the  insurgents  by  land,  the  Amer 
icans  by  water,  telegraphed  to  Madrid  for  instructions, 
sending  the  partial  report  of  the  battle  which  quickly 
spread  over  the  world.  On  May  2  the  answer  came. 
It  offered  defiance  to  the  enemy.  At  once  Dewey  sent  the 
Baltimore  and  the  Raleigh  to  Corregidor  Island,  and  sum 
moned  the  colonel  in  command  to  surrender.  He  did  so 
without  hesitation,  and  the  works  commanding  the  en 
trance  to  the  harbor  fell  into  American  hands.  At  four 
o'clock  that  afternoon  communication  by  telegraph  with 
Hong  Kong  ceased.  Dewey  had  lifted  and  cut  the 
cable,  the  use  of  which  had  been  refused  to  him.  The 
only  means  of  communication  left  was  by  boat  to  Hong 
Kong,  and  thither  the  McCulloch  was  despatched  with 
news  of  the  victory.  On  May  7  came  by  telegraph  from 
China  the  message  from  Dewey  we  have  quoted,  and 
which  electrified  the  expectant  people  of  the  United 
States  and  elicited  the  admiration  of  all  Europe. 


THE   WAR   WITH   SPAIN.  167 

In  addition  to  the  despatch  given,  the  McCulloch 
brought  another,  dated  May  4,  saying  : 

' '  I  have  taken  possession  of  naval  station  at  Cavite, 
Philippine  Islands,  and  destroyed  the  fortifications.  Have 
destroyed  fortifications  at  bay  entrance,  Corregidor  Is 
land,  paroling  the  garrison.  I  control  the  bay  com 
pletely  and  can  take  the  city  at  any  time.  The  squadron 
is  in  excellent  health  and  spirits.  The  Spanish  loss  not 
fully  known,  but  is  very  heavy.  One  hundred  and  fifty 
killed,  including  captain,  on  Reina  Cristina  alone.  I 
am  assisting  in  protecting  Spanish  sick  and  wounded. 
Two  hundred  and  fifty  sick  and  wounded  in  hospital 
within  our  lines.  Much  excitement  at  Manila.  Will 
protect  foreign  residents. 

"DEWEY." 

The  Petrel,  which  had  been  sent  into  the  inner  harbor 
to  destroy  the  gunboats,  found  there  one  vessel  unhurt,  the 
transport  Manila,  which  lay  in  three  feet  of  mud  near 
the  navy-yard.  She  was  towed  off  and  anchored  near 
the  squadron,  and  proved  to  be  a  handsome  steamer  of 
about  two  thousand  tons.  She  was  laden  with  supplies 
and  five  hundred  tons  of  coal,  from  which  the  Raleigh 
supplied  her  bunkers.  The  remaining  prizes  consisted  of 
a  number  of  tugs  and  launches,  which  were  seized  for 
the  service  of  the  American  fleet.  When  the  men 
landed  from  the  Petrel  to  search  the  navy- yard,  they 
were  met  by  the  doctor  and  a  deputation  of  Sisters  of 
Mercy  from  the  hospital,  who  begged  them  not  to  kill 
the  wounded  or  fire  on  the  hospital.  They  learned  with 
surprise  and  delight  that  American  soldiers  did  not  per 
form  such  deeds.  They  had  been  made  to  believe  that 
they  had  ruthless  savages  to  deal  with. 


168  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

The  departure  of  the  Spanish  soldiers,  who  fled  in 
haste  to  Manila  after  the  battle,  left  Cavite  at  the  mercy 
of  the  insurgents,  who  swarmed  into  the  place  and  looted 
it  to  their  hearts'  content,  carrying  off  many  boat-loads 
of  plunder  over  the  bay.  At  the  request  of  the  officers 
and  surgeons  of  the  naval  hospital,  which  was  filled 
with  wounded  from  the  fleet  and  threatened  with  attack 
by  the  natives,  a  force  of  marines  was  sent  to  guard  it. 
The  work  of  plundering,  however,  went  on  with  activity 
in  the  town  of  St.  Roque,  near  Cavite,  the  houses  of 
Spaniards  being  mercilessly  looted,  while  hundreds  of 
people  fled  from  the  town,  carrying  their  household 
effects  in  all  available  vehicles.  Even  the  arsenal  was 
robbed  of  many  boat-loads  of  furniture  and  stores  before 
the  guard  of  marines  was  posted  at  its  gates. 

The  reception  of  the  despatch  from  Dewey  by  the 
President  was  acknowledged  without  delay  through  Sec 
retary  Long,  who  sent  the  following  message  to  the 

victorious  commodore  : 

"WASHINGTON,  May  7, 1898. 
"  DEWEY,  Manila. 

4 '  The  President,  in  the  name  of  the  American  people, 
thanks  you  and  your  officers  and  men  for  your  splendid 
achievement  and  overwhelming  victory.  In  recognition 
he  has  appointed  you  acting  admiral,  and  will  recom 
mend  a  vote  of  thanks  to  you  by  Congress. 

"LONG." 

On  May  9,  Congress,  by  a  rising  vote  in  both  Houses, 
passed  a  resolution  of  thanks  to  Dewey  and  his  officers 
and  men,  and  appropriated  $10,000  to  present  him  with 
a  sword  and  medals  to  all  under  his  command.  On  the 
nth  he  was  nominated  and  confirmed  rear-admiral.  He 
hastened  to  return  his  grateful  thanks  to  the  President 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  169 

and  Congress  for  the  compliment  paid  him  and  the  honors 
conferred  on  him  and  his  men. 

The  unexpectedly  complete  success  of  the  Manila  ex 
pedition  was  followed  by  steps  for  the  reinforcement  of 
Admiral  Dewey  and  for  taking  possession  of  the  Philip 
pine  Islands,  an  outcome  of  the  war  which  at  once  be 
came  urgent.  Supplies  and  men  were  made  ready  to 
send  across  the  Pacific,  under  command  of  Major-Gen- 
eral  Wesley  Merritt,  who  on  May  12  was  announced  as 
military  governor  of  the  Philippines. 

On  the  1 8th  the  cruiser  Charleston  sailed  from  Mare 
Island  for  Manila,  loaded  with  supplies  and  ammunition. 
There  was  considerable  delay  in  despatching  men,  the 
first  detachment  of  troops,  numbering  two  thousand  five 
hundred  men,  not  leaving  San  Francisco  for  the  Philip 
pines  until  May  25.  The  second  expedition,  three  thou 
sand  five  hundred  strong,  set  out  on  June  15.  To 
strengthen  Dewey' s  fleet  the  monitor  Monterey  was 
ordered,  June  i,  to  join  him,  and  on  June  23  the  monitor 
Monadnock  set  out  from  San  Francisco  for  the  same 
purpose.  Meanwhile  the  victorious  admiral  awaited  in 
the  bay  of  Manila  the  arrival  of  Merritt  and  his  men,  he 
having  decided  that  it  would  be  unwise  to  proceed  against 
the  city  until  amply  able  to  hold  it  and  restrain  the 
insurgent  forces.  The  two  monitors  sent  were  deemed 
sufficient  to  enable  him  to  meet  any  fleet  which  Spain 
could  despatch  against  him.  A  third  expedition,  five 
thousand  in  number,  left  San  Francisco  for  the  Philip 
pines  June  27  to  29,  and  on  July  15  and  subsequently  a 
fourth  expedition  set  sail.  Admiral  Dewey  meanwhile 
awaited  the  arrival  of  these  reinforcements,  keeping  up 
a  strict  blockade,  but  making  no  effort  to  take  posses 
sion  of  a  city  which  he  was  too  weak  to  hold. 


CHAPTER    IX. 

UNDER   FIRE   AT   CARDENAS   AND   CIENFUEGOS. 

ON  May  i,  the  date  of  Commodore  Dewey's  signal 
victory  at  Manila,  preparations  for  active  work  were 
making  in  the  Atlantic  waters.  The  Spanish  fleet  at  the 
Cape  Verde  Islands  had  been  obliged  to  leave  harbor 
there  on  April  29,  in  consequence  of  the  proclamation  of 
neutrality  by  Portugal.  It  was  believed  to  have  steamed 
westward,  bound,  so  many  thought,  for  Porto  Rico, 
though  others  feared  that  its  destination  might  be  some 
point  on  the  coast  of  the  United  States.  The  uncer 
tainty  as  to  its  goal  gave  rise  to  much  apprehension 
among  the  seaboard  population  of  this  country,  and 
active  measures  were  taken  to  meet  it  on  land  and  water. 
The  defence  of  our  seaports  became  of  prime  importance, 
and  the  whole  coast  was  put  under  surveillance,  a  system 
of  land  patrol  being  organized  which  extended  along  the 
exposed  seaboard  of  the  country,  and  was  alert  to  make 
instant  report  of  the  approach  of  suspicious  vessels  to 
any  part  of  the  coast.  Harbor  defence  was  similarly 
provided  for,  submarine  mines  being  planted  in  all  chan 
nels  leading  to  commercial  cities,  and  guns  mounted 
on  coast-defence  fortifications  as  rapidly  as  they  could 
be  procured.  The  movements  of  merchant-vessels  en 
tering  port  were  put  under  careful  supervision,  that 
there  might  be  no  interference  by  anchor  or  keel  with 
the  mines. 

At  sea  the  same  alertness  was  shown  as  on  land.  The 
170 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  171 

Flying  Squadron  at  Hampton  Roads  was  kept  ready, 
like  so  many  war-hounds  in  leash,  to  fly  to  the  defence 
of  any  imperilled  point.  It  was  strengthened  by  the 
addition  of  other  vessels,  among  them  the  fine  purchased 
cruiser  New  Orleans.  The  swift  Columbia  and  Minne 
apolis,  the  greyhounds  of  the  seas,  were  kept  on  scout 
ing  duty  along  the  northern  coast,  in  sharp  lookout  for 
the  approach  of  hostile  craft.  The  Northern  Patrol 
Squadron  was  similarly  on  the  qui  vive^  and  it  would 
have  been  next  to  impossible  for  an  enemy  to  enter  our 
waters  without  quick  discovery  and  as  quick  preparation 
for  his  approach. 

The  probability  that  Porto  Rico  or  some  Cuban  port 
might  be  the  destination  of  the  Spanish  fleet  gave  rise  to 
equal  activity  in  the  West  India  waters.  The  larger 
vessels  of  Admiral  Sampson's  squadron  were  withdrawn 
to  Key  West  to  coal  and  otherwise  prepare  for  a  long 
journey  in  the  tropical  seas,  leaving  the  duty  of  the 
blockade  to  the  minor  vessels,  the  gunboats,  torpedo- 
boats,  and  smaller  cruisers.  This  squadron,  under  the 
familiar  designation  of  the  "mosquito  fleet,"  from  that 
time  forward  kept  up  the  blockade,  while  the  larger 
vessels  were  more  actively  employed. 

Life  was  not  altogether  monotonous  on  board  the 
mosquito  fleet.  It  had  its  adventures,  some  of  them 
interesting  and  important.  The  Spaniards  on  shore 
were  watchful  and  combative,  and  a  brisk  exchange  of 
shots  was  no  uncommon  occurrence.  Certain  thrilling 
experiences  were  gone  through  by  members  of  the  fleet 
in  the  effort  to  perform  perilous  duties  assigned  them. 
The  present  chapter  will  be  devoted  to  an  account  of  the 
more  striking  of  these  events. 

On  May  6  the  bombardment  of  the  Matanzas  forts  by 


172  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

Admiral  Sampson  on  the  New  York  was  repeated  by 
two  of  the  smallest  vessels  in  the  navy, — the  torpedo- 
boat  Dupont  and  the  auxiliary  cruiser  Hornet.  On  the 
previous  day  the  Dupont,  while  cruising  close  to  the 
shore,  had  observed  a  number  of  men  raising  a  Spanish 
flag  on  a  point  near  Matanzas  light-house.  It  was  sus 
pected  that  a  new  battery  was  being  constructed  there, 
and  on  the  following  afternoon  the  Dupont,  now  accom 
panied  by  the  Hornet,  scouted  close  in  shore.  This 
temerity  soon  called  forth  a  response.  When  they  were 
not  more  than  six  hundred  yards  distant  a  storm  of 
rifle-bullets  came  whizzing  towards  them,  lashing  the 
water  sharply  about  the  boats,  but  not  touching  a  man 
on  board.  The  attack  came  from  a  body  of  Spanish 
cavalry  ranged  in  groups  along  the  shore.  The  little 
boats  lost  no  time  in  replying,  pouring  a  stream  of  pro 
jectiles  from  their  quick-firing  guns  into  the  cavalry, 
which  sought  cover  with  all  convenient  speed.  Their 
fire  was  next  directed  against  three  block-houses,  which 
were  quickly  destroyed.  The  activity  of  the  craft  now 
drew  an  8-inch  shell  from  one  of  the  Matanzas  batteries. 
It  fell  short  and  was  not  repeated.  On  the  following 
day  the  boats  returned  and  fired  on  the  forts,  but  no 
reply  was  drawn  from  them.  Though  no  harm  was 
done  to  the  men  on  board,  there  were  indications  that 
the  Spanish  had  suffered  considerable  loss. 

The  first  engagements  of  the  war  in  which  the  Ameri 
cans  suffered  any  loss  of  life  occurred  on  May  n,  at 
Cardenas  and  Cienfuegos.  Cardenas,  a  seaport  town  on 
the  north  coast  of  Cuba,  lies  seventy-five  miles  to  the 
eastward  of  Havana,  and  about  twenty  miles  from  Ma 
tanzas.  Cardenas  Bay,  in  which  one  of  the  engage 
ments  in  question  took  place,  is  a  picturesque  harbor, 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  173 

broad  and  shallow,  the  channel,  scarcely  two  fathoms 
deep,  winding  its  way  tortuously  inward  through  clusters 
of  verdant  coral  keys  to  the  city,  which  spreads  out  on 
the  sloping  hills  fully  seven  miles  from  the  entrance. 

The  blockading  squadron  off  this  port  consisted  of  the 
gunboats  Wilmington  and  Machias,  the  torpedo-boat 
Winslow,  and  the  auxiliary  tug  Hudson.  The  Spaniards 
had  withdrawn  from  the  entrance  to  the  bay,  destroying 
the  buoys  and  other  aids  to  navigation  as  they  went. 
On  Sunday,  the  8th,  the  Winslow,  venturing  into  the 
harbor,  was  chased  to  its  entrance  by  three  small  gun 
boats,  one  of  which  she  disabled.  It  was  to  destroy 
these  and  the  signal-station,  and  to  make  observations 
on  the  harbor,  that  Captain  Todd,  of  the  Wilmington, 
and  Commander  Merry,  of  the  Machias,  decided  on 
Wednesday  to  run  into  the  bay.  In  this  movement  the 
Winslow  led  the  way,  closely  followed  by  the  Hudson. 
The  Wilmington,  which  draws  a  little  over  nine  feet  of 
water,  was  obliged  to  stop  at  eighteen  hundred  yards 
from  the  city,  while  the  Machias,  which  draws  thirteen 
feet,  was  unable  to  enter  the  shallow  harbor. 

The  Winslow  followed  the  eastern  and  the  Hudson 
the  western  shore  of  the  bay.  They  had  drawn  close 
together  at  about  one  thousand  yards  from  the  water 
front  of  the  city,  when,  just  before  two  P.M.,  a  puff  of 
smoke  was  observed  on  shore  at  Cardenas  and  a  shell 
whistled  over  the  daring  boats.  This  shot  was  quickly 
followed  by  others,  and  soon  shells  were  bursting  hotly 
about  the  little  Winslow,  which  was  firing  rapidly  in 
return.  The  Hudson  was  also  actively  engaged,  pour 
ing  projectiles  from  her  two  rapid-fire  6-pounder  guns. 
What  effect  was  produced  could  not  easily  be  seen  for 
the  cloud  of  smoke  ;  but  it  was  perceived  that  the 


174  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

Spanish  aim  improved  as  the  battle  went  on,  two  empty 
barks  anchored  off  shore  being  used  as  ranges.  The 
garrison  had  evidently  prepared  for  an  attack.  At 
about  half-past  two  a  4-inch  shell  struck  the  Winslow  on 
the  starboard  beam,  wrecking  her  forward  boiler  and 
starboard  engine,  and  crippling  her  steam  steering-gear. 
A  minute  later,  while  the  quartermaster  was  hooking  up 
the  hand-gear,  it  also  was  shot  away,  he  receiving  a 
severe  wound  in  the  breast. 

Lieutenant  Bernadou,  finding  his  vessel  crippled  be 
yond  control,  and  that  it  had  become  the  target  for  a 
stream  of  well-directed  shot,  hailed  the  Hudson,  and 
asked  her  to  take  him  in  tow.  A  group  of  sailors  on 
the  Hudson  at  once  made  ready  to  heave  a  line,  Ensign 
Bagley,  of  the  Winslow,  hastening  them  with  the  ex 
clamation,  "  Heave  her  !  Let  her  come  !  It's  getting 
pretty  warm." 

The  line  was  flung  and  was  grasped  by  the  Winslow' s 
men,  who  vigorously  drew  it  in,  bringing  their  craft  foot 
by  foot  towards  the  Hudson.  The  next  instant  a  tragic 
event  took  place.  A  4-inch  shell  from  the  shore  battery 
burst  among  the  crew,  Ensign  Bagley  and  Fireman 
Daniels  being  almost  torn  asunder  by  its  explosion. 
Three  others  were  struck  by  fragments  of  the  shell,  and 
died  in  a  few  minutes.  A  flying  piece  of  shrapnel  struck 
Lieutenant  Bernadou  in  the  thigh,  cutting  an  ugly  gash. 
The  hawser  parted  and  the  torpedo-boat  was  left  floun 
dering  helplessly  in  the  water  at  the  mercy  of  the 
enemy's  fire,  which  never  relaxed. 

Meanwhile,  the  Wilmington  was  hurling  her  4-inch 
shells  rapidly  on  shore,  with  an  accuracy  of  aim  that 
must  have  done  deadly  execution.  The  enemy  seemed 
to  have  the  exact  range  of  the  Winslow,  not  a  shell 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  175 

reaching  the  Hudson.  With  all  haste  the  men  on  the 
latter  boat  threw  another  line,  which  was  made  fast,  and 
the  torpedo-boat  pulled  out  of  the  range  of  the  Spanish 
guns.  The  Hudson  then  towed  her  consort  to  Piedras 
Cay,  a  little  island  twelve  miles  off,  where  the  Machias 
lay.  The  Wilmington  followed  them  out. 

Little  trace  of  the  enemy's  shot  was  visible  on  the 
Hudson  or  the  Wilmington,  the  Winslow  alone  having 
suffered.  What  damage  had  been  done  to  the  gunboats 
and  batteries  of  the  enemy  could  not  be  told,  though 
there  was  reason  to  believe  that  it  had  been  considera 
ble.  After  the  battle,  the  signal-station  on  Diana  Cay, 
whose  destruction  had  been  one  of  the  purposes  of  the 
expedition,  was  laid  in  ruins  by  a  force  of  marines  from 
the  Machias. 

Lieutenant  Bernadou  had  shown  intrepid  courage 
through  the  action,  stopping  the  flow  of  blood  in  his 
wounded  thigh  with  a  tourniquet  tightened  by  a  i -pound 
shell,  and  remaining  pluckily  at  his  post,  manoeuvring 
his  little  craft  as  well  as  he  could  by  means  of  her  screw- 
propeller,  and  replying  briskly  to  the  enemy's  fire  from 
his  i -pounder  rapid-fire  gun. 

The  dead  were  brought  to  Key  West,  where  four  of 
them  were  interred  with  all  the  honors  of  war,  side  by 
side  with  the  graves  of  the  victims  of  the  Maine.  The 
body  of  Ensign  Bagley  was  sent  to  his  home  for  inter 
ment.  As  the  first  victims  of  the  war,  the  death  of  these 
five  men,  and  particularly  of  Ensign  Bagley,  a  young 
man  of  much  promise,  sent  a  thrill  of  sympathy  through 
out  the  land.  Many  now  first  began  to  appreciate  what 
war  really  is,  and  a  shudder  of  dread  filled  thousands  of 
hearts  as  they  looked  forward  into  the  uncertain  future, 
with  its  possible  harvest  of  sanguinary  events. 


i;6  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

On  the  same  day  with  this  engagement  an  event  of 
equal  interest,  and  one  that  also  had  its  victims,  took 
place  on  the  opposite  coast  of  Cuba,  in  the  bay  of  Cien- 
fuegos,  the  only  post  then  under  blockade  in  the  south. 
The  town  of  Cienfuegos,  like  that  of  Cardenas,  lies  some 
distance  back  from  the  sea,  in  a  harbor  whose  channel 
winds  and  twists.  It  is  bounded  by  high  hills,  which 
completely  hide  the  town  from  ships  at  sea.  Near  the 
harbor's  mouth  the  land  is  low  for  some  distance  back, 
then  it  rises  into  a  sharp  bluff  covered  with  trees.  The 
cable  connecting  Havana  with  Santiago  de  Cuba  enters 
the  water  at  this  point,  the  cable-house  standing  on  the 
shore  close  to  the  water's  edge.  Not  far  away,  on  one 
side  of  this,  a  light-house  then  stood,  and  opposite  it  an 
old  block-house,  one  of  the  many  established  along  the 
coast  to  intercept  filibustering  expeditions.  There  was 
another  cable  running  to  Batabano,  and  a  small  one  ex 
tending  to  some  local  point  eastward.  These  cables  it 
was  determined  to  cut. 

The  blockading  squadron,  consisting  of  the  cruiser 
Marblehead,  the  gunboat  Nashville,  and  the  auxiliary 
cruiser  Windom,  was  detailed  to  do  the  perilous  work  of 
cutting  these  cables  ;  and  in  the  early  morning  of  Wed 
nesday,  May  n,  those  vessels  steamed  in  close  to  the 
shore.  It  was  evident  that  the  Spanish  had  made  prep 
arations  for  such  an  attempt.  Rifle-pits  could  be  seen 
at  the  water's  edge,  rapid-fire  guns  were  visible,  and 
groups  of  cavalry  and  infantry  were  in  motion  upon  the 
hill-side  and  the  shore.  Yet,  in  defiance  of  this  evident 
preparation,  the  boats  assigned  to  the  task  were  manned 
and  set  out  on  their  perilous  duty.  They  consisted  of 
two  steam  launches,  two  launches  of  smaller  size,  and 
half  a  dozen  row-boats.  The  launches  were  armed  with 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  177 

machine-guns,  their  purpose  being  to  protect  the  small 
boats  as  they  worked,  and  tow  them  back  to  the  ships  if 
the  men  should  be  disabled. 

The  boats  moved  steadily  inward  until  a  point  about 
one  hundred  feet  from  the  cable-house  and  two  hundred 
from  the  rifle-pits  was  reached.  Lieutenant  Winslow,  of 
the  Marblehead,  was  in  command.  Standing  fearlessly 
upright  in  his  launch  as  the  boats  drew  near  to  the  shore, 
he  at  length  gave  the  word  to  anchor  and  grapple  for 
the  cable.  Without  delay  the  oars  were  shipped  and 
the  grappling- hooks  thrown  over  the  side,  while  the 
launches,  and,  farther  out,  the  ships,  stood  ready  to 
repel  an  assault.  The  work  went  on  with  all  haste,  but 
the  cable  was  difficult  to  find,  and  some  time  passed 
before  it  was  drawn  from  the  sands  in  which  it  lay  em 
bedded  and  lifted  to  the  gunwales  of  the  boats. 

Until  this  moment  the  Spaniards  had  made  no  attack. 
Now  there  came  a  flash  on  shore,  and  a  singing  shot 
went  over  the  heads  of  the  men  in  the  boats.  It  was 
the  signal  for  a  sharp  fire  from  the  shore,  which  was 
echoed  in  a  moment  by  a  volley  from  the  machine-guns 
of  the  launches  and  by  broadsides  from  the  ships.  The 
shells  of  the  Marblehead,  bursting  in  the  rifle-pits, 
quickly  put  their  defenders  to  flight.  The  Nashville 
followed,  and  the  little  Windom  opened  briskly  with  her 
4-pounders.  Protected  by  this  vigorous  fire,  the  men 
continued  their  work,  hacking  away  at  the  tough  steel 
wires  of  the  cable  with  axes,  chisels,  and  saws.  Severed 
at  length,  the  cable  was  underrun  and  cut  at  another 
point,  one  hundred  and  fifty  feet  being  taken  out  of  its 
length.  This  was  done  to  prevent  its  being  lifted  and 
spliced.  The  cable  thus  cut  was  supposed  to  be  the  one 
to  Batabano. 

12 


178  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

A  more  important  one,  that  to  Santiago  de  Cuba,  re 
mained,  and  grappling  for  this  at  once  began.  It  was 
soon  found  and  dealt  with  in  the  same  manner,  eighty 
feet  being  cut  out  of  its  length.  The  other  cable  men 
tioned,  of  smaller  calibre,  was  also  cut.  In  the  opinion 
of  the  daring  workers,  General  Blanco' s  last  channel  of 
communication  with  the  outside  world  was  severed. 
This,  as  subsequent  events  proved,  was  an  error,  but 
the  valor  and  energy  of  the  workers  was  not  the  less 
commendable. 

The  work  of  cable-lifting  and  cutting  took  consider 
able  time,  during  much  of  which  the  sailors  were  exposed 
to  a  sharp  rifle-fire  from  the  shore,  though  the  activity 
of  the  attack  was  greatly  diminished  by  the  fierce  return 
from  the  launches  and  the  ships.  A  shell  from  the 
Nashville  tore  the  cable-house  into  fragments.  One 
from  the  Marblehead  tumbled  the  block- house  into  a 
heap  of  ruins.  The  ships  were  rolling  in  a  heavy  sea, 
yet  the  marksmanship  was  superb, — the  shots  searching 
the  rifle-pits,  furrowing  the  sand  of  the  beach,  and 
sweeping  the  hill-side.  But,  despite  this  active  bom 
bardment,  the  rifle-bullets  found  their  victims,  eight  men 
falling  wounded,  one  of  whom,  Patrick  Regan,  died  on 
the  way  back  to  the  ships.  Lieutenant  Winslow  was 
struck  in  the  hand.  All  the  ships  bore  marks  of  the 
fray,  being  struck  many  times  by  bullets  from  machine- 
guns.  But  the  only  casualty  on  the  ships  was  on  the 
Nashville,  where  a  bullet  passed  through  the  shoulder 
of  an  ensign  and  struck  Captain  Maynard  on  the  chest 
near  the  heart.  Fortunately,  the  wound  was  a  slight  one. 

It  had  not  been  proposed  to  injure  the  light-house, 
but  it  was  found  that  the  Spaniards  were  using  it  as  a 
fort,  firing  from  its  cover  on  the  men  in  the  boats.  The 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  179 

guns  of  the  Marblehead  were  at  once  trained  on  it,  and 
the  commander,  from  the  bridge,  gave  the  order  to 
' '  Cut  it  down  F '  At  once  fire  was  opened  on  it  with 
remarkable  accuracy,  considering  the  rolling  motion  of 
the  ships,  which  lay  at  a  distance  of  one  thousand  yards. 
In  a  short  time  the  tower  was  a  ruin  and  the  assailants 
were  in  hasty  flight  for  new  places  of  shelter. 

The  bold  enterprise  had  occupied  more  than  three 
hours,  the  boats  leaving  the  ships  at  seven  o'clock  in 
the  morning  and  returning  at  10.15  A.M.  During  all 
that  time  they  had  been  under  fire  within  short  rifle- 
range,  and  only  the  incessant  work  of  the  machine-  and 
rapid-fire  guns  had  saved  their  crews  from  annihilation. 
What  loss  the  Spanish  sustained  was  unknown.  It  was 
probably  considerable,  in  view  of  their  numbers  and  the 
torrent  of  fire  that  searched  out  their  every  lurking-place. 
This  affair  and  that  at  Cardenas  were  of  great  moral 
value  in  showing  the  intrepidity  of  American  sailors  and 
their  coolness  and  daring  under  fire.  Like  the  battle  at 
Manila,  these  smaller  engagements  served  as  valuable 
object  lessons  to  America  and  the  world. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  mention  in  detail  the  several 
later  attempts  that  were  made  to  cut  the  cables  connect 
ing  Cuba  with  the  outer  world.  Despite  the  success  at 
Cienfuegos,  Blanco  at  Havana  kept  in  communication 
with  Santiago  and  Spain,  and,  though  other  wires  were 
cut  at  later  dates,  in  front  of  Santiago,  at  Guantanamo 
Bay,  and  at  the  eastern  end  of  Cuba,  the  governor-gen 
eral  kept  in  touch  with  the  government  at  Madrid.  Not 
until  after  the  capture  of  Santiago  was  he  finally  cut  off 
from  communication  with  the  world  without.  There 
was  still  a  cable  from  Havana  to  Key  West,  but  that, 
for  obvious  reasons,  he  did  not  care  to  use. 


CHAPTER    X. 

THE  SEARCH    FOR   THE   SPANISH    FLEET. 

THE  events  narrated  in  the  last  chapter  were  followed 
on  the  succeeding  day  by  a  more  important  one,  the 
bombardment  of  San  Juan  de  Porto  Rico  by  Admiral 
Sampson's  squadron,  which,  on  May  3,  had  sailed  from 
Key  West  for  a  destination  unknown,  though  shrewdly 
suspected.  It  was  believed  that  the  Cape  Verde  Span 
ish  squadron  was  bound  for  the  West  Indies  and  would 
seek  to  make  port  at  San  Juan.  Admiral  Sampson's 
purpose  was  to  cut  the  Spanish  fleet  off  from  this  port, 
or,  if  too  late  for  that,  to  attack  it  in  the  harbor  of  San 
Juan,  or  wherever  it  could  be  found  outside.  His  squad 
ron  consisted  of  the  battle-ships  Iowa  and  Indiana,  the 
monitors  Amphitrite  and  Terror,  the  cruisers  New  York, 
Montgomery,  and  Detroit,  and  the  torpedo-boat  Porter. 
It  was  accompanied  by  the  coaler  Niagara,  the  tug 
Wampatuck,  and  the  Dauntless,  one  of  the  press-boats 
which  accompanied  every  expedition  of  the  fleets. 

Moving  along  the  northern  coast  of  Cuba,  which  was 
kept  steadily  in  sight,  the  squadron  on  May  7  reached 
Cape  Haytien,  a  northern  seaport  of  the  island  of  Hayti. 
Progress  had  been  delayed  by  the  slow  speed  of  the 
monitors,  which  needed  to  be  towed  during  most  of  the 
course,  and  won  from  the  sailors  the  ungallant  name  of 
' (  crabs. ' '  Stopping  at  Cape  Haytien  to  send  despatches 
to  Washington  and  receive  replies,  the  ships  moved  on 
eastward  during  the  loth  and  nth,  and  during  the  night 
180 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  181 

of  the  1 2th  appeared  off  the  port  of  San  Juan,  the  me 
tropolis  and  principal  seaport  of  the  island  of  Porto  Rico. 

The  city  of  San  Juan  lies  on  the  interior  of  a  long, 
narrow  bay,  a  high  headland  separating  it  from  the 
ocean,  while  in  the  mouth  of  the  channel  rises  the  lofty 
Cabras  Island,  whose  summit,  like  that  of  the  headland, 
is  fortified.  The  city  is  built  on  the  slopes  of  high 
hills  which  rise  on  the  ocean  side  of  the  bay.  To  reach 
it,  it  is  necessary  to  pass  the  Canuelo  battery  on  Cabras 
Island,  the  Morro  Castle  fortifications  within,  and  the 
San  Carlos  battery  on  a  promontory  at  the  east  entrance 
to  the  harbor.  Inland,  sharply  outlined  against  the  sky, 
rises  a  range  of  mountains,  which  send  down  their  spurs 
in  broken  hills  almost  to  the  sea.  It  was  about  three 
o'  clock  in  the  morning  of  May  1 2  that  the  fleet  came 
near  the  entrance  of  this  bay  and  began  its  preparations 
for  battle,  stripping  the  decks  of  impedimenta  and  get 
ting  ready  the  guns,  ammunition,  and  appliances  for 
handling  the  wounded.  On  reaching  the  entrance  to 
the  bay,  it  became  evident  that  the  Spanish  fleet  was 
not  within.  It  had  either  not  reached  there  or  had  de 
parted  for  some  new  destination.  But  before  seeking  it 
elsewhere,  Admiral  Sampson  determined  to  attack  the 
batteries  defending  the  port,  in  order  to  develop  their 
positions  and  strength,  though  with  no  intention  of  bom 
barding  or  besieging  the  city. 

Preliminary  to  the  assault,  the  admiral  transferred  his 
flag  to  the  Iowa,  and  issued  orders  that  the  flag-ship, 
followed  by  the  Indiana,  New  York,  Amphitrite,  and 
Terror,  should  sail  inward  past  Cabras  Island,  then  turn 
and  pass  outward  by  the  westward  channel,  repeating 
this  evolution  until  signalled  to  stop.  The  smaller  ves 
sels  were  directed  to  occupy  certain  positions  and  to 


182  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

keep  a  sharp  lookout  for  torpedo-boat  destroyers.  Two 
principal  objects  of  attack  had  been  in  view,  the  bat 
teries  upon  Morro  and  the  Spanish  men-of-war,  if  any 
were  found  in  the  harbor, — care  being  taken  to  avoid 
firing  on  neutral  war-vessels  if  present,  and  also  to  avoid 
striking  the  hospitals  on  Cabras  Island.  As  soon,  how 
ever,  as  it  became  evident  that  the  ships  were  not  within 
the  harbor,  attention  was  confined  to  the  forts,  which 
were  vigorously  assailed. 

The  attack  began  at  5.15  A.M.  and  lasted  for  three 
hours.  The  plans  of  the  admiral  were  thoroughly  car 
ried  out,  the  ships  steaming  majestically  into  the  harbor 
and  three  times  making  the  circuit  outlined  in  the  general 
order.  A  ten-knot  easterly  breeze  was  blowing,  lifting 
the  waters  into  a  long,  heavy  swell  as  the  great  ships 
moved  gracefully  on.  As  they  entered  the  harbor's 
mouth,  no  evidence  of  a  lookout  by  the  enemy  was  ob 
served.  Alike  in  town  and  forts  the  Spaniards  seemed 
asleep,  and  only  the  roar  of  the  mighty  guns  appeared 
to  waken  them  from  their  slumbers.  Four  broadsides 
were  fired  from  the  ships  before  the  Spanish  gunners 
were  thoroughly  aroused  to  the  exigencies  of  the  situa 
tion  and  began  to  reply  from  their  elevated  positions  to 
the  projectiles  of  the  great  12-  and  1 3-inch  guns.  Inward 
swept  the  Iowa,  delivering  the  fire  from  her  turrets  as 
she  went.  Behind  her  came  the  Indiana  and  then  the 
graceful  New  York,  while  the  low-lying  monitors  glided 
inward  in  the  rear.  When  the  Iowa  turned  to  go  back 
in  the  circuit  laid  down,  the  whole  line  had  become  en 
gaged,  the  Detroit  and  Montgomery  firing  rapidly  from 
their  smaller  guns  on  the  Cabras  and  Morro  batteries. 

The  squadron  had  completed  one  round  and  was  re 
turning  on  the  second  before  the  Spanish  gunners  be- 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  183 

came  fully  warmed  up  to  their  work.  Then  from  their 
elevated  positions  they  poured  a  plunging  fire  upon 
the  fleet,  one  which,  had  the  guns  been  well  served, 
might  have  done  serious  execution.  Their  fire  was 
furious  but  aimless,  the  shells  causing  the  water  to  spurt 
up  all  around,  but  only  one  or  two  during  the  whole 
conflict  touching  a  ship.  The  Detroit,  which  preceded 
the  Iowa  into  the  harbor,  and  the  Wampatuck,  which 
kept  on  her  beam,  sounding  constantly  as  they  moved 
inward,  occupied  posts  of  danger,  but  escaped  injury. 
The  Detroit  drew  in  close  under  Morro,  and  shells 
seemed  to  rain  around  her  as  she  lay  within  five  hun 
dred  yards  of  the  batteries,  hurling  projectiles  from  her 
4-inch  rapid-fire  guns ;  yet  she  made  a  marvellous  escape 
from  damage  by  shot  or  shell. 

By  the  end  of  the  third  round  the  heat  of  the  sun  had 
become  intense,  the  men  working  under  great  strain  ; 
and,  as  his  purpose  had  been  achieved,  the  admiral 
deemed  it  useless  to  continue  the  attack  on  the  forts, 
and  signalled  to  withdraw.  This  signal  failed  to  be  seen 
or,  at  least,  to  be  understood  by  the  Terror,  which  re 
mained  in  the  channel  and  for  half  an  hour  engaged 
Morro  Castle  alone.  The  scene  was  one  of  intense 
interest  as  the  low-lying  craft  hurled  the  shells  from  her 
turrets  up-hill  at  the  elevated  forts,  while  the  Spanish 
gunners  poured  down  their  projectiles  with  utter  useless- 
ness,  the  shells  splashing  in  the  water  often  hundreds 
of  feet  from  the  Terror,  and,  when  exploding,  hurling 
columns  of  water  sixty  feet  into  the  air.  Finally,  as  if 
weary  of  the  work,  the  monitor  glided  slowly  outward, 
firing  as  she  went,  while  the  gunners  on  the  hill-side 
blazed  away  until  she  was  far  out  of  range,  not  a  shot 
touching  her  during  the  whole  exciting  duel.  The 


*84  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

Montgomery,  meanwhile,  had  engaged  and  silenced 
Fort  Canuelo,  on  Cabras  Island,  while  the  Porter,  lying 
close  under  the  cliff  east  of  the  Detroit,  was  prepared  to 
torpedo  any  Spanish  cruiser  that  sought  to  escape  from 
the  harbor. 

It  was  eight  o'clock  when  the  engagement  closed. 
The  escape  of  the  fleet  from  the  heavy  and  continuous 
fire  of  the  enemy's  batteries,  all  occupying  elevated 
positions,  was  something  almost  incredible,  and  could 
only  have  been  due  to  absolute  incapacity  in  the 
gunners.  Of  the  hundreds  of  projectiles  only  two 
reached  their  mark,  and  only  one  man  was  killed  on  the 
fleet.  A  shell  struck  the  Iowa  and  did  some  small 
damage  on  deck,  where  three  men  were  slightly  hurt. 
One  that  exploded  on  the  New  York  was  more  effective, 
one  seaman,  Frank  Widemark,  being  killed,  and  four 
wounded,  while  two  search-lights  were  shattered  and 
other  slight  injuries  done.  In  addition  to  the  man 
killed  on  the  New  York,  a  gunner's  mate  on  the  Am- 
phitrite  died  from  the  effect  of  the  stifling  heat.  Of  the 
wounded  men  only  two  were  seriously  enough  hurt  to 
be  transferred  to  the  hospital-ship  Solace,  which  subse 
quently  joined  the  fleet.  During  the  engagement  the 
admiral  occupied  a  position  on  the  lee  of  the  conning- 
tower,  not  deeming  it  necessary  to  enter  that  place  of 
refuge.  His  experience  and  that  of  Dewey  indicate  that 
the  conning-tower  is  little  likely  to  be  made  use  of  un 
less  the  shots  come  from  both  sides.  The  commander 
seems  as  safe  behind  it  as  in  it. 

The  results  of  the  bombardment  were  the  silencing  of 
the  Cabras  Island  battery,  the  damaging  of  the  San 
Carlos  battery,  and  the  demolition  of  the  north  end  of 
Morro  Castle.  Some  damage  was  done  to  the  section 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  185 

of  the  city  adjoining  the  batteries  and  a  panic  seems  to 
have  prevailed,  most  of  the  inhabitants  taking  to  the 
woods,  with  a  natural  fear  that  the  hostile  fleet  might 
turn  its  death-dealing  guns  on  the  helpless  city.  They 
returned  with  a  warm  sense  of  relief  when  it  was  certain 
that  the  terrible  ships  had  withdrawn. 

One  lesson  of  importance  was  learned  from  these  three 
hours  of  sharp  work.  It  was  the  first  time  that  modern 
ships  had  attacked  in  force  land  fortifications,  and  the 
result  was  observed  by  the  military  nations  of  the  world 
with  deep  interest.  It  had  been  an  unsettled  problem 
whether  coast  defence  could  be  best  provided  for  by  war- 
vessels  or  land  intrenchments.  The  engagement  at  San 
Juan  and  the  subsequent  naval  siege  of  Santiago  went 
far  to  settle  this  question.  In  both  instances  ancient 
forts,  quite  unfit  to  bear  the  fire  of  modern  guns,  sus 
tained  a  hot  fire  for  hours  without  being  silenced  or 
materially  injured.  They  had,  it  may  be  said,  a  special 
advantage  from  their  elevated  situation,  which  rendered 
it  difficult  to  plant  shells  effectively  in  their  midst.  On 
the  other  hand,  they  bore  the  bombardment  practically 
without  replying,  for  the  wretched  gunnery  of  the  Span 
iards  was  a  subject  of  derision  to  the  sailors,  their  pro 
jectiles  being  wasted  by  hundreds  on  the  waters  of  the 
bay.  Only  two  of  the  whole  number  reached  their 
mark,  and  this  perhaps  more  by  accident  than  accurate 
aiming.  Had  the  guns  of  the  Morro  all  been  of  modern 
make  and  handled  by  well-trained  gunners,  the  result 
must  have  been  decidedly  different.  From  their  coign 
of  vantage  on  the  harbor  hills  they  could  have  poured 
their  shells  in  a  devastating  stream  on  the  ships  and 
have  driven  them  in  haste  from  their  waters  or  sunk 
them  in  the  channel.  Such  forts,  well  built  and  handled, 


186  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

would  be  impregnable  to  the  fire  of  ships,  and  would 
be  able  to  meet  an  attack  with  a  deadly  and  destructive 
return. 

The  hospital-ship  Solace,  which  visited  the  fleet  after 
the  battle  on  an  errand  of  mercy,  was  a  new  departure 
in  naval  warfare, — a  vessel  fitted  up  with  all  requirements 
for  aid  of  the  sick  and  wounded.  She  was  in  effect  an 
ambulance-ship,  her  mission  being  to  make  the  suffering 
comfortable  until  they  could  be  landed  in  a  hospital  on 
shore.  Her  white  sides  and  the  flag  of  the  Red  Cross 
that  floated  at  her  peak  told  the  story  of  her  benevo 
lent  purpose  to  friend  and  foe,  while  she  was  provided 
with  delicacies  for  the  sick  and  all  the  requirements  for 
temporary  hospital  treatment  of  the  wounded,  having 
an  operating-room  well  equipped  with  surgical  instru 
ments,  a  complete  paraphernalia  for  treating  wounds,  a 
convalescents'  room,  and  a  full  corps  of  surgeons  and 
nurses.  Her  accommodations  were  sufficient  for  two 
hundred  or  more  wounded  soldiers,  and  her  speed  great 
enough  to  enable  her  to  reach  a  northern  port  with  her 
suffering  inmates  without  loss  of  time.  The  wounded 
of  the  New  York  were  the  first  that  called  for  the  services 
of  this  useful  ship.  At  a  later  date  a  second  vessel 
adapted  to  the  same  important  service,  the  Relief,  spe 
cially  known  as  an  "army  hospital-ship,"  was  added  to 
the  auxiliary  vessels  of  the  navy.  Later  in  the  war 
these  two  winged  messengers  of  mercy  proved  of  the 
highest  utility. 

Immediately  after  the  end  of  the  bombardment  the 
squadron  put  to  sea  again,  standing  to  the  northeast 
until  out  of  sight  of  San  Juan,  when  the  course  was  laid 
to  the  westward,  with  the  view  of  communicating  with 
Washington  and  ascertaining  if  anything  had  been 


THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN.  187 

learned  about  the  movements  of  the  Spanish  fleet.  At 
Cape  Haytien  the  admiral  received  word  by  wire  that  the 
squadron  of  the  enemy,  under  Admiral  Cervera,  had 
been  heard  from  at  the  French  island  of  Martinique. 
Being  unable  to  obtain  supplies  there,  it  had  made  its 
way  to  the  Dutch  island  of  Curacao,  near  the  north 
coast  of  South  America.  Here  entrance  was  forbidden 
to  more  than  two  vessels  of  the  fleet  at  a  time,  the 
Maria  Teresa  and  the  Vizcaya  being  admitted  to  the 
port,  where  they  obtained  a  small  quantity  of  inferior 
coal  and  some  other  supplies. 

As  Holland  and  France  had  declared  neutrality,  they 
could  not,  under  the  rules  of  international  law  governing 
belligerents,  permit  the  ships  of  either  combatant  to 
remain  in  any  of  their  ports  longer  than  necessity  de 
manded,  or  to  obtain  more  coal  than  was  requisite  to 
enable  them  to  reach  the  nearest  port  of  their  respective 
nations.  Great  Britain  had  declared  coal  contraband  of 
war.  This  rendered  it  useless  for  Admiral  Cervera  to 
call  at  any  British  West  India  port.  Nothing  remained 
for  him  but  to  make  a  dash  for  some  Cuban  or  Porto 
Rican  harbor,  and  the  American  fleet  was  on  the  alert  to 
check  any  effort  of  this  kind,  and  to  meet  and  engage 
the  Spanish  squadron  if  possible. 

The  news  of  the  presence  of  a  powerful  Spanish  fleet 
in  the  West  Indies  was  followed  by  active  naval  move 
ments.  On  the  1 2th,  the  Flying  Squadron,  so  long  held 
at  Hampton  Roads,  was  released  from  its  weary  wait 
for  a  possible  enemy,  and  sailed  southward  under  the 
command  of  Commodore  Schley.  The  main  section  of 
the  squadron,  consisting  of  the  flag-ship  Brooklyn,  the 
battle-ships  Massachusetts  and  Texas,  and  the  gunboat 
Scorpion,  put  in  at  Key  West,  where  coal  and  other 


188  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

supplies  were  taken  on  with  all  haste.  The  Minneapolis, 
leaving  Hampton  Roads  a  day  later,  sailed  eastward  and 
passed  through  the  Windward  Passage  to  the  south  of 
Cuba,  where  the  Harvard  and  the  St.  Paul  were  then 
cruising.  The  Columbia  was  left  on  patrol  duty  off  the 
North  Atlantic  States. 

At  Key  West  Schley's  squadron  was  joined  on  the 
1 8th  by  that  of  Admiral  Sampson,  which  came  dashing 
in  at  top  speed,  the  New  York  far  ahead  of  the  other 
vessels  of  the  squadron,  which  made  their  appearance 
one  by  one  during  that  and  the  following  day.  They 
had  steamed  in  all  haste  from  San  Juan  to  Key  West  for 
coal.  No  time  was  to  be  lost  with  a  Spanish  squadron 
at  large  in  the  West  India  seas.  Orders  were  given  to 
Commodore  Schley  to  proceed  south  at  once  by  the 
Yucatan  Channel  and  scour  the  southern  waters  for  the 
foe,  and  by  the  time  the  last  of  Sampson's  ships  had 
reached  harbor  the  first  of  Schley's  had  set  her  fore 
foot  towards  the  Cuban  coast.  ' '  I  congratulate  you  in 
advance.  I  believe  you  are  going  to  meet  and  defeat 
the  Spaniards,"  signalled  Sampson  from  the  New  York 
as  the  Flying  Squadron  passed  out  to  sea.  The  Iowa, 
then  coaling,  was  ordered  to  follow  and  join  it,  while  the 
North  Atlantic  Squadron  began  coaling  with  all  rapidity, 
preparatory  to  a  return  voyage  eastward  to  the  Wind 
ward  Channel.  By  the  night  of  Saturday,  the  2ist, 
nearly  all  the  ships  had  coaled  and  were  off  again. 
Cuba  was  being  circumnavigated  in  search  of  the  enemy. 

Commodore  Schley's  orders  were  to  proceed  to  Cien- 
fuegos,  where  he  would  be  joined  by  the  Iowa,  and  could 
take  up  the  Marblehead  and  Nashville  and  the  two  tor 
pedo-boats  then  off  that  point.  It  was  soon  learned, 
however,  that  the  blockade  at  Cienfuegos  had  been 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  189 

temporarily  abandoned  in  consequence  of  the  probable 
arrival  of  the  Spanish  fleet,  and  the  Marblehead  and  the 
Nashville  were  soon  sighted  running  to  Key  West  for 
coal  and  repairs.  Off  Cape  San  Antonio,  at  the  western 
extremity  of  Cuba,  two  steamers  were  sighted,  which 
proved  to  be  the  cruiser  Cincinnati  and  the  dynamite 
boat  Vesuvius.  They  were  also  running  in  for  coal,  and 
reported  that  they  had  seen  nothing  of  the  Spanish  fleet. 
On  Saturday,  the  2ist,  at  five  P.M.,  the  harbor  of  Cien- 
fuegos  came  in  sight.  It  was  possible  that  Cervera's 
squadron  might  have  taken  refuge  in  this  land-locked 
bay,  and  the  commodore  prepared  to  satisfy  his  mind  on 
this  important  point  before  proceeding  farther.  The 
first  evidence  of  activity  within  the  bay  came  at  an  early 
hour  on  Sunday  morning,  when  a  torpedo-boat  thrust 
its  forefoot  out  of  the  harbor  entrance.  It  quickly  dis 
appeared  on  seeing  the  group  of  war-vessels  that  lay 
outside.  On  the  shore  batteries  the  Spanish  standard 
waved  defiance,  and  some  cavalry  were  visible  on  the 
hill-side,  but  from  the  position  of  the  ships  no  trace 
could  be  seen  of  the  Spanish  fleet.  Noon  that  day 
brought  the  Iowa,  whose  coming  was  greeted  with 
cheers  for  its  gallant  commander,  * '  Fighting  Bob' ' 
Evans,  whose  arm  had  recently  been  crushed  by  the 
falling  of  a  battle-hatch,  but  who  did  not  let  the  intense 
pain  of  this  accident  allay  his  thirst  for  battle. 

At  five  o'clock,  Sunday  afternoon,  Commodore  Schley 
made  an  inspection  of  the  harbor,  running  close  in.  No 
ships-of-war  were  visible  from  his  point  of  view,  the  only 
craft  to  be  seen  being  a  few  schooners  and  a  small  gun 
boat.  No  shot  was  fired.  ' c  It  is  the  Spanish  squadron 
I  am  after, ' '  said  the  gallant  commodore,  *  *  not  a  few  of 
Spain's  almost  ruined  subjects  in  Cuba." 


190  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

If  not  at  Cienfuegos,  where  was  this  fleet  ?  It  was  all- 
essential  to  discover,  and  at  eight  o'clock  that  evening 
the  Scorpion  was  despatched  to  Santiago  de  Cuba,  three 
hundred  miles  to  the  east,  off  which  port  it  was  hoped 
she  would  find  the  Minneapolis  or  the  Harvard,  and 
perhaps  gain  some  important  information.  Despatches 
were  sent  on  the  Scorpion  to  be  taken  by  either  of  these 
swift  vessels  to  Hayti  and  forwarded  to  the  Navy  De 
partment  of  the  United  States. 

On  Monday,  May  23,  the  converted  yacht  Hawk  came 
in  from  Key  West,  in  company  with  the  gunboat  Cas- 
tine  and  the  collier  Merrimac,  and  bringing  important 
news.  This  was  that  the  Minneapolis,  while  scouting 
to  the  eastward  on  the  igth,  had  tracked  the  Spanish 
fleet  to  Santiago  harbor,  and  at  once  hastened  to  Hayti 
and  cabled  the  news.  The  Hawk  had  been  sent  with 
all  speed  to  apprise  Schley,  who  on  learning  the  news 
felt  much  alarm  for  the  safety  of  the  Scorpion. 

Yet  the  location  of  the  Spanish  fleet  remained  much 
of  a  mystery.  It  might  have  merely  touched  at  San 
tiago  and  proceeded  westward.  The  hills  that  bounded 
the  winding  channel  of  Cienfuegos  harbor  hid  its  depths 
from  view,  the  city  being  reached  through  two  sharp 
turns  followed  by  a  winding  passage  only  wide  enough 
for  a  single  ship  to  pass.  The  fleet  might  still  lie  there 
out  of  sight,  or  might  have  touched  at  some  other  point 
along  the  coast.  Commodore  Schley  deemed  it  wise  to 
wait  and  investigate  more  thoroughly  before  leaving  the 
way  open  for  the  enemy  to  make  a  dash  to  Havana. 
On  Tuesday  the  Marblehead  joined,  with  the  two  con 
verted  yachts  Eagle  and  Vixen.  The  squadron  had  be 
come  large  and  formidable. 

Meanwhile,  evidence  was  gathering  as  to  the  actual 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  191 

location  and  the  condition  of  the  Spanish  fleet.  Reports 
came  from  two  captains,  British  and  Dutch,  who  had 
seen  Admiral  Cervera's  ships  at  Cura£ao,  and  who  re 
ported  them  as  in  bad  condition,  the  ships'  bottoms  be 
ing  seriously  fouled  with  barnacles  and  long  grass.  They 
reached  there  on  May  14,  bought  all  the  provisions  they 
could  and  a  small  quantity  of  very  inferior  coal,  and 
sailed  again  on  the  evening  of  the  I5th,  seemingly  in 
haste  in  consequence  of  a  despatch  received  by  the  ad 
miral,  for  much  of  the  coal  and  a  considerable  number 
of  cattle  were  left  behind. 

Other  skippers  of  merchant-vessels  reported  having 
observed  the  Spanish  fleet  near  Santiago,  and  still  others 
claimed  to  have  seen  it  enter  the  harbor.  One  of  these, 
the  captain  of  the  British  ship  Adula,  from  Kingston, 
Jamaica,  reported  to  Schley  at  Cienfuegos  that  at  mid 
night  on  the  i  Qth  he  had  seen  the  lights  of  seven  ships 
some  seventy  miles  south  of  Santiago,  and  that  on  the 
following  day  the  arrival  of  the  Spanish  fleet  in  that  har 
bor  had  been  telegraphed  to  Kingston.  Further  evi 
dence  was  obtained  on  May  26,  when  the  St.  Paul, 
cruising  off  Santiago  harbor,  picked  up  the  British 
steamer  Restormel,  which  was  trying  to  steal  into  the 
harbor  with  a  cargo  of  coal,  presumably  for  the  Spanish 
ships.  The  Restormel  had  sailed  first  for  San  Juan. 
This  port  being  deemed  unsafe,  she  was  ordered  to 
Cura£ao,  and,  reaching  there  too  late,  was  despatched 
to  Santiago,  only  to  be  sent  on  a  final  journey  to  Key 
West  under  the  care  of  a  prize  crew  from  the  St.  Paul. 

These  various  shreds  of  testimony,  or  such  of  them 
as  came  to  Commodore  Schley' s  ears,  induced  him  to 
leave  Cienfuegos  for  Santiago,  in  front  of  whose  harbor 
he  arrived  on  the  night  of  the  27th.  The  result  of  his 


I92  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

visit  was  indicated  in  a  despatch  which  reached  Wash 
ington  May  30,  and  which  stated  that  the  Spanish  fleet 
was  certainly  in  the  bay  of  Santiago  de  Cuba,  since  he 
had  himself  seen  and  recognized  the  vessels. 

The  fleet  being  there,  the  next  thing  was  to  keep  it 
there,  and  the  great  ships  of  the  squadron  were  ranged 
in  line  in  front  of  the  harbor's  mouth,  effectually  closing 
it.  Cervera  and  his  fleet  were  safely  bottled  up,  never 
again  to  sail  the  open  seas  under  the  Spanish  flag. 

Santiago  de  Cuba,  which  was  about  to  become  the 
principal  seat  of  the  war,  is  the  second  city  in  size  on 
the  island,  and  has  the  credit  of  being  probably  the 
oldest  city  of  any  importance  in  the  western  hemisphere, 
having  been  founded  in  1514,  twenty-two  years  after  the 
discovery  of  America.  In  1895  it  had  a  population  of 
59,614.  It  is  the  metropolis  of  eastern  Cuba,  had  before 
the  war  a  large  commerce,  and  is  the  head-quarters  of 
three  large  mining  plants  owned  by  citizens  of  the  United 
States.  It  lies  near  the  bottom  of  a  beautiful  bay,  six 
miles  long  and  two  miles  wide,  which  is  entered  by  a 
narrow  channel,  flanked  by  highlands,  on  which,  to  the 
east,  stands  Morro  Castle,*  a  venerable  fortification  which 
derives  its  sole  importance  from  its  elevated  position. 
Opposite  the  Morro  were  some  newly-built  batteries,  and 
two  others,  Estrella  and  Catalina,  on  the  east  shore, 
farther  in.  About  half  a  mile  inward,  where  the  channel 
widens  out  into  the  bay,  is  an  islet,  Cayo  Smith,  on 


*  The  title  Morro  seems  somewhat  abundant  in  Spanish  forti 
fications.  There  is  a  famous  Morro  Castle  at  Havana,  and  others 
at  San  Juan  and  Santiago.  The  word  Morro  has  various  signi 
fications,  but  as  thus  employed  means  a  fort  on  a  rounded  head 
land,  such  as  appears  at  the  entrance  of  each  of  these  ports. 


THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN.  193 

which  were  batteries  with  modern  guns,  while  Blanco 
battery,  near  the  city,  was  similarly  armed.  There  was 
excellent  reason,  also,  to  believe  that  the  channel  was 
mined,  and  that  an  attempt  to  make  a  forcible  entrance 
into  the  harbor  would  prove  a  very  dangerous  pro 
ceeding. 

As  regards  Admiral  Cervera's  fleet,  it  was  not  easy 
to  recognize  it  from  the  harbor  entrance.  The  Reina 
Mercedes,  a  partly  dismantled  cruiser,  not  connected 
with  the  fleet,  lay  within  easy  view,  and  farther  in  were 
two  ships,  supposed  to  be  the  Almirante  Oquendo  and 
the  Cristobal  Colon.  The  remainder  of  the  fleet  could 
not  be  seen.  This  fleet,  it  is  proper  here  to  state,  con 
sisted  of  four  armored  cruisers  and  three  torpedo-boat 
destroyers.  Of  the  former,  the  Vizcaya,  Almirante 
Oquendo,  and  Infanta  Maria  Teresa  were  similar  in 
design  and  armament,  being  of  6890  tons  displacement 
and  of  about  20  knots  speed.  The  side  armor  was  of 
ten  or  twelve  inches  thickness,  while  the  two  turrets 
were  protected  by  9-inch  steel  armor,  and  carried  two 
1 1 -inch  Hontorio  guns,  one  in  each  turret.  The  main 
battery  contained  also  ten  5.5-inch  guns,  and  the  secon 
dary  battery  eight  6-pounders,  ten  i -pounders,  ten 
machine-guns,  and  eight  torpedo-tubes.  The  Cristobal 
Colon  was  a  684O-ton  cruiser,  armored  with  a  complete 
belt  of  6-inch  nickel  steel.  She  carried  two  lo-inch 
guns  in  barbettes,  ten  6-inch  and  six  4.7-inch  guns,  and 
a  considerable  number  of  small  guns.  The  Terror, 
Furor,  and  Pluton  were  torpedo-boat  destroyers  of  recent 
British  build,  and  formidable  examples  of  this  type  of 
modern  war-vessels. 

Of  the  latter  craft,  the  Terror  was  not  now  with  the 
fleet,  having  been  left  at  Fort-de-France,  Martinique. 

13 


i94  THE   WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

Here  was  the  auxiliary  cruiser  Harvard  under  repair, 
and  apprehension  was  felt  that  the  formidable  little 
torpedo  gunboat  might  make  a  prize  of  the  large  but 
lightly  armed  cruiser.  The  danger,  however,  existed 
more  in  imagination  than  in  fact,  and  the  Harvard  sailed 
safely  north  when  ready  to  do  so. 

Such  was  the  known  strength  of  the  fleet.  As  regarded 
that  of  the  fortifications  Commodore  Schley  determined 
to  satisfy  himself,  and  on  the  3ist,  the  fourth  day  after 
his  arrival,  he  stood  close  in  with  the  Massachusetts  and 
Iowa  and  the  cruiser  New  Orleans,  which  had  joined  his 
squadron.  At  1. 15  P.M.  the  ships  reached  a  point  about 
seven  thousand  yards  from  the  shore,  and  then  headed 
due  west,  the  Massachusetts  in  the  lead,  the  Iowa  bring 
ing  up  the  rear.  The  two  battle-ships  opened  with  their 
heavy  guns  on  the  Cristobal  Colon,  which  lay  about  a 
mile  inside  the  Morro,  while  the  New  Orleans  sought  to 
draw  the  fire  of  the  forts.  The  narrowness  of  the  har 
bor  entrance  permitted  only  a  few  shots  to  be  fired  at 
the  Colon  before  the  speed  of  the  ships  shut  her  out 
from  view.  All  the  forts,  some  six  in  number,  opened 
fire,  some  of  the  guns  being  fairly  well  aimed,  but  none 
of  them  doing  any  damage  to  the  ships.  The  round 
completed,  a  second  one  was  made,  somewhat  farther 
in,  Schley  standing  unconcernedly  near  the  forward 
turret  of  the  Massachusetts  and  watching  the  effect  of 
the  enemy's  fire.  Having  accomplished  his  mission,  he 
withdrew.  It  was  evident  that  a  heavy  bombardment 
would  be  necessary  to  disable  the  Spanish  batteries.  A 
second  purpose  of  the  movement  was  indicated  in  Schley' s 
despatch  to  the  Navy  Department  :  ' '  Rcconnoissance 
developed  satisfactorily  the  presence  of  the  Spanish 
squadron  lying  behind  the  island  near  the  upper  fort, 


THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 


195 


as  they  fired  over  the  hill  at  random.     Quite  satisfied 
the  Spanish  fleet  is  here. ' ' 

About  midnight  the  two  torpedo-boats  slipped  out  of 
the  harbor,  gliding  under  the  shadow  of  the  hills  towards 


the  American  fleet.  They  were  first  seen  by  the  lookout 
on  the  Texas,  whose  search-light  was  at  once  turned  upon 
them,  revealing  their  dangerous  presence.  They  dashed 
towards  the  Texas,  which  was  lying  farthest  inshore,  but 
were  met  with  such  a  rain  of  shot  from  her  rapid-fire  guns 
that  discretion  appeared  the  better  part  of  valor,  and  they 
turned  and  ran  hastily  back  into  the  harbor. 

On  June  i,  Admiral  Sampson,  with  the  New  York, 


196  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

Oregon,  and  Mayflower,  arrived  off  Santiago  and  took 
command  of  the  combined  squadrons.  He  had  at  his 
disposal  a  total  fleet  of  fifteen  war-vessels  to  pit  against 
Cervera's  squadron,  the  escape  of  which  was  now  ren 
dered  hopeless. 

The  presence  of  the  Oregon  calls  for  some  further 
mention.  For  more  than  two  months  that  stanch  battle 
ship  had  been  sailing  along  the  American  coast,  having 
left  San  Francisco  on  March  19  with  a  journey  of  thir 
teen  thousand  miles  before  her,  equal  to  more  than  half 
the  circumference  of  the  globe.  Rio  Janeiro  was  reached 
on  April  30,  and  here  came  the  most  exciting  part  of 
the  journey,  since  there  was  reason  to  believe  that  the 
Spanish  torpedo-boat  Temerario,  stationed  on  that  coast, 
was  giving  chase.  But  this  proved  to  be  a  false  alarm, 
and  the  great  ship  sped  on,  reaching  Bahia  on  May  8. 
Warning  was  received  here  of  a  possible  attempt  at 
interception  by  the  Spanish  squadron,  but  Captain  Clark 
kept  steadily  onward  without  meeting  an  enemy,  touch 
ing  at  Barbadoes  on  the  iSth,  and  reaching  Jupiter 
Inlet,  Florida,  on  the  25th.  The  ship  had  coaled  four 
times  on  her  trip.  The  remarkable  feature  of  the  great 
achievement  was  that  the  Oregon  came  into  port  after 
her  stupendous  run  at  a  fifteen-knot  speed,  and  in  such 
excellent  condition  that  she  was  ready  for  service  with 
out  any  overhauling.  Hastily  coaling,  she  at  once  set 
out  for  Santiago,  where  she  joined  the  blockading  fleet. 

Another  of  the  American  war-vessels,  the  Columbia, 
was  less  fortunate.  On  May  28,  while  cruising  off  the 
coast  in  a  dense  fog,  about  eight  miles  southwest  of 
Fire  Island  Light,  she  collided  with  the  British  steamship 
Foscolio,  which  had  left  New  York  with  a  cargo  the  day 
before.  The  result  of  the  collision  was  fatal  to  the  Fos- 


THE   WAR   WITH   SPAIN.  197 

colio,  which  gradually  filled  and  sank,  all  of  her  crew 
being  taken  off.  The  Columbia  had  a  jagged  hole  stove 
in  her  starboard  side,  abreast  of  the  mainmast,  about  six 
feet  wide  and  extending  some  five  feet  below  the  water- 
line.  The  four-inch  steel  of  the  protective  deck  was 
bent  backward  nearly  double  by  the  blow.  Only  for 
her  heavy  frame  and  this  deck  of  steel  the  great  cruiser 
might  have  been  cut  in  two.  As  it  was,  her  water-tight 
compartments  kept  her  easily  afloat,  and  a  brief  period 
in  dry-dock  put  her  in  serviceable  condition  again. 

During  the  month  of  May  several  attempts  to  land 
supplies  for  the  Cubans  in  arms  had  been  made.  On 
May  ii  the  transport  steamer  Gussie  left  Key  West 
laden  with  seven  thousand  rifles  and  a  large  quantity  of 
ammunition  brought  from  Tampa,  the  expedition  being 
under  the  charge  of  Captain  J.  H.  Dorst,  of  the  cavalry 
arm,  who  took  with  him  over  one  hundred  men  of  the 
First  Infantry  and  ten  Cuban  scouts.  The  approach  of 
the  expedition  was  amply  heralded  to  the  Spaniards  by 
the  newspaper  correspondents,  who  gave  minute  descrip 
tions  of  the  purpose  and  cargo  and  the  probable  landing- 
point  of  the  Gussie.  This  information  was  duly  trans 
mitted  to  Havana,  and  preparations  were  made  to  give 
the  transport  a  warm  reception. 

After  a  rough  voyage  the  Gussie  was  met  off  the 
Cuban  coast  by  the  gunboats  Wasp  and  Manning,  which 
escorted  her  in.  The  selected  place  of  landing  was  at 
Cabanas,  province  of  Pinar  del  Rio  ;  but  as  the  shore 
was  approached,  a  large  body  of  Spanish  soldiers  ap 
peared  and  opened  fire  on  the  vessels.  The  gunboats 
replied,  the  men  being  landed  under  cover  of  their  guns. 
The  Spaniards  drew  back,  but  opened  fire  again  from 
their  works  and  from  the  woods,  maintaining  their  posi- 


198  THE  WAR   WITH    SPAIN. 

tion  with  such  energy  that  the  Americans  found  it  ne 
cessary  to  withdraw. 

The  failure  of  this  expedition  had  an  important  result. 
It  was  evidently  due  to  the  publicity  which  had  been 
given  to  the  movements  of  the  vessel,  and  in  consequence 
a  rigid  censorship  of  newspaper  messages  was  estab 
lished,  no  despatch  being  allowed  to  go  over  the  wires 
until  it  had  passed  under  the  blue  pencil  of  the  censor. 
Anticipated  movements  were  no  longer  heralded  to  the 
world,  and  much  greater  secrecy  afterwards  surrounded 
military  and  naval  movements.  Conjectures  were  printed 
freely  enough  :  no  objection  was  made  to  them  if  they 
did  not  touch  too  closely  on  the  truth,  as  their  effect 
could  be  but  to  set  the  enemy  astray. 

On  May  21  another  expedition  set  sail,  this  time  on 
the  steamer  Florida,  it  being  under  Captain  Dorst,  as 
before.  It  comprised  nearly  four  hundred  men,  three 
hundred  of  them  being  Cubans,  the  latter  under  the 
command  of  Colonel  Jose  Lacret,  a  dashing  Cuban 
leader.  It  brought  with  it  a  pack-train  of  seventy-five 
mules  and  twenty-five  horses  ;  its  stores  consisting  of 
seven  thousand  rifles  and  two  million  rounds  of  ammuni 
tion  for  General  Garcia' s  army.  The  landing  was  made 
at  Point  Banes  without  interruption,  though  a  body  of 
Spanish  soldiers  and  two  gunboats  were  known  to  be 
within  a  few  miles.  The  Florida  spent  three  days  in  the 
harbor,  landing  all  her  stores,  aided  by  insurgents,  who 
eagerly  helped  in  the  work.  And  with  them  came  some 
three  hundred  half-starved  pacificos,  who  earnestly  lent 
their  assistance  in  exchange  for  a  little  food.  The  rifle- 
cases  were  opened  and  their  contents  distributed  among 
the  men  and  loaded  on  pack-animals,  the  procession  then 
joyfully  setting  out  with  its  treasures  for  the  mountains.. 


CHAPTER  XL 

THE  HEROES  OF  THE  MERRIMAC. 

ABOUT  the  hour  of  three  in  the  morning  of  June  3,  a 
craft  that  loomed  large  through  the  darkness  left  the 
side  of  the  flag-ship  of  the  American  squadron  before 
Santiago  and  sailed  straight  for  the  throat  of  the  narrow 
channel  leading  to  the  beleaguered  city.  On  board 
were  eight  men,  apparently  devoted  to  death,  yet  all  of 
them  eager  volunteers.  Below  decks  a  series  of  torpe 
does  were  ranged  along  the  sides  of  the  ship,  prepared 
to  blow  it  into  an  utter  wreck  when  the  proper  moment 
came.  As  for  the  safety  of  the  crew,  that  had  been  a 
secondary  consideration.  Death  was  likely  to  be  their 
lot,  but  they  offered  their  lives  in  their  country's  service 
when  they  went  on  that  perilous  enterprise,  and  were 
ready  to  do  and  dare  all  that  might  be  demanded  of 
them.  The  vessel  was  the  collier  Merrimac  ;  her  crew 
consisted  of  Richmond  P.  Hobson,  Assistant  Naval  Con 
structor,  and  seven  volunteer  seamen  ;  their  purpose 
was  to  seal  up  the  Spanish  fleet  effectually  in  Santiago 
harbor. 

How  best  to  deal  with  Cervera  and  his  ships  had  been 
a  matter  of  much  concern.  Commodore  Schley  had 
drawn  the  fire  of  the  Spanish  forts  and  discovered  that 
an  attempt  to  take  his  fleet  into  the  harbor  over  the 
mines  and  in  face  of  the  batteries  was  likely  to  prove 
ruinous.  There  was  some  thought  of  attempting  to  ex 
plode  the  mines  by  the  use  of  the  dynamite  projectiles 

199 


200  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

of  the  Vesuvius,  but  the  result  of  this  was  doubtful. 
The  ships  would  have  to  enter  single  file,  and  the  sinking 
of  one  of  them  would  block  the  channel  to  the  others. 
At  this  juncture  Lieutenant  Hobson  suggested  that  it 
would  be  better  to  sink  a  useless  hulk  than  a  battle-ship. 
If  the  Spanish  ships  could  not  be  reached,  they  might  be 
kept  where  they  were.  With  the  fleet  was  the  large 
collier  Merrimac,  bought  by  the  government  at  a  high 
price,  yet  practically  worthless.  She  could  be  put  to 
no  better  service  than  to  block  up  the  channel.  The 
Spanish  fleet  was  "bottled  up"  in  Santiago  harbor. 
The  Merrimac  could  be  placed  as  a  "  cork  in  the  neck 
of  the  bottle,"  and  Hobson  volunteered  to  be  the  man 
for  the  work. 

Admiral  Sampson  hesitated  to  send  men  to  what 
seemed  likely  to  be  certain  death,  but  the  brave  lieu 
tenant's  enthusiasm  finally  won  his  consent,  and  the 
daring  enterprise  was  determined  upon.  The  Merrimac 
was  brought  from  the  side  of  the  Massachusetts,  to  which 
she  had  been  delivering  coal,  and  on  the  day  and  night 
of  June  i  crews  from  the  New  York  and  Brooklyn  were 
kept  busy  in  preparing  her  for  her  final  service.  A 
heavy  weight  in  coal  was  still  on  board,  but  that  was 
left  to  aid  in  her  speedy  sinking,  after  her  sides  had 
been  torn  open  by  the  torpedoes  arranged  for  that  pur 
pose.  The  night  was  well  advanced  towards  morning 
before  the  work  was  completed  and  the  Merrimac  ready 
for  her  task. 

When  the  news  of  the  intended  expedition  passed 
through  the  fleet,  with  word  that  volunteers  were  wanted 
for  the  desperate  enterprise,  it  seemed  as  if  half  the  men 
in  service  were  eager  to  take  part.  The  six  men  asked 
for  could  easily  have  been  extended  into  a  ship's  crew. 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  201 

More  than  two  hundred  men  on  the  New  York  offered 
their  services.  The  Iowa  signalled  that  she  had  one 
hundred  and  forty  volunteers.  Similar  responses  came 
from  the  other  ships.  The  junior  officers  were  wildly 
eager  to  take  part.  There  was  bitter  disappointment  in 
many  faces  when  Hobson  announced  his  choice,  consist 
ing  of  Daniel  Montague,  chief  master-at-arms  of  the 
New  York  ;  George  Charette,  gunner's  mate  of  the  same 
vessel ;  J.  C.  Murphy,  a  coxswain  of  the  Iowa,  and  three 
of  the  crew  of  the  Merrimac,  Oscar  Deignan,  John  P. 
Phillips,  and  John  Kelly.  When  the  expedition  finally 
started,  there  was  another  man  on  board,  H.  Clausen,  a 
coxswain  of  the  New  York,  a  stowaway  for  the  perilous 
enterprise. 

It  was  4.30  A.M.  when  Admiral  Sampson  finally  left 
the  Merrimac,  after  a  final  inspection  of  the  work  done. 
Day  was  already  dawning  in  the  eastern  sky,  and  to 
most  of  those  within  view  the  hour  seemed  too  late.  It 
certainly  seemed  so  to  the  admiral ;  yet  to  the  general 
surprise  the  collier  was  seen  to  be  in  motion,  and  a  cry 
arose,  ' '  She  is  going  in  !' ' 

At  this  cry,  Admiral  Sampson  seized  the  megaphone, 
and  hailed  the  torpedo-boat  Porter,  which  lay  near  at 
hand.  "Porter,  there!  Tell  the  Merrimac  to  return 
immediately." 

The  Merrimac  was  headed  directly  towards  the  throat 
of  the  channel.  The  Porter  darted  after  her,  smoke 
pouring  from  her  stacks.  Darkness  had  vanished,  and 
all  eyes  watched  the  swift  little  craft  as  she  flew  in  the 
wake  of  the  big  collier.  They  were  both  within  range 
of  the  Spanish  guns  when  the  Porter  darted  across  the 
bows  of  the  Merrimac,  heading  her  off.  A  sigh  of  relief 
went  up  ;  to  venture  under  the  Spanish  guns  in  full  day- 


202  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

light  seemed  fatal  temerity.  Yet  the  Porter  was  seen 
returning,  while  the  Merrimac  held  her  place,  Hobson 
signalling  for  permission  to  go  on.  He  thought  he  could 
do  it.  The  admiral  displayed  a  peremptory  order  to 
return,  and  the  lumbering  collier  slowly  came  back. 

The  2d  of  June  passed  wearily  for  the  men,  whose 
nerves  were  strung  to  high  tension  for  the  perilous  task, 
and  at  about  three  o'  clock  in  the  morning  of  the  3d  the 
devoted  vessel  again  got  under  weigh,  heading  through 
the  darkness  for  the  harbor  and  hoping  to  get  well  in 
before  being  seen.  Not  a  light  was  shown,  and  it  needed 
no  small  skill  to  hit  the  narrow  channel  squarely  in  the 
gloom.  Clouds  covered  the  moon  as  the  dark  vessel 
stole  in  towards  the  coast,  heading  eastward,  while  in 
the  rear  followed  a  steam  launch  from  the  New  York, 
manned  by  Cadet  ].  W.  Powell  and  four  men,  ready  to 
pick  up  any  member  of  the  Merrimac' s  crew  who  should 
escape. 

From  the  deck  of  the  New  York  nothing  could  be 
seen  of  the  collier  after  she  passed  under  the  shadow  of 
the  hills.  All  eyes  were  anxiously  peering  into  the 
gloom  and  all  ears  were  alert  for  a  sound,  but  for  a  time 
silence  and  darkness  prevailed.  Then  the  gloom  was 
broken  by  a  flash  from  Morro  Castle,  and  the  sound  of  a 
distant  gun  boomed  across  the  waves.  Other  flashes 
followed  from  the  battery  opposite,  and  for  about  twenty 
minutes  flash  succeeded  flash  rapidly  in  the  narrow 
space.  The  Merrimac  was  meeting  her  doom.  At  6. 15 
A.M.  Powell  and  the  launch  returned,  followed  by  spite 
ful  but  ill-aimed  shots  from  the  Spanish  guns.  The 
brave  cadet  had  gone  directly  under  the  batteries  in  the 
hope  of  picking  up  some  of  the  Merrimac' s  men,  but 
returned  disappointed.  Hobson  and  his  brave  crew  had 


Copyright,  1898,  by  Ark  ell  Publishing  Company 

LIEUTENANT    HOBSON    ON    THE    MERRIMAC 


THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN.  203 

gone  to  the  depths  in  their  sinking  ship  or  were  prison 
ers  in  Spanish  hands.  The  launch  had  followed  the 
Merrimac  until  it  had  seen  her  headed  squarely  in  for 
the  harbor,  the  first  shot  being  fired  when  the  collier 
was  about  two  hundred  yards  from  the  entrance.  After 
that  the  firing  rapidly  increased,  and  the  smoke,  which 
hung  heavily,  hid  the  vessel  from  view.  Then  came  the 
explosion  of  the  torpedoes.  Powell  waited  till  full  day 
under  the  cliffs,  and  before  leaving  saw  a  spar  of  the 
Merrimac  rising  out  of  the  water  of  the  channel.  The 
sinking  had  been  a  success,  whatever  the  fate  of  the 
men. 

For  the  rest  of  the  story  we  must  turn  to  Lieutenant 
Hobson' s  narrative,  given  a  month  later.  His  purpose 
had  been  to  take  the  Merrimac  into  the  channel  past  the 
Estrella  battery  and  sink  her  in  the  narrowest  part  of 
the  passage,  dropping  the  anchor  and  handling  the 
rudder  so  as  to  turn  her  athwart  the  stream.  She  was 
longer  than  the  channel's  breadth,  and  it  was  hoped  to 
close  it  up  completely.  When  the  proper  point  was 
reached,  Hobson  proposed  to  stop  the  engines,  drop  the 
anchors,  put  the  helm  hard  aport,  open  the  sea  connec 
tions,  and  touch  off  the  torpedoes,  of  which  ten  lay  on 
the  port-side  of  the  ship,  each  containing  eighty-two 
pounds  of  gunpowder,  and  the  whole  so  connected  that 
they  could  be  fired  in  train.  Two  men  were  below,  one 
to  reverse  the  engines,  the  other  to  break  open  the  sea 
connections  with  a  sledge-hammer.  The  men  on  deck 
were  to  drop  the  anchor  and  set  the  helm.  Then 
Hobson  would  touch  the  button  setting  off  the  torpedoes, 
and  all  were  to  leap  overboard  and  swim  to  the  dingy 
that  was  towed  astern,  and  in  which  they  hoped  to 
escape. 


204  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

This  plan  worked  fairly  well,  and  would  have  been 
completely  successful  but  for  one  or  two  contingencies 
which  seriously  affected  the  result.  The  narrow  channel 
was  entered  at  about  the  hour  of  three,  the  Merrimac 
steaming  in  under  the  guns  of  the  Morro  through  a  dense 
darkness  and  a  stillness  like  that  of  death.  Silently  on 
ward  she  moved,  but  the  Spanish  were  on  the  alert. 
The  stillness  was  broken  by  the  wash  of  a  small  picket- 
boat  that  approached  from  the  shore  and  ran  under  the 
Merrimac' s  stern,  firing  several  shots  at  the  suspicious 
craft.  One  of  these  carried  away  the  rudder,  and  put 
an  end  to  the  project  of  steering  the  ship  athwart  the 
channel.  Another  perhaps  wrecked  the  dingy  in  tow. 

The  remainder  of  the  adventure  was  highly  exciting. 
The  picket- boat  hastened  to  give  the  alarm,  and  in  a 
brief  time  the  guns  of  the  shore  batteries,  followed  by 
those  of  the  ships  in  the  harbor,  were  pouring  their  fire 
upon  the  dark  hulk.  The  Spaniards  thought  that  an 
American  battle-ship  was  trying  to  force  its  way  into  the 
port,  and  did  not  know  but  that  the  whole  fleet  was  fol 
lowing  in  its  train.  The  Merrimac  drove  onward  at  her 
full  speed,  trembling  violently  as  a  submarine  mine  went 
off  harmlessly  in  her  wake.  The  deep  gloom  and  her 
rapid  motion  saved  her  from  destruction. 

At  length  the  desired  position  was  reached.  At  Hob- 
son' s  signal  the  engines  were  reversed,  the  anchor  was 
dropped,  and  the  helm  set.  To  his  disappointment,  the 
ship  refused  to  answer  her  helm.  Only  then  did  he 
learn  that  the  rudder  had  been  lost.  The  plan  of  setting 
her  lengthwise  across  the  channel  had  failed  and  the 
final  task  remained.  Hobson  touched  the  electric  but 
ton  connected  with  the  torpedoes,  and,  as  a  sullen  roar 
broke  out  beneath  them  and  the  ship  heavily  lurched 


THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN.  205 

and  rolled,  the  men,  who  had  stripped  to  their  under 
clothing  to  facilitate  swimming,  leaped  over  the  side. 
Some  of  them  were  thrown  over  the  rail  by  the  shock 
and  the  lurching  of  the  ship.  Down  she  went  with  a 
surge  at  the  bow,  loud  cheers  from  the  forts  and  ships 
greeting  her  as  she  sank.  The  defenders  thought  they 
had  sent  to  the  depths  one  of  the  American  ships-of- 
war. 

The  dingy  being  wrecked,  the  only  resource  of  the 
fugitives  was  an  old  catamaran  which  at  the  last  moment 
had  been  placed  on  the  collier' s  deck.  This  float  lay  on 
the  roof  of  the  midship  house,  and,  that  it  should  not 
be  lost  in  the  suction  made  by  the  sinking  ship,  it  had 
been  tied  to  the  taffrail,  giving  it  slack  line  enough  to 
let  it  float  loose  after  the  ship  had  sunk  into  her  resting- 
place. 

In  continuation  of  our  narrative,  we  cannot  do  better 
than  quote  from  Lieutenant  Hobson,  giving  his  graphic 
account  of  the  thrilling  experiences  of  himself  and  men 
after  their  plunge  into  the  waters  of  the  channel : 

* '  I  swam  away  from  the  ship  as  soon  as  I  struck  the 
water,  but  I  could  feel  the  eddies  drawing  me  backward 
in  spite  of  all  I  could  do.  That  did  not  last  very  long, 
however,  and,  as  soon  as  I  felt  the  tugging  cease,  I 
turned  and  struck  out  for  the  float,  which  I  could  see 
dimly  bobbing  up  and  down  over  the  sunken  hull. 

"The  Merrimac's  masts  were  plainly  visible,  and  I 
could  see  the  heads  of  my  seven  men  as  they  followed 
my  example  and  made  for  the  float  also.  We  had  ex 
pected,  of  course,  that  the  Spaniards  would  investigate 
the  wreck,  but  we  had  no  idea  that  they  would  be  at  it 
as  quickly  as  they  were.  Before  we  could  get  to  the 
float,  several  row-boats  and  launches  came  around  the 


206  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

bluff  from  inside  the  harbor.  They  had  officers  on 
board  and  armed  marines  as  well,  and  they  searched 
that  passage,  rowing  backward  and  forward,  until  the 
next  morning.  It  was  only  by  good  luck  that  we  got 
to  the  float  at  all,  for  they  were  upon  us  so  quickly  that 
we  had  barely  concealed  ourselves  when  a  boat  with 
quite  a  large  party  on  board  was  right  beside  us. 

' '  Unfortunately,  we  thought  then,  but  it  turned  out 
afterwards  that  nothing  more  fortunate  than  that  could 
have  happened  to  us,  the  rope  with  which  we  had  se 
cured  the  float  to  the  ship  was  too  short  to  allow  it  to 
swing  free,  and  when  we  reached  it  we  found  that  one 
of  the  pontoons  was  entirely  out  of  the  water  and  the 
other  one  was  submerged.  Had  the  raft  lain  flat  on  the 
water  we  could  not  have  got  under  it,  and  would  have 
had  to  climb  up  on  it,  to  be  an  excellent  target  for  the 
first  party  of  marines  that  arrived.  As  it  was,  we  could 
get  under  the  raft,  and,  by  putting  our  hands  through 
the  crevices  between  the  slats  which  formed  its  deck,  we 
could  hold  our  heads  out  of  water  and  still  be  unseen. 
That  is  what  we  did,  and  all  night  long  we  stayed  there 
with  our  noses  and  mouths  barely  out  of  the  water. 

' '  None  of  us  expected  to  get  out  of  the  affair  alive, 
but  luckily  the  Spaniards  did  not  think  of  the  apparently 
damaged,  half-sunken  raft  floating  about  beside  the 
wreck.  They  came  to  within  a  cable' s  length  of  us  at 
intervals  of  only  a  few  minutes  all  night.  We  could 
hear  their  words  distinctly,  and  even  in  the  darkness 
could  distinguish  an  occasional  glint  of  light  on  the  rifle- 
barrels  of  the  marines  and  on  the  lace  of  the  officers' 
uniforms.  We  were  afraid  to  speak  above  a  whisper, 
and  for  a  good  while,  in  fact  whenever  they  were  near 
us,  we  breathed  as  easily  as  we  could.  I  ordered  my 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  207 

men  not  to  speak  unless  to  address  me,  and  with  one 
exception  they  obeyed. 

' '  After  we  had  been  there  an  hour  or  two  the  water, 
which  we  found  rather  warm  at  first,  began  to  get  cold, 
and  my  fingers  ached  where  the  wood  was  pressing  into 
them.  The  clouds,  which  were  running  before  a  pretty 
stiff  breeze  when  we  went  in,  blew  over,  and  then  by  the 
starlight  we  could  see  the  boats  when  they  came  out  of 
the  shadows  of  the  cliffs  on  either  side,  and  even  when 
we  could  not  see  them  we  knew  that  they  were  still  near, 
because  we  could  hear  very  plainly  the  splash  of  the  oars 
and  the  grinding  of  the  oarlocks. 

"  Our  teeth  began  to  chatter  before  very  long,  and  I 
was  in  constant  fear  that  the  Spaniards  would  hear  us 
when  they  came  close.  It  was  so  still  that  the  chatter 
ing  sound  seemed  to  us  as  loud  as  a  hammer,  but  the 
Spaniards'  ears  were  not  sharp  enough  to  hear  it.  We 
could  hear  sounds  from  the  shore  almost  as  distinctly  as 
if  we  had  been  there,  we  were  so  close  to  the  surface  of 
the  water,  which  is  an  excellent  conductor,  and  the  voices 
of  the  men  in  the  boats  sounded  as  clear  as  a  bell.  My 
men  tried  to  keep  their  teeth  still,  but  it  was  hard 
work,  and  not  attended  with  any  great  success  at  the 
best. 

4 '  We  all  knew  that  we  would  be  shot  if  discovered  by 
an  ordinary  seaman  or  a  marine,  and  I  ordered  my  men 
not  to  stir,  as  the  boats  having  officers  on  board  kept 
well  in  the  distance.  One  of  my  men  disobeyed  orders 
and  started  to  swim  ashore,  and  I  had  to  call  him  back. 
He  obeyed  at  once,  but  my  voice  seemed  to  create  some 
commotion  among  the  boats,  and  several  of  them  ap 
peared  close  beside  us  before  the  disturbance  in  the 
water  made  by  the  man  swimming  had  disappeared. 


208  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

We  thought  it  was  all  up  with  us  then,  but  the  boats 
went  away  into  the  shadows  again. 

"There  was  much  speculation  among  the  Spaniards 
as  to  what  the  ship  was  and  what  we  intended  to  do 
next.  I  could  understand  many  of  the  words,  and 
gathered  from  what  I  heard  that  the  officers  had  taken 
in  the  situation  at  once,  but  were  astounded  at  the  au 
dacity  of  the  thing.  The  boats,  I  also  learned,  were 
from  the  fleet,  and  I  felt  better,  because  I  had  more 
faith  in  a  Spanish  sailor  than  I  had  in  a  Spanish  soldier. 

' '  When  daylight  came  a  steam  launch  full  of  officers 
and  marines  came  out  from  behind  the  cliff  that  hid  the 
fleet  and  harbor  and  advanced  towards  us.  All  the  men 
on  board  were  looking  curiously  in  our  direction.  They 
did  not  see  us.  Knowing  that  some  one  of  rank  must  be 
on  board,  I  waited  until  the  launch  was  quite  close  and 
hailed  her. 

"My  voice  produced  the  utmost  consternation  on 
board.  Every  one  sprang  up,  the  marines  crowded 
to  the  bow,  and  the  launch's  engines  were  reversed. 
She  not  only  stopped,  but  she  backed  off  until  nearly  a 
quarter  of  a  mile  away,  where  she  stayed.  The  marines 
stood  ready  to  fire  at  the  word  of  command  when  we 
clambered  out  from  under  the  float.  There  were  ten  of 
the  marines,  and  they  would  have  fired  in  a  minute  had 
they  not  been  restrained. 

' '  I  swam  towards  the  launch  and  then  she  started 
towards  me.  I  called  out  in  Spanish :  '  Is  there  an 
officer  on  board  ?'  An  officer  answered  in  the  affirma 
tive,  and  then  I  shouted  in  Spanish  again  :  *  I  have 
seven  men  to  surrender.'  I  continued  swimming,  and 
was  seized  and  pulled  out  of  the  water. 

"As  I  looked  up  when  they  were  dragging  me  into 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  209 

the  launch,  I  saw  that  it  was  Admiral  Cervera  himself 
who  had  hold  of  me.  He  looked  at  me  rather  dubiously 
at  first,  because  I  had  been  down  in  the  engine-room  of 
the  Merrimac,  where  I  got  covered  with  oil,  and  that, 
with  the  soot  and  coal-dust,  made  my  appearance  most 
disreputable.  I  had  put  on  my  officer's  belt  before 
sinking  the  Merrimac,  as  a  means  of  identification,  no 
matter  what  happened  to  me,  and  when  I  pointed  to  it 
in  the  launch  the  admiral  understood  and  seemed  satis 
fied.  The  first  words  he  said  to  me  when  he  learned 
who  I  was  were  '  Bienvenido  sea  usted, '  which  means 
*  You  are  welcome. '  My  treatment  by  the  naval  officers 
and  that  of  my  men  also  was  courteous  all  the  time  that 
I  was  a  prisoner.  They  heard  my  story,  as  much  of  it 
as  I  could  tell,  but  sought  to  learn  nothing  more. 

' '  Sharks  ?  No,  we  did  not  have  time  to  think  of 
them  that  night,"  said  Lieutenant  Hobson  in  reply  to  a 
question.  ' '  We  saw  a  great  many  things,  though,  and 
went  through  a  great  many  experiences.  When  we 
started  out  from  the  fleet  I  tied  to  my  belt  a  flask  of 
medicated  water,  supplied  to  me  by  my  ship's  surgeon. 
The  frequency  with  which  we  all  felt  thirsty  on  the  short 
run  into  the  passage  and  the  dryness  of  my  mouth  and 
lips  made  me  believe  that  I  was  frightened.  The  men 
felt  the  same,  and  all  the  way  the  flask  went  from  hand 
to  hand.  Once  I  felt  my  pulse  to  see  if  I  was  frightened, 
but  to  my  surprise  I  found  it  normal.  Later  we  forgot 
all  about  it,  and  when  we  got  into  the  water  there  was 
no  need  for  the  flask. ' ' 

The  prisoners  were  taken  ashore  and  placed  in  a  cell 
in  Morro  Castle,  the  solid  doors  of  the  cell  being  kept 
closed  for  an  hour  or  two,  but  afterwards  left  open  by 
order  of  the  admiral.  This  gave  them  a  view  of  the 

14 


210  THE   WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

harbor,  the  city,  and  the  Spanish  fleet,  while  from  the 
windows  they  could  see  and  hear  the  shells  during  the 
bombardment  that  took  place  some  days  afterwards. 
Hobson's  description  of  the  sounds  made  by  these  shells 
is  well  worth  quoting. 

"The  windows  in  the  side  of  our  cell,"  he  says, 
1 '  opened  west  across  the  harbor  entrance,  and  we  could 
hear  and  see  the  shells  as  they  struck.  We  knew  that 
we  would  not  be  fired  upon,  as  word  had  gone  out  as  to 
where  we  were,  so  we  sat  at  the  windows  and  watched 
the  shells.  Each  one  sang  a  different  tune  as  it  went 
by.  The  smaller  shells  moaned  or  screeched  as  they 
passed,  but  the  1 3-inch  shells  left  a  sound  behind  them 
like  that  of  the  sudden  and  continued  smashing  of  a 
huge  pane  of  glass.  The  crackling  was  sharp  and 
metallic,  something  like  sharp  thunder  without  the  roar, 
and  the  sound  continued,  but  decreased,  after  the  shell 
had  gone.  In  many  instances  the  shells  struck  project 
ing  points  of  rock,  and,  ricocheting,  spun  end  over  end 
across  the  hills.  The  sound  they  made  as  they  struck 
again  and  again  was  like  the  short,  sharp  puffs  of  a 
locomotive  starting  with  a  heavy  train. ' ' 

Meanwhile,  on  board  the  fleet  the  escape  of  the  ad 
venturers  was  unknown,  and  dread  of  their  destruction 
prevailed.  This  feeling  of  depression  was  put  an  end 
to  by  the  chivalry  of  Admiral  Cervera,  who  sent  Captain 
Ovideo,  his  chief  of  staff,  to  the  fleet  under  a  flag  of 
truce  to  acquaint  the  American  admiral  with  their  safety 
and  to  make  an  offer  for  their  exchange.  Captain  Ovideo 
was  received  by  Admiral  Sampson  on  the  New  York, 
and,  after  salutes  had  been  exchanged,  delivered  the 
following  message  : 

*  *  Admiral  Cervera,  the  commander  of   the  Spanish 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  211 

fleet,  is  most  profoundly  impressed  with  the  brilliant 
courage  shown  by  the  men  who  sank  the  steamer  Mer- 
rimac  in  our  harbor,  and  in  admiration  of  their  courage 
he  has  directed  me  to  say  to  their  countrymen  that  they 
are  alive,  and,  with  the  exception  of  two  of  the  men 
who  were  slightly  hurt,  they  are  uninjured.  They  are 
now  prisoners  of  war,  and  are  being  well  cared  for,  and 
will  be  treated  with  every  consideration." 

The  captain  was  given  a  courteous  reception  in  the 
cabin  of  the  New  York,  and,  after  an  interview  on  the 
subject  of  exchanging  the  prisoners,  returned  with  money 
and  clothing  sent  them  by  Admiral  Sampson.  The 
courtesy  of  the  Spanish  admiral  sent  a  thrill  of  admira 
tion  throughout  the  fleet,  and  throughout  the  country 
when  it  became  known,  and  insured  the  gallant  Spaniard 
a  kind  reception  if  the  fortune  of  war  should  deliver  him 
into  American  hands. 

The  brave  Cervera  estimated  the  boldness  of  the  ex 
ploit  at  its  full  value,  and  treated  the  captives  with  great 
consideration  while  they  remained  in  his  hands.  For 
some  time  the  fleet  desisted  from  firing  on  the  Morro, 
fearing  that  the  prisoners  might  be  injured.  They  were 
kept  there,  however,  but  four  days,  when  Cervera  turned 
them  over  to  General  Linares,  commander  of  the  Span 
ish  forces  in  the  city,  who  was  much  less  favorably  dis 
posed  towards  them. 

In  regard  to  the  estimation  in  the  navy  of  this  most 
daring  deed,  we  may  quote  from  a  remark  of  Com 
modore  Schley  to  a  correspondent  of  the  Associated 
Press.  Pointing  towards  the  gray  walls  of  Morro  Castle, 
where  Lieutenant  Hobson  and  his  brave  men  were  said  to 
be  incarcerated,  the  commodore  spoke  as  follows  :  "  His 
tory  does  not  record  an  act  of  finer  heroism  than  that  of 


212  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

the  gallant  men  who  are  prisoners  over  there.  I  watched 
the  Merrimac  as  she  made  her  way  to  the  entrance  of 
the  harbor,  and  my  heart  sank  as  I  saw  the  perfect  hell 
of  fire  that  fell  on  the  devoted  men.  I  did  not  think  it 
was  possible  one  of  them  could  have  gone  through  it 
alive.  They  went  into  the  jaws  of  death.  It  was 
Balaklava  over  again  without  the  means  of  defence  which 
the  Light  Brigade  had.  Hobson  led  a  forlorn  hope, 
without  the  power  to  cut  his  way  out.  But  fortune  once 
more  favored  the  brave,  and  I  hope  he  will  have  the 
recognition  and  promotion  he  deserves.  His  name  will 
live  as  long  as  the  heroes  of  the  world  are  remembered. ' ' 
This  feeling  of  the  people  was  shared  by  the  govern 
ment,  and  steps  were  at  once  taken  to  reward  the  gallant 
lieutenant  and  his  men  by  promotion.  Efforts  were 
made  for  their  speedy  release  and  to  learn  what  treat 
ment  they  were  receiving.  Anxiety  on  this  last  point 
was  set  at  rest  by  a  telegram  from  Mr.  W.  F.  Ramsden, 
the  British  consul  at  Santiago,  dated  June  10,  in  reply  to 
one  from  the  New  York  Herald.  It  said  : 

"Replying  to  your  telegram,  Hobson  and  men  well 
cared  for  by  authorities.  Have  myself  just  seen  him. 

"RAMSDEN." 

Mr.  Ramsden,  in  fact,  was  very  kind  to  the  prisoners, 
visiting  them  on  several  occasions  and  supplying  them 
with  food  of  a  superior  kind  to  that  provided  by  the 
authorities.  Cervera  also  visited  them,  and,  aside  from 
the  discomfort  of  being  held  as  prisoners  in  a  half-starved 
city,  they  received  very  considerate  treatment. 

The  story  of  their  release  comes  later  in  point  of  time. 
It  may,  however,  be  properly  given  here  as  a  close  to 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  213 

the  narrative  of  their  adventure.  Cervera's  promise  of 
a  speedy  exchange  was  not  concurred  in  by  the  Spanish 
authorities  ;  difficulties  were  thrown  in  the  way,  and  it 
was  not  until  after  July  i,  when  the  situation  had  mate 
rially  changed  at  Santiago,  that  a  consent  to  the  exchange 
was  given.  A  Spanish  lieutenant  and  fourteen  privates 
were  offered  on  the  American  side  in  exchange  for  Hob- 
son  and  his  seven  men. 

On  July  7  the  exchange  took  place.  At  that  date 
Santiago  was  beleaguered  by  an  American  army  and 
Admiral  Cervera  a  prisoner  on  the  American  fleet,  his 
proud  squadron  being  laid  in  ruin  on  the  Cuban  coast. 
Leaving  the  Reina  Mercedes  hospital,  on  the  outskirts 
of  Santiago,  where  they  had  been  confined,  in  charge  of 
Major  Irles,  a  Spanish  staff- officer,  the  captives  were 
conducted  to  a  meeting-place  between  the  lines,  Hobson 
on  horseback,  his  men,  in  new  uniforms,  following  on 
foot.  Colonel  John  Jacob  Astor  and  Lieutenant  Miloy 
conducted  the  Spanish  prisoners.  The  choice  of  two 
lieutenants  was  offered,  and  Adolfo  Aries,  of  the  aristo 
cratic  First  Provisional  Regiment  of  Barcelona,  was 
chosen  in  exchange  for  Lieutenant  Hobson. 

As  the  gallant  eight  came  up  the  trail  leading  to  the 
American  lines  through  an  avenue  of  palms  that  arched 
from  the  high  banks  across  the  road,  the  soldiers  stood 
in  reverent  silence,  baring  their  heads  as  the  hero  ap 
proached,  while  the  band  struck  up  * '  The  Star-Spangled 
Banner. ' '  Then  came  a  cry  for  cheers  and  a  welcoming 
roar  from  all  the  men  in  sight,  the  Rough  Riders  break 
ing  into  a  cowboy  yell.  The  men  were  past  restraint, 
and  as  Hobson  rode  slowly  through  the  lines,  the  ranks 
were  everywhere  broken,  and  men  rushed  eagerly  to 
grasp  him  and  his  men  by  the  hand. 


214  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

It  was  the  same  all  the  way  to  Siboney, — men  shouting, 
cheering,  rushing  to  shake  hands,  fairly  wild  with  excite 
ment.  A  short  distance  from  the  shore  lay  the  New 
York,  waiting  to  take  them  on  board.  There  the  en 
thusiasm  was  equally  great,  the  men  growing  delirious 
with  delight  when  Hobson  set  foot  on  deck.  Captain 
Chadwick  had  escorted  him  to  his  vessel,  and  there 
Admiral  Sampson  was  one  of  the  first  to  welcome  him, 
almost  embracing  him  in  the  warmth  of  his  greeting, 
while  the  officers  of  the  ship  were  no  less  earnest  and 
ardent  in  their  reception  of  their  gallant  comrade. 

The  returning  hero  seemed  astonished  at  this  tumult 
uous  applause.  Locked  in  a  Spanish  prison,  he  knew 
nothing  of  how  his  fellow-countrymen  regarded  his 
exploit,  which,  as  he  modestly  remarked,  "was  not 
much  of  a  feat."  In  this  he  did  not  find  many  to  agree 
with  him.  People  thought  it  very  much  of  a  feat, 
and  days  passed  before  Hobson  was  allowed  to  sink 
quietly  back  into  the  duties  of  his  office,  his  heroic  deed 
having  passed  into  history. 


CHAPTER   XII. 

THE   FIRST   FIGHT   ON   CUBAN   SOIL. 

CAREFULLY  as  Lieutenant  Hobson's  enterprise  had 
been  managed,  and  cool  as  he  had  been  in  carrying  out 
its  every  detail,  it  proved  practically  a  failure.  The  loss 
of  the  rudder  had  rendered  it  impossible  to  handle  the 
vessel,  and  she  had  sunk  along  instead  of  across  the 
channel,  leaving  space  for  a  war-ship  to  pass  by  her  side. 
Thus  the  services  of  the  fleet  were  still  necessary  to  hold 
the  Spanish  ships  in  check,  and  none  could  be  spared 
from  the  blockade.  The  necessity  of  alertness  was  to  be 
demonstrated  before  many  weeks  by  a  startling  event. 
It  was  still  a  matter  of  doubt,  however,  whether  the 
whole  of  Admiral  Cervera's  squadron  lay  within.  Not 
all  the  ships  had  been  seen,  and  it  was  not  sure  but  that 
some  of  them  might  still  be  in  the  open  seas,  prowling 
for  prey  in  the  West  India  or  North  Atlantic  waters.  It 
was  known  that  the  torpedo-boat  destroyer  Terror  was 
still  at  large,  and  it  was  just  possible  that  others  might  be 
outside  of  Santiago  harbor.  This  question  it  was  im 
portant  to  settle  definitely. 

For  this  purpose,  Commodore  Schley,  after  his  bom 
bardment  of  the  Santiago  forts,  opened  communication 
with  the  insurgents  at  a  point  on  the  coast  about  eighteen 
miles  east  of  the  city.  They  were  asked  to  send  scouts 
to  the  vicinity  of  the  city  and  try  to  learn  the  number 
and  names  of  the  vessels  then  in  the  harbor.  On  Fri 
day,  June  3,  Lieutenant  Sharp,  of  the  Vixen,  visited  the 

215 


216  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

place  of  rendezvous  and  received  from  the  insurgents  a 
map  of  the  harbor,  showing  the  entire  Cape  Verde  fleet, 
with  the  exception  of  one  of  the  torpedo-boats.  They 
lay  at  the  upper  extremity  of  the  harbor,  under  the  guns 
of  Blanco  battery. 

This  information,  definite  as  it  appeared,  was  not  fully 
satisfactory  to  Admiral  Sampson,  who  seems  to  have 
preferred  American  to  Cuban  eyes  as  means  of  accurate 
observation.  He  therefore  despatched  Lieutenant  Blue, 
a  daring  young  officer  of  the  fleet,  on  an  enterprise 
only  second  in  peril  to  that  performed  by  Lieutenant 
Hobson.  Leaving  shipboard,  the  lieutenant  made  a 
detour  of  seventy  miles  around  the  harbor  of  Santiago, 
counting  and  inspecting  the  ships  that  lay  there  from 
commanding  points  of  observation  on  the  high  hills  sur 
rounding,  and  satisfying  himself  beyond  doubt  that  all 
the  ships  of  the  squadron,  with  the  exception  of  the 
Terror,  were  there.  This  tour  of  observation  in  a  hostile 
country  was  one  that  demanded  no  small  degree  of  cour 
age  and  resolution.  In  military  law  he  would,  if  taken, 
have  been  adjudged  a  spy,  and  in  all  probability  would 
have  been  hanged  as  one.  It  was  simply  another  in 
stance  of  that  intrepidity  which  seems  so  common  a  trait 
of  the  American  sailor  and  soldier. 

The  fact  of  the  presence  of  the  Spanish  fleet  being 
definitely  established,  the  blockade  went  on,  its  monot 
ony  broken  by  occasional  stirring  incidents.  On  the 
night  of  June  3  a  second  attempt  to  use  their  torpedoes 
against  the  blockading  ships  was  made  by  the  Spaniards. 
It  was  defeated  by  the  sharp  lookout  kept  up  on  the 
American  fleet.  Shortly  after  ten  o'clock  a  flash  of 
colored  lights  on  the  deck  of  the  New  Orleans  gave 
warning  that  an  enemy  was  in  sight.  A  second  signal 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  217 

indicated  that  a  torpedo-boat  had  been  seen.  Immedi 
ately  night  signals  flashed  around  the  six  or  seven  miles' 
circuit  of  the  blockading  squadron,  while  shots  came 
from  the  rapid-fire  battery  of  the  New  Orleans.  The 
New  York  sought  the  locality  at  full  speed,  hoping  to 
shut  off  the  daring  stranger  from  the  harbor. 

*'  A  torpedo-boat  one  point  forward  on  the  port-beam, 
sir  ;  headed  this  way,"  reported  Ensign  Mustin  to  Cap 
tain  Chadwick,  and  for  some  minutes  the  guns  of  the 
flag-ship  boomed  out  through  the  nignt.  The  Oregon, 
coming  up  to  the  eastward,  followed  with  two  shots 
from  her  big  guns.  Then  the  signal  ' '  Cease  firing' ' 
was  given.  The  search-lights  showed  no  signs  of  an 
enemy.  The  prowling  craft  had  escaped.  That  it  had 
not  been  a  false  alarm  was  proved  the  next  morning, 
when  the  torpedo-boat  Porter  found  two  loaded  torpe 
does  floating  off  shore.  They  had  evidently  been  dis 
charged  at  the  ships,  but  had  missed  their  mark.  One 
of  them  was  taken  on  board  the  Porter,  the  other  sank 
as  they  were  seeking  to  lift  it.  The  one  recovered  was 
a  14-inch  Whitehead  torpedo,  worth  about  $3500,  in 
perfect  condition,  and  calculated  to  have  sunk  any  ship 
against  which  it  struck.  The  result  added  another  to 
the  numerous  failures  in  the  attempted  use  of  torpedo- 
boats. 

A  second  bombardment  of  the  forts  at  Santiago  was 
made  on  June  7,  the  large  vessels  of  the  American  fleet 
pouring  in  a  steady  and  effective  fire  from  7.45  until 
nearly  n  A.M.  The  fleet  formed  in  double  column,  six 
miles  off  Morro  Castle,  and  steamed  slowly  along  three 
thousand  yards  off  shore,  the  Brooklyn  leading  one 
column,  followed  by  the  Marblehead,  Texas,  and  Mass 
achusetts,  and  moving  westward.  In  the  second  column, 


218  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

headed  eastward,  the  New  York  led,  the  New  Orleans, 
Yankee,  Iowa,  and  Oregon  following.  A  sharp  fire  was 
directed  against  all  the  forts  with  the  exception  of  the 
Morro,  which  was  saved  from  attack  by  the  supposed 
presence  of  Lieutenant  Hobson  and  his  men. 

The  bombardment  appeared  to  be  very  effective,  the 
Spanish  fire  weakening  until  it  ceased  entirely.  The 
Estrella  and  Catalina  batteries  seemed  to  have  particu 
larly  suffered,  while  considerable  injury  was  done  to  the 
Reina  Mercedes,  the  only  Spanish  ship  within  reach. 
Throughout  the  engagement  not  an  American  ship  was 
hit  and  no  American  was  injured.  The  Spaniards  fired 
with  their  usual  lack  of  aim,  wasting  their  projectiles  idly 
upon  the  waters  of  the  harbor.  The  attack  was  specially 
directed  against  Aguadores,  a  small  town  on  the  coast 
a  little  to  the  east  of  the  harbor  entrance.  A  fort  re 
cently  constructed  there  was  completely  wrecked,  and  a 
party  of  marines  were  landed  at  Daiquiri,  some  distance 
east  of  Aguadores,  and  near  a  station  on  the  railroad 
running  to  Santiago.  They  were  attacked  by  Spanish 
infantry  and  cavalry,  but  held  their  ground,  being  aided 
by  a  neighboring  force  of  Cuban  insurgents.  The  pur 
pose  of  this  landing  was  probably  to  hold  the  point  as  a 
landing-place  for  the  expected  troops  ;  but  the  position 
was  not  maintained. 

On  the  same  day  a  similar  movement  was  made  near 
the  mouth  of  the  fine  harbor  of  Guantanamo,  which  lies 
some  forty-five  miles  along  the  coast  east  of  Santiago 
harbor.  This  bay  is  a  very  fine  one,  the  harbor  being 
capacious  and  with  forty  feet  depth  of  water.  The 
town  lies  some  six  miles  inland  from  the  mouth  of  the 
bay.  The  Marblehead  and  the  Yankee,  under  orders 
from  Admiral  Sampson,  entered  the  lower  bay  on  the 


THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN.  219 

date  mentioned,  drove  a  Spanish  gunboat  into  the  inte 
rior  harbor,  and  silenced  the  batteries  after  a  few  minutes' 
bombardment.  On  Friday,  the  loth,  a  landing  was 
effected,  forty  marines  from  the  Oregon  going  ashore 
and  occupying  the  western  entrance  to  the  bay.  Soon 
after  the  troop-ship  Panther,  with  six  hundred  marines, 
arrived,  and  these  were  landed  without  opposition,  the 
Spanish  having  been  driven  back  by  the  fire  of  the 
Marblehead  the  day  before.  The  marines  found  evidence 
that  the  Spaniards  had  left  in  panic  haste, — watches, 
hammocks,  and  ammunition  being  left  scattered  about 
their  works.  The  landing-party,  under  command  of 
Lieutenant-Colonel  R.  W.  Huntington,  made  its  way 
up  the  rocky  hill-side  to  the  deserted  earthworks  on  top, 
and  soon  the  American  flag  was  flying  from  the  flagstaff 
of  the  captured  Spanish  camp. 

The  position  of  this  force  on  the  crest  of  the  hill  to 
which  it  had  climbed  was  an  exposed  one.  It  occupied 
a  bare  spot  surrounded  on  all  sides  by  heavy  brush,  the 
ground  descending  inward  into  a  ravine,  whose  chaparral 
offered  close  cover  to  the  Spanish  bush-fighters,  while 
the  American  camp,  outlined  on  the  bare  crest  against 
the  sky,  seemed  as  if  intended  as  a  target  for  rifle-fire 
from  below.  Only  for  the  aimless  character  of  Spanish 
marksmanship,  the  marines  must  have  suffered  severely 
for  their  incautious  temerity. 

The  guerillas  had  gathered  thickly  in  the  brush,  and 
at  five  o'clock  on  Saturday  afternoon,  the  day  after  the 
landing,  a  brisk  fire  told  of  the  presence  of  an  unseen 
foe.  It  was  answered  sharply  from  the  camp,  the  men 
sheltering  themselves  as  best  they  could  and  firing  at 
random  into  the  bushes.  The  exact  position  of  the 
enemy  could  not  be  discovered  on  account  of  their  use 


220  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

of  smokeless  powder.  This  firing  was  kept  up  all  night 
long,  ending  only  at  six  o'clock  on  Sunday  morning, 
when  reinforcements  from  the  Marblehead  joined  the 
beleaguered  troops.  The  loss  on  the  American  side  was 
small,  considering  the  advantage  in  position  of  the 
enemy,  being  but  three  men  killed  and  one  wounded. 
Among  the  killed  was  Surgeon  John  Blair  Gibbs,  son  of 
Major  Gibbs,  one  of  the  victims  of  the  Custer  massacre. 
The  loss  of  the  Spaniards  was  unknown.  Fears  were 
entertained  that  the  advance  pickets,  under  Lieutenants 
Neville  and  Shaw,  had  been  cut  off  by  the  foe ;  but  during 
the  morning  these  officers  appeared  in  camp  with  their 
thirty  men,  much  exhausted  by  their  long  term  of  picket 
duty  and  all-night  fight  with  the  enemy,  but  otherwise 
none  the  worse  for  this  arduous  service.  During  most 
of  the  time  they  had  been  surrounded  by  a  superior 
force,  but  had  firmly  held  their  ground,  inflicting  con 
siderable  damage  and  receiving  none. 

Shortly  after  midnight  a  fierce  assault  was  made  upon 
the  camp,  the  Spanish  charging  boldly  up  the  southwest 
slope.  They  were  met  by  rapid  volleys  from  the  marines 
who  encircled  the  inner  side  of  the  crest,  and  broke 
before  they  were  one-third  of  the  way  to  the  top.  Some 
of  them  came  farther  up,  and  at  points  there  was  almost 
a  hand-to-hand  struggle.  It  was  during  this  charge  that 
Surgeon  Gibbs  fell.  As  a  rule,  however,  the  Spaniards 
fought  under  cover,  creeping  up  as  close  as  they  dared 
to  the  American  line  and  delivering  their  fire  from  the 
brush.  It  was  a  mode  of  warfare  in  which  they  displayed 
an  Indian-like  skill,  and  which  they  had  long  practised 
in  their  contest  with  the  Cubans. 

On  Sunday  morning  Colonel  Huntington  decided  to 
change  the  position  of  his  camp,  the  tents  being  removed 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN.  221 

from  the  crest  and  pitched  on  the  side  of  the  hill  facing 
the  harbor,  where  they  were  under  the  protection  of  the 
guns  of  the  war-ships.  The  crest  was  given  up  to  bat 
teries  and  rifle-pits,  two  3-inch  guns  being  drawn  up  the 
hill  and  mounted  on  the  works  in  expectation  of  a  second 
attack  on  Sunday  night.  Other  guns  of  smaller  caliber 
and  two  Colt  machine-guns  were  also  mounted.  The 
looked-for  attack  began  shortly  after  dark  and  was  kept 
up  all  night,  the  firing  being  incessant,  but  not  very 
effective.  Two  of  the  marines  were  killed  and  three  in 
jured.  During  the  night  the  Spaniards  made  an  assault 
on  the  camp  on  the  hill-side,  and  the  Marblehead,  under 
the  mistaken  idea  that  the  Americans  had  been  driven 
out,  threw  several  shells  into  the  place,  fortunately  with 
out  harm.  The  attack  was  easily  repulsed  by  the  few 
marines  in  camp. 

The  night  battle  was  a  picturesque  and  striking  spec 
tacle,  tongues  of  fire  darting  from  every  bush  encircling 
the  camp,  while  the  search-lights  of  the  ships  swept  back 
and  forth  over  the  hills,  revealing  the  lurking  enemy  to 
the  marines  on  the  crest.  These  gleams  of  light  were 
accompanied  by  a  strange  variety  of  sounds,  including 
the  crack  of  the  Mauser  rifles,  the  twitter  of  the  long 
steel  bullets  overhead,  the  rattle  of  the  machine-guns,  the 
crash  of  the  field-guns  as  they  drove  their  canister  into 
the  thicket,  the  sharp  reports  of  the  rapid-fire  i -pounders 
in  the  ship  launches  below,  and  an  occasional  screech 
from  the  large  guns  of  the  Marblehead. 

Lieutenant  Neville  was  again  sent  out  on  scout  duty, 
and  attacked  a  small  stone  fort,  from  which  the  Span 
iards  were  driven  with  loss,  fifteen  dead  bodies  being 
found  within.  On  Monday  the  marines  received  an  im 
portant  reinforcement,  being  joined  by  about  sixty  Cuban 


222  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

allies,  whose  acquaintance  with  the  country  and  with  the 
Spanish  method  of  fighting  made  them  of  great  value. 
General  Garcia  had  sent  General  Rabi,  his  chief  of  staff, 
with  about  one  thousand  men,  to  occupy  Ascerraderos, 
a  village  on  the  coast  to  the  west  of  Santiago,  following 
up  this  movement  with  the  main  body  of  his  forces,  and 
sending  a  detachment  to  reinforce  the  marines. 

During  Monday  the  works  on  Crest  Hill  were  strength 
ened,  and  a  body  of  Cubans  and  marines  was  sent  to 
establish  strong  outposts  a  mile  in  advance.  This  gave 
the  battalion  a  rest  during  Monday  night,  and  the  next 
day  an  attack  was  made  on  the  Spanish  camp,  which 
scouts  had  located  at  a  point  about  four  miles  inland, 
near  the  only  well  to  be  found  for  miles  around.  A  force 
of  marines  under  Captain  Elliott  and  of  Cubans  under 
Colonel  Thomas  left  the  camp  on  Tuesday  morning,  and 
about  eleven  o'clock  caught  sight  from  a  hill-top  of  the 
Spanish  quarters  on  a  brush-covered  ridge  below.  Or 
ders  for  an  immediate  attack  were  given,  and  a  spirited 
charge  was  made,  the  troops  coming  close  up  before 
they  were  discovered  by  the  foe.  A  sharp  engagement 
followed,  the  Spaniards  resisting  for  some  twenty  min 
utes  the  onset  of  the  marines.  Then  they  broke  for  a 
thicket  in  the  rear,  the  American  bullets  pouring  into 
the  fleeing  line  with  deadly  effect.  Resistance  was  con 
tinued  until  about  3.30  P.M.,  by  which  time  the  rout 
was  complete,  when  the  assailants  returned,  burned  the 
camp  buildings,  and  destroyed  the  well  by  filling  it  up 
with  earth  and  stones.  No  other  drinking  water  was  to 
be  had  nearer  than  Guantanamo,  several  miles  away. 
An  attempt  was  made  by  Captain  Elliott  to  cut  off  the 
enemy's  retreat  by  climbing  through  cactus  and  brush 
a  high  hill  in  the  rear,  but  the  misdirected  fire  of  the 


THE  WAR   WITH  SPAIN.  223 

Dolphin  checked  this  movement  and  gave  the  Spaniards 
an  opportunity  to  escape. 

The  bodies  of  about  forty  dead  Spaniards  were  found 
in  the  vicinity  of  the  block-house  and  eighteen  prisoners 
were  taken.  The  Cubans  had  two  men  killed  and  four 
wounded,  and  the  marines  two  wounded,  while  twenty- 
three  were  overcome  by  the  intense  heat.  In  truth,  the 
heat  seemed  more  deadly  than  Spanish  bullets,  which 
were  fired  without  regard  to  aim.  This  affair  ended  the 
conflict,  the  Spanish  having  been  too  severely  punished 
to  make  any  new  assault  on  the  camp  of  the  marines. 

The  experience  of  the  marines  taught  some  useful  les 
sons.  It  showed  that  the  Spaniards  were  shrewd  and 
daring  bush-fighters,  and  that  American  camps  needed 
to  be  carefully  protected  against  night  attacks.  It  also 
proved  that  bullets  from  magazine  rifles  might  be  wasted 
at  an  extraordinary  rate  without  execution  under  the 
shades  of  night.  In  the  daylight  attacks  the  Spaniards 
had  concealed  themselves  in  the  brush  by  wearing  plan 
tain  leaves  on  their  foreheads  in  place  of  hats.  They 
also,  wearing  bark-colored  trousers  and  tying  green 
branches  round  their  waists,  had  shown  themselves  able 
to  move  slowly  across  open  spaces  without  being  de 
tected.  Another  trick  was  to  make  a  moving  screen  of 
two  or  three  large  palm  leaves,  which  formed  an  excel 
lent  disguise  in  the  chaparral,  from  which  stunted  palms 
everywhere  rose. 

The  Cuban  allies  far  surpassed  the  marines  in  detect 
ing  these  tricks,  with  which  they  were  thoroughly  fa 
miliar,  having  often  practised  them  against  the  Spaniards. 
These  men,  mostly  negroes,  were  keen-eyed  woodsmen, 
well  versed  in  bush-fighting,  in  which  they  displayed  a 
daring  that  called  forth  American  admiration.  But  they 


224  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

were  wildly  reckless  in  handling  the  magazine  rifles  with 
which  they  had  been  supplied,  and  as  wretched  in  marks 
manship  as  the  Spanish  troops. 

The  final  engagement  in  the  bay  of  Guantanamo  was 
the  shelling,  on  June  16,  of  the  fort  and  earthworks  at  Cai- 
manera,  a  town  on  the  west  side  of  the  bay  some  distance 
inward  from  the  camp  of  the  marines.  These  works  were 
demolished,  and  all  resistance  was  brought  to  an  end. 
On  the  same  day  the  fleet  made  a  third  bombardment  of 
the  forts  at  the  mouth  of  Santiago  harbor,  with  the  ex 
ception  of  the  Morro,  where  Lieutenant  Hobson  was 
supposed  to  be  confined.  The  affair  continued  for  about 
an  hour,  the  Spaniards  replying  briskly  but  wildly,  while 
in  the  end  most  of  their  guns  were  abandoned.  Not  a 
ship  was  struck  nor  a  man  hurt  on  the  American  side. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  batteries  showed  signs  of  being 
seriously  injured,  and  many  of  their  guns  appeared  to 
be  dismounted. 

The  interesting  feature  of  this  affair,  however,  was  the 
work  of  the  dynamite  boat  Vesuvius.  The  dynamite 
guns  carried  by  this  vessel  had  been  tried  with  good 
effect  on  land,  but  they  had  never  been  tested  at  sea, 
and  the  dread  that  the  gun-cotton  cartridges  might  ex 
plode  within  the  tubes  and  blow  the  vessel  to  fragments 
made  naval  officers  fearful  of  them.  In  consequence, 
the  Vesuvius  had  been  used  as  a  despatch-boat,  and 
only  on  this  occasion  was  permission  given  for  a  trial  of 
her  guns.  At  midnight  of  the  day  preceding  the  bom 
bardment  she  drew  cautiously  in  and  fired  three  of  her 
250-pound  projectiles  with  perfect  safety  to  the  vessel. 
From  two  of  these  no  report  came.  The  third  exploded 
with  terrific  violence  on  Cayo  Smith,  a  frightful  fiery 
gleam  illuminating  the  harbor.  From  the  ships  the  next 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  225 

morning  a  deep  crater  appeared  on  the  side  of  the 
island,  though  subsequent  observation  indicated  that  no 
great  harm  had  been  done.  On  June  24  the  Vesuvius 
performed  a  service  of  a  different  character,  entering 
the  harbor  at  night  and  passing  unobserved  around  the 
wreck  of  the  Merrimac.  The  result  of  the  reconnoissance 
was  to  prove  that  the  channel  had  not  been  closed,  and 
that  a  battle-ship  could  pass  in  safety  on  either  side  of 
the  sunken  collier. 

On  the  2oth  occurred  the  first  landing  of  officers  of 
the  regular  army  on  Cuban  soil.  This  was  at  Ascerra- 
deros,  twelve  miles  west  of  Santiago,  where  General 
Garcia  had  established  his  camp.  General  Shafter,  com 
mander  of  the  army  of  invasion,  with  his  staff,  landed  for 
a  conference  with  the  Cuban  general,  accompanied  by 
Admiral  Sampson  and  his  chief  of  staff.  No  soldiers  or 
sailors  were  landed,  the  escort  of  ragged  Cuban  soldiers 
sufficing.  The  meeting  took  place  in  a  very  picturesque 
location,  on  the  summit  of  a  high  cliff  that  overlooked 
a  valley  green  with  the  royal  palm,  while  beyond  the 
white  breakers  at  the  beach  stretched  far  away  the  calm 
blue  sea,  dotted  thickly  with  transports  and  ships-of- 
war. 

The  three  commanders  took  their  seats  under  the 
palm-leaf  roof  of  an  open  hut  on  which  the  sun' s  rays  fell 
hotly.  Outside  stood  five  half-naked  negro  sentries, 
and  beyond  were  grouped  hundreds  of  Cubans,  officers 
and  men  commingled,  conversing  as  well  as  they  could 
with  the  staff-officers  from  the  fleet. 

Plans  for  the  coming  attack  on  Santiago  were  dis 
cussed  and  arrangements  for  the  co-operation  of  the 
allied  forces  settled,  a  map  of  the  surrounding  country 
being  frequently  consulted.  This  done,  the  conference 


226  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

ended,  the  three  principal  actors  in  the  drama  about  to 
be  played  bade  one  another  adieu,  and  the  Americans 
returned  to  their  boats,  leaving  their  Cuban  allies  to 
seek  again  their  lurking-places  in  the  brush. 


CHAPTER   XIII. 

THE   ARMY   OF   INVASION. 

ON  the  23d  of  April  President  McKinley,  as  already 
stated,  called  forth  a  volunteer  force  of  125,000  men  for 
two  years'  service,  apportioning  them  among  the  States 
and  Territories  in  accordance  with  population.  These 
were  recruited  from  the  existing  National  Guard  organi 
zations,  vacancies  being  filled  under  a  very  careful  system 
of  health  inspection.  On  May  23  a  second  call  was 
issued,  for  75,000  men,  under  similar  conditions,  though 
without  restriction  to  the  National  Guards.  The  regu 
lar  army  was  also  increased  by  filling  up  the  regiments 
to  their  full  quotas,  its  limit  being  62,000  men,  and 
several  special  forces  were  called  for,  making  the  total 
strength  of  the  army,  when  fully  recruited,  278,500 
men. 

This  force  was  to  be  made  up  as  follows  :  Regular 
army,  62,000  ;  volunteer,  first  call,  125,000,  second  call, 
75,000 ;  three  special  cavalry  regiments,  3000  ;  new 
engineer  force,  3500  ;  and  ten  regiments  of  volunteer 
infantry  immune  from  yellow  fever,  10.000.  The  last, 
composed  of  men  who  had  recovered  from  or  been  ex 
posed  to  this  fever,  were  intended  for  use  in  infected 
districts.  The  first  assignment  of  commanding  officers, 
made  public  May  16,  included  the  following  major- 
generals  :  Wesley  Merritt,  in  command  of  the  Depart 
ment  of  the  Pacific  (including  the  Philippines);  John  R. 
Brooke,  in  command  of  the  First  Corps  and  the  De- 

227 


228  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

partment  of  the  Gulf  ;  William  M.  Graham,  of  the 
Second  Corps,  Camp  Alger,  Falls  Church,  Virginia  ; 
James  F.  Wade,  of  the  Third  Corps,  Chickamauga, 
Georgia  ;  John  J.  Coppinger,  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  Mo 
bile,  Alabama  ;  William  R.  Shafter,  of  the  Fifth  Corps, 
Tampa,  Florida  ;  James  H.  Wilson,  of  the  Sixth  Corps, 
Chickamauga,  Georgia  ;  Fitzhugh  Lee,  of  the  Seventh 
Corps,  Tampa,  Florida  ;  Joseph  H.  Wheeler,  in  com 
mand  of  the  Cavalry  Division,  Tampa,  Florida.  Major- 
General  Elwell  S.  Otis  was  made  second  in  command  to 
General  Merritt.  The  whole  army  was  under  the  com 
mand  of  Major-General  Nelson  A.  Miles.  Various  sub 
sequent  appointments  were  made  of  major-  and  brigadier- 
generals  and  minor  officers,  some  of  which  failed  to  win 
public  approbation,  since  political  influences  were  claimed 
to  have  controlled  their  selection. 

This  was  not  the  only  adverse  criticism  made.  The 
whole  management  of  military  affairs  was  sharply  called 
in  question  by  some  observers,  the  War  Department 
and  the  * '  Board  of  Strategy' '  being  severely  taken  to 
task  for  alleged  neglect  of  the  troops.  These  charges 
of  the  hostile  press  were  particularly  devoted  to  the 
state  of  affairs  at  Tampa,  Florida,  where,  it  was  claimed, 
the  soldiers  had  been  grossly  neglected,  the  men  being 
dumped  down  at  a  railway  siding  like  so  many  emi 
grants,  and  left  to  seek  what  quarters  they  could  find 
in  the  burning  sand,  no  preparations  being  made  for 
them.  It  was  said  that  they  lacked  suitable  clothing 
and  food,  were  not  properly  drilled,  and  were  in  every 
respect  shamefully  treated.  And  the  reason  given  for 
this  was  the  alleged  incompetence  of  their  officers,  few  of 
whom,  it  was  said,  had  any  knowledge  of  military  affairs, 
while  General  Wheeler,  a  famous  Confederate  cavalry 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  229 

leader  of  the  Civil  War,  was  declared  to  be  incompetent 
through  age. 

These  charges  were  strongly  denied  by  Richard  Hard 
ing  Davis,  a  newspaper  correspondent,  who  quoted  from 
General  Miles,  Colonel  Pope,  the  chief  surgeon  of  the 
Fifth  Corps,  and  others,  including  a  German  military 
attache,  to  prove  that  the  army  was  in  an  excellent  state 
of  health,  well  fed  and  cared  for,  thoroughly  equipped 
and  disciplined.  "I  have  never  been  so  proud,"  said 
General  Miles,  ' '  as  I  was  yesterday  when  I  rode  through 
the  camps  of  the  Fifth  Army  Corps  and  saw  the  mag 
nificent  condition  and  physical  perfection  of  our  men. 
There  is  no  army  corps  anywhere  in  the  world  that  is 
better  supplied  with  men  and  officers  of  courage,  forti 
tude,  and  intelligence." 

This  refers  in  particular  to  the  regulars.  The  volun 
teers  were,  necessarily,  generally  in  charge  of  inex 
perienced  officers,  and  for  a  time  suffered  hardships. 
This  was  in  a  measure  unavoidable  in  a  country  with 
out  a  large  standing  army  and  suddenly  plunged  from 
peace  into  war.  "  I  do  not  believe,"  said  General  Alger, 
Secretary  of  War,  ' '  that  there  ever  was  a  nation  on 
earth  that  attempted  to  embark  in  a  war  of  such  magni 
tude  while  so  utterly  unprovided  with  everything  neces- 
ary  for  a  campaign.  When  war  was  declared,"  he 
further  remarked,  "we  were  unprepared,  yet  obstacles 
almost  insurmountable  have  been  overcome.  I  do  not 
believe  that  history  records  an  instance  where  so  much 
has  been  done  in  a  military  campaign  of  this  magnitude 
in  the  brief  time  that  has  elapsed  since  hostilities  began. 
When  the  people  have  learned  the  actual  condition  of 
affairs  and  realize  what  an  enormous  task  we  have  per 
formed  in  the  brief  time  allowed  us  by  the  circumstances 


230  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

of  war,  they  will  be  entirely  satisfied.  The  critics  will 
be  answered,  and  the  enemies  of  our  army  will  have  no 
ground  to  stand  on. ' ' 

This  was  written  on  June  10.  By  July  24,  three 
months  from  the  beginning  of  the  war,  two  hundred  and 
sixty-one  thousand  men  had  been  mustered  into  service, 
fully  equipped,  and  prepared  to  take  the  field, — some 
of  them  having  shown  their  discipline  and  fighting 
qualities  by  experience  in  battle.  The  seeming  slow 
ness  in  filling  up  the  ranks  was  due  to  the  severe  tests 
applied  to  recruits,  the  physical  examination  being  of 
the  most  searching  character.  This  was  specially  the 
case  with  the  regulars,  not  more  than  one  in  four  of  the 
applicants  being  accepted.  The  men  obtained  were  of 
the  best  fighting  material,  and  showed  excellent  aptitude 
for  military  discipline  and  instruction.  In  fact,  it  is 
doubtful  if  an  army  in  better  physical  condition  ever 
took  the  field,  and  the  recruiting,  mustering,  equipping, 
and  bringing  into  service  of  so  large,  carefully  selected, 
and  well  trained  an  army  within  ninety  days  was  looked 
upon  by  many  as  a  remarkable  achievement,  and  excited 
the  surprise  and  admiration  of  military  observers  from 
Europe. 

Of  one  portion  of  the  army  something  further  may  be 
said,  from  the  large  place  which  it  filled  in  the  public 
estimation.  This  was  the  special  cavalry  corps,  com 
posed  of  three  regiments  known  popularly  as  ' '  Rough 
Riders,"  they  being  made  up  of  cowboys  and  others 
thoroughly  trained  in  horsemanship.  Two  of  these 
regiments  had  been  recruited  in  the  West,  and  were 
commanded  respectively  by  Colonel  Melvin  Grigsby  and 
Colonel  Jay  L.  Torrey,  men  of  great  influence  with  the 
cowboys,  who  made  up  the  bulk  of  their  forces.  The 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  231 

third  had  been  recruited  by  Theodore  Roosevelt,  who 
had  resigned  his  position  as  assistant  secretary  of  the  navy 
for  the  purpose  of  taking  part  in  the  actual  campaigning. 
This  regiment  was  commanded  by  Colonel  Leonard 
Wood,  Roosevelt  having  voluntarily  retired  to  the  post 
of  lieutenant-colonel  as  better  befitting  his  lack  of  mili 
tary  experience.  But  the  public  persisted  in  speaking 
of  the  regiment  as  "  Roosevelt's  Rough  Riders."  It, 
like  the  others,  had  been  principally  recruited  in  the 
West,  but  contained  about  twelve  per  cent,  of  business 
and  professional  men  from  the  Eastern  cities,  including 
college  graduates  and  representatives  of  families  of  high 
social  standing.  These  men  were  experts  in  horseman 
ship  and  physical  exercises,  and  showed  themselves  the 
equals  of  their  cowboy  companions  in  the  saddle. 

Before  they  left  camp  the  Rough  Riders  were  drilled 
to  charge  standing  in  their  stirrups,  the  horses  being 
trained  to  wheel  and  stop  short  at  word  of  command, 
and  the  men  riding  with  a  reckless  abandon  calculated 
seriously  to  try  the  nerves  of  foot-soldiers.  Armed  with 
machetes,  rifles,  and  revolvers,  this  corps  would  prob 
ably  have  proved  almost  irresistible  in  the  charge.  As 
it  proved,  however,  fortune  put  the  Rough  Riders  into 
the  battlefield  on  foot,  and  their  record  in  war  was  made 
as  infantry. 

Early  in  June  a  large  fleet  of  transports,  thirty-five 
in  number,  gathered  in  Tampa  Bay  for  the  conveyance 
of  a  strong  military  force  to  Santiago  de  Cuba,  this  place 
having,  in  consequence  of  the  presence  there  of  the 
Spanish  fleet,  been  selected  as  the  first  point  of  attack. 
The  force  to  be  sent  consisted  of  the  Fifth  Army  Corps, 
under  Major-General  Shafter,  and  four  regiments  of 
General  Coppinger's  corps  from  Mobile.  Two  regi- 


232  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

ments  of  volunteer  infantry  were  chosen  to  accompany 
the  expedition,  the  Seventy-first  New  York  and  the 
Second  Massachusetts,  and  eight  troops  of  volunteer 
cavalry  selected  from  Roosevelt's  Rough  Riders.  In 
addition,  there  were  four  batteries  of  light  and  two  of 
heavy  artillery,  a  battalion  of  engineers,  signal  and  hos 
pital  corps,  etc. ,  the  whole  making  a  grand  total  of  over 
fifteen  thousand  men. 

The  sinking  of  the  Merrimac  in  the  channel  of  San 
tiago  harbor,  with  the  assumed  locking  up  of  the  Span 
ish  fleet  in  that  haven  of  refuge,  was  immediately  fol 
lowed  by  active  preparations  for  the  despatch  of  this 
army,  the  embarkation  of  troops  beginning  on  Monday, 
June  6.  On  Wednesday  afternoon,  after  a  number  of 
them  had  put  to  sea,  came  a  hasty  order  for  their  recall, 
and  the  Castine  was  despatched  to  bring  them  back, 
One  transport,  the  City  of  Washington,  had  made  such 
progress  that  the  coast  of  Cuba  was  sighted  before  the 
order  of  recall  reached  her.  It  was  Saturday  before  she 
and  the  Castine  returned. 

The  cause  of  this  delay  was  said  to  be  due  to  reports 
that  war-vessels  had  left  Barcelona,  Spain,  bound  for 
Cuban  waters,  and  that  suspicious-looking  vessels,  with 
military  tops,  had  been  seen  off  Florida.  That  this  was 
the  actual  cause,  however,  may  well  be  questioned,  and 
the  delay  has  been  claimed  as  due  to  that  general  lack 
of  efficient  management  that  afterwards  declared  itself. 
Whatever  its  cause,  it  was  unfortunate  for  the  men,  who 
for  more  than  a  week  were  kept  packed  in  the  close 
transports,  with  the  thermometer  near  100°  F.,  many 
cases  of  heat-prostration,  even  among  the  seasoned 
regulars,  being  the  result. 

The  start  finally,  took  place  on  the  i4th,  the  transports 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  233 

being  convoyed  by  a  squadron  of  war- vessels,  with  the 
battle-ship  Indiana  in  the  lead.  At  ten  o'clock  A.M.  came 
the  signal  for  sailing,  which  was  greeted  by  wild  cheers 
from  the  men,  who  were  eager  to  leave  that  stifling  at 
mosphere,  and  in  a  few  minutes  the  leading  vessels  of 
the  fleet  were  gliding  down  the  bay.  On  reaching  the 
Florida  Straits  the  transports  were  formed  into  three 
lines,  about  one  thousand  yards  apart,  the  ships  in  each 
line  being  separated  by  six  hundred  yards.  The  war- 
vessels  gathered  on  their  flanks,  on  the  alert  by  day,  and 
at  night  sweeping  the  waters  towards  Cuba  with  their 
search-lights.  No  lights  were  allowed  to  be  shown  on 
the  transports.  Fortunately,  the  winds  kept  down  and 
the  sea  was  smooth,  but  the  journey  was  a  dull  and 
tedious  one,  with  not  the  show  of  an  enemy  to  break  its 
monotony,  and  it  was  with  joy  that  the  weary  soldiers 
beheld,  a  week  after  they  had  set  sail,  the  blockading 
fleet  before  Santiago.  The  horses  and  mules  on  the 
transports  suffered  severely  during  the  voyage,  many  of 
them  dying  ;  but  the  men  bore  the  journey  well,  a  few 
cases  of  typhoid  fever  being  the  only  serious  ailments. 

The  news  of  the  arrival  of  the  troops  came  to  Wash 
ington  by  direct  cable  message  from  Guantanamo  Bay, 
via  the  wires  of  the  French  Cable  Company  running 
from  Santiago  to  Cape  Haytien.  This,  the  first  direct 
communication  by  telegraph  with  the  seat  of  war,  was 
received  with  the  highest  gratification  by  the  govern 
ment.  It  had  been  supposed  that  Guantanamo  Bay  was 
being  held  by  its  force  of  marines  as  a  point  of  debarka 
tion  for  the  troops.  But  the  distance  to  be  traversed, 
over  a  hilly  country,  without  suitable  roads,  rendered 
that  locality  inadvisable,  and  the  place  finally  selected 
was  the  village  of  Bajquiri,  about  fifteen  miles  east  of  the 


234  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

mouth  of  Santiago  harbor.  From  here  a  road  led  to 
Santiago  and  a  railroad  followed  the  coast  to  a  terminus 
on  the  harbor.  Midway  lay  Juragua,  another  locality 
considered  in  connection  with  the  landing,  and  which 
was  bombarded  on  the  morning  of  the  22d  as  a  feint  to 
distract  attention  from  the  real  point  chosen.  For  the 
same  purpose  colliers  were  sent  to  the  west  of  the  harbor, 
the  Spaniards  mistaking  them  for  transports. 

During  the  preceding  night  many  of  the  troop-ships 
had  drawn  in  towards  the  shore,  while  in  the  thickets 
and  mountain  fastnesses  on  land  Cuban  insurgents  were 
gathered  thickly,  watching,  gun  in  hand,  every  road  and 
mountain-path  along  which  Spanish  reinforcements  could 
come.  The  day  had  not  far  advanced  before  tongues  of 
flame  and  clouds  of  smoke  rising  from  Daiquiri  indicated 
that  the  Spaniards  had  fired  and  abandoned  that  place. 
The  only  evidence  of  Spanish  occupation  on  the  previous 
day  had  been  a  flag  flying  at  the  summit  of  a  steep, 
rocky  hill  that  offered  excellent  opportunities  for  defence. 
But  with  day-dawn  this  flag  was  seen  to  have  vanished. 
The  hill,  like  the  village,  had  been  abandoned. 

The  bombardment  of  Jaragua  was  followed  by  a  sharp 
fire  upon  Baiquiri  from  the  guns  of  the  New  Orleans. 
No  response  came,  and  in  a  few  minutes  more  the  waters 
were  enlivened  by  a  flotilla  of  small  boats  filled  with 
troops  and  headed  by  launches,  moving  swiftly  in  to 
wards  the  shore.  The  lighters  sent  with  the  expedition 
had  been  lost  during  the  voyage.  In  a  brief  time  more 
the  foremost  of  the  landing-party  gladly  set  foot  on 
Cuban  soil,  each  man  in  full  fighting  trim,  carrying  three 
days'  rations,  a  shelter-tent,  a  rifle,  and  two  hundred 
cartridges,  ready  to  fight  or  march  at  a  moment's  notice. 
Landing  was  no  easy  matter.  There  was  at  this  point  a 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  235 

fine  pier  built  by  the  iron-mining  company,  but  the  surf 
broke  roughly  against  it,  and  the  men  were  obliged  to 
fling  their  rifles  up  first  and  scramble  up  the  trestle-work 
after  them.  As  they  reached  solid  ground,  they  at  once 
lined  up  in  companies  and  regiments  and  marched  away, 
making  room  for  their  successors. 

The  Eighth  Infantry  was  the  first  to  land,  followed  by 
the  First,  General  Shafter's  old  regiment.  Other  organ 
izations  rapidly  followed,  and  by  nightfall  some  six 
thousand  soldiers  were  encamped  in  the  hilly  country 
around  Baiquiri.  General  Lawton  threw  out  a  strong 
detachment  to  a  point  about  six  miles  west,  on  the  road 
to  Santiago,  and  another  to  the  north  of  the  village,  the 
remainder  being  quartered  in  the  houses,  few  of  which 
had  been  burned,  and  under  their  tents  in  the  adjoining 
fields.  The  place  was  deserted  when  the  troops  arrived, 
but  fugitive  women  and  children  soon  appeared  from  the 
surrounding  thickets  and  sought  their  homes.  During 
the  following  two  days  the  remainder  of  the  troops  were 
landed,  and  the  occupation  in  force  of  Cuban  soil  was 
fairly  inaugurated.  The  work  of  landing  the  siege-guns, 
horses,  and  other  heavy  supplies  followed,  but  was 
prosecuted  with  difficulty  on  account  of  the  lack  of 
lighters  and  of  landing  facilities  in  general. 

In  fact,  as  time  revealed,  the  whole  business  had  been 
inefficiently  managed,  guns  and  other  necessaries  of  the 
expedition  being  left  at  Tampa,  while  requisite  parts  of 
the  artillery  that  were  brought  were  scattered  carelessly 
through  several  ships.  As  a  result,  the  army  was  by  no 
means  in  the  best  condition  for  an  advance  on  a  fortified 
place,  and  there  was  abundant  reason  for  delay  until  all 
the  essentials  of  a  campaign  were  at  hand.  But  delay 
under  Cuban  suns  and  rains  was  a  dangerous  alternative. 


236  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

Yellow  fever  might  prove  a  more  deadly  enemy  than 
Spanish  troops,  and  the  commanding  general,  while 
doubtless  deploring  the  position  in  which  the  haste  and 
heedlessness  of  incompetent  aids  had  placed  him,  seems 
to  have  felt  that  wisdom  demanded  an  immediate  ad 
vance.  At  all  events,  no  delay  was  made,  the  troops 
being  at  once  set  in  motion  towards  the  enemy's  lines  of 
defence.  On  the  day  of  landing  a  reinforcement  of  six 
teen  hundred  men,  comprising  the  Thirty-third  and  one 
battalion  of  the  Thirty-fourth  Michigan  Volunteers,  set 
sail  on  the  Yale  from  Hampton  Roads,  and  other  rein 
forcements  were  rapidly  preparing  to  follow. 

The  advance  began  on  the  23d,  the  Cubans  serving  as 
skirmishers  in  front  of  General  Shafter's  army,  and 
having  several  brushes  with  the  retreating  Spaniards  as 
the  latter  fell  back.  Colonel  Wagner,  with  fifty  picked 
men  from  General  Lawton's  brigade,  formed  the  skir 
mish  line,  assisted  by  some  two  hundred  Cuban  scouts, 
whose  familiarity  with  the  country  and  the  Spanish  mode 
of  fighting  rendered  them  of  much  utility.  Juragua, 
some  eight  miles  from  the  landing-place,  was  reached 
without  a  check,  the  guns  of  the  fleet  protecting  the 
movement  up  to  that  point.  The  Spaniards  seemed  to 
have  left  the  place  in  haste  after  an  ineffectual  attempt  to 
burn  it. 

The  scouting  party*  pushed  on  to  the  west,  and  at  a 
short  distance  came  suddenly  upon  a  party  of  Spanish 
soldiers,  who  exchanged  shots  briskly  with  the  Cubans, 
two  of  whom  were  killed  and  eight  wounded.  As  the 
skirmishers  fell  back,  the  Twenty-second  regulars  came 
up  at  the  double  quick,  drawn  by  the  firing  ;  but  the 
Spaniards  were  already  in  retreat  and  had  sought  the 
shelter  of  the  woods.  By  night  a  junction  was  effected 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  237 

between  the  main  divisions  of  the  army  of  invasion  at  a 
point  on  the  high  ground  back  from  the  coast,  and 
within  ten  miles  of  Morro  Castle. 

At  nightfall  of  the  25th  all  the  troops  were  on  shore, 
and  the  Cubans  of  Garcia' s  army,  some  three  thousand 
in  number,  had  been  brought  by  water  from  Ascerrade- 
ros,  west  of  the  harbor,  and  landed  at  Juragua.  Most 
of  the  horses,  also,  were  on  firm  land.  With  a  single 
steam  barge  and  a  fleet  of  small  boats,  General  Shafter 
had  landed  over  fifteen  thousand  men,  hundreds  of 
horses  and  mules,  and  a  large  quantity  of  supplies  on 
a  difficult  beach,  only  two  men  losing  their  lives  and 
about  fifty  animals  being  drowned.  The  animals  had 
to  be  pushed  in  the  water  and  towed  ashore.  Of  the 
supplies,  hardly  a  package  was  lost. 


CHAPTER    XIV. 

THE   RAID   OF   THE   ROUGH   RIDERS. 

WHILE  the  work  of  landing  the  army  of  invasion  and 
its  supplies  was  still  in  progress,  the  first  battle  had 
taken  place  on  Cuban  soil.  The  Spaniards  had  made  a 
stand  in  force,  and  the  vanguard  of  the  army  had  re 
ceived  its  baptism  of  fire.  Raw  as  the  troops  were  and 
difficult  as  the  ground,  they  had  behaved  with  conspicu 
ous  gallantry,  winning  victory  in  the  face  of  much  larger 
forces  placed  in  ambush  and  with  every  advantage  of 
position.  This  battle  merits  special  attention  as  the  first, 
with  the  exception  of  the  minor  affair  at  Guantanamo 
Bay,  fought  by  American  soldiers  since  the  close  of  the 
Civil  War,  thirty- three  years  before.  In  it  sons  of  the 
South  and  of  the  North  fought  side  by  side,  and  proved 
themselves  worthy  the  reputation  for  courage  and  daring 
which  their  fathers  had  won  on  many  a  hard-fought  field 
a  third  of  a  century  in  the  past. 

The  men  who  had  the  honor  of  taking  part  in  this 
initial  engagement  were  all  of  the  cavalry  arm  of  the 
service,  horsemen  serving  as  infantry.  The  position 
was  one  in  which  horses  could  not  have  been  employed 
had  there  been  any  to  use.  The  force  consisted  of  eight 
troops  of  Colonel  Wood's  regiment,  Roosevelt's  Rough 
Riders  as  they  will  be  known  in  history,  and  four  troops 
each  of  the  First  and  the  Tenth  Cavalry,  a  total  force 
of  nine  hundred  and  sixty-four  men,  constituting  nearly 
the  whole  of  General  Wheeler's  cavalry  command. 
238 


THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN.  239 

On  the  23d,  Wheeler,  under  orders  from  the  com 
manding  general,  proceeded  to  Siboney,  to  find  that  the 
enemy  had  withdrawn  from  that  place  towards  Sevilla, 
skirmishing  with  the  Cuban  scouts  as  they  retreated. 
He  rode  out  to  the  front  and  found  that  the  Spanish  had 
halted  and  established  themselves  at  a  point  about  three 
miles  in  advance.  Studying  the  ground  with  the  aid  of 
General  Castillo,  in  command  of  the  Cubans,  Wheeler 
determined  to  make  an  attack  on  the  enemy  at  daybreak 
of  the  24th,  a  rough  map  of  the  country  being  drawn  as 
an  aid  to  the  projected  movement. 

The  country  was  rougher  than  any  map  that  could  be 
made  of  it.  The  theory  was  that  it  was  traversed  by 
roads  ;  but  in  effect  these  roads  were  simply  rude  paths 
through  a  dense  tropical  forest,  along  which  ox-teams 
could  laboriously  make  their  way  in  dry  weather,  but 
which  in  wet  weather  were  impassable  to  teams  and  al 
most  so  to  men  on  horseback.  There  were  no  bridges, 
and  the  rains  made  torrents  of  the  streams  that  crossed 
the  roads.  In  the  subsequent  movement  of  the  army 
new  roads  had  to  be  made  before  a  single  wagon-train 
could  get  through,  and  the  bridges  built  for  this  purpose 
were  repeatedly  swept  away.  As  a  consequence,  on 
several  occasions  the  army  had  to  depend  on  pack-trains, 
and  the  movement  of  supplies  to  the  front  became  a  very 
difficult  operation.  As  for  the  siege-guns,  landed  with 
difficulty,  not  one  got  beyond  Siboney. 

The  roads  to  be  traversed  by  General  Wheeler' s  force 
were  of  the  character  here  described.  There  were  two 
of  them,  one  following  the  foot  of  the  hill  upon  which 
the  Spaniards  had  made  their  stand,  the  other  ascending 
the  slope.  These  so-called  roads  were  little  more  than 
gullies,  rough  and  narrow  and  at  places  almost  impass- 


24o  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

able.  On  both  sides  they  were  lined  by  prickly  cactus- 
bushes,  while  the  underbrush  was  so  thick  that  it  was 
impossible  to  see  ten  feet  on  either  side.  The  conditions 
were  favorable  for  a  murderous  ambuscade,  and  this  was 
the  one  mode  of  fighting  in  which  the  Spanish  soldiers 
excelled. 

The  enemy,  doubtless  having  good  reason  to  look  for 
an  advance  of  the  invaders  along  these  roads  in  their 
movement  towards  Sevilla,  had  prepared  to  give  them  a 
warm  reception.  On  the  hill-slopes  had  been  erected 
two  block-houses,  flanked  by  irregular  intrenchments  of 
stones  and  felled  trees.  Behind  these  and  in  the  thick 
underbrush  on  both  sides  of  the  trail  a  large  body  of 
Spaniards  had  posted  themselves,  considerably  outnum 
bering  General  Wheeler's  force,  and  expecting  to  check 
his  advance  with  ease.  Hitherto  they  had  fought  with 
Cubans  only,  and  judged  their  new  foes  from  experience 
of  their  old.  As  the  Spaniards  could  not  be  seen,  their 
numbers  could  be  estimated  only  by  the  weight  of  their 
fire,  which  was  constant  and  heavy  and  much  more  accu 
rate  than  had  been  expected. 

There  were  practically  two  battles, — General  Young 
leading  the  regulars  along  the  road  at  the  base  of  the 
hill,  with  the  design  of  making  a  feint  on  the  enemy's 
front,  and  Colonel  Wood  leading  the  Rough  Riders 
along  the  ascending  trail,  proposing  to  attack  them  in 
flank.  As  a  result,  when  the  enemy  was  reached  the 
two  detachments  were  about  a  mile  apart.  The  first  part 
of  the  journey  of  the  Rough  Riders  was  over  steep  hills 
several  hundred  feet  high.  The  men  carried  two  hun 
dred  rounds  of  ammunition  and  heavy  camp  equipment. 
Although  this  was  done  easily  in  the  early  morning,  the 
weather  became  intensely  hot  as  the  day  advanced,  and 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  241 

the  sun  beat  down  severely  upon  the  cowboys  and  East 
ern  athletes  as  ihey  toiled  up  the  grade  with  their  heavy 
packs,  frequent  rests  becoming  necessary.  The  trail  was 
so  narrow  that  for  the  greater  part  of  the  way  the  men 
had  to  proceed  in  single  file.  One  by  one  the  men, 
unable  to  endure  the  sweltering  heat,  threw  away  their 
blankets  and  tent-rolls  and  emptied  their  canteens,  re 
taining  only  their  arms  and  cartridges. 

The  first  intimation  that  there  were  Spaniards  in  the 
vicinity  was  when  they  reached  a  point  three  or  four  miles 
back  from  the  coast,  when  the  low  cuckoo  calls  of  the 
Spanish  soldiers  were  heard  in  the  brush.  It  was  difficult 
to  locate  the  exact  point  from  which  these  sounds  came. 
The  men  were  ordered  to  speak  in  whispers,  and  frequent 
halts  were  made.  Finally,  a  place  was  reached,  about 
eight  o'  clock,  where  the  trail  opened  into  a  space  covered 
with  high  grass  on  the  right-hand  side  of  the  trail  and 
the  thickest  kind  of  bramble  and  underbrush  on  the 
other.  A  barbed-wire  fence  also  ran  along  the  left  side. 
The  dead  body  of  a  Cuban  was  found  on  the  side  of  the 
road  and  the  heads  of  several  Spaniards  were  seen  in  the 
bushes  for  a  moment. 

It  was  not  until  then  that  the  men  were  permitted  to 
load  their  carbines.  When  the  order  to  load  was  given, 
they  acted  on  it  with  a  will,  and  displayed  the  greatest 
eagerness  to  make  an  attack.  At  this  time  the  sound  of 
firing  was  heard  a  mile  or  two  to  the  right,  apparently 
coming  from  the  hills  beyond  the  thicket.  It  was  the 
regulars  replying  to  the  Spaniards,  who  had  opened  on 
them  from  the  thicket.  In  addition  to  rapid  rifle-fire  the 
boom  of  Hotchkiss  guns  could  be  heard.  Hardly  two 
minutes  elapsed  before  Mauser  rifles  commenced  to  crack 
in  the  thicket,  and  a  hundred  bullets  whistled  over  the 

16 


242  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

heads  of  the  Rough  Riders,  cutting  the  leaves  from  the 
trees  and  sending  chips  flying  from  the  fence-posts  by 
the  side  of  the  men.  The  Spaniards  had  opened  and 
were  pouring  in  a  heavy  fire,  which  had  a  disastrous 
effect. 

Sergeant  Hamilton  Fish  was  the  first  man  to  fall.  He 
was  shot  through  the  breast  and  lived  but  twenty  min 
utes,  giving  a  small  hunting-case  watch  from  his  belt  as 
a  souvenir  to  a  messmate.  Captain  Capron  and  others 
rallied  around  him,  firing  into  the  bush,  but  they  were 
in  the  thick  of  the  Spanish  fire,  and  the  captain  soon  fell 
with  a  mortal  wound.  Dead  and  wounded  were  falling 
all  around,  but  the  men  held  their  ground,  seemingly 
without  a  thought  of  retreat.  Our  troops  had  evidently 
fallen  into  an  ambush  held  by  a  much  superior  force,  and 
Captain  Capron' s  troop,  in  the  advance,  were  in  a  hot 
place,  the  Spanish  fire  pouring  upon  them  in  volleys. 

This  was  a  state  of  affairs  that  called  for  either  a  retreat 
or  a  charge.  Of  the  former  no  thought  was  entertained. 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Roosevelt  at  the  head  of  one  wing, 
and  Colonel  Wood  and  Major  Brodie  leading  the  other, 
advanced  in  open  order  on  the  foe,  Major  Brodie  falling 
wounded  before  the  troops  had  advanced  one  hundred 
yards.  An  order  for  a  general  charge  was  now  given, 
and  with  a  yell  the  men  sprang  forward.  Roosevelt, 
snatching  a  rifle  and  ammunition-belt  from  a  wounded 
^oldier,  led  the  way  at  the  head  of  his  men,  cheering 
and  yelling  as  loudly  as  the  best  of  them. 

For  a  period  the  bullets  were  singing  like  a  swarm 
of  bees  all  around  them,  and  at  every  instant  men  fell 
from  the  ranks.  On  the  right  wing  Captain  McClintock 
had  his  leg  broken  by  a  bullet  from  a  machine-gun, 
while  four  of  his  men  went  down.  At  the  same  time 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  243 

Captain  Luna  lost  nine  of  his  men.  Then  the  reserves, 
Troops  K  and  E,  were  ordered  up.  There  was  no  hesi 
tation.  Colonel  Wood,  with  the  right  wing,  charged 
straight  at  a  block-house  about  eight  hundred  yards 
away,  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  Roosevelt,  on  the  left, 
charged  at  the  same  time.  Up  the  men  went  with  their 
cowboy  yell,  never  stopping  to  return  the  fire  of  the 
Spaniards,  but  keeping  on  with  a  grim  determination  to 
capture  the  block-house  or  die  in  the  attempt.  That 
charge  was  the  last.  By  the  time  the  American  advance 
had  got  within  six  hundred  yards  of  the  block-house  the 
Spaniards  abandoned  it,  not  having  the  resolution  to 
stand  that  furious  rush,  and  in  the  next  moment  were 
flying  at  their  utmost  speed  through  the  brush  beyond, 
followed  by  a  hail  of  bullets  from  the  victorious  troops. 

While  this  hot  battle  had  been  taking  place  on  the 
hill,  the  regulars  under  General  Young  were  having  as 
lively  a  time  below.  The  battle  here  began  in  much 
the  same  manner  as  above,  and  when  the  machine-guns 
poured  their  rain  of  bullets  into  the  brush,  the  Spanish 
from  their  lurking-places  on  the  hill-side  sent  volleys  at 
the  gunners  below.  A  charge  was  now  made  up  the  hill 
by  part  of  the  force,  while  the  remainder  covered  with 
their  rifles  every  point  from  which  the  Spanish  shots 
came.  Back  through  the  thicket,  step  by  step,  went 
the  enemy,  firing  as  they  retreated,  and  finally  seeking 
refuge  in  the  block-house  in  front  of  Colonel  Wood's 
command.  They  were  dislodged  with  their  comrades 
by  the  irresistible  charge  of  Wood  and  Roosevelt  and 
their  men.  In  the  words  of  General  Young,  the  battle 
was  one  of  the  sharpest  he  had  ever  experienced.  It 
was  only  the  quick  and  constant  fire  of  the  troopers, 
whether  they  could  see  the  enemy  or  not,  that  forced 


244  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

the  Spanish  so  soon  from  their  ambuscade.  Reinforce 
ments  had  been  ordered  forward  from  Juragua,  but  the 
march  was  a  long  one  and  the  fight  was  over  before  they 
arrived. 

In  the  two  hours'  fighting,  during  which  the  volun 
teers  battled  against  a  concealed  enemy,  many  deeds  of 
heroism  were  done.  One  of  the  men  of  Troop  E, 
desperately  wounded,  was  lying  squarely  between  the 
lines  of  fire.  Surgeon  Church  hurried  to  his  side,  and, 
with  bullets  pelting  all  around  him,  calmly  dressed  the 
man's  wound,  bandaged  it,  and  walked  unconcernedly 
back,  soon  returning  with  two  men  and  a  litter.  The 
wounded  man  was  placed  on  the  litter  and  brought  into 
our  lines.  Another  soldier  of  Troop  L,  concealing  him 
self  as  best  he  could  behind  a  tree,  gave  up  his  place  to 
a  wounded  companion,  and  in  a  moment  or  so  later  was 
himself  wounded. 

Sergeant  Bell  stood  by  the  side  of  Captain  Capron 
when  the  latter  was  mortally  hit.  He  had  seen  that  he 
was  fighting  against  terrible  odds,  but  he  never  flinched. 
"  Give  me  your  gun  a  minute,"  he  said  to  the  sergeant, 
and,  kneeling  down,  he  deliberately  aimed  and  fired  two 
shots  in  quick  succession.  At  each  a  Spaniard  was  seen 
to  fall.  Bell,  in  the  mean  time,  had  seized  a  dead  com 
rade's  gun  and  knelt  beside  his  captain  and  fired  steadily. 
When  Captain  Capron  fell  he  gave  the  sergeant  a  parting 
message  to  his  wife  and  father,  bade  him  good-by  in  a 
cheerful  voice,  and  was  then  borne  away  dying. 

A  private  was  shot  through  the  thigh,  the  bullet  enter 
ing  at  the  side  and  going  out  at  the  back.  He  made 
his  way  to  the  field  hospital  and  was  told  nothing*  could 
be  done  for  him.  Returning  to  the  front,  he  crawled 
along,  firing  with  the  rest. 


THE   WAR   WITH  SPAIN.  245 

Colonel  Wood,  who  was  at  the  front  throughout  the 
entire  action,  saw  a  trooper  apparently  skulking,  fifty  feet 
in  the  rear  of  the  firing-line,  and  ordered  him  sharply 
to  advance.  The  boy  rose  and  hurried  forward,  limping. 
As  he  took  his  place  and  raised  his  carbine,  he  said, — 

"  My  leg  is  a  little  stiff,  sir." 

Colonel  Wood  looked,  and  saw  that  a  bullet  had 
ploughed  along  the  trooper's  leg  for  twelve  inches. 

The  ground  was  uneven,  and  the  advance  was  im 
peded  by  vines  an  inch  thick,  trailing  bushes,  and  cactus 
plants,  known  as  Spanish  bayonets,  which  tear  the  flesh 
and  clothes.  Through  this  the  men  fought  their  way, 
falling,  stumbling,  wet  with  perspiration,  panting  for 
breath,  but  obeying  Colonel  Wood's  commands  instantly. 

The  Rough  Riders  disproved  all  that  had  been  said 
in  criticism  of  them  when  the  organization  was  formed. 
The  cowboys  observed  perfect  discipline,  and  the  East 
ern  element  in  Troop  K,  from  clubs  and  colleges,  acted 
with  the  greatest  coolness  and  intelligence. 

The  spirit  of  Mr.  Marshall,  a  correspondent  of  the 
New  York  Journal,  was  as  admirable  as  that  of  any 
soldier  on  the  field.  He  was  shot  in  the  first  firing-line, 
and  though  the  bullet  passed  within  an  inch  of  his  spine 
and  threw  him  into  frequent  and  terrible  convulsions,  he 
continued  in  his  intervals  of  consciousness  to  write  his 
account  of  the  fight  and  gave  it  to  a  wounded  soldier  to 
be  forwarded  to  his  paper.  This  devotion  to  duty  by  a 
man  who  believed  he  was  dying  was  as  fine  as  any  of  the 
many  courageous  and  inspiring  deeds  that  occurred 
during  the  two  hours  of  breathless,  desperate  fighting. 

The  result  of  the  battle  was  to  give  the  Americans 
possession  of  La  Quasimas,  the  point  of  meeting  of  the 
hill-side  and  the  valley  roads.  The  complete  exhaustion 


246  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

of  the  men,  from  their  exertions  and  the  great  heat,  pre 
vented  their  continuing  the  pursuit,  and  they  contented 
themselves  with  holding  the  ground  they  had  gained. 
The  total  loss  on  the  American  side  was  sixteen  killed 
and  fifty-two  wounded.  That  of  the  Spaniards  could 
not  be  told,  but  from  the  number  of  dead  found  it  must 
have  been  much  more  severe.  The  engagement,  in  the 
words  of  General  Wheeler,  * '  inspired  our  troops,  and 
must  have  had  a  bad  effect  upon  the  spirits  of  the  Span 
ish  soldiers.  It  also  gave  our  army  the  beautiful  and 
well- watered  country  in  which  we  established  our  encamp 
ments,  with  a  full  view  of  Santiago  and  the  surrounding 
country,  and  enabled  us  to  reconnoitre  close  up  to  the 
fortifications  of  that  place." 

An  interesting  commentary  on  this  pioneer  battle  is 
contained  in  the  words  of  a  Spanish  soldier  who  was  in 
the  battle  and  was  afterwards  captured  by  the  Cubans. 
He  said  of  the  volunteers  : 

1 '  They  did  not  fight  like  other  soldiers.  When  we 
fired  a  volley,  they  advanced  instead  of  going  back. 
The  more  we  fired  the  nearer  they  came  to  us.  We  are 
not  used  to  fighting  with  men  who  act  in  that  way." 

In  other  words,  they  were  not  fighting  with  Cuban  in 
surgents,  and  the  tactics  used  in  guerilla  warfare  did  not 
apply.  Under  the  fire  which  the  Americans  faced  they 
could  without  dishonor  have  fallen  back.  But,  instead, 
they  kept  on  in  a  steady,  cool  advance,  which  only  ceased 
when  they  were  in  possession  of  the  enemy's  base  and 
the  Spaniards  were  in  full  retreat. 


CHAPTER    XV. 

THE   BATTLE   OF   SANTIAGO. 

THE  victory  on  the  hill-side  cleared  the  way  to  the 
vicinity  of  Santiago,  since  the  enemy  evacuated  Sevilla — 
some  miles  in  advance,  where  it  had  been  expected  a 
stand  in  force  would  be  made — on  the  night  of  the  24th, 
and  the  American  army  occupied  this  post  without  a 
shot.  Here  the  army  was  delayed  for  several  days 
from  the  difficulty  in  getting  subsistence  stores  to  the 
front.  It  was  not  considered  safe  to  move  unless  each 
man  had  at  least  three  days'  rations  in  his  knapsack, 
and  this  was  impossible  in  the  wretched  condition  of  the 
roads,  which  were  converted  into  mud  gullies  by  the 
frequent  rains.  Pack-trains  alone  could  get  through, 
and  these  could  supply  the  army  with  food  only  from 
day  to  day.  To  make  the  road  passable  for  wagon- 
trains,  artillery,  and  ambulances  was  a  task  of  the  utmost 
difficulty,  which  seriously  taxed  the  skill  of  the  en 
gineers  and  the  endurance  of  officers  and  men.  From 
Baiquiri  the  way  ran  through  a  tangle  of  tropical  under 
growth  and  over  treacherous  swamps  bordering  streams 
for  a  distance  of  twelve  miles.  The  engineers  were  kept 
busy  levelling  the  track,  filling  pits,  and  bridging  the 
streams,  while  a  large  force  with  axes,  aided  by  Cubans 
with  machetes,  hacked  down  trees  and  cleared  out  the 
underbrush,  widening  the  narrow  way.  All  this  neces 
sarily  took  time,  and  kept  the  army  in  a  waiting  state. 

Meanwhile,  a  thorough  reconnoissance  of  the  country 

247 


248  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

was  being  made,  which,  with  information  gained  from 
the  Cubans,  who  claimed  exact  acquaintance  with  it, 
enabled  a  fairly  accurate  map  to  be  drawn.  The  daring 
scouts  advanced  to  the  very  trenches  of  the  enemy,  near 
enough  to  hear  the  sentries  on  picket  duty  talking. 
Lieutenant  Smith,  of  the  Fourth  Infantry,  pushed  for 
ward  as  far  as  El  Caney  without  meeting  any  Spanish 
troops,  and  Captain  Wright,  of  General  Bates' s  staff, 
followed  the  line  of  the  railroad  from  Juragua  to  within 
two  and  a  half  miles  of  the  city.  Lieutenant  Blue,  of 
the  gunboat  Suwanee,  repeated  his  exploit  of  a  fortnight 
before,  making  a  tour  of  some  sixty  miles  in  extent 
around  the  city  and  again  counting  the  Spanish  ships  at 
anchor  in  the  bay.  He  ventured  close  up  to  the  enemy's 
batteries,  and  at  one  point  in  his  journey  reached  a 
Cuban  outpost  which  faced  an  outpost  of  the  Spaniards 
only  four  hundred  yards  away.  The  lieutenant's  account 
of  what  took  place  forms  a  sarcastic  commentary  upon 
the  character  of  the  former  Cuban  war. 

"  They  popped  away  at  one  another  all  the  time,"  he 
said  ;  "  but  I  do  not  think  the  Cubans  hurt  the  Spanish 
very  much,  and  I  know  the  Spanish  did  not  hurt  the 
Cubans." 

On  June  27  the  front  rested  on  the  small  stream 
known  as  the  Rio  Guama,  and  extended  from  the  crest 
of  the  Sevilla  hills  for  a  mile  and  a  half  into  the  interior. 
General  Kent's  men  lay  encamped  along  the  railroad, 
their  advance  being  not  far  from  Morro  Castle.  General 
Lawton's  division  occupied  the  road  to  Santiago,  the 
Third  Brigade,  which  formed  the  centre,  lying  across 
the  road  and  the  river,  the  First  Brigade  forming  the 
left  flank,  and  the  Second  Brigade  holding  the  opposite 
position  on  the  right  flank.  General  Wheeler,  with  the 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN.  249 

dismounted  cavalry,  lay  in  the  rear,  between  the  Sevilla 
hills  and  the  Rio  Guama.  At  Siboney  was  a  brigade  of 
reinforcements  which  had  just  landed  from  the  Yale,  and 
others  were  hourly  expected  on  the  Harvard.  Drinking 
water  for  the  troops  was  obtained  from  the  Rio  Guama, 
a  stream  fed  by  mountain  springs  and  yielding  excellent 
water.  The  fare,  consisting  of  hardtack,  bacon,  and 
coffee,  was  hardly  suited  to  the  climate,  and  the  men 
could  not  be  kept  from  eating  the  great  variety  of  tropical 
fruits — mangoes,  oranges,  etc. — which  abounded  in  the 
woodland,  though  strict  orders  had  been  given  to  the 
contrary.  Limes  and  the  milk  from  green  cocoanuts 
were  alone  considered  safe  to  indulge  in,  but  the  attrac 
tion  of  the  other  fruits  proved  too  great  to  resist. 

General  Shafter  landed  on  the  27th,  and  rode  at  once 
to  the  front,  in  order  to  consult  with  General  Wheeler 
and  the  division  commanders  and  look  over  the  field  of 
operations.  A  few  cases  of  sickness  had  appeared,  due 
to  the  intense  heat  of  midday,  the  dampness  of  the 
climate,  and  the  inadequate  equipment  of  the  troops. 
The  nights  were  cool,  and  many  of  the  men  seriously 
felt  the  need  of  the  blankets  and  woollen  clothing  which 
they  had  thrown  away  in  the  distress  of  the  march,  and 
which  the  Cubans  had  hastened  to  pick  up.  The  inor 
dinate  indulgence  of  many  in  the  forbidden  fruits  of  the 
country  aided  in  producing  sickness,  and  it  became 
necessary  to  provide  a  fixed  hospital.  This  was  estab 
lished  at  Siboney,  trained  nurses  and  the  necessary  con 
veniences  being  landed  from  the  transport  Iroquois.  The 
dreaded  scourge  of  yellow  fever  had  not  yet  appeared 
among  the  troops,  but  some  cases  were  reported  by  the 
Cubans,  and  it  might  at  any  time  attack  the  unacclimated 
Americans. 


250  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

Though  the  enemy  had  withdrawn  from  their  outpost 
positions,  there  was  reason  to  believe  that  a  stubborn 
defence  of  their  interior  works  would  be  made.  Scouts 
reported  that  the  top  of  every  hill  north  and  east  of  the 
city  was  occupied  by  block-houses,  whence  the  move 
ments  of  the  invading  army  could  be  observed,  while 
intrenchments  were  visible  on  every  knoll  and  bit  of 
high  ground  fronting  the  city  itself.  These  trenches 
were  dug  to  suit  the  conformation  of  the  ground,  over 
lapping  where  breaks  in  the  line  occurred,  thus  securing 
safe  retreat  to  an  inner  line  if  an  outer  trench  should  be 
captured.  Four  parallel  lines  of  rifle-pits,  shoulder  deep, 
were  reported  as  existing,  in  front  of  which  were  marked 
ranges  and  several  rows  of  barbed-wire  fences.  The 
work  of  defence  had  been  carefully  provided  for,  and  to 
many  experienced  officers  it  appeared  as  if  nothing  could 
be  done  until  more  artillery  was  brought  up,  and  that  a 
regular  siege  might  be  necessary. 

This  was  not  General  Shafter's  opinion.  The  situa 
tion  was  a  difficult  one  and  delay  was  dangerous.  With 
a  large  body  of  unacclimated  men,  exposed  to  hot  suns 
by  day  and  cool  winds  by  night,  under  tropical  rains 
that  kept  the  ground  constantly  moist,  immediate  action 
seemed  imperatively  necessary.  Sickness  threatened, 
and  fever  might  prove  more  difficult  to  combat  than  the 
Spaniards  with  all  their  rifle-pits  and  wire  fences.  And 
deliberation  does  not  seem  to  have  been  General  Shafter'  s 
idea  of  war.  Whatever  might  have  been  done  under  a 
more  cautious  commander,  we  are  only  concerned  with 
what  was  done,  and  that  was  to  throw  the  American 
army  upon  the  Spanish  works  within  a  week  from  the 
day  they  completed  their  landing  on  Cuban  soil. 

At  set  of  sun  on  the  closing  day  of  June  a  general 


THE  \VAR  WITH   SPAIN.  251 

order  was  issued  commanding  an  advance  in  force  at 
daybreak  on  the  morrow,  and  before  midnight  every 
man  in  the  army  knew  that  a  desperate  struggle  was  at 
hand.  The  news  put  the  men  in  a  fever  of  excitement  ; 
cheering  and  singing  banished  sleep  for  the  remainder 
of  the  night,  and  from  end  to  end  of  the  line  rang  the 
improvised  strain, — 

"  There'll  be  a  hot  time  in  Santiago  to-morrow." 

At  four  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  July  i,  hundreds  of 
bugles  rang  out  the  reveille  ;  and  before  the  sun  had 
risen  the  line  was  complete.  At  the  extreme  left  was 
General  Duffield  with  the  Thirty-third  Michigan,  his 
command  having  reached  the  Aguadores  bridge  by  train. 
Next  to  the  northeast  was  General  Kent's  division,  a 
mile  and  a  half  from  the  sea  and  held  as  a  reserve  force. 
The  centre  of  the  line  was  held  by  a  cavalry  division 
which,  until  General  Wheeler  arrived  at  noon,  was  com 
manded  by  General  Sumner.  Owing  to  General  Young's 
illness,  Colonel  Wood  of  the  Rough  Riders  commanded 
his  brigade,  which  consisted  of  the  First  volunteer,  the 
First  regular,  the  Tenth  regular,  and  one  battalion  of  the 
Ninth  regular  cavalry,  all  dismounted  with  the  excep 
tion  of  two  troops.  On  the  extreme  right  was  General 
Lawton's  division,  fully  five  miles  from  the  sea. 

Military  balloons  were  in  use  by  the  signal  corps  for 
the  purpose  of  gaining  exact  information  of  the  location 
of  the  enemy  and  the  character  of  their  defences.  One 
of  these  was  sent  up  on  the  morning  of  the  battle,  rising 
over  the  tree-tops  and  being  guided  along  three  miles  of 
the  road  towards  the  lines  of  the  enemy.  Photographs 
were  taken  of  the  fortifications  as  it  proceeded,  the 


252  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

Spaniards  firing  at  it  whenever  it  halted  for  this  purpose. 
It  approached  until  it  hung  over  San  Juan,  not  more 
than  five  hundred  yards  from  the  enemy,  who  for  five 
minutes  vainly  sought  to  puncture  it.  In  the  end,  how 
ever,  it  was  pierced  and  came  down  with  a  run,  its  mis 
sion  ended  for  that  day  of  battle. 

The  balloon  had  been  of  some  service,  but  on  the 
whole  did  more  harm  than  good.  The  position  of  the 
advancing  troops,  masked  by  the  bushes  from  the  enemy, 
was  revealed  by  this  trailing  globe,  which  served  as  a 
signal  to  direct  the  fire  of  the  Spaniards.  As  a  result 
the  advancing  lines  suffered  severely,  the  observation 
balloon  being  responsible  for  a  considerable  increase  in 
dead  and  wounded  in  the  American  ranks.  The  soldiers 
had  nothing  but  anathemas  for  this  new  idea  in  warfare. 

The  conflict  of  July  i  was  mainly  concentrated  about 
two  strong  positions  of  the  enemy.  General  Lawton's 
division,  forming  the  right  wing  of  the  army,  faced  the 
picturesque  old  town  of  El  Caney,  a  suburban  place  of 
residence  for  wealthy  citizens  of  Santiago,  from  which  it 
lay  about  four  miles  to  the  northeast.  Looking  down 
from  the  ridge  which  they  occupied,  Lawton's  men  saw 
in  the  broad  valley  below  them  this  quaint  old  town. 
The  valley  was  three  miles  wide.  It  had  been  a  garden 
spot  in  times  of  peace,  but  now  the  abandoned  planta 
tions  were  filled  with  a  rank  tropical  growth,  including 
numbers  of  the  formerly  cultivated  cocoanut-  and  mango- 
trees.  Bordering  it  on  the  west  rose  a  low  ridge,  on 
which  were  visible  the  Spanish  barracks  and  a  large  red 
building  flying  the  Red  Cross  flag.  This  was  the  Reina 
Mercedes  Hospital,  then  the  prison  of  Lieutenant  Hob- 
son  and  his  gallant  seven.  Opposite,  on  the  northern 
side  of  the  valley,  extended  a  broad  plateau,  accessible 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN.  253 

by  a  good  road.  This  was  the  key  to  Santiago,  since 
artillery  planted  there  would  command  the  city.  To 
win  it  was  the  purpose  of  General  Lawton's  proposed 
move. 

East  of  the  city,  in  front  of  Colonel  Wood's  brigade, 
lay  the  village  of  San  Juan,  crowning  a  steep  hill  which 
was  well  fortified  and  defended  by  cannon,  and  which 
threatened,  in  the  absence  of  sufficient  artillery,  to  be 
very  difficult  to  take.  Barracks  and  other  buildings  oc 
cupied  the  crest.  Nearer  the  coast,  where  the  railroad 
crossed  San  Juan  River,  stood  the  village  of  Aguadores, 
garrisoned  by  Spanish  troops. 

The  condition  of  the  Americans  was  excellent.  De 
spite  the  drenching  rains  and  the  hot  sun,  little  sickness 
had  shown  itself,  and  the  men  were  eager  for  the  fight. 
In  preparation  for  the  final  assault  upon  Santiago  sixty 
tried  men  in  each  brigade,  non-commissioned  officers 
and  privates,  had  been  promoted  to  be  wire-clippers, 
their  duty  being  to  precede  the  firing-line  about  two  or 
three  hundred  yards  for  the  purpose  of  cutting  the 
barbed-wire  fences  that  obstructed  the  way  to  the  city. 
Their  mission  was  a  most  hazardous  one,  as  they  would 
be  exposed  to  the  fire  of  their  comrades  as  well  as  that 
of  the  enemy.  But  in  the  general  enthusiasm  there  was 
no  difficulty  in  obtaining  volunteers  for  this  perilous  task. 
The  use  of  barbed  wire  was  a  new  device  in  defensive 
warfare,  and  could  be  met  only  by  some  such  method 
as  this. 

The  great  disadvantage  of  the  army  lay  in  the  lack  of 
artillery.  The  heavy  siege-guns  were  still  at  Baiquiri. 
It  had  proved  impossible  to  convey  them  over  the 
muddy  roads,  and  General  Shafter  concluded  not  to 
wait  for  them.  The  only  guns  at  the  front  were  four 


254  THE   WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

batteries  of  light  artillery,  sixteen  guns  in  all,  where  fully 
five  times  that  many  should  have  been  in  the  line.  Of 
these  only  eight  were  actually  brought  into  use.  It  was 
a  battle  in  which  infantry  did  the  work  of  artillery,  and 
did  it  well  and  nobly,  though  suffering  severely  from  the 
lack  of  guns. 

At  five  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  ist  General 
Lawton's  troops  were  put  in  motion,  preceded  by  a  bat 
tery  of  the  First  Artillery  under  Captain  Allyn  Capron, 
father  of  the  Captain  Capron  who  fell  at  La  Quasimas. 
The  plan  of  the  battle  was  for  Captain  Capron' s  battery, 
which  held  a  position  in  the  centre,  above  General  Lud- 
low,  to  shell  the  fort  near  the  town  ;  for  General  Chaffee 
to  close  in  as  soon  as  the  artillery  had  reduced  the  fort 
and  driven  the  Spaniards  towards  Santiago  ;  for  General 
Ludlow  to  lie  in  the  road  below  the  hill  on  which  Cap 
tain  Capron' s  battery  was  stationed  and  swing  in  on 
General  Chaffee' s  left,  and  for  Colonel  Miles' s  brigade 
to  keep  close  to  General  Ludlow' s  right,  and  by  a  si 
multaneous  movement  sweep  the  Spaniards  in  towards 
Caney.  At  6.40  the  battery  opened  fire  upon  the  fort, 
the  first  shot  falling  close  by,  the  second  hitting  it  fairly. 
This  accurate  firing  was  too  much  for  the  valor  of  the 
garrison,  who  ran  in  a  body  down  the  hill  towards  the 
town.  The  covered  way  in  front  of  the  fort,  however, 
was  held  by  the  Spanish  troops,  who  maintained  an 
obstinate  fire  upon  our  men  as  they  advanced  slowly 
through  the  brush  and  groves,  firing  only  an  occasional 
shot. 

Captain  Capron' s  battery  opened  on  the  enemy  at 
once  and  tore  up  the  ground  with  shells.  A  number  of 
these  were  sent  entirely  through  the  fort,  tearing  down 
large  sections  of  the  walls.  This  fine  marksmanship  was 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  255 

of  great  service,  the  battery  stopping  the  fire  of  the 
Spanish  soldiers,  who  opened  repeatedly  from  the  cov 
ered-way  pits.  By  eight  o'clock  General  Chaffee's 
brigade  was  pressing  in  towards  the  town,  and  the  firing 
at  intervals  was  very  warm.  It  was  difficult,  however, 
to  see  anything  of  the  battle,  owing  to  the  rolling  nature 
of  the  ground  and  the  dense  vegetation  that  obscured  the 
view  in  almost  every  direction. 

The  firing  continued  heavy,  but  the  Spaniards  in  the 
covered  way  made  a  most  obstinate  defence  and  refused 
to  yield  an  inch.  Time  and  again  the  shells  from  Cap 
tain  Capron's  battery  drove  them  to  cover,  but  as  soon 
as  his  fire  ceased  they  were  up  and  at  it  again.  In  con 
sequence,  despite  the  hot  fire  of  the  American  troops, 
they  were  able  to  make  but  little  apparent  progress 
during  the  morning,  although  eventually  they  steadily 
drew  in  and  enclosed  the  town  on  all  sides. 

Up  to  the  middle  of  the  day  the  Second  Massachusetts 
sustained  the  heaviest  losses,  although  other  regiments 
were  more  actively  engaged.  During  the  afternoon 
the  conflict  continued  with  the  greatest  obstinacy,  the 
Spaniards  fighting  under  cover  and  the  Americans  in  the 
open.  The  Spaniards  fought  with  unexpected  courage 
and  persistence,  clinging  to  their  positions  with  an  un 
yielding  determination  that  caused  great  loss  on  the 
American  side.  General  Lawton's  report  emphasizes  at 
once  the  difficulties  overcome  by  the  Americans  and  the 
valor  of  the  Spaniards.  He  says, — 

*  *  It  may  not  be  out  of  place  to  call  attention  to  the 
peculiar  character  of  the  battle,  it  having  been  fought 
against  an  enemy  fortified  and  intrenched  within  a  com 
pact  town  of  stone  and  concrete  houses,  some  with  walls 
several  feet  thick,  and  supported  by  a  number  of  covered 


256  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

forts  cut  in  solid  stone,  and  the  enemy  continuing  to  re 
sist  until  nearly  every  man  was  killed  or  wounded, — a 
desperation  apparently  predetermined." 

At  noon  it  became  evident  that  the  fire  from  the 
covered  way  could  not  be  stopped  by  the  artillery  alone, 
and  that  no  permanent  advance  could  be  made  until  the 
place  was  taken,  and  General  Lawton  decided  to  capture 
it  by  assault.  Accordingly  he  sent  a  messenger  to  Gen 
eral  Chaffee  with  instructions  to  take  the  position  by  a 
charge.  General  Chaffee  thereupon  closed  in  with  his 
men  rapidly  from  the  north,  while  Captain  Capron  main 
tained  a  heavy  fire  on  the  fort,  keeping  the  Spaniards  in 
the  covered  way  and  making  hole  after  hole  in  the  stone 
walls.  Shortly  afterwards  he  threw  a  shot  from  the  bat 
tery  which  tore  away  the  flagstaff,  bringing  the  Spanish 
flag  to  the  ground.  It  was  not  raised  again. 

At  three  o'clock  the  advanced  line  of  General  Chaffee' s 
skirmishers,  the  Seventh  Infantry,  began  to  appear  on 
the  edge  of  the  woods  below  the  fort,  and  by  rapid  rushes 
advanced  up  the  hill  towards  it.  No  shot  was  fired  as 
they  swept  forward,  and  it  was  evident  that  the  covered 
way  had  been  abandoned.  In  a  few  minutes  the  American 
troops  were  thick  around  the  fort,  which  commanded  the 
north  side  of  the  town.  The  Spaniards  were  completely 
surrounded.  The  main  part  of  the  army  was  between 
them  and  Santiago,  and  General  Lawton' s  division  was 
around  them  on  the  other  three  sides.  They  retreated 
to  buildings  in  the  town,  and  made  a  gallant  defence, 
but  from  the  time  General  Chaffee' s  men  took  the  stone 
fort  they  were  lost  troops  to  Spain. 

Rather  than  attempt  to  take  the  town  by  a  general 
assault,  without  the  aid  of  artillery,  which  must  certainly 
result  in  a  great  loss  of  life,  General  Lawton  decided  to 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN.  257 

order  forward  artillery  to  shell  it  at  close  range.  Al 
though  the  road  from  the  hill  to  the  edge  of  the  town 
was  nearly  impassable  for  artillery,  Captain  Capron  made 
the  effort,  and  by  five  o'clock  had  his  guns  in  position 
to  open  upon  it. 

For  some  time  General  Chaffee'  s  brigade  held  its  posi 
tion  behind  the  stone  fort,  and  then  began  the  descent 
towards  the  town,  firing  rapid  volleys  as  it  advanced. 
General  Ludlow  and  Colonel  Miles  pressed  closely  in 
on  the  other  sides,  and  at  nightfall  El  Caney  was  practi 
cally  in  the  hands  of  the  Americans,  and  a  large  number 
of  prisoners  had  been  taken. 

The  valley  in  which  this  battle  was  fought  was  inter 
sected  by  several  ridges  of  fifty  feet  or  less  in  height. 
Groves  of  cocoanut-  and  mango-trees  rose  here  and  there, 
divided  by  broad  fields  of  grass,  often  waist-high.  It 
was  in  crossing  the  ridges  and  open  spaces  that  the 
Americans  suffered  most  severely,  and  this  was  particu 
larly  the  case  with  Ludlow' s  and  Miles' s  men,  who  were 
compelled  to  make  their  final  charges  across  an  open 
space  through  which  the  Spanish  fire  swept  with  deadly 
effect. 

No  finer  work  has  ever  been  done  by  soldiers  than  was 
done  by  these  brigades  as  they  closed  in  on  the  town. 
The  Spanish  blazed  at  them  with  Mausers  and  machine- 
guns,  but  without  checking  their  advance  ;  nothing  could 
stop  them.  They  pushed  in  closer  and  closer  during 
the  afternoon,  and  by  the  time  General  Chaff ee's  men 
were  in  form  Miles  and  Ludlow  were  on  the  skirts  of 
the  town,  holding  on  with  tenacity  and  preventing  the 
Spaniards  from  retreating  towards  Santiago,  while  Chaf 
fee  closed  in  on  the  right. 

As  evidence  of  the  opinion  of  American  courage  en- 
17 


258  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

tertained  by  the  Spanish,  a  quotation  from  the  narrative 
of  an  officer  who  took  part  in  the  battle  will  be  in 
place  : 

1 '  The  enemy' s  fire  was  incessant,  and  we  answered 
with  equal  rapidity.  I  have  never  seen  anything  to 
equal  the  courage  and  dash  of  those  Americans,  who, 
stripped  to  the  waist,  offered  their  naked  breasts  to  our 
murderous  fire,  and  literally  threw  themselves  on  our 
trenches,  on  the  very  muzzles  of  our  guns. 

' '  Our  execution  must  have  been  terrible.  We  had 
the  advantage  of  our  position  and  mowed  them  down  by 
the  hundreds,  but  they  never  retreated  or  fell  back  an 
inch.  As  one  man  fell  shot  through  the  heart,  another 
would  take  his  place,  with  grim  determination  and  un 
flinching  devotion  to  duty  in  every  line  of  his  face. 
Their  gallantry  was  heroic.  We  wondered  at  these 
men,  who  fought  like  lions  and  fell  like  men,  courting  a 
wholesale  massacre,  which  could  well  have  been  avoided 
had  they  only  kept  up  their  firing  without  storming  our 
trenches." 

On  the  extreme  left  General  Duffield  had  begun  the 
day's  fighting  by  an  attack  on  the  coast  village  of  Agua- 
dores,  in  which  he  was  aided  by  the  fire  of  the  war- 
vessels  New  York,  Gloucester,  and  Suwanee,  which 
actively  shelled  the  fort  and  the  rifle-pits,  driving  all  the 
Spaniards  from  the  vicinity.  The  railroad  bridge  which 
crossed  the  little  San  Juan  River  was  down,  and  the 
troops  were  unable  to  occupy  the  town,  though  the 
Spaniards  did  not  seem  inclined  to  hold  it. 

Meanwhile,  a  hot  engagement  had  been  in  progress  at 
San  Juan,  between  Aguadores  and  El  Caney  and  on  the 
main  road  from  Siboney  to  Santiago.  Here  was,  as  has 
been  said,  a  steep  hill,  strongly  fortified,  and  likely  to 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  259 

be  very  difficult  to  take  in  the  absence  of  sufficient 
artillery.  On  the  morning  of  July  i  Wheeler's  cav 
alry  division  moved  forward  by  the  Santiago  road  and 
formed  its  line  with  its  left  near  the  road,  and  Kent's 
infantry  division  did  the  same,  its  right  joining  the  left 
of  the  cavalry  division.  The  men  were  all  compelled  to 
wade  the  San  Juan  River  to  get  into  line,  and  this  they 
did  under  a  very  heavy  infantry  and  artillery  fire  from 
the  Spanish  works  on  the  crest  of  the  hill,  which  rose 
before  them  some  three  hundred  feet  high.  Men  and  offi 
cers  fell  in  numbers  as  they  emerged  into  the  open  space 
in  full  view  of  the  enemy,  and  their  position  became  a 
very  trying  one. 

A  charge  by  these  troops  seems  not  to  have  been  con 
templated,  they  being  held  in  column  on  the  road  to 
reinforce  General  Lawton,  if  necessary,  while  Grimes' s 
battery  made  a  diversion  on  the  left.  But  when  the 
Spanish  guns  began  to  drop  shells  over  the  road 
which  they  occupied,  and  when  word  of  General 
Lawton' s  success  reached  them,  a  movement  of  advance 
or  retreat  became  necessary.  Anything  was  better  than 
to  remain  where  they  were.  It  was,  as  we  have  before 
said,  the  observation  balloon,  which  was  drawn  forward 
by  the  troops  as  they  advanced  and  hung  in  the  air  above 
them,  that  directed  the  fire  of  the  Spanish  artillerymen, 
whose  shells  reached  the  waiting  columns  in  the  road 
and  caused  severe  loss. 

Grimes' s  battery  took  a  position  in  the  little  town  of 
El  Paso,  from  which  the  Spaniards  had  been  driven  by 
the  sharp  musketry  fire  of  the  cavalry  division,  and 
from  here  it  protected  the  advance  by  pouring  a  steady 
fire  into  the  Spanish  works. 

The  line  was  no  sooner  formed  than  an  advance  began, 


260  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

as  if  by  a  general  impulse.  The  men  simply  could  not 
stand  at  rest  under  the  punishment  they  were  receiving. 
"  It  was  evident,"  said  General  Wheeler  in  his  report, 
"that  we  were  as  much  under  fire  in  forming  the  line 
as  we  could  be  by  an  advance,  and  I  therefore  pressed 
the  command  forward  from  the  covering  under  which  it 
was  formed.  It  emerged  into  open  space  in  full  view  of 
the  enemy,  who  occupied  breastworks  and  batteries  on 
the  crest  of  the  hill  which  overlooks  Santiago,  officers 
and  men  falling  at  every  step.  The  troops  advanced 
gallantly,  soon  reached  the  foot  of  the  hill,  and  ascended, 
driving  the  enemy  from  their  works  and  occupying  them 
on  the  crest  of  the  hill.  To  accomplish  this  required 
courage  and  determination  of  a  high  order  on  the  part  of 
the  officers  and  men,  and  the  losses  were  very  severe. ' ' 

In  the  charge  of  the  Rough  Riders,  Colonel  Roose 
velt  led  the  way,  the  only  mounted  man  in  the  line.  It 
was  little  short  of  a  miracle  that  he  came  through  that 
desperate  charge  alive.  In  truth,  the  whole  line  be 
haved  with  the  most  conspicuous  gallantry,  and  that 
wild  climb  up  a  steep  hill  in  the  face  of  a  murderous  fire 
was  one  of  the  most  courageous  actions  ever  performed 
by  American  troops.  Apparently,  the  Spanish,  though 
well  capable  of  bearing  punishment  when  intrenched, 
could  not  stand  such  a  charge.  In  the  reports  of  the 
battle  from  Santiago  the  American  troops  were  claimed 
to  have  been  beaten,  the  Spaniards  retiring  only  because 
the  Americans  "persisted  in  fighting."  Evidently  they 
belonged  to  the  class  of  men  who  ' '  do  not  know  when 
they  are  whipped. ' ' 

C.  E.  Hand,  the  correspondent  of  the  London  Daily 
Mail,  thus  graphically  describes  the  taking  of  the  San 
Juan  heights,  as  seen  by  him  from  a  distance  : 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  261 

' '  When  afternoon  came — I  lost  exact  count  of  time — 
there  was  still  a  jumble  of  volleying  over  by  Caney. 
But  in  front  our  men  were  away  out  of  sight  behind  a 
ridge  far  ahead.  Beyond  there  arose  a  long,  steepish 
ascent,  crowned  by  the  block-house  upon  which  artillery 
had  opened  fire  in  the  morning. 

"  Suddenly,  as  we  looked  through  our  glasses,  we  saw 
a  little  black  ant  go  scrambling  quickly  up  this  hill,  and 
an  inch  or  two  behind  him  a  ragged  line  of  other  little 
ants,  and  then  another  line  of  ants  at  another  part  of  the 
hill,  and  then  another,  until  it  seemed  as  if  somebody 
had  dug  a  stick  into  a  great  ants'  nest  down  in  the 
valley,  and  all  the  ants  were  scrambling  away  up-hill. 
Then  the  volley  firing  began  ten  times  more  furious  than 
before  ;  from  the  right  beyond  the  top  of  the  ridge  burst 
upon  the  ants  a  terrible  fire  of  shells  ;  from  the  block 
house  in  front  of  them  machine-guns  sounded  their  con 
tinuous  rattle.  But  the  ants  swept  up  the  hill.  They 
seemed  to  us  to  thin  out  as  they  went  forward  ;  but  they 
still  went  forward.  It  was  incredible,  but  it  was  grand. 
The  boys  were  storming  the  hill.  The  military  authori 
ties  were  most  surprised.  They  were  not  surprised  at 
these  splendid  athletic  dare-devils  of  ours  doing  it,  but 
that  a  military  commander  should  have  allowed  a  forti 
fied  and  intrenched  position  to  be  assailed  by  an  infantry 
charge  up  the  side  of  a  long,  exposed  hill,  swept  by  a 
terrible  artillery  fire,  frightened  them,  not  so  much  by 
its  audacity  as  by  its  terrible  cost  in  human  life. 

' '  As  they  neared  the  top  the  different  lines  came 
nearer  together.  One  moment  they  went  a  little  more 
slowly,  then  they  nearly  stopped,  then  they  went  on 
again  faster  than  ever,  and  then  all  of  us  sitting  there  on 
the  top  of  the  battery  cried  with  excitement.  For  the 


262 


THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 


ants  were  scrambling  all  round  the  block-house  on  the 
ridge,  and  in  a  moment  or  two  we  saw  them  inside  it. 
But  then  our  hearts  swelled  up  into  our  throats,  for  a 
fearful  fire  came  from  somewhere  beyond  the  block 
house  and  from  somewhere  to  the  right  of  it  and  some 
where  to  the  left  of  it.  Then  we  saw  the  ants  come 
scrambling  down  the  hill  again.  They  had  taken  a 
position  which  they  had  not  the  force  to  hold.  But  a 
moment  or  two  and  up  they  scrambled  again,  more  of 


TtosCa 


••  Americana 
HH  Spanish. 


Battle  of  SANTIAGO 

SCALE  OF  MILES 


them,  and  more  quickly  than  before,  and  up  the  other 
face  of  the  hill  to  the  left  went  other  lines,  and  the  ridge 
was  taken,  and  the  block-house  was  ours,  and  the 
trenches  were  full  of  dead  Spaniards. 

"It  was  a  grand  achievement, — for  the  soldiers  who 
shared  it, — this  storming  of  the  hill  leading  up  from  the 
San  Juan  River  to  the  ridge  before  the  main  fort.  We 
could  tell  so  much  at  two  thousand  five  hundred  and 
sixty  yards.  But  we  also  knew  that  it  had  cost  them 


THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN.  263 

dear.  Later  on  we  knew  only  too  well  how  heavy  the 
cost  was. ' ' 

At  nightfall  the  Americans  held  every  point  for  which 
they  had  fought,  and  two  thousand  prisoners  were  in 
their  hands,  the  fruits  of  the  capture  of  El  Caney. 
General  Lawton  occupied  the  plateau  on  the  north, 
Generals  Kent  and  Wheeler  held  the  position  at  San 
Juan,  and  Aguadores  had  been  evacuated  by  the  enemy. 
The  army  had  fought  its  way  across  two  and  a  half  miles 
of  strongly  fortified  and  hotly  contested  country,  and 
reached  a  position  in  which  its  guns  commanded  the  city 
of  Santiago.  In  this  work  nearly  the  entire  army  had 
been  engaged,  with  four  thousand  of  Garcia' s  Cuban 
auxiliaries.  But  this  success  had  not  been  gained  with 
out  severe  loss,  hundreds  of  killed  and  wounded  attest 
ing  the  valor  with  which  the  Americans  had  fought  and 
the  persistency  with  which  the  Spaniards  had  held  their 
ground. 

The  Spanish  retreat  from  the  crest  of  San  Juan  hill 
was  precipitate,  but  the  men  were  too  exhausted  to 
follow,  while  their  shoes  were  soaked  with  water  from 
wading  the  San  Juan  and  their  clothes  were  drenched 
with  rain.  It  was  afterwards  asserted  that  had  the  pur 
suit  been  continued  the  demoralized  Spaniards  would 
have  surrendered  that  night,  but  a  pursuit  was  physically 
impossible.  Yet,  despite  the  exhausted  condition  of 
the  men,  they  labored  during  the  night  in  erecting 
breastworks,  doing  their  best  to  excavate  the  rocky  soil 
with  shovels  and  picks.  General  Wheeler  was  appealed 
to  by  many  officers  to  withdraw  and  take  up  a  stronger 
position  farther  back,  his  lines  being  so  thin  on  account 
of  his  losses  during  the  day,  and  his  men  so  worn  out 
that  it  seemed  doubtful  if  they  could  hold  their  own 


264  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

against  an  assault.  He  refused,  however,  fearing  to  lose 
prestige  for  the  troops  by  a  reverse  movement. 

At  dawn  on  Saturday  the  battle  began  again,  the 
Spaniards  making  a  desperate  effort  on  that  day  to  re 
gain  the  positions  they  had  lost.  The  four  batteries  of 
artillery  were  placed  in  position,  and  opened  fire  on  the 
San  Juan  quarter  of  the  city  and  the  works  in  front  of 
the  American  right.  One  of  these  batteries,  that  of 
Major  Diffenbach,  was  advanced  to  a  position  within  four 
hundred  yards  of  the  Spanish  lines,  where  it  was  exposed 
to  so  hot  a  fire  that  the  men  could  load  only  while  lying 
down,  and  were  soon  forced  to  withdraw.  The  fleet  in 
the  harbor  added  to  the  din  of  battle,  Admiral  Cervera 
sending  in  many  shells  which  exploded  close  to  the  in- 
trenchments.  Admiral  Sampson  also  took  part  in  the 
work,  his  great  guns  at  intervals  sending  shells  which 
exploded  within  the  city  limits. 

On  this  day  the  Americans  fought  mainly  on  the  de 
fensive,  holding  the  earthworks  which  they  had  thrown 
up  during  the  night,  and  from  which  the  enemy  sought 
in  vain  to  dislodge  them.  At  about  ten  o'clock  the 
Spanish  infantry  made  a  vigorous  charge  upon  the 
American  lines,  driving  back  the  men  in  one  or  two 
places.  But  they  quickly  rallied,  and  in  turn  drove  the 
enemy  into  their  trenches,  numbers  of  them  falling  before 
the  hot  rifle-fire  of  the  American  troops.  The  loss  this 
day  was  small,  as  the  men  fought  mainly  under  cover. 
The  Spaniards  lost  heavily.  One  result  of  the  morn 
ing's  fight  was  the  capture  of  two  hundred  Spanish 
soldiers  and  sixty-two  officers,  who  were  marched  to  the 
rear  with  the  prisoners  of  the  day  before. 

An  element  of  the  fight  that  exasperated  the  men  was 
the  discovery  of  many  sharp-shooters  in  the  trees  along 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN.  265 

the  trail.  The  courage  of  these  guerillas  cannot  be  over 
estimated,  as  they  were  absolutely  cut  off  from  their 
own  forces,  but  their  barbarity  is  beyond  belief.  They 
kept  up  a  steady  fire  on  a  dressing-station  of  the  field 
hospital,  and  before  their  hiding-places  were  discovered 
had  killed  and  wounded  many  surgeons  and  others  of 
the  hospital  corps,  besides  soldiers  who  were  already 
wounded.  A  detail  was  sent  into  the  woods  to  scout 
for  these  men,  and  a  number  of  them  were  discovered  in 
the  branches  of  trees  and  disposed  of.  Their  programme 
also  included  picking  off  officers  and  aides  passing  be 
neath  them  along  the  trail.  For  a  long  time  their  fire 
was  supposed  to  be  spent  bullets  of  the  enemy. 

On  the  3d  the  army  rested,  so  far  as  the  fire  of  the 
enemy  would  permit.  The  lack  of  artillery  prevented 
any  farther  advance,  and  little  reply  was  made  to  the 
infantry  fire  during  the  night.  The  situation  was  as 
follows  :  Santiago  rises  from  the  harbor  to  the  crest  of  a 
long  hill,  three-quarters  of  a  mile  back  from  which  rise 
the  hills  of  San  Juan,  which  were  held  by  our  army.  El 
Caney  and  the  commanding  plateau  to  the  north  were 
in  American  possession.  In  these  positions  the  troops 
had  strongly  intrenched  themselves,  but  they  were  nearly 
exhausted  from  their  long  and  severe  struggle  in  the 
heat  and  rain,  and  from  the  lack  of  sleep  and  of  food. 
Their  position  would  have  been  a  critical  one  had  the 
enemy  been  in  any  condition  for  an  assault  in  force.  But 
they  had  suffered  still  more  severely  than  the  Americans, 
and  equally  needed  rest  and  recuperation. 

This  battle  was  fought  with  the  general  in  command 
invalided  two  miles  in  the  rear.  He  had  been  overcome 
by  the  heat  on  the  day  before  its  opening,  and  lay  in  his 
tent.  General  Wheeler  was  also  sick,  but  rose  from  his 


266  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  . 

bed  and  reached  the  front  about  noon.  The  losses  of 
the  three  days'  fight,  as  reported  by  General  Shafter, 
were  21  officers  and  205  men  killed,  77  officers  and  1197 
men  wounded,  84  men  missing,  making  a  total  of  1584. 
The  Spanish  loss  was  much  heavier,  as  they  clung  to 
their  rifle-pits  until  they  were  shot  dead  in  windrows. 
General  Linares,  their  commander-in-chief,  was  badly 
wounded,  and  General  Vara  del  Rey,  their  second  in 
command,  was  killed  upon  the  field. 

The  work  of  the  American  soldiers  in  this  desperate 
conflict  was  of  the  most  admirable  character.  Not  a 
man  of  them  had  ever  faced  an  army  in  battle  before. 
They  were  very  largely  raw  troops,  only  about  two 
months  in  service.  They  confronted  an  enemy  their 
equal  in  numbers  and  strongly  posted  in  intrenchments 
and  rifle-pits,  which  they  held  with  obstinate  energy. 
They  were  sadly  deficient  in  artillery,  and  had  to  trust 
mainly  to  the  rifle  and  the  bayonet.  Yet,  with  a  vim 
and  valor  which  foreign  observers  designated  as  superb, 
they  rushed  upon  the  works  of  the  foe,  pushing  forward 
with  grim  determination,  never  for  a  moment  giving 
way,  inspired  apparently  by  the  single  thought  that  they 
were  there  to  win  the  posts  of  the  enemy,  and  must  do 
it  through  blood  and  death,  and  persisting  until  all  these 
posts  were  in  their  hands,  their  defenders  dead,  captive, 
or  in  flight.  It  was  truly  a  remarkable  instance  of  Amer 
ican  courage  and  self-reliance,  and  the  battle  of  Santiago 
must  take  its  place  in  history  among  the  most  glorious 
of  those  in  which  American  soldiers  have  fought. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

THE  FATE  OF  CERVERA'S  FLEET. 

WHILE  the  army  was  doing  such  good  work  on  shore 
the  navy  was  doing  as  good  work  at  sea,  the  final  day  of 
the  land  battle,  July  3,  being  made  famous  by  one  of  the 
most  brilliant  exploits  in  the  history  of  the  American 
navy.  Before  describing  this  event,  however,  there  are 
some  minor  naval  occurrences  to  be  mentioned.  It  has 
already  been  stated  that  one  of  Cervera's  ships,  the 
torpedo-boat  destroyer  Terror,  did  not  accompany  the 
fleet  to  Santiago.  It  remained  at  Fort-de-France,  Mar 
tinique,  and  apprehensions  were  entertained  that  its  pur 
pose  there  was  the  capture  of  the  Harvard,  then  repairing 
in  that  port.  Under  the  rules  of  international  law,  how 
ever,  the  Terror  was  not  allowed  to  leave  harbor  until 
the  Harvard  had  time  to  make  a  good  offing,  and  the 
threatened  attack  did  not  take  place. 

The  Terror  was  next  heard  from  at  San  Juan,  Porto 
Rico,  where,  during  the  last  week  in  June,  it  made  an 
attack  on  the  auxiliary  cruiser  Yale.  A  dash  was  made 
by  the  destroyer  for  the  great  liner,  but  its  assault  was 
met  by  a  sharp  fire  from  the  rapid-fire  guns  of  the  Yale. 
These  were  so  effectively  served  that  three  shots  sufficed. 
An  officer  and  two  men  were  killed  and  several  men 
wounded  on  the  Terror,  which  dropped  back  under  the 
batteries  with  difficulty  and  was  towed  into  the  harbor  in 
a  sinking  condition. 

On  the  28th  of  June  President  McKinley  issued  a 

267 


268  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

proclamation  extending  the  blockade  to  the  southern 
coast  of  Cuba,  from  Cape  Francis  to  Cape  Cruz,  and 
also  to  San  Juan,  Porto  Rico.  This  increased  the  length 
of  blockaded  coast  fourfold,  adding  five  hundred  miles 
of  coast-line  to  the  sections  already  under  guard.  The 
new  line  lay  in  the  great  bight  of  the  south  Cuban  coast, 
a  region  of  shallow  water  with  few  ports,  so  that  the  fresh 
work  laid  out  for  the  mosquito  fleet  was  not  very  difficult 
to  perform. 

The  only  remaining  event  of  importance  was  an  attack 
by  three  small  vessels  of  Admiral  Sampson's  fleet  on 
the  Spanish  squadron  at  Manzanillo,  during  which  two 
Spanish  gunboats,  a  sloop,  and  a  pontoon  were  sunk 
and  a  torpedo-boat  and  several  gunboats  considerably 
damaged.  This  work  was  done  by  three  small  craft,  the 
Hist,  the  Hornet,  and  the  Wampatuck,  which  unex 
pectedly  found  nine  vessels  in  the  harbor,  flanked  by 
shore  batteries.  The  Hist,  formerly  a  yacht,  was  hit 
eleven  times,  and  the  Hornet,  also  a  steam  yacht,  was 
disabled  by  a  shell  that  cut  her  main  steam-pipe.  No 
lives  were  lost,  however,  and  the  little  boats  kept  pluckily 
to  their  work,  with  the  results  above  mentioned,  until  the 
injury  to  the  Hornet  compelled  their  withdrawal,  the 
Wampatuck  towing  the  disabled  vessel  out  to  sea. 

We  have  hitherto  said  nothing  about  Spain's  remain 
ing  ships,  the  home  squadron,  composed  of  her  single 
battle-ship,  the  Pelayo,  an  armored  cruiser,  the  Carlos 
V.,  several  torpedo-boat  destroyers,  and  a  number  of 
other  vessels  likely  to  prove  of  very  little  service  in  com 
bat.  This  squadron,  commanded  by  Admiral  Camara, 
had  been  kept  in  port  at  Cadiz,  Spain,  the  government 
indulging  in  threats  to  use  it  for  various  purposes,  but 
remaining  apparently  at  a  loss  how  to  employ  it  to  the 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  269 

best  advantage.  The  first  evidence  that  the  Spanish 
cabinet  had  made  up  its  mind  came  on  June  22,  when 
an  English  captain  reported  that  he  had  seen  the  Cadiz 
squadron  in  the  Mediterranean  bound  eastward.  It  con 
sisted  of  fifteen  ships,  three  of  them  being  torpedo-boats, 
and  several  of  them  transports  laden  with  troops.  The 
secret  was  out.  Manila  was  the  goal.  Admiral  Dewey 
was  to  be  attacked.  On  the  2yth  news  came  that  the 
Spanish  squadron  had  appeared  at  Port  Said,  at  the 
western  end  of  the  Suez  Canal. 

This  news  called  forth  instant  action  on  the  part  of 
the  United  States.  An  ' '  Eastern  Squadron' '  was  at 
once  formed,  under  Admiral  Watson,  including  the  bat 
tle-ships  Iowa  and  Oregon  and  a  number  of  cruisers  and 
colliers,  with  orders  to  proceed  to  the  Spanish  coast, 
with  the  purpose  of  forcing  Camara  to  return  or  of  fol 
lowing  him  to  the  Philippine  Islands.  As  events  turned 
out,  it  was  not  necessary  for  this  squadron  to  sail. 
Camara  was  delayed  at  Port  Said  through  difficulty  in 
obtaining  coal,  but  finally  passed  through  the  Suez  Canal 
into  the  Red  Sea,  only  to  be  hastily  recalled  to  protect 
the  coast  of  Spain.  Soon  his  squadron  was  lumbering 
back  through  the  Mediterranean,  the  ships  the  worse  for 
wear.  A  threat  had  sufficed  to  save  Dewey  from  the 
proposed  attack,  and  the  sailing  of  Watson's  fleet  was 
deferred.  Various  later  dates  were  fixed  for  its  sailing, 
but  subsequent  events  prevented  its  setting  out  at  all. 

Meanwhile,  Sampson's  fleet  was  diligently  keeping 
up  the  blockade  of  Santiago,  occasionally  exchanging 
shots  with  the  forts,  but  principally  maintaining  a  vigi 
lant  watch  over  Cervera's  ships.  As  to  the  manner  in 
which  this  work  was  performed,  we  may  quote  from  the 
admiral's  report : 


270  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

* '  The  harbor  of  Santiago  is  naturally  easy  to  blockade, 
there  being  but  one  entrance,  and  that  a  narrow  one, 
the  deep  water  extending  close  up  to  the  shore-line,  pre 
senting  no  difficulties  of  navigation  outside  of  the  en 
trance.  At  the  time  of  my  arrival  before  the  port,  June 
i,  the  moon  was  at  its  full,  and  there  was  sufficient  light 
during  the  night  to  enable  any  movement  outside  of  the 
entrance  to  be  detected,  but  with  the  waning  of  the 
moon  and  the  coming  of  dark  nights  there  was  opportu 
nity  for  the  enemy  to  escape,  or  for  his  torpedo-boats  to 
make  an  attack  upon  the  blockading  vessels.  It  was 
ascertained  with  fair  conclusiveness  that  the  Merrimac, 
so  gallantly  taken  into  the  channel  on  June  3,  did  not 
obstruct  it.  I  therefore  maintained  the  blockade  as 
follows  :  To  the  battle-ships  was  assigned  the  duty,  in 
turn,  of  lighting  the  channel.  Moving  up  to  the  port, 
at  a  distance  of  from  one  to  two  miles  from  the  Morro, 
dependent  upon  the  condition  of  the  atmosphere,  they 
threw  a  search-light  beam  directly  up  the  channel,  and 
held  it  steadily  there.  This  lightened  up  the  entire 
breadth  of  the  channel  for  half  a  mile  inside  of  the  en 
trance  so  brilliantly  that  the  movement  of  small  boats 
could  be  detected.  Why  the  batteries  never  opened  fire 
upon  the  search-light  ship  was  always  a  matter  of  surprise 
to  me,  but  they  never  did.  Stationed  close  to  the  en 
trance  of  the  port  were  three  picket  launches,  and  at  a 
little  distance  further  out  three  small  picket  vessels,  usu 
ally  converted  yachts,  and,  when  they  were  available, 
one  or  two  of  our  torpedo-boats.  With  this  arrange 
ment  there  was  at  least  a  certainty  that  nothing  could 
get  out  of  the  harbor  undetected.  After  the  arrival  of 
the  army,  when  the  situation  forced  upon  the  Spanish 
admiral  a  decision,  our  vigilance  increased.  The  night 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  271 

blockading  distance  was  reduced  to  two  miles  for  all 
vessels,  and  a  battle-ship  was  placed  alongside  the  search 
light  ship,  with  her  broadside  trained  upon  the  channel 
in  readiness  to  fire  the  instant  a  Spanish  ship  should  ap 
pear.  The  commanding  officers  merit  great  praise  for 
the  perfect  manner  in  which  they  entered  into  this  plan 
and  put  it  into  execution." 

On  July  i,  during  the  battle  on  shore,  the  blockading 
fleet  kept  up  a  steady  fire,  elevating  their  great  guns  and 
sending  shells  into  the  water-line  streets  of  Santiago, 
some  six  miles  away.  This  work  was  continued  at  in 
tervals  for  about  nine  hours  on  that  day,  and  in  the  early 
morning  of  the  2d  the  work  of  bombardment  was  re 
sumed,  Morro  Castle  being  now  the  main  object  of  attack. 
For  two  or  three  hours  shells  were  thrown  into  this  ven 
erable  fortification,  one  shot  from  the  Oregon  bringing 
down  the  Spanish  flag.  The  ships  then  withdrew  to 
their  blockading  stations,  and  the  men  were  given  an 
opportunity  to  rest.  They  needed  it,  for  terrible  work 
awaited  them  during  the  next  day. 

The  threatened  capture  of  Santiago  had  put  the  Spanish 
admiral  in  an  awkward  position.  If  brought  between 
the  fire  of  fleet  and  army  he  might  have  to  yield  without 
a  fight.  This  was  not  to  the  brave  Cervera's  taste  nor 
to  that  of  his  superiors,  for  he  received  peremptory  orders 
from  Madrid  to  leave  the  harbor.  Apparently,  it  was  be 
lieved  that  his  fleet  was  strong  and  swift  enough  to  engage 
and  outsail  the  American  ships.  Cervera  and  his  cap 
tains  decided  to  make  their  dash  for  liberty  on  the  night  of 
Saturday,  July  2,  the  pilots  expecting  to  avail  themselves 
of  the  search-lights  of  the  American  ships  as  guides  in 
passing  the  wreck  of  the  Merrimac.  Cervera' s  orders  were 
to  steam  at  full  speed  to  the  westward  after  clearing  the 


272  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN. 

harbor,  and  to  concentrate  their  fire  upon  the  Brooklyn, 
neglecting  the  other  ships  unless  forced  to  attack  them. 
He  hoped  by  disabling  the  Brooklyn  to  dispose  of  the 
swiftest  and  most  dreaded  of  his  enemies,  trusting  to  the 
speed  of  his  vessels  to  run  away  from  the  battle-ships. 
Reasons  satisfactory  to  himself,  however,  induced  the 
Spanish  admiral  to  change  his  purpose  of  a  midnight 
flight,  and  to  defer  the  hazardous  enterprise  till  the 
morning  of  Sunday,  July  3. 

On  that  eventful  morning  the  American  fleet  lacked 
much  of  its  strength.  The  Massachusetts  was  at  Guan- 
tanamo  Bay  coaling.  With  her  were  the  New  Orleans 
and  the  Newark.  The  New  York  was  also  absent,  having 
steamed  along  the  coast  to  Baiquiri  to  enable  Admiral 
Sampson  to  confer  with  General  Shafter.  This  weaken 
ing  of  the  fleet  had  not  escaped  the  eyes  of  the  Spanish 
scouts,  and  served  to  confirm  Admiral  Cervera  in  his 
purpose.  The  large  ships  left  on  blockade  consisted  of 
the  battle-ships  Iowa,  Indiana,  Oregon,  and  Texas,  and 
Schley's  flag-ship,  the  Brooklyn.  The  Iowa  lay  a  mile 
out  beyond  the  other  vessels,  trying  to  fix  her  forward 
turret,  which  was  out  of  repair,  and  the  Indiana  was  en 
gaged  in  similar  work.  The  distances  of  the  ships  from 
the  harbor's  mouth  varied  from  four  thousand  to  six 
thousand  yards.  The  Brooklyn  and  the  yacht  Vixen 
were  the  only  ships  west  of  the  entrance,  the  others 
having  drifted  well  to  the  east. 

Several  times  during  the  morning  the  lookout  of  the 
Brooklyn  had  reported  smoke  in  the  harbor,  and  at  about 
9.30  Navigator  Hodgson  called  to  him  from  the  bridge, 
"Isn't  that  smoke  moving?"  His  question  was  an 
swered  by  almost  a  yell  from  the  lookout.  "There's  a 
big  ship  coming  out  of  the  harbor,  sir  !' '  Hodgson  sat- 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  273 

isfied  himself  by  a  rapid  glance  of  the  truth  of  this  stirring 
report,  seized  the  megaphone,  and  shouted  in  vigorous 
tones,  ' '  After  bridge,  there  !  Tell  the  commodore  the 
enemy's  fleet  is  coming  out!" 

In  an  instant  the  Sunday  morning  calm  on  the  deck 
was  changed  into  intense  excitement.  ' '  Clear  the  ship 
for  action  !"  cried  the  commodore.  The  signal  of  the 
exciting  news  flew  to  the  masthead  as  a  warning  to  the 
other  vessels,  and  from  all  parts  of  the  ship  the  men 
rushed  to  their  quarters.  Down  below  the  stokers 
hurled  coal  into  the  furnaces,  in  the  turrets  the  gun 
crews  hastily  made  ready  their  pieces,  the  ammunition- 
hoist  was  brought  into  active  service,  and  in  every  sec 
tion  of  the  big  ship  every  man  was  on  the  alert  as  the 
news  spread  with  magical  rapidity. 

The  signal  from  the  Brooklyn  was  matched  by  one 
from  the  Iowa,  on  whose  deck  the  trail  of  drifting  smoke 
had  been  seen  at  the  same  instant,  the  bow  of  the  lead 
ing  Spanish  ship  quickly  appearing  in  the  narrow 
channel  beside  the  sunken  Merrimac.  ' '  There  come 
the  Spaniards  out  of  the  harbor  !'  *  rose  in  a  shout. 
* '  Clear  ship  for  action  !' '  roared  the  answering  com 
mand,  as  the  Spanish  vessels  were  seen  rushing  in  ' '  line 
ahead' '  around  Socapa  Point  and  heading  for  the  open 
sea.  The  Infanta  Maria  Teresa,  Cervera's  flag-ship,  led 
the  line,  followed  by  the  Vizcaya,  the  Almirante  Oquendo, 
and  the  Cristobal  Colon.  They  were  quickly  followed 
by  the  two  torpedo-boat  destroyers. 

"Full  speed  ahead!  Open  fire!"  shouted  Commo 
dore  Schley.  A  stunning  roar  answered  his  words,  as 
the  shells  from  the  8-  and  5-inch  port  guns  of  the 
Brooklyn  began  to  scream  in  their  rapid  flight  towards 
the  fugitives.  The  other  ships  were  as  alert.  As  the 

18 


274  THE   WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

Spaniards  cleared  the  harbor  and  were  observed  to  head 
to  the  west,  the  Oregon  began  to  swing  round  in  the 
same  direction.  The  Texas  was  already  reaching  the 
Maria  Teresa  with  her  shells.  The  Iowa  and  the  Indiana 
were  as  quick.  Hardly  a  minute  passed  from  the  first 
alarm  before  the  whistling  shriek  of  a  rapid-fire  shell  was 
heard  from  the  Iowa's  deck,  and  within  two  minutes 
every  gun  on  the  ship  was  cast  loose,  manned,  loaded, 
and  ready  for  the  signal  to  fire. 

Five  minutes  previously  the  great  ships  had  been 
swinging  lazily  on  the  long  rollers  of  the  sea,  the  men  at 
Sunday  "quarters  for  inspection,"  none  of  them  think 
ing  of  aught  but  the  monotony  of  every-day  duty. 
Now  every  ship  was  belching  clouds  of  black  smoke 
into  the  air,  every  man  was  at  his  post,  his  nerves  strung 
to  fighting  pitch,  every  gun  ready  for  action,  and  every 
ship  moving  with  rapidly-increasing  speed  towards  the 
fugitives.  Not  many  minutes  passed  before  a  fire  was 
concentrated  upon  the  Spanish  ships  such  as  had  hardly 
if  ever  been  equalled  before,  and  with  a  precision  of  aim 
that  had  never  been  surpassed.  The  fugitive  ships  were 
being  rapidly  torn  and  rent  by  a  frightful  shower  of 
shells,  some  of  them  of  enormous  size  and  terrible 
powers  of  destruction. 

The  position  of  the  Brooklyn,  as  the  most  westerly  of 
the  blockading  fleet,  rendered  easy  of  accomplishment 
Cervera's  purpose  of  concentrating  his  fire  on  this  vessel, 
and  for  some  ten  minutes  she  was  made  the  target  of 
three  of  the  enemy's  ships  at  the  short  range  of  fifteen 
hundred  yards,  and  of  the  west  battery  at  three  thousand 
yards  distance.  The  fire  poured  upon  her  was  terrific, 
but  the  harm  done  was  next  to  nothing,  owing  to  the 
unskilful  handling  of  the  Spanish  guns.  At  the  end  of 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  275 

the  interval  named  the  other  vessels,  which  were  closing 
in  rapidly,  diverted  the  fire  of  the  enemy  and  relieved 
the  Brooklyn  from  this  somewhat  too  close  attention. 

While  the  Spanish  ships  were  wasting  nearly  all  their 
shells  upon  the  sea,  the  fire  of  the  American  gunners 
was  remarkably  accurate.  '  *  Fire  deliberately,  and  don' t 
waste  a  shot,"  was  Schley's  order  to  his  gunners,  and 
they  worked  the  guns  as  carefully  as  if  on  practice  duty. 
* '  I  have  never  before  witnessed  such  deadly  and  fatally 
accurate  shooting  as  was  done  by  the  ships  of  your  com 
mand  as  they  closed  in  on  the  Spanish  squadron, ' '  said 
Schley  in  his  report  to  the  admiral ;  and  the  outcome 
indicated  that  this  statement  was  in  no  sense  too  strong. 
The  results  of  the  terrific  bombardment  were,  indeed,  mo 
mentous.  In  twenty-five  minutes  after  the  first  Spanish 
vessel  had  been  sighted  only  two  ships  of  the  squadron 
remained  afloat.  Two  of  the  cruisers  were  on  fire  and 
beached  and  the  torpedo-boats  were  sunk. 

The  Maria  Teresa,  Cervera's  flag-ship,  was  the  first  to 
succumb.  A  shell  from  the  Brooklyn  exploded  in  the 
admiral's  cabin,  and  in  a  minute  the  after  part  of  the  ship 
was  in  flames.  One  from  the  Texas  pierced  the  side 
armor  and  exploded  in  the  engine-room,  breaking  the 
main  steam-pipe.  Shells  were  bursting  all  around  the 
bridge  and  riddling  the  hull  of  the  ship.  The  engineer 
was  signalled  to  start  the  pumps.  No  reply  came,  and 
it  was  found  that  every  one  in  that  part  of  the  ship  had 
been  killed.  Most  of  the  men  had  been  driven  from 
the  guns,  the  flames  were  increasing,  and  resistance  had 
become  hopeless.  The  captain  gave  orders  to  beach  the 
ship  and  haul  down  the  flag.  As  he  spoke,  he  was  struck 
by  a  shell,  and  his  career  came  to  an  end,  the  second 
captain  taking  command.  So  fast  and  furious  was  the 


276  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

American  fire  that  the  smoke  of  bursting  shells  hid  the 
fact  that  the  flag  was  down,  and  the  fire  did  not  cease 
until  a  white  blanket  was  run  up  to  the  peak. 

The  Almirante  Oquendo  was  receiving  as  frightful  a 
baptism  of  fire.  The  Iowa,  after  paying  her  attentions  to 
the  Maria  Teresa,  was  left  in  the  rear  by  that  vessel  and 
found  herself  opposite  the  Oquendo  at  a  distance  of 
eleven  hundred  yards.  Her  entire  battery,  including  the 
rapid-fire  guns,  was  now  opened  on  this  vessel,  and  at 
that  distance  their  work  was  terrible.  Eight-inch  shells 
were  seen  to  explode  inside  the  Spanish  ship,  two  pro 
jectiles  piercing  her  at  the  same  moment,  one  forward 
and  the  other  aft.  For  a  moment  her  engines  stopped 
and  she  lost  headway,  but  she  immediately  regained  her 
speed  and  drew  ahead  of  the  Iowa,  only  to  come  under 
the  guns  of  the  Oregon  and  the  Texas,  by  which  she  was 
cruelly  pounded.  This  punishment  was  more  than  she 
could  endure  ;  she  was  soon  a  mass  of  flames  and,  like 
the  Teresa,  was  headed  for  the  shore.  Less  than  half  an 
hour  had  passed  when  these  vessels  met  their  fate,  at  a 
point  six  or  seven  miles  from  the  harbor's  mouth.  We 
have  said  nothing  here  of  the  part  taken  by  the  Indiana, 
but  she  was  doing  her  full  share  in  the  work  of  destruc 
tion,  filling  the  air  with  the  screech  of  her  shells  and 
hurling  her  great  projectiles  fiercely  upon  the  foe.  Like 
blood-hounds  in  the  chase,  the  whole  squadron  was  hot 
upon  the  heels  of  the  fleeing  prey. 

The  Vizcaya  as  yet  had  not  been  badly  hit,  and  her 
captain  determined  to  make  an  effort  to  ram  the  Brook 
lyn,  the  nearest  and  fastest  of  the  American  ships,  with 
the  hope  that  the  Colon  and  the  Oquendo  might  get 
away.  The  flames  on  the  Teresa  showed  that  she  was 
already  past  escape.  This  effort  failed  through  the  rapid 


THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN.  277 

circling  of  the  Brooklyn,  which  in  turn  made  an  attempt 
to  ram  and  force  the  Vizcaya  towards  the  shore.  An 
exchange  of  fire  now  ensued,  the  shells  of  the  Vizcaya 
going  wild,  while  those  of  the  Brooklyn  crashed  into  her 
side.  One  shell  went  along  the  entire  gun-deck,  killing 
half  the  men  on  it  and  wounding  most  of  the  remainder. 
The  Oregon  also  got  in  some  effective  shells,  the  fire 
growing  so  hot  that  the  men  were  driven  in  terror  from 
their  guns.  The  Vizcaya  was  burning  when  a  final 
shell  from  the  Oregon  hit  the  superstructure,  and  Cap 
tain  Eulate  gave  the  order  to  haul  down  the  flag  and 
beach  the  ship.  This  was  at  Ascerraderos,  twenty  miles 
west  of  Santiago  Bay.  The  hour  was  10.50.  The  ship 
burned  fiercely  as  she  lay  at  the  beach,  and  she  blew  up 
during  the  night. 

Only  one  of  the  Spanish  cruisers,  the  Cristobal  Colon, 
the  fastest  of  them  all,  remained  afloat.  She  had  as  yet 
escaped  injury,  had  passed  all  her  consorts,  and  when 
the  Vizcaya  went  ashore  was  about  six  miles  ahead  of 
the  Brooklyn,  the  Oregon  being  a  mile  and  a  half  and 
the  Texas  three  miles  farther  astern.  For  an  hour  the 
chase  continued,  the  Colon  hugging  the  shore.  But  her 
spurt  was  finished,  and  the  Brooklyn  and  the  Oregon — 
the  latter  developing  an  unexpected  speed — were  gaining 
on  her  mile  by  mile.  The  Colon  would  have  to  round 
Cape  Cruz  by  a  long  detour  to  escape  her  pursuers,  and 
Schley  put  the  Brooklyn  on  a  straight  course  for  this 
cape,  signalling  the  Oregon  to  keep  on  the  Colon's 
track. 

Another  hour  passed  ;  both  the  pursuers  had  gained  ; 
at  12.50,  on  signal  from  the  Brooklyn,  the  Oregon  fired 
one  of  her  1 3-inch  guns.  The  huge  shell  struck  the 
water  not  far  behind  the  Colon,  then  four  miles  away. 


278  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

Another  was  tried,  and  fell  beyond  her.  The  Brooklyn 
followed  with  her  8-inch  guns,  one  shell  going  through 
the  Colon  above  her  armor- belt.  At  1.05  both  ships 
were  pounding  away  at  the  fugitive,  which  returned  the 
fire  in  an  ineffective  manner.  This  was  kept  up  for  some 
fifteen  minutes  ;  the  Colon  was  rapidly  losing  ground  ; 
her  hope  of  escape  was  at  an  end.  At  1.20  she  gave  up 
the  fight,  hauled  down  her  flag,  and  turned  her  prow  to 
the  shore.  She  touched  land  at  Rio  Torquino,  after  a 
flight  for  life  of  forty-eight  miles. 

Admiral  Sampson's  flag-ship,  which  had  been  recalled 
in  haste  and  had  followed  the  chase  at  her  utmost  speed, 
but  too  late  to  take  part  in  the  contest,  came  up  while 
Captain  Cook,  of  the  Brooklyn,  was  receiving  the  sur 
render  of  the  Colon's  crew.  Commodore  Schley  had 
directed  that  the  officers  should  retain  all  their  personal 
effects,  a  courtesy  which  the  admiral  confirmed.  The 
Colon  had  not  been  injured  by  the  firing  and  but  little 
by  beaching,  but  her  sea-valves  had  been  opened  by  the 
crew,  and  as  she  slipped  off  the  steep  beach  into  the  sea 
she  began  to  sink.  To  prevent  her  total  loss  she  was 
pushed  bodily  on  the  beach  by  the  New  York,  where  she 
sank  in  shoal  water,  in  a  location  where  it  was  hoped 
she  might  be  saved. 

While  this  work  was  being  done  by  the  battle-ships  and 
cruisers,  the  little  Gloucester,  a  yacht  converted  into  a 
gunboat,  was  attending  to  the  torpedo-boats,  which  had 
followed  their  consorts  from  the  harbor.  On  their 
appearance,  the  Gloucester,  which,  under  the  command 
of  Lieutenant-Commander  Wainwright,  formerly  of  the 
Maine,  had  been  in  the  thick  of  the  fight  with  the  larger 
vessels,  dashed  for  them  under  a  high  head  of  steam,  and 
when  at  short  range  poured  in  a  fierce  volley  from  her 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  279 

rapid-fire  guns.  The  Indiana  and  others  of  the  vessels 
had  been  firing  at  them  from  their  secondary  batteries, 
but  they  desisted  through  fear  of  injuring  their  little 
consort,  and  the  Gloucester  completed  the  work  alone, 
riddling  them  with  an  accurate  and  deadly  fire.  Twenty 
minutes  sufficed  to  end  the  career  of  the  destroyers.  At 
the  close  of  that  time  the  Furor  and  the  Pluton  were 
both  sunk  and  two-thirds  of  their  people  were  killed. 

This  ended  the  fight.  The  character  of  the  result  can 
be  shown  in  the  brief  statement  that  the  Spanish  had 
about  six  hundred  men  killed  ;  the  American  loss  was 
one  man  killed  and  one  wounded  :  the  Spanish  ships  were 
helpless  wrecks  ;  the  American  ships  were  almost  unin 
jured.  The  victory  parallels  that  of  Manila  Bay  in  the 
utter  destruction  of  the  Spanish  fleet  and  the  marvellous 
immunity  from  injury  of  the  Americans,  both  men  and 
ships.  The  record  of  the  battle  is  of  interest  in  showing 
that  the  great  guns  had  little  to  do  with  the  result.  Only 
two  of  the  huge  projectiles  of  the  12-  or  1 3-inch  turret 
guns  struck  a  vessel,  both  these  being  put  through  the 
Maria  Teresa.  The  8-inch,  6-inch,  5-inch,  and  6-pound 
projectiles  did  the  bulk  of  the  work  and  proved  fright 
fully  destructive.  One  of  the  most  important  lessons 
learned  from  the  fight  was  the  danger  of  wood-work  on 
a  war-ship.  Every  one  of  the  Spanish  ships  was  set  on 
fire  by  the  American  shells,  the  crews  being  forced  to 
spend  their  energy  in  fighting  the  fire.  On  the  Vizcaya 
the  water-mains  were  shot  away,  so  that  this  was  im 
possible.  Another  lesson  was  the  difficulty  of  sending 
messages  through  the  ships,  voice-tubes  being  useless  in 
the  great  noise  and  messengers  too  slow.  Some  new 
invention  for  this  purpose  seems  called  for.  The  con- 
ning-towers  were  not  used,  the  officers  seeking  the  bridge 


280  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

in  preference.  And  the  delicate  range-finders,  so  useful 
in  target-practice,  were  soon  put  out  of  order  in  the  action, 
and  the  old  system  of  angling  on  the  mast-head  height 
of  the  enemy  had  to  be  made  use  of. 

The  battle  ended,  a  new  state  of  affairs  came  into  play. 
The  impulse  to  destroy  was  immediately  succeeded  by 
the  impulse  to  save,  and  the  American  sailors  took  as 
great  risks  in  the  effort  to  rescue  their  late  foes  as  they 
had  done  in  the  fight.  In  past  warfare,  destruction 
was  the  one  and  only  thing  considered.  In  modern  war 
fare,  the  sentiment  of  mercy  quickly  follows  the  battle 
rage  ;  and  this  was  never  more  fully  exemplified  than  in 
the  battle  with  Cervera's  fleet.  Captain  Evans,  of  the 
Iowa,  tells  a  story  of  his  highly  commendable  efforts  to 
save  the  crew  of  the  Vizcaya,  whose  sides  were  just  before 
being  rent  by  the  murderous  fire  of  his  guns.  Heading 
for  this  ship,  which  was  furiously  burning  fore  and  aft,  he 
lowered  all  his  boats  and  sent  them  to  the  assistance  of  the 
unfortunate  men,  who  were  being  roasted  on  the  decks, 
drowned  or  mutilated  by  sharks  in  the  water,  or  fired  at 
by  Cuban  insurgents  on  shore. 

The  men  of  the  Iowa  worked  manfully  and  saved 
numbers  of  the  wounded,  one  man  clambering  up  the 
side  of  the  Vizcaya  and  rescuing  three  at  the  risk  of  his 
life.  In  all,  thirty  officers  and  two  hundred  and  seventy- 
two  men  of  the  Vizcaya  were  thus  taken  off,  and  were 
clothed,  fed,  and  tenderly  cared  for  by  their  American 
hosts. 

The  torpedo-boat  Ericsson  and  the  little  Hist  aided  in 
this  work,  while  the  Harvard  and  the  Gloucester  en 
gaged  in  the  same  errand  of  mercy  with  the  Maria  Teresa 
and  the  Oquendo.  "This  rescue  of  prisoners,"  says 
Admiral  Sampson  in  his  report,  "  including  the  wounded 


^  I 


r<  % 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  281 

from  the  burning  Spanish  vessels,  was  the  occasion  of 
some  of  the  most  daring  and  gallant  conduct  of  the  day. 
The  ships  were  burning  fore  and  aft,  their  guns  and 
reserve  ammunition  were  exploding,  and  it  was  not 
known  at  what  moment  the  fire  would  reach  the  main 
magazines.  In  addition  to  this  a  heavy  surf  was  running 
just  inside  of  the  Spanish  ships.  But  no  risk  deterred 
our  officers  and  men  until  their  work  of  humanity  was 
complete. ' ' 

Of  the  incidents  of  the  battle,  one  of  the  most  memor 
able  was  the  rebuke  of  Captain  Philip,  of  the  Texas,  to 
his  men,  who  were  greeting  the  Spanish  surrender  with 
cheers, — 

' '  Don' t  cheer,  boys  ;  the  poor  devils  are  dying. ' ' 

In  these  words  we  have  the  true  spirit  of  nineteenth- 
century  war,  at  least  as  viewed  from  the  American  stand 
point,  and  the  remark  of  the  gallant  and  humane  captain 
is  likely  to  go  down  in  history  among  the  epoch-making 
phrases  of  modern  times. 

By  midnight  the  Harvard  had  nine  hundred  and 
seventy-six  prisoners  on  board,  a  great  number  of  them 
wounded.  The  Gloucester  rescued  Admiral  Cervera, 
who  had  swam  ashore  from  his  wrecked  ship  with  the 
aid  of  his  son.  He  was  nearly  naked  when  rescued, 
and  was  supplied  with  a  thin  suit  of  flannel  by  Lieu 
tenant-Commander  Wainwright,  of  the  Gloucester,  who 
soon  after  delivered  him  to  the  Iowa.  As  the  captive 
admiral  came  on  board  bareheaded  and  half-dressed, 
Captain  Evans  received  him  with  a  full  admiral's  guard, 
the  crew  cheering  him  vociferously.  He  was  bitterly 
depressed,  but  the  kindness  and  courtesy  of  his  new  host 
brought  tears  of  gratitude  to  his  eyes.  His  treatment 
of  Lieutenant  Hobson  had  assured  him  in  advance  a 


282  THE   WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

considerate  reception  by  the  officers  of  the  fleet,  and 
had  given  him  a  warm  place  in  the  American  heart. 

A  few  words  will  complete  our  story  of  the  destruction 
of  the  Spanish  fleet.  The  Reina  Mercedes,  a  dilapidated 
Spanish  cruiser  which  Cervera  had  found  and  had  left  in 
the  harbor  of  Santiago,  made  her  appearance  just  after 
midnight  of  July  4,  slowly  drifting  out  of  the  narrow  en 
trance,  as  if  with  intention  to  escape.  In  a  moment  all 
the  ships  within  reach  opened  upon  her,  pounding  her 
with  a  frightful  hail  of  shells.  A  few  minutes  sufficed. 
She  sank  to  the  bottom  on  the  beach  under  El  Morro, 
part  of  her  hull  and  her  masts  and  stacks  being  above 
water.  She  had  probably  been  sent  out  with  the  pur 
pose  of  blocking  the  channel  against  the  American  ships. 
During  this  brief  work  the  shore  batteries  opened  on  the 
ships,  and  a  6-inch  shell  fell  on  the  forward  deck  of  the 
Indiana,  exploding  below  in  the  men's  sleeping-rooms. 
Fortunately,  they  were  all  at  quarters  and  no  one  was 
hurt.  The  remarkable  good  fortune  of  the  American 
sailors  continued  to  the  end. 

Shortly  afterwards  an  effort  of  a  Spanish  cruiser  to 
escape  from  Havana  harbor  was  made,  with  similar  result. 
She  was  overhauled  near  Mariel  in  an  attempt  to  run  the 
blockade,  and  sent  to  the  bottom  by  the  hot  fire  of  the 
mosquito  fleet. 

During  the  battle  of  the  3d  an  example  of  special 
gallantry  was  displayed  on  the  Brooklyn,  which  may  be 
given  in  the  words  of  Captain  Cook,  commander  of  that 
ship  : 

"When  all  did  their  duty  manfully,  it  is  a  difficult 
matter  to  select  individuals  for  special  mention.  There 
are  some,  however,  who  deserve  to  be  brought  to  notice 
by  name  for  conduct  that  displayed  in  a  conspicuous 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  283 

manner  courage,  intelligence,  and  devotion  to  duty. 
During  the  early  part  of  the  action  a  cartridge  became 
jammed  in  the  bore  of  the  starboard  forward  6-pounder, 
and  in  the  effort  to  withdraw  it  the  case  became  detached 
from  the  projectile,  leaving  the  latter  fast  in  the  bore 
and  impossible  to  extract  from  the  rear. 

' '  Corporal  Robert  Gray,  of  the  port  gun,  asked  and 
obtained  permission  to  attempt  to  drive  the  shell  out 
with  the  rammer.  To  do  this  it  was  necessary  to  go 
out  on  the  gun,  hanging  over  the  water,  and  the  under 
taking  was  full  of  difficulties  and  danger,  the  latter  due 
in  a  great  measure  to  the  blast  of  the  8-inch  turret  guns 
firing  overhead.  The  gun  was  hot,  and  it  was  necessary 
to  cling  to  the  '  Jacob' s  ladder'  with  one  hand  while 
endeavoring  to  manipulate  the  long  rammer  with  the 
other.  After  a  brave  effort,  he  was  forced  to  give  up, 
and  was  ordered  in. 

"Quarter-Gunner  Smith  then  came,  sent  by  Exec 
utive  Officer  Mason,  and  promptly  placed  himself  in 
the  dangerous  position  outside  the  gun-port,  where  he 
worked  and  failed,  as  the  corporal  had  done.  Neither 
had  been  able  to  get  the  rammer  into  the  bore,  and  there 
seemed  nothing  left  to  do  but  dismount  the  gun. 

<(  At  this  juncture  Private  MacNeal,  one  of  the  gun's 
crew,  volunteered  to  go  out  and  make  a  final  effort. 
The  gun  was  so  important,  the  starboard  battery  being 
engaged,  that,  as  a  forlorn  hope,  he  was  permitted  to 
make  the  attempt.  He  pushed  boldly  out  and  set  to 
work.  The  guns  of  the  forward  8-inch  turret  were  fir 
ing,  almost  knocking  him  overboard,  and  the  enemy's 
shots  were  coming  with  frequency  into  his  immediate 
neighborhood.  At  this  time  the  chief  yeoman  was  killed 
on  the  other  side  of  the  deck.  NacNeal  never  paused 


284  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

in  his  work.  The  rammer  was  finally  placed  in  the  bore 
and  the  shell  ejected,  and  MacNeal  resumed  his  duties 
as  coolly  as  if  what  he  had  done  were  a  matter  of  every 
day  routine." 

This  chapter  may  be  fitly  concluded  with  Commodore 
Schley's  account  of  his  consideration  of  the  men  below 
decks,  and  his  interesting  description  of  how  the  only 
man  killed  on  the  American  side  in  the  battle  met  his 
death.  He  said, — 

( '  I  took  it  for  granted  that  every  man  on  the  ship  was 
just  as  much  interested  in  how  the  fight  was  going  as  I 
was,  but  the  men  behind  the  casements  and  those  below 
decks,  of  course,  could  not  see  what  was  going  on. 
During  the  battle  I  sent  orderlies  among  them  telling 
them  what  was  happening  and  what  effect  their  shots 
were  having. 

"Then,  when  the  Vizcaya  struck  and  only  the  Colon 
was  left,  I  sent  orderlies  down  to  the  stokeholes  and 
engine-room,  where  the  men  were  working  away  like 
heroes  in  the  terrible  temperature. 

"  'Now,  boys,'  I  sent  them  word,  'it  all  depends  on 
you.  Everything  is  sunk  except  the  Colon,  and  she  is 
trying  to  get  away.  We  don' t  want  her  to,  and  every 
thing  depends  on  you.' 

"They  responded  nobly,  and  we  got  her." 

Of  the  death  of  young  Ellis,  the  only  man  killed  on 
the  Brooklyn,  he  said, — 

"He  was  a  bright  lad,  from  Brooklyn,  who  enlisted 
to  go  before  the  mast ;  but  he  was  a  hard  worker,  studied 
navigation  with  the  young  officers  of  the  ship,  and  had 
risen  to  the  rank  of  yeoman. 

"As  I  stood  talking  with  Captain  Cook,  while  we 
finished  the  Vizcaya,  it  seemed  that  our  shots  were 


IHN- 


THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN.  285 

falling  a  little  short.  I  turned  to  Ellis,  who  stood  near, 
and  asked  him  what  the  range  was.  He  replied,  '  Seven 
teen  hundred  yards.' 

' '  I  have  pretty  keen  eyesight,  and  it  seldom  deceives 
me  as  to  distances,  and  I  told  him  I  thought  it  was 
slightly  more  than  that.  '  I  just  took  it,  sir,  but  I'll  try 
it  again,'  he  said,  and  stepped  off  to  one  side  about  eight 
feet  to  get  the  range. 

"  He  had  just  raised  his  instrument  to  his  eye  when  a 
shell  struck  him  full  in  the  face  and  carried  away  all 
of  his  head  above  the  mouth.  A  great  deal  of  blood 
spurted  around,  and  the  men  near  were  rattled  for  a 
moment. 

' '  Shells  are  queer  things, ' '  he  continued,  after  a 
moment's  silence.  "I  noticed  one  man  standing  with 
his  hand  grasping  a  hammock  rail  as  a  shell  struck  the 
ship,  ricocheted,  and  burst.  One  piece  of  the  metal  cut 
the  rail  on  one  side  of  his  hand,  another  on  the  other 
side,  so  that  he  was  left  standing  with  a  short  section  of 
the  rail  still  grasped  in  his  hand.  Another  portion  of 
the  shell  passed  over  his  shoulder  and  another  between 
his  legs.  He  was  surprised,  but  wasn't  hurt." 


CHAPTER    XVII. 

THE   SIEGE   AND    FALL   OF   SANTIAGO. 

ON  July  3,  at  8.30  A.M.,  General  Shafter  sent  a  flag 
of  truce  to  the  Spanish  lines  with  a  letter,  in  which  he 
threatened  to  shell  Santiago  unless  surrender  was  made, 
and  gave  until  ten  o'clock  of  the  next  morning  for  the 
removal  of  the  women  and  children  and  the  citizens  of 
foreign  countries.  This  was  no  empty  threat,  for  the 
positions  gained  during  the  battle  of  the  ist  and  2d  had 
given  his  batteries  command  of  the  city,  which  lay  under 
his  guns.  General  Jos6  Toral,  who  had  succeeded  to 
the  command  of  the  Spanish  forces  on  account  of  the 
serious  wounding  of  General  Linares,  replied  that  he 
would  not  surrender,  but  would  inform  the  consuls  and 
people  of  the  permission  to  remove.  At  the  request  of 
the  foreign  consuls,  the  bombardment  was  deferred  until 
noon  of  the  5th,  it  being  stated  that  fifteen  thousand  or 
more  people,  many  of  them  old,  would  probably  leave 
the  city. 

The  offer  to  escape  was  gladly  taken  advantage  of  by 
the  people  of  Santiago,  particularly  by  those  of  foreign 
birth,  and  during  the  next  day  there  was  a  pitiful  scene 
as  the  fugitives  swarmed  in  hosts  out  of  the  city  and 
trudged  wearily  over  the  road  to  El  Caney,  San  Luis, 
and  other  towns  in  the  vicinity.  All  day  long  the  hegira 
continued,  the  fugitives  struggling  painfully  onward  un 
der  the  blazing  sun,  and  over  a  road  in  many  places 
ankle-deep  in  mud.  Tottering  old  men  and  women 
286 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  287 

supported  by  their  children,  mothers  carrying  their  in 
fants,  rich  and  poor,  white  and  black,  cultured  and  ig 
norant,  all  fled  in  terror  from  the  horrors  of  an  expected 
bombardment  that  was  never  to  come. 

Most  of  them  made  their  way  to  El  Caney,  in  which 
town,  with  accommodations  for  not  more  than  five  hun 
dred  people,  over  five  thousand  slept  that  night,  crowded 
into  the  deserted  houses  and  camping  out  on  the  veran 
das  and  in  the  rain-soaked  streets.  At  dawn  of  the 
next  day  hundreds  who  had  been  overtaken  on  the  road 
by  the  darkness  began  to  come  in,  and  the  flood  con 
tinued  until  a  multitude  of  fugitives,  estimated  at  fifteen 
thousand,  overflowed  the  little  town.  They  had  not 
been  permitted  to  bring  food,  and  there  was  none  in  the 
town,  so  that  those  with  money  were  as  destitute  as  those 
without.  Pathetic  sights  were  to  be  seen  on  all  sides. 
Ladies  of  good  birth,  supported  by  frail  girls,  came  feebly 
into  the  town,  seeking  to  hide  their  faces  from  the  vul 
gar  gaze  of  the  ignorant  and  coarse  who  surged  about 
them.  Despair  filled  all  countenances,  hunger  threat 
ened  the  miserable  multitude  with  death,  the  scene  being 
a  reproduction  on  a  minor  scale  of  the  results  of  General 
Weyler's  brutal  reconcentration  order. 

General  Shafter  was  appealed  to  for  the  support  of 
the  miserable  throng.  This  he  was  not  well  able  to 
afford,  but  promised  to  give  them  a  limited  daily  supply 
of  food,  the  necessities  of  the  troops  and  the  difficulty 
of  getting  supplies  to  the  front  standing  greatly  in  the 
way  of  his  feeding  this  starving  multitude.  In  this  di 
lemma,  Clara  Barton  and  the  Red  Cross  officials  did 
noble  work,  making  the  most  earnest  efforts  to  feed  the 
starving.  But  it  was  a  difficult  task,  the  tides  and  the 
surf  standing  greatly  in  the  way  of  landing  supplies, 


288  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

while  transportation  was  very  difficult  to  obtain,  and  the 
roads  between  the  landing-place  and  the  front  were  al 
most  impassable. 

The  wounded  in  the  late  battle  were  in  as  deplorable 
a  state  as  the  refugees.  The  field  hospitals  were  inade 
quately  supplied  with  the  simplest  necessaries  for  the 
care  of  the  sick, — medicines,  beds,  tents,  all  requisites, 
being  greatly  lacking.  In  many  cases  only  the  packages 
of  "first  aid  for  the  wounded,"  which  the  soldiers  car 
ried  with  them,  were  available,  while  the  wounded,  on 
being  taken  from  the  operating-tables,  had  to  be  laid  on 
the  ground,  often  without  a  blanket  between  them  and 
the  rain-soaked  soil  or  shelter  from  the  scorching  Cuban 
sun. 

The  result  of  this  unfortunate  state  of  affairs  was  a  new 
hegira,  many  of  the  wounded  painfully  dragging  them 
selves  down  the  long,  winding,  muddy  road  to  Siboney, 
where  the  general  hospital  had  been  established,  the  field 
hospitals  being  devoted  to  those  too  badly  hurt  to  be 
moved.  Improvised  ambulances,  principally  composed 
of  army-wagons,  were  crowded  with  men  who  could  not 
walk,  and  whose  ride  over  the  rutted  roads  in  these 
rough  vehicles  was  an  awful  experience.  But  of  these 
there  was  not  enough,  and  numbers  of  feeble,  bullet- 
pierced  unfortunates  were  forced  to  drag  themselves  on 
foot  along  that  dreary  road,  which  wound  for  a  distance 
of  eight  miles  around  the  bases  of  the  hills,  and  several 
miles  farther  for  those  who  set  out  from  El  Caney.  Nor 
was  the  weary  drag  of  the  wounded  over  this  wheel- 
scarred  and  water-soaked  trail  all  that  had  to  be  endured. 
Ruthless  Spanish  guerillas  lay  hid  in  the  branches  of 
trees  that  lined  the  way,  and  whistling  bullets  added  to 
the  terrors  of  that  dreadful  journey.  The  sharp-shooting 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  289 

was  not  very  straight,  but  now  and  then  a  wounded 
soldier  was  killed.  The  vandals,  however,  did  not  do 
their  heartless  work  with  impunity.  Some  of  the  men 
had  brought  their  rifles  and  fired  back  at  the  flash.  One 
of  these  tells  that  he  took  the  rifle  of  a  fallen  man  and 
fired  in  succession  from  different  points  to  give  the  im 
pression  that  there  were  men  in  the  lines  able  to  shoot 
in  all  directions.  All  night  long  and  until  the  middle  of 
the  next  day  the  dreadful  march  kept  up,  many  of  the 
bleeding  plodders  ending  their  life's  march  on  that 
terrible  road.  It  formed  a  painful  epilogue  to  a  day  of 
battle  and  blood. 

A  striking  feature  of  the  case  was  the  cheerfulness  with 
which  the  soldiers  endured  their  painful  journey.  In 
evidence  of  this,  we  cannot  do  better  than  quote  from  a 
correspondent  of  the  London  Daily  Mail  : 

' '  Besides  the  wagons  there  came  along  from  the  front 
men  borne  on  hand-litters,  some  lying  face  downward, 
writhing  at  intervals  in  awful  convulsions,  others  lying 
motionless  on  the  flat  of  their  backs,  with  their  hats 
placed  over  their  faces  for  shade.  And  there  also  came 
men,  dozens  of  them,  afoot,  painfully  limping,  with  one 
arm  thrown  over  the  shoulders  of  a  comrade  and  the 
other  arm  helplessly  dangling. 

"  '  How  much  farther  to  the  hospital,  neighbor?'  they 
would  despairingly  ask. 

"  '  Only  a  quarter  of  a  mile  or  so,  neighbor,'  I  would 
answer  ;  and,  with  a  smile  of  hope  at  the  thought  that, 
after  all,  they  would  be  able  to  achieve  the  journey,  they 
would  hobble  along. 

' '  But  the  ammunition- wagons  and  the  few  ambulance 
wagons  did  not  carry  them  all.  For  hobbling  down  the 
steep  bank  from  the  hospital  came  bandaged  men  on 

19 


2QO  THE   WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

foot.  They  sat  down  for  awhile  on  the  bank,  as  far  as 
they  could  get  from  the  jumble  of  mules  and  wagons  in 
the  lane,  and  then,  setting  their  faces  towards  Siboney, 
they  commenced — to  walk  it.  They  were  the  men  whose 
injuries  were  too  slight  for  wagon-room  to  be  given 
them.  There  was  not  enough  wagon-accommodation 
for  the  men  whose  wounds  rendered  them  helplessly 
prostrate.  So  let  the  men  who  had  mere  arm-  and 
shoulder-wounds,  simply  flesh-wounds,  or  only  one  in 
jured  leg  or  foot,  walk  it :  Siboney  was  only  eight  miles 
away. 

' '  True,  it  was  a  fearfully  bad  road,  but  then  the  plain 
fact  was  that  there  was  not  enough  wagons  for  all,  and 
it  was  better  for  these  men  to  be  at  the  base  hospital, 
and  better  that  they  should  make  room  at  the  division 
hospital,  even  if  they  had  to  make  the  journey  on  foot. 

' '  There  was  one  man  on  the  road  whose  left  foot  was 
heavily  bandaged  and  drawn  up  from  the  ground.  He 
had  provided  himself  with  a  sort  of  rough  crutch  made 
of  the  forked  limb  of  a  tree,  which  he  had  padded  with 
a  bundle  of  clothes.  With  the  assistance  of  this  and  a 
short  stick  he  was  paddling  briskly  along  when  I  over 
took  him. 

"  *  Where  did  they  get  you,  neighbor?'  I  asked  him. 

"  'Oh,  durn  their  skins  !'  he  said,  in  the  cheerfullest 
way,  turning  to  me  with  a  smile  ;  '  they  got  me  twice, — 
a  splinter  of  a  shell  in  the  foot,  and  a  bullet  through  the 
calf  of  the  same  leg  when  I  was  being  carried  back  from 
the  firing-line.' 

"  '  A  sharp-shooter?' 

*  *  '  The  fellow  was  up  in  a  tree. ' 

[<And   you're  walking  back  to  Siboney.     Wasn't 
there  room  for  you  to  ride  ?' 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  291 

' '  I  expected  an  angry  outburst  of  indignation  in  reply 
to  this  question.  But  I  was  mistaken.  In  a  plain, 
matter-of-fact  way,  he  said, — 

"'  Guess  not.  They  wanted  all  the  riding- room  for 
worst  cases  'n  mine.  Thank  God,  my  two  wounds  are 
both  in  the  same  leg,  so  I  can  walk  quite  good  and  spry. 
They  told  me  I'd  be  better  off  down  at  the  landing 
yonder ;  so  I  got  these  crutches  and  made  a  break.  * 

' '  '  And  how  are  you  getting  along  ?'  I  asked. 

"  '  Good  and  well,'  he  said,  as  cheerfully  as  might  be; 
'just  good  and  easy.'  And  with  his  one  sound  leg  and 
his  two  sticks  he  went  cheerfully  paddling  along. 

' '  It  was  just  the  same  with  other  walking  wounded 
men.  They  were  all  beautifully  cheerful.  And  not 
merely  cheerful.  They  were  all  absolutely  unconscious 
that  they  were  undergoing  any  unnecessary  hardships  or 
sufferings.  They  knew  now  that  war  was  no  picnic,  and 
they  were  not  complaining  at  the  absence  of  picnic  fare. 
Some  of  them  had  lain  out  all  the  night,  with  the  dew 
falling  on  them  where  the  bullets  had  dropped  them,  be 
fore  their  turn  came  with  the  overworked  field  surgeons. 

' 5  *  There  were  only  sixty  doctors  with  the  outfit,'  they 
explained,  'and,  naturally,  they  couldn't  'tend  every 
body  at  once.' 

' '  That  seemed  to  them  a  quite  sufficient  explanation. 
It  did  not  occur  to  them  that  there  ought  to  have  been 
more  doctors,  more  ambulances.  Some  of  them  seemed 
to  have  a  faint  glimmering  of  a  notion  that  there  might 
perhaps  have  been  fewer  wounded  ;  but  then  that  was  so 
obvious  to  everybody.  The  conditions  subsequent  to 
the  battle  they  accepted  as  the  conditions  proper  and 
natural  to  the  circumstances.  The  cheerful  fellow  with 
the  improvised  crutches  was  so  filled  with  thankfulness 


292  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

at  the  possession  of  his  tree-branch  that  it  never  occurred 
to  him  that  he  had  reason  to  complain  of  the  absence  of 
proper  crutches.  I  happened  by  chance  to  know  that 
packed  away  in  the  hold  of  one  of  the  transports  lying 
out  in  Siboney  Bay  there  were  cases  full  of  crutches,  and 
I  was  on  the  point  of  blurting  out  an  indignant  statement 
of  the  fact  when  I  remembered  that  the  knowledge 
would  not  make  his  walk  easier.  So  I  said  nothing 
about  it." 

The  impossibility  of  supplying  the  many  thousands  of 
refugees  at  El  Caney  with  army  rations  soon  started  a 
new  movement  towards  the  army  base  at  Siboney,  and 
within  a  day  or  two  thousands  of  these  miserables  were 
plodding  along  the  muddy  road  in  the  trail  of  the 
wounded,  women,  and  children,  dragging  wearily  on, 
staggering  and  slipping  under  the  burdens  they  bore, 
and  ready  to  endure  any  privations  to  escape  from  the 
horrors  of  a  bombarded  city.  Fortunately,  nature  pro 
vided  one  alleviation  from  the  suffering  which  all  endured. 
The  woods  were  full  of  mango-trees,  bountifully  laden 
with  fruit,  then  ripe  and  at  its  best.  This  fruit  is  of  the 
size  and  shape  of  a  pippin  apple,  of  a  deep  yellow  color, 
and  rich  and  luscious  in  taste.  Just  then  it  was  the  most 
precious  of  nature's  gifts. 

The  truce  which  had  been  granted  in  order  that  non- 
combatants  might  leave  the  city  was  extended  for  more 
than  a  week  in  hope  that  the  Spaniards  might  by  a  sur 
render  avoid  the  necessity  of  further  bloodshed.  There 
was  no  truce,  however,  in  the  preparations  for  attack  and 
defence.  Active  measures  for  bombardment  were  taken 
on  the  American  side,  new  batteries  being  brought  up 
from  the  rear  and  planted  in  commanding  positions. 
Three  of  these  were  posted  on  El  Paso  ridge,  twenty-four 


I 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  293 

hundred  yards  from  the  city,  while  the  batteries  of  Cap 
tains  Capron  and  Grimes,  which  had  done  such  good 
service  in  the  battle,  were  placed  in  the  rear  of  General 
Lawton's  division,  fifteen  hundred  yards  north  of  the 
road.  In  firing  they  would  have  to  shell  the  town  over 
the  heads  of  the  troops  ;  but  this  could  be  safely  done 
from  their  elevated  position. 

Twelve  mortars  had  been  brought  to  the  front,  and 
were  mounted  in  a  battery  ready  for  use.  A  dynamite 
gun  which  had  played  its  part  in  the  battle  of  San  Juan 
was  depended  upon  to  do  effective  work  in  the  coming 
bombardment,  its  twenty-pound  charges  of  gun-cotton 
being  likely  to  cause  havoc  in  the  Spanish  trenches. 
The  navy  was  also  expected  to  play  an  imposing  part  in 
case  hostilities  were  reopened,  Admiral  Sampson  promis 
ing  to  drop  a  shell  into  the  city  every  five  minutes,  or 
every  two  minutes  if  deemed  necessary. 

On  the  Spanish  side  similar  activity  was  displayed, 
the  trenches  being  deepened  and  extended  and  guns 
mounted  in  position  for  active  work.  Some  of  these 
guns  were  of  much  heavier  caliber  than  any  the  American 
army  had  been  able  to  get  to  the  front,  but  many  of  them 
were  of  antiquated  pattern  and  not  likely  to  do  serious 
damage.  There  were,  however,  a  fair  show  of  modern 
guns,  capable  of  excellent  performance,  and  the  works  of 
defence  were  very  strong.  The  principal  weakness  was 
a  deficiency  of  food  and  water.  The  main  aqueduct 
leading  to  the  city  was  cut  by  the  Americans  on  the  i  ith, 
yielding  them  an  abundance  of  excellent  water  of  which 
they  had  deprived  the  enemy. 

At  the  end  of  the  truce  the  American  lines  extended 
around  the  city  in  the  shape  of  a  horseshoe,  five  miles 
in  length.  The  side  of  the  hills  facing  the  city  was  a 


294  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

succession  of  bomb-proof  rifle-pits,  trenches,  and  re 
doubts,  looking  like  the  openings  of  so  many  mines,  and 
threatening  to  turn  the  Spanish  works  into  pits  of  death. 
General  Garcia,  with  the  Cubans,  hitherto  of  little  service, 
had  been  thrown  out  on  the  roads  of  approach  from  the 
west  to  cut  off  reinforcement  sseeking  to  enter  the  city, 
which  was  not  invested  on  that  side,  and  it  seemed  to  be 
but  a  question  of  hours  when  surrender  would  become 
inevitable. 

General  Toral,  acting  commander-in-chief,  was  fully 
aware  of  his  desperate  position,  and  at  noon  on  the  gth, 
the  hour  fixed  for  the  beginning  of  the  bombardment, 
sent  a  flag  of  truce  to  the  American  lines  with  an  impor 
tant  proposition.  The  little  group  of  officers  under  the 
flag  were  met  and  escorted  to  comfortable  quarters,  while 
the  letter  they  bore  was  taken  to  General  Shafter's  tent, 
two  miles  in  the  rear.  It  conveyed  an  offer  from  General 
Toral  to  surrender  the  city,  provided  his  army  might 
capitulate  "with  honor."  This,  he  stated,  meant  that 
they  should  march  from  the  city  with  colors  flying  and 
arms  in  hand,  and  go  unmolested  whither  they  would. 
Surrender  under  any  other  conditions,  he  said,  was  im 
possible  and  could  not  be  considered. 

This  proposal  Shafter  unhesitatingly  refused,  but 
agreed  to  extend  the  truce  until  Sunday  at  noon,  so  that 
he  might  communicate  with  his  government.  During 
Sunday  he  notified  General  Toral  that  no  terms  but 
unconditional  surrender  could  be  granted.  These  the 
Spanish  general  declined  to  consider,  and  at  four  o'clock, 
to  which  hour  the  truce  had  been  extended,  a  fire  from 
the  Spanish  trenches  began.  It  was  answered  from  the 
American  works,  and  until  dark  a  hot  fire  was  kept  up, 
the  fleet  joining  in  from  its  position  five  miles  away,  and 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  295 

for  an  hour  dropping  shells  at  intervals  of  two  minutes. 
Most  of  these,  however,  fell  short  and  wasted  their  energy 
on  the  waters  of  the  bay,  the  intervening  cliffs,  over 
which  the  shells  had  to  be  thrown,  preventing  the  guns 
from  doing  their  best  work.  The  Spanish  return  to  the 
severe  American  fire  was  so  weak  that  fear  was  enter 
tained  that  the  enemy  might  have  withdrawn  from  the 
city,  leaving  a  few  men  in  the  trenches.  Shafter'  s  army, 
on  the  contrary,  had  been  strongly  reinforced  during  the 
truce,  and  now  numbered  nearly  twenty-six  thousand 
men,  of  whom  about  twenty- three  thousand  were  avail 
able  for  duty. 

The  bombardment  continued  on  Monday,  the  nth, 
the  army  and  navy  joining  in  the  work,  while  the  reply 
from  the  Spanish  guns  continued  very  weak.  Step  by 
step  the  Americans  advanced,  entering  several  of  the 
Spanish  trenches,  in  which  they  found  no  soldiers  and 
only  dummy  wooden  guns.  At  one  P.M.  the  booming  of 
the  guns  ceased,  and  Shafter  again  sent  a  flag  of  truce 
into  the  city,  once  more  demanding  its  unconditional  sur 
render.  While  he  awaited  a  reply  he  extended  his  lines 
on  the  north  down  to  the  bay,  thus  completing  the  inves 
titure  of  the  place  and  placing  a  barrier  of  American  guns 
between  the  Spaniards  in  the  city  and  any  reinforcements 
which  might  seek  to  enter  from  the  west.  This  line,  as 
yet  a  thin  one,  was  composed  of  General  Lawton's  divi 
sion,  whose  flank  occupied  the  little  town  of  Caimenes, 
on  the  harbor's  edge,  the  trenches  vacated  by  Lawton's 
men  being  occupied  by  reinforcements  from  Juragua. 
Ten  batteries  of  light  artillery  had  also  been  landed,  and 
were  ordered  to  be  rushed  to  the  front. 

General  Toral  delayed  his  reply  to  General  Shafter' s 
demand  until  eight  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  I2th, 


296  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

when  he  sent  a  defiant  message,  saying  in  effect  that  if 
the  Americans  wanted  Santiago  they  could  come  and 
take  it.  Unconditional  surrender,  he  declared,  was  un 
reasonable  and  impossible,  and  he  was  ready  to  meet  an 
attack  whenever  the  invading  army  chose  to  make  one. 
The  white  flag  which  had  been  flying  over  the  city  during 
the  truce  was  withdrawn,  and  defiance  was  the  order  of 
the  day. 

General  Shafter  accepted  this  reply  as  final,  and,  while 
not  ordering  an  immediate  bombardment,  he  made  rapid 
preparations  for  a  severe  struggle.  In  truth,  the  state  of 
the  weather  was  far  from  favorable  to  active  operations. 
For  two  days  the  army  had  learned  to  the  full  what  is 
meant  by  the  rainy  season  in  Cuba,  fierce  thunder- 
showers  coming  in  rapid  succession  with  an  almost  in 
cessant  downpour  of  rain.  The  rifle-pits  and  trenches 
were  flooded,  and  the  men  who  sought  to  sleep  under 
their  shelter-tents  were  drenched  to  the  skin,  the  canvas 
proving  unable  to  keep  out  the  pitiless  floods  of  rain. 
Cooking  was  impossible  ;  not  a  stick  of  dry  wood  could 
be  found.  There  was  nothing  to  eat  but  hardtack.  The 
trail  to  the  front  was  in  a  frightful  condition,  the  streams 
and  the  fords  being  swollen  and  the  soft  soil  everywhere 
cut  into  deep  ruts  by  the  wheels  of  the  supply-wagons. 
Through  this  violent  tropical  storm  General  Miles,  com- 
mander-in-chief  of  the  armies  of  the  United  States,  who 
had  just  landed,  rode  to  the  front,  his  horse  in  many 
places  sinking  to  its  knees  in  the  mud  as  it  toiled  despond 
ently  onward.  Bad  as  conditions  were  in  the  American 
camp,  they  were  still  worse  in  that  of  the  refugees,  for 
whom  it  had  become  next  to  impossible  to  provide  food, 
and  most  of  whom  were  exposed  without  shelter  to  the 
drenching  floods. 


Maj.-Gen.  Wesley  Merritt 


Maj.-Gen.  Joseph  H.  Wheeler  Maj.-Gen.  William  R.  Shatter 


Col.  Theodore  Roosevelt 


Maj.-Gen.  Fitzhugh  Lee 
UNITED   STATES   ARMY   COMMAKDKRS\  J 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN.  297 

The  bad  conditions  in  the  American  army  due  to  the 
rains  were  added  to  by  the  yellow  fever,  which  had 
broken  out  in  the  camps,  probably  through  infection 
from  some  of  the  refugees.  General  Miles  found  the 
buildings  at  Siboney  so  shockingly  lacking  in  sanitary 
conditions  that  he  had  them  set  on  fire  as  the  most  avail 
able  means  of  cleaning  them,  several  wooden  buildings, 
including  the  one  he  had  himself  temporarily  occupied, 
being  reduced  to  ashes.  The  dtbris  being  removed, 
fresh,  clean  tents  were  provided,  with  a  ditch  around 
each  to  carry  off  the  rain.  To  these  the  sick  were  re 
moved.  The  wounded,  except  those  who  were  only 
slightly  hurt,  had  already  been  placed  on  hospital-ships 
for  conveyance  to  the  cooler  climate  of  the  north. 

On  reaching  the  front,  General  Miles  showed  no  in 
tention  of  superseding  General  Shafter  in  command,  but, 
in  fear  of  a  possible  epidemic  of  yellow  fever,  pressed 
for  an  immediate  settlement  of  the  surrender  question. 
As  a  final  attempt  at  a  peaceable  solution  of  the  prob 
lem,  an  offer  was  made  to  General  Toral,  under  sanction 
from  the  government,  to  send  all  his  troops,  if  surren 
dered,  back  to  Spain.  At  eight  o'clock  on  Wednesday, 
the  1 3th,  Generals  Miles  and  Shafter,  with  their  respec 
tive  staffs,  rode  to  the  front  under  a  flag  of  truce  and 
sent  a  request  to  General  Toral  for  a  personal  interview. 
This  was  acceded  to,  and  at  nine  o'clock  Miles,  Shafter, 
Wheeler,  and  others  of  the  American  commanding  offi 
cers  crossed  the  intrenchments  and  rode  into  the  valley 
beyond.  Here  they  were  met  by  General  Toral  and  his 
chief  of  staff  under  a  spreading  mango-tree  midway  be 
tween  the  lines,  and  an  interview  of  an  hour's  length 
took  place. 

Toral  was  offered  the  alternative  of  being  sent  home 


298  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

with  his  army  or  of  leaving  Santiago  province  with  his 
troops,  but  without  their  arms.  He  replied  that  he  had 
no  discretion.  He  had  been  granted  permission  by  his 
government  to  evacuate  Santiago,  but  nothing  more. 
He  could  accept  no  other  terms  without  permission  from 
Madrid.  He  was  accordingly  given  until  noon  of  the 
1 4th  for  a  final  answer. 

"If  he  refuses,"  said  General  Shafter  on  his  return, 
"  I  will  open  on  him  at  twelve  o'clock  to-morrow  with 
every  gun  I  have,  and  will  have  the  assistance  of  the 
navy,  which  is  ready  to  bombard  the  city  with  1 3-inch 
shells. ' '  Evidently  the  case  had  reached  a  climax. 

On  the  previous  day  the  wounded  General  Linares, 
the  Spanish  commander-in-chief,  had  telegraphed  an 
urgent  appeal  to  Madrid,  showing  clearly  the  hopeless 
ness  of  the  situation.  They  had  but  half  forage  for  the 
horses  and  no  food  but  rice  for  the  men,  he  said.  The 
works  were  so  thinly  held  that  even  the  sick  had  to  serve 
in  the  trenches.  It  would  be  impossible,  in  their  weak 
ened  condition,  to  break  through  the  enemy's  lines,  and 
there  was  no  hope  of  aid  from  without.  He  drew  a 
pathetic  picture  of  the  condition  of  the  men  under  his 
command,  and  made  a  moving  appeal  for  authority  to 
obtain  what  terms  they  could,  ending  with  the  usual 
rodomontade  that  they  would  all  die  in  their  tracks  if 
ordered  to  do  so. 

This  and  Toral's  appeal  brought  Madrid  to  its  senses. 
The  proposed  bombardment  did  not  take  place,  being 
prevented  by  an  agreement  to  surrender  on  the  terms 
proposed.  "  Santiago  surrendered  at  three,"  came  the 
significant  despatch  to  the  President  at  Washington,  and 
soon  the  exhilarating  news  passed  from  end  to  end  of 
the  land.  The  strained  situation  at  Santiago  was  at  an 


THE   WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  299 

end,  and  what  seemed  to  many  the  decisive  turning- 
point  in  the  war  was  reached. 

Shortly  after  midnight,  on  the  morning  of  July  15,  the 
preliminary  basis  for  the  capitulation  of  the  Spanish 
forces  in  Eastern  Cuba  was  agreed  to  and  signed  under 
a  picturesque  cieba-tree  half-way  between  the  lines. 
Efforts  to  obtain  further  delay  and  further  consent  from 
Madrid  had  been  made,  but  the  American  commissioners 
insisted  upon  final  action  then  and  there,  only  consenting 
to  substitute  the  word  ' '  capitulation' '  for  the  harsher 
word  "surrender."  As  for  Toral's  desire  to  take  the 
arms  of  his  men  back  to  Spain,  as  a  concession  to  Span 
ish  honor,  the  utmost  the  commissioners  would  do  was 
to  offer  to  recommend  it  to  Washington.  With  this  un 
derstanding  the  papers  were  signed.  The  conference 
had  lasted,  with  intermissions,  from  two  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon  until  midnight.  Further  delay  followed,  due 
to  Toral's  desire  to  obtain  an  authorization  of  his  action 
from  Madrid.  It  duly  came,  Sagasta,  the  Spanish  prime 
minister,  being  fully  convinced  that  a  longer  struggle  in 
that  quarter  was  useless  and  perilous,  and  on  the  morn 
ing  of  the  1 6th  the  following  letter,  couched  in  English 
' '  as  she  is  wrote' '  in  Spain,  reached  the  American 
lines  : 

"SANTIAGO  DE  CUBA,  July  16. 

"To   His   EXCELLENCY,   Commander-in-Chief   of   the 
American  forces. 

"  EXCELLENT  SIR, — I  am  now  authorized  by  my  gov 
ernment  to  capitulate.  I  have  the  honor  to  so  apprise 
you,  and  requesting  that  you  design  the  hour  and  place 
where  my  representatives  shall  appear  to  compare  with 
those  of  your  excellency  to  effect  the  articles  of  capitula 
tion,  on  the  basis  of  what  has  been  agreed  upon  to  this  date 


300  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

in  due  time.  I  wish  to  manifest  my  desire  to  know  the 
resolutions  of  the  United  States  government  respecting 
the  return  of  army,  so  as  to  note  on  the  capitulations, 
also  the  great  courtesy  of  your  great  graces  and  return 
for  the  great  generosity  and  impulse  for  the  Spanish 
soldiers,  and  allow  them  to  return  to  the  peninsula  with 
the  honors  the  American  army  do  them  the  honor  to 
acknowledge  as  dutifully  descended. 

"JosE  TORAL, 

11  General  Commanding  Fourth  Army  Corps. 
"GENERAL  SHAFTER, 

1 '  Commanding  American  Forces. ' ' 

The  receipt  of  this  letter  was  followed  by  the  follow 
ing  despatch  from  Shafter  to  Washington  : 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS  NEAR  SANTIAGO,  July  16. 
"ADJUTANT-GENERAL  U.  S.  ARMY,  Washington. 

"The  conditions  of  capitulation  include  all  forces  and 
war-material  in  described  territory.  The  United  States 
agrees,  with  as  little  delay  as  possible,  to  transport  all 
Spanish  troops  in  district  to  kingdom  of  Spain,  the 
troops,  as  far  as  possible,  to  embark  near  to  the  garrisons 
they  now  occupy.  Officers  to  retain  their  side-arms, 
and  officers  and  men  to  retain  their  personal  property. 
Spanish  authorized  to  take  military  archives  belonging 
to  surrendered  district.  All  Spanish  forces  known  as 
volunteers,  Moirilizadves,  and  guerillas  who  wish  to  re 
main  in  Cuba  may  do  so  under  parole  during  present 
war,  giving  up  their  arms.  Spanish  forces  march  out  of 
Santiago  with  honors  of  war,  depositing  their  arms  at  a 
point  mutually  agreed  upon,  to  await  disposition  of  the 
United  States  government,  it  being  understood  United 
States  commissioners  will  recommend  that  the  Spanish 


THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN.  301 

soldiers  return  to  Spain  with  arms  so  bravely  defended. 
This  leaves  the  question  of  return  of  arms  entirely  in 
the  hands  of  the  government.  I  invite  attention  to  the 
fact  that  several  thousand  surrendered,  said  by  General 
Toral  to  be  about  twelve  thousand,  against  whom  a  shot 
has  not  been  fired.  The  return  to  Spain  of  the  troops 
in  this  district  amounts  to  about  twenty-four  thousand, 
according  to  General  Toral. 

"W.  R.  SHAFTER, 

"  U.  S.  Volunteers:' 

At  nine  o'clock  in  the  evening  a  further  message  was 
made  public  at  the  White  House,  saying:  "The  sur 
render  has  been  definitely  settled,  and  the  city  will  be 
turned  over  to-morrow  morning,  and  the  troops  will  be 
marched  out  as  prisoners  of  war.  The  Spanish  colors 
will  be  hauled  down  at  nine  o'clock  and  the  American 
flag  hoisted."  In  response,  President  McKinley  and 
Secretary  Alger  thanked  the  victorious  general  and  army 
in  the  following  congratulatory  words  : 

"To  GENERAL  SHAFTER,  Commanding,  Front,  near 

Santiago,  Playa. 

' '  The  President  of  the  United  States  sends  to  you 
and  your  brave  army  the  profound  thanks  of  the  Ameri 
can  people  for  the  brilliant  achievements  at  Santiago, 
resulting  in  the  surrender  of  the  city  and  all  of  the 
Spanish  troops  and  territory  under  General  Toral. 
Your  splendid  command  has  endured  not  only  the  hard 
ships  and  sacrifices  incident  to  the  campaign  and  battle, 
but  in  stress  of  heat  and  weather  has  triumphed  over 
obstacles  which  would  have  overcome  men  less  brave 
and  determined.  One  and  all  have  displayed  the  most 


302  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

conspicuous  gallantry  and  earned  the  gratitude  of  the 
nation.  The  hearts  of  the  people  turn  with  tender  sym 
pathy  to  the  sick  and  the  wounded.  May  the  Father  of 
Mercies  protect  and  comfort  them. 

"WILLIAM   McKlNLEY." 

'•To  MAJOR-GENERAL   SHAFTER,  Front,  near  Santi 
ago,  Playa. 

* '  I  cannot  express  in  words  my  gratitude  to  you  and 
your  heroic  men.  Your  work  has  been  well  done. 
God  bless  you  all. 

"R.  A.  ALGER, 

11  Secretary  of  War." 

Shafter's  reply,  reaching  Washington  on  the  evening 
of  the  1 6th,  said  : 

"To  THE  PRESIDENT: 

"I  thank  you,  and  my  army  thanks  you,  for  your 
congratulatory  telegram  of  to-day.  I  am  proud  to  say 
every  one  in  it  performed  his  duty  gallantly.  Your 
message  will  be  read  to  every  regiment  in  the  army  at 

noon  to-morrow. 

"SHAFTER, 

4  (  Major-  General. ' ' 

Shafter  and  the  army  richly  deserved  congratulation, 
for  they  had  accomplished  much  more  than  the  capture 
of  Santiago  and  its  garrison.  The  territory  surrendered 
by  General  Toral  included  a  large  portion  of  the  province 
of  Santiago  de  Cuba,  embracing  the  eastern  extremity  of 
the  island.  The  surrendered  territory  lay  east  of  a  line 
drawn  from  Ascerraderos,  twenty-five  miles  west  of  San 
tiago,  northward  to  Dos  Palmas,  and  thence  northeast- 


THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN.  303 

ward  to  Sagua  de  Tanamo  on  the  northern  coast.  This 
district  embraced  some  five  thousand  square  miles  of 
territory  and  a  population  of  more  than  one  hundred  and 
twenty-five  thousand,  and  contained  the  four  important 
cities  of  Santiago,  Guantanamo,  Sagua,  and  Baracoa. 
These  cities  and  other  points  had  their  garrisons,  equal 
ling  in  total  number  those  in  Santiago,  making  the  total 
number  of  prisoners  included  in  the  surrender,  as  esti 
mated  by  Toral,  twenty-two  thousand  seven  hundred  and 
eighty-nine.  Officers  and  troops  were  at  once  sent, 
accompanied  by  Spanish  officers,  to  receive  the  sur 
render  of  those  interior  garrisons.  In  Santiago  over  ten 
thousand  rifles  and  about  ten  million  rounds  of  ammu 
nition  were  sent  in  to  the  American  ordnance  officer. 

At  exactly  nine  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  Monday, 
July  1 8,  the  Spanish  flag  was  lowered  from  the  staff 
crowning  the  heights  on  which  stood  the  venerable  an 
tiquity  known  as  Morro  Castle,  which,  mediaeval  as  it 
was,  had  borne  its  several  bombardments  with  the  best 
of  modern  guns  with  little  material  harm.  This  immu 
nity  was  mainly  due  to  its  elevated  situation.  Immedi 
ately  after  the  lowering  of  the  flag,  Lieutenants  Hobson 
and  Palmer  entered  the  harbor  in  steam  launches,  pene 
trating  as  far  as  the  firing  station  of  the  submarine  mines. 
These  mines  were  all  exploded  in  the  afternoon,  and 
once  more  Santiago  harbor  was  open  to  the  commerce 
of  the  world.  Shortly  after  noon,  Commodore  Schley 
and  Captain  Cook,  of  the  Brooklyn,  entered  the  harbor 
and  made  an  inspection  of  the  condition  of  affairs.  The 
main  result  of  their  reconnoissance  was  to  discover  that 
the  batteries  had  borne  their  bombardments  remarkably 
well,  conveying  the  lesson  that  in  the  duel  between  ships 
and  land  defences  the  latter  have  largely  the  advantage. 


304  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

The  conclusion  reached  from  a  later  and  more  complete 
inspection  was  that  '  *  over  two  million  dollars'  worth  of 
ammunition  thrown  at  the  batteries  defending  Santiago 
harbor  was  absolutely  harmless  in  its  effect,  so  far  as  the 
reducing  of  the  batteries  was  concerned,  and  simply  bore 
out  the  well-known  fact  that  it  is  a  waste  of  time  and 
money  to  bombard  earthworks."  And  this  bombard 
ment  had  been  done  by  the  same  men  who  had  effect 
ually  proved  their  skill  in  gunnery  on  the  Spanish  fleet 
under  conditions  of  unusual  haste  and  excitement. 

Shortly  after  six  o'clock  on  Monday  morning,  July 
1 8,  Lieutenant  Crook,  of  General  Shafter's  staff,  entered 
the  city  and  received  a  surrender  of  all  the  arms  in  the 
arsenal.  At  about  seven  o'clock  General  Toral  sent  his 
sword  to  General  Shafter  in  evidence  of  his  submission, 
and  about  nine  o'clock  Shafter  and  his  generals,  with 
mounted  escorts  of  one  hundred  picked  men  of  the 
Second  Cavalry,  rode  over  the  trenches  to  the  open 
ground  beyond,  midway  to  the  deserted  Spanish  works. 
On  the  crest  of  the  heights  beyond  the  several  regiments 
of  the  army  were  drawn  up  under  arms  ;  comprising,  as 
they  did,  a  total  of  over  twenty  thousand  men,  and  ex 
tending  along  seven  miles  of  intrenchments,  they  formed 
an  imposing  spectacle. 

On  reaching  the  selected  ground,  General  Shafter  found 
confronting  him  General  Toral  and  his  staff,  all  mounted 
and  in  full  uniform,  followed  by  a  select  detachment  of 
Spanish  troops.  The  scene  that  followed  was  dramatic 
and  picturesque.  General  Shafter,  with  his  generals  and 
their  staffs  grouped  immediately  in  the  rear,  and  the 
troops  of  cavalrymen  with  drawn  sabres  on  the  left, 
advanced  to  meet  his  vanquished  foe.  A  few  words  of 
courteous  greeting  passed,  and  then  the  American  gen- 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  305 

eral  returned  General  Toral  his  sword,  with  words  of 
compliment  which  seemed  to  touch  him  deeply  and 
drew  from  him  a  warm  response  of  thanks.  The  con 
clusion  of  the  ceremony  was  performed  by  the  Spanish 
company,  which  in  miniature  represented  the  army,  and, 
under  Toral' s  command,  grounded  arms,  wheeled,  and 
marched  across  the  American  lines  to  the  place  selected 
for  the  prisoners'  camp. 

General  Toral  throughout  the  ceremony  was  deeply 
dejected.  When  General  Shafter  introduced  him  by 
name  to  each  member  of  his  staff,  the  Spanish  general 
appeared  to  be  a  very  broken  man.  He  seemed  to  be 
about  sixty  years  old  and  of  frail  constitution,  though 
stern  resolution  was  shown  in  every  feature.  The  lines 
were  strongly  marked,  and  his  face  was  deep  drawn,  as 
if  he  was  in  physical  pain.  He  replied  with  an  air  of 
abstraction  to  the  words  addressed  to  him,  and  when  he 
accompanied  General  Shafter,  at  the  head  of  the  escort, 
into  the  city  to  take  formal  possession  of  Santiago,  he 
spoke  but  few  words.  The  appealing  faces  of  the  starv 
ing  refugees  streaming  back  into  the  city  did  not  move 
him,  nor  did  the  groups  of  Spanish  soldiers  lining  the 
road  and  gazing  curiously  at  the  fair-skinned,  stalwart- 
framed  conquerors.  Only  once  did  the  faint  shadow  of 
a  smile  lurk  about  the  corners  of  his  mouth.  This  was 
when  the  cavalcade  passed  through  a  barbed- wire  en 
tanglement.  No  body  of  infantry  could  ever  have  got 
through  this  defence  alive,  and  General  Shafter' s  remark 
about  its  resisting  power  found  the  first  gratifying  echo 
in  the  defeated  general's  heart. 

Farther  along,  the  desperate  character  of  the  Spanish 
resistance,  as  planned,  amazed  our  officers.  Although 
primitive,  it  was  well  devised.  Each  approach  to  the 

20 


306  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN. 

city  was  thrice  barricaded  and  wired,  and  the  barricades 
were  high  enough  and  sufficiently  strong  to  withstand 
shrapnel.  The  slaughter  among  our  troops  would  have 
been  frightful  had  it  ever  become  necessary  to  storm 
the  city,  General  Shafter  remarking  that  it  would  have 
cost  him  the  lives  of  five  thousand  men  to  take  the  city 
by  storm. 

The  palace  was  reached  soon  after  ten  o'clock,  the 
American  generals  being  here  introduced  to  the  mu 
nicipal  authorities.  At  noon  the  closing  ceremony  took 
place,  the  American  flag  rising  gracefully  to  the  peak 
of  the  staff  over  the  palace  walls,  and  Santiago  finally 
changed  hands.  After  nearly  four  centuries  of  rule  it 
had  passed  from  the  control  of  Spain  and  become  for 
the  time  being  an  appanage  of  the  great  republic  of  the 
West. 


CHAPTER    XVIII. 

EVENTS  AFTER  THE  SURRENDER. 

WITH  the  raising  of  the  stars  and  stripes  over  the  gov 
ernor's  palace  at  Santiago,  a  remarkable  change  came 
upon  that  ancient  city.  Not  many  days  before  its  in 
habitants  had  been  streaming  outward  in  hopeless  misery 
and  destitution.  Now  they  came  hurrying  back,  many 
of  them  with  smiling  faces  and  hopeful  hearts.  The 
streets,  silent  and  deserted  on  the  day  of  the  surrender, 
were  thronged  with  people  ;  the  houses,  many  of  which 
had  been  looted  by  the  Spanish  soldiers,  were  occupied 
by  their  former  inmates  ;  life  in  the  deserted  city  had 
begun  again.  The  roads  were  still  filled  with  the  home 
coming  refugees,  plodding  wearily  but  hopefully  onward. 
In  the  city  most  of  the  people  were  gathered  about 
the  wharves,  where  the  Red  Cross  steamer,  the  State  of 
Texas,  was  unloading  food  for  the  needy.  There  were 
few  signs  of  gloom  on  the  faces  of  these  people.  Mercu 
rial  in  disposition,  they  gazed  with  lively  interest  on  the 
activity  in  the  harbor,  while  smiles  wreathed  their  faces 
at  the  prospect  of  getting  other  food  than  rice  and  salt 
meat.  Of  the  better  class  of  inhabitants,  however,  few 
had  returned.  Their  houses  were  closed,  and  they 
remained  at  El  Caney  and  their  other  places  of  refuge. 
Everywhere  filth  was  in  evidence  in  the  streets,  the  odors 
were  the  reverse  of  salubrious,  and  all  could  see  that  to 
fit  Santiago  for  American  residence  radical  sanitary  work 
needed  to  be  done. 

307 


308  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

In  addition  to  the  Red  Cross  steamer,  several  other 
large  steamers  were  unloading  cargoes  of  supplies  and 
provisions,  numbers  of  vessels  flying  the  stars  and  stripes 
lay  in  the  harbor,  small  boats  were  plying  briskly  to  and 
fro,  and  everywhere  bustle  and  activity  replaced  the  recent 
death-like  quiet  of  the  scene.  The  great  sheds  along 
the  water-front  were  being  packed  with  merchandise,  and 
the  large  stores  rented  on  Marina  Street  were  steadily 
receiving  goods.  A  revival  of  commercial  activity  seemed 
to  have  been  suddenly  inaugurated.  The  electric-light 
plant  was  working,  the  ice-factory  was  busy,  and  the 
water-supply  pipes  were  being  repaired.  Miss  Barton 
was  rapidly  distributing  supplies  to  the  hungry  and  desti 
tute,  and,  as  with  the  turn  of  a  kaleidoscope,  the  aspect 
of  the  whole  city  had  changed. 

Between  the  American  and  Spanish  soldiers  the  best 
of  good  feeling  prevailed.  A  few  days  before  they  had 
been  doing  their  best  to  kill  one  another  ;  now  they  met 
and  mingled  on  the  most  friendly  terms,  victors  and 
vanquished  alike  glad  that  the  period  of  strife  was  at  an 
end  and  the  horrors  of  the  siege  were  things  of  the 
past.  The  narrow,  cobble-paved  streets,  grilling  in  the 
fierce  sunshine,  were  filled  with  groups  of  chatting 
Spanish  soldiers  and  of  laughing  and  rollicking  Ameri 
cans,  while  about  the  plaza  facing  the  palace  and  in  the 
numerous  airy  caf6s  the  officers  of  the  opposing  armies 
lounged  and  fraternized.  The  saloons  remained  closed 
by  order  of  the  military  governor,  to  prevent  the  quarrels 
likely  to  arise  from  drunkenness,  but  business  of  other 
kinds  showed  marked  symptoms  of  revival.  Busiest  of  all 
were  the  pawnshops,  which  were  doing  a  rushing  busi 
ness,  goods  of  all  kinds  being  offered  by  the  people,  the 
officers  tendering  for  small  loans  their  medals,  spurs,  and 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  309 

swords,  and  the  civil  employes  their  gold-headed  canes 
of  office.  These  in  turn  were  bought  by  American 
officers  and  soldiers  at  fancy  prices.  Machetes  in  par 
ticular  were  purchased  in  numbers  as  souvenirs  of  the 
war. 

An  amusing  story  is  told  of  one  way  in  which  the 
needy  Castilian  cavalry  provided  themselves  with  Ameri 
can  coin.  Knowing  that  they  would  have  to  turn  over 
their  horses  to  the  Americans  as  part  of  the  spoils  of 
victory,  they  contrived  to  do  so  in  a  profitable  manner. 
It  stood  to  reason  that  the  invading  soldiers  would  be 
glad  of  a  meal  of  fresh  meat  after  their  diet  of  salt  bacon 
and  hardtack,  and  for  a  time  meat  was  to  be  had  in 
abundance  at  good  prices  at  the  local  restaurants,  until 
the  hungry  soldiers  began  to  suspect  that  they  were 
dining  on  horse-steaks,  when  the  demand  suddenly 
ceased.  Then  for  a  few  days  an  active  business  went  on 
in  the  sale  of  horses  on  the  hoof,  the  chivalrous  Spaniards 
deeming  it  better  to  sell  cheap  than  to  give  up  for  nothing. 
As  a  result,  when  General  Toral  turned  over  the  horses 
of  his  army  on  July  24,  the  sum  total  of  Spanish  steeds 
delivered  was  one  hundred  and  forty-nine. 

General  McKibben  had  been  appointed  temporary 
military  governor  of  the  city.  He  was  succeeded  by 
Colonel  Wood,  of  the  Rough  Riders,  who  at  once  began 
a  sanitary  work  that  was  sadly  needed.  The  narrow 
streets,  the  malodorous  alleys  and  by-ways  of  the  city, 
were  encumbered  with  refuse  of  every  kind  to  an  inde 
scribable  extent,  while  drainage  and  sanitary  conditions 
in  general  were  absolutely  lacking.  The  people  had 
lived  for  centuries  in  disregard  of  the  simplest  laws  of 
hygiene,  considering  yellow  fever  a  mysterious  dispen 
sation  of  Providence,  and  the  only  cleaning  the  city  ever 


310  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN. 

got  came  in  the  flushing  of  its  streets  by  the  fierce 
summer  rains.  Hundreds  of  carts  were  soon  at  work 
carrying  the  filth  from  the  streets,  and  orders  were  given 
that  every  house  should  at  once  be  cleaned,  inside  and 
out,  an  order  which  produced  very  inadequate  results. 
In  people  who  have  been  born  and  reared  in  filth,  belief 
in  the  virtues  of  sanitation  cannot  be  instilled  in  a  day. 

Meanwhile,  the  Americans,  while  making  the  Spanish 
their  friends,  were  making  the  Cubans  their  enemies. 
Bad  blood  had  existed  between  them  almost  from  the 
start,  and  it  grew  as  the  days  went  on.  The  Cubans, 
while  brave  enough  in  their  own  way,  were  not  used  to 
the  open  fighting  of  the  Americans,  and  did  not  shine 
in  the  methods  of  regular  warfare.  The  American  sol 
diers  soon  began  to  look  upon  them  with  contempt, 
which  was  changed  to  anger  when  their  Cuban  allies 
refused  to  lend  their  aid  in  road-making  and  hospital 
labors,  preferring  the  pleasanter  task  of  disposing  of 
rations,  an  enjoyment  of  which  they  had  long  been  de 
prived.  The  insurgents  were  not  as  black  as  they  were 
painted.  The  number  of  their  wounded  in  the  hospitals 
indicated  that  they  had  not  feared  to  face  the  bullets  of 
the  enemy.  The  difficulty  was  perhaps  largely  due  to 
ignorance  of  the  language  and  misunderstanding  of  orders. 
But  their  evident  disinclination  to  exert  themselves  in 
any  useful  way  excited  a  scorn  in  the  Americans  which 
they  took  little  pains  to  conceal. 

This  difficulty  between  the  soldiers  was  followed  by 
one  between  their  leaders,  General  Garcia  taking  deep 
offence  because  he  had  not  been  consulted  in  the  terms 
of  surrender  and  the  subsequent  steps  for  the  govern 
ment  of  the  city.  General  Shafter  personally  invited 
him  to  go  with  him  into  the  city  on  the  occasion  of  the 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  311 

surrender,  but  he  declined,  sending  the  message,  "  I 
cannot  be  your  guest  under  the  Spanish  flag."  His 
leading  cause  of  offence,  however,  was  that  the  Spanish 
civil  officers  were  left  in  power.  It  was  explained  that 
these  officials  were  retained  only  until  it  would  be  con 
venient  to  change  them  for  others,  but  this  explanation 
did  not  suffice  to  heal  his  wounded  feelings. 

'  *  The  trouble  with  General  Garcia  was, ' '  said  General 
Shafter,  '  *  that  he  expected  to  be  placed  in  command  at 
this  place  ;  in  other  words,  that  we  would  turn  the  city 
over  to  him.  I  explained  to  him  fully  that  we  were  at 
war  with  Spain,  and  that  the  question  of  Cuban  inde 
pendence  could  not  be  considered  by  me.  Another 
grievance  was  that,  finding  that  several  thousand  men 
marched  in  without  opposition  from  General  Garcia,  I 
extended  my  own  lines  in  front  of  him  and  closed  up 
the  gap,  as  I  saw  that  I  had  to  depend  upon  my  own 
men  for  any  effective  investment  of  the  place. ' ' 

Shafter  explained  his  attitude  in  a  conciliatory  letter 
to  Garcia,  but  it  failed  to  placate  the  offended  Cuban 
general,  who  withdrew  with  his  forces  and  marched  in 
wards  towards  Holguin,  an  interior  town  with  a  consider 
able  Spanish  garrison.  He  proposed  to  resume  the  war 
of  the  insurrection  on  his  own  account,  and  cut  loose 
from  these  American  invaders,  whom  he  conceived  to  be 
conducting  the  war  for  themselves.  '  *  I  have  the  most 
kindly  feeling  for  General  Garcia, ' '  said  Shafter,  '  *  and 
sincerely  regret  that  he  has  found  cause  for  complaint, 
and  that  he  should  feel  offended  because  he  was  not 
permitted  to  be  a  signatory  party  to  the  Spanish  sur 
render.  It  is  idle,  however,  to  argue  the  point,  for,  no 
matter  how  warmly  one  may  sympathize  with  the  Cubans, 
the  proposition  to  install  them  in  power  immediately  after 


312  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN. 

the  surrender  of  the  Spanish  is  untenable,  and  lacks 
support  among  Cubans  themselves. ' ' 

Shafter  not  alone  declined  to  place  the  Cubans  in  im 
mediate  power,  but  also  failed  to  include  any  of  them 
among  the  military  guard  in  charge  of  the  city,  fearing 
evil  results  from  their  bitter  hostility  to  the  Spanish  and 
a  possible  sacking  of  the  deserted  houses.  This  added 
to  Garcia' s  injured  feeling  and  was  another  inciting  cause 
in  his  removal  of  his  troops.  His  action  was  not  likely 
to  prove  to  the  advantage  of  the  Cubans,  as  it  added 
strength  to  the  growing  belief  that  they  were  not  to  be 
trusted  in  control,  and  that  the  United  States  would  have 
to  hold  the  reins  of  military  rule  over  the  island  until  its 
people  had  proved  themselves  capable  of  self-rule  and 
the  amenities  of  modern  government. 

While  this  state  of  affairs  ruled  at  Santiago,  events  of 
some  interest  were  taking  place  elsewhere  on  the  island. 
General  Gomez,  the  Cuban  commander-in- chief,  had 
apparently  remained  dormant  during  the  war,  leaving 
all  active  operations  to  his  subordinate ;  but  on  July  3 
an  expedition  landed  a  large  cargo  of  supplies  for  his 
army  at  Palo  Alto,  on  the  southern  coast.  It  was  the 
final  expedition  for  the  aid  of  the  insurgents,  and  did 
not  succeed  in  its  purpose  withput  risk  and  loss,  Captain 
Nunez,  brother  of  General  Emilio  Nunez,  being  killed  in 
the  attempt  to  land. 

On  July  21  the  last  important  naval  engagement  on 
the  Cuban  coast  took  place,  four  American  war-ships 
entering  the  harbor  of  Nipe,  on  the  northeast  coast  of 
Santiago  province,  where,  after  a  furious  bombardment, 
they  took  possession  of  the  port.  The  vessels  engaged 
were  the  Topeka,  Annapolis,  Wasp,  and  Leyden.  The 
place  was  defended  by  three  forts  and  the  Spanish  gun- 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN.  313 

boat  Jorge  Juan,  the  latter  being  attacked  by  the  Topeka, 
which  sent  4-inch  shells  crushing  into  her  at  such  a  rate 
that  she  went  to  the  bottom  within  twenty  minutes.  The 
forts  were  as  easily  silenced,  and  the  riflemen  who  had 
taken  part  in  the  engagement  were  quickly  put  to  flight. 
The  bay  of  Nipe,  thus  taken,  is  a  large  land-locked 
harbor,  almost  directly  north  of  Santiago  and  about  fifty 
miles  distant.  It  lies  two  days  nearer  than  Santiago  to 
Key  West  and  other  American  ports,  has  harborage  for 
a  host  of  vessels,  and  is  a  place  which  may  become  of 
much  commercial  importance  under  American  control. 

Meanwhile,  the  several  garrisons  included  in  General 
Toral's  capitulation  were  one  by  one  making  their  sub 
mission  and  marching  to  the  camp  at  Santiago.  Guan- 
tanamo  was  among  the  last  to  yield,  its  garrison,  six 
thousand  men  in  number,  bringing  the  total  of  captives 
up  to  Toral's  estimate  of  nearly  twenty-three  thousand 
men.  The  sending  of  this  large  body  of  prisoners  to 
Spain  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  the  capitulation 
was  the  next  thing  to  be  considered.  It  was  not  deemed 
safe  to  trust  American  transports  within  Spanish  ports, 
and  bids  were  asked  from  the  shipmasters  of  neutral 
powers.  An  unlooked-for  result  followed,  the  lowest  bid 
coming  from  Spain  itself,  the  successful  bidder  being  the 
Compania  Transatlantica  Espanola,  of  Barcelona.  The 
fact  that  this  was  a  Spanish  company  proved  no  hin 
drance  ;  it  was  given  the  contract,  and  at  once  began 
preparations  for  conveying  the  Spanish  soldiers  home  in 
Spanish  ships.  They  were  to  be  sent  without  their  arms, 
the  United  States  government  holding  in  abeyance  as 
yet  the  recommendation  of  the  commissioners  to  honor 
them  by  a  return  of  the  arms  which  they  had  so  bravely 
used. 


314  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN. 

There  remained  another  problem  to  be  solved.  On 
the  coast  of  Cuba  lay  the  wrecks  of  Spain's  four  best 
ships,  the  armored  cruisers  which  had  gone  down  in 
their  daring  rush  for  liberty.  Two  of  these,  the  Vizcaya 
and  the  Almirante  Oquendo,  were  wrecked  beyond  re 
pair,  so  torn  by  shell  and  ruined  by  flame  and  explosion 
that  they  were  useless  hulks.  But  the  remaining  two 
were  in  much  better  condition,  and  might  be  saved  as 
useful  additions  to  the  navy  of  the  United  States.  It  was 
thought  possible  to  float  the  Maria  Teresa  without  serious 
difficulty.  The  Cristobal  Colon  was  in  a  more  critical 
state.  Little  hurt  as  she  was  by  shot  or  shell,  she  had 
been  rilled  by  the  opening  of  her  sea- valves,  and  lay  upon 
her  beam  ends  sunk  upon  a  very  shelving  beach,  where 
she  was  sure  to  be  totally  lost  if  a  hurricane  should 
arise.  The  task  of  raising  her  was  given  to  Lieutenant 
Hobson,  of  Merrimac  fame,  who  proposed  to  do  so  by 
the  aid  of  external  pontoons  and  internal  air-bags,  and 
also  by  pumping  the  water  from  her  watertight  compart 
ments. 

In  Santiago  a  special  commission  was  appointed  to 
investigate  the  city  prison,  the  commissioners  finding 
instances  of  gross  injustice  and  criminal  negligence  which 
fully  justified  the  rending  of  the  city  from  the  cruel  hands 
of  Spain.  The  prison  records  and  the  questioning  of 
prisoners  revealed  shameful  examples  of  injustice, — men 
and  women  having  been  thrown  into  cells  and  kept  there 
for  years  without  a  trial  for  such  a  petty  offence  as  speak 
ing  disrespectfully  of  the  Spanish  government.  In  many 
instances  all  records  of  the  charges  against  untried  prison 
ers  had  been  lost,  the  witnesses  had  died,  the  existing 
officials  were  ignorant  why  they  were  held,  and  in  some 
cases  the  prisoners  themselves  had  forgotten.  One  man 


THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN.  315 

named  Jos6  Silvera,  for  a  petty  theft,  the  maximum 
penalty  for  which  was  six  months'  imprisonment,  had 
been  detained  for  fourteen  years.  Other  cases  of  crying 
injustice  were  found,  and  the  prisoners  thus  foully  dealt 
with  were  released.  It  seemed  indeed  full  time  that  the 
colonial  dominion  of  Spain  was  brought  to  an  end  and 
medisevalism  replaced  by  modern  civilization  on  Cuban 
soil. 

While  these  events  were  taking  place  in  and  about 
Santiago,  the  army  of  invasion  had  fallen  into  a  de 
plorable  state.  By  men  accustomed  to  the  temperate 
climate  of  the  north  and  exposed  to  the  scorching  suns 
and  drenching  rains  of  a  Cuban  summer,  with  little 
shelter  from  the  humid  atmosphere  and  the  water-soaked 
soil,  sickness  could  not  well  be  avoided,  and  was  likely 
to  prove  more  dangerous  than  the  bullets  of  the  enemy. 
The  difficulty  of  making  the  men  observe  sanitary  pre 
cautions  added  to  the  danger,  and  febrile  disorders  of  a 
malarial  character  soon  began  to  spread  among  the 
troops.  The  dreaded  yellow  fever,  a  disease  indigenous 
to  the  soil,  was  not  long  in  making  its  appearance,  prob 
ably  through  infection  from  the  Santiago  refugees,  and 
fear  of  its  rapid  spread  among  the  troops  hastened  the 
negotiations  for  the  surrender  of  the  Spanish  army. 

The  wounded  were  in  less  peril  than  the  sick.  For 
tunately  for  them,  the  Mauser  rifle,  used  by  the  Spanish 
soldiers,  makes  what  surgeons  call  a  "humane  wound." 
During  the  Civil  War,  when  a  man  was  shot  through 
the  lungs  by  a  bullet  from  a  Springfield  rifle,  he  was 
almost  sure  to  die  in  a  few  days  or  a  few  months  from 
consumption,  pneumonia,  or  other  affections  brought  on 
by  the  wound.  This  is  not  the  case  with  the  Mauser 
bullet,  which  does  not  lacerate  the  parts,  and  does  not 


316  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

crush  bones  so  as  to  render  amputation  necessary.  If  not 
struck  in  a  mortal  spot,  the  wounded  man  is  very  apt  to 
recover.  Antiseptic  treatment,  which  was  practised  in 
this  war  to  an  extent  probably  never  before  known  in 
warfare,  also  had  much  to  do  with  the  remarkable  per 
centage  of  recoveries  of  our  men.  A  small  package 
marked  * '  first  aid  to  the  wounded' '  was  carried  in  the 
hip-pocket  of  each  of  the  soldiers,  and  proved  a  most 
fortunate  provision  in  the  deficiency  of  medical  supplies. 
It  enabled  the  doctors  at  once  to  apply  an  antiseptic 
dressing  to  the  wounds,  causing  them  to  heal  without 
the  appearance  of  inflammation  or  the  formation  of  pus. 
The  results  were  remarkable,  the  large  percentage  of  re 
coveries  among  the  wounded  being  perhaps  unequalled 
in  any  preceding  war.  The  lack  of  medical  supplies 
seems  to  have  been  more  a  misfortune  than  a  fault  of  the 
surgical  authorities.  They  had  been  brought  in  abun 
dance  in  the  transports,  but  in  the  general  difficulty  of 
landing  the  first  attention  had  been  given  to  the  muni 
tions  of  war,  and  the  transports  had  been  moved  to  make 
room  for  others  before  their  medicines  and  surgical  in 
struments  were  put  on  shore.  The  means  for  making 
wounds  were  given  precedence  ;  the  means  for  healing 
wounds  were  left  untouched  in  the  holds  of  the  ships. 
This  was  due  mainly  to  the  haste  and  confusion  of  the 
operations,  though  General  Shafter  did  not  escape  blame 
through  failure  to  respond  satisfactorily  to  the  appeals 
of  the  surgeons  for  aid  in  landing  and  transporting  their 
stores. 

It  was  fortunate  for  the  wounded  that  an  improved 
method  of  treatment  was  adopted,  for  the  arrangements 
for  their  comfort  were  of  the  most  wretched  character. 
The  tents  provided  were  far  too  few  to  accommodate 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  317 

the  suffering,  and  many  of  the  wounded  soldiers  were 
obliged  to  lie  in  the  open  air,  exposed  to  a  scorching 
sun-bath  during  part  of  the  day  and  drenched  with  rain 
during  the  remainder.  At  Siboney  little  better  provision 
was  made,  many  of  the  wounded  being  obliged  to  lie  on 
the  water-soaked  ground.  The  more  severely  wounded, 
however,  were  soon  taken  north  on  hospital-ships,  leav 
ing  only  the  lighter  cases  to  be  dealt  with  on  Cuban 
soil. 

Meanwhile,  sickness  was  increasing  with  a  rapidity 
that  soon  became  alarming,  nearly  five  thousand  of  the 
troops,  almost  a  fourth  part  of  the  whole  army,  being 
down  with  various  diseases  by  August  i.  Three-fourths 
of  these  were  cases  of  fever,  and  yellow  fever  had  grown 
dangerously  prevalent.  When  this  state  of  affairs  be 
came  known  in  the  North,  a  sharp  criticism  of  the  War 
Department  arose,  this  branch  of  the  government  being 
considered  responsible  for  the  condition  of  the  army, 
which  was  believed  to  be  due  to  lack  of  proper  care  and 
foresight.  The  trouble  was  not  confined  to  Cuba,  for 
at  Camp  Alger,  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  Wash 
ington,  typhoid  fever  had  become  epidemic,  and  had 
existed  since  the  formation  of  the  camp.  There  was 
excellent  reason  to  believe  that  the  water-supply  was 
contaminated  and  that  the  soldiers  were  being  unneces 
sarily  kept  in  a  dangerous  locality. 

As  the  unfortunate  situation  at  the  front  became  better 
known,  the  adverse  criticism  grew  more  stringent,  Sec 
retary  of  War  Alger  and  Surgeon- General  Sternberg 
being  sharply  denounced  by  many  newspapers,  while 
General  Shafter  by  no  means  escaped.  Dr.  Nicholas 
Senn,  chief  of  the  operating  staff  of  the  army  at  Santi 
ago,  and  a  man  of  the  highest  reputation  in  his  profes- 


3i8  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 


sion,  made  the  following  incriminating  statement,  under 
date  of  July  17  : 

"SIBONEY,  CUBA,  July  17. 

* '  In  the  present  war  with  Spain  every  one  knew  that 
our  army  would  be  exposed  to  an  unusual  extent  to 
disease  and  the  debilitating  effect  of  the  tropical  climate 
of  Cuba.  The  invasion  of  the  province  of  Santiago 
meant  certain  exposure  to  yellow  fever  infection.  The 
commanding  general  must  have  been  aware  of  this.  It 
is  said  the  seafaring  men  along  the  coast  of  Cuba  fear 
Santiago  more  than  any  other  port.  Yellow  fever  reigns 
there  more  or  less  throughout  the  entire  year.  At 
Siboney  and  Baiquiri  it  is  known  as  l  hill  fever.'  It 
appears  that  the  precautions  outlined  by  Colonel  Green- 
leaf,  chief  surgeon  of  the  army  in  the  field,  were  entirely 
ignored  by  the  commander  of  the  invading  force. 

1  *  I  was  more  than  astonished  when  I  arrived  at 
Siboney,  on  July  7,  to  find  that  thousands  of  refugees 
from  infected  districts  were  permitted  to  enter  the  camps 
unmolested  and  mingle  freely  with  our  unsuspecting 
soldiers.  All  along  the  road,  from  the  base  of  opera 
tions  to  the  line  of  intrenchments,  could  be  seen  at  short 
intervals  scenes  which  were  sure  to  bring  about  disas 
trous  results.  Our  soldiers,  in  a  strange  land  and 
among  strange  people,  enjoyed  at  first  the  novelty,  and 
were  free  in  buying  the  fruits  of  the  land  and  exchang 
ing  coins,  not  knowing  how  dearly  they  would  be  called 
upon  to  pay  for  such  a  questionable  privilege.  Houses 
and  huts  in  which  yellow  fever  had  raged  were  visited 
freely,  and  the  dangerous  germs  of  the  disease  were 
inhaled,  as  a  matter  of  course.  The  results  of  such 
intimate  association  of  our  susceptible  troops  with  the 
natives  could  be  readily  foreseen. 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  319 

"It  required  only  the  usual  time  for  the  disease  to 
make  its  appearance,  and  when  it  did  so  it  was  not  in  a 
single  place,  but  all  along  the  line  from  our  intrench- 
ments  to  Siboney. 

' '  Dr.  Guiteras,  the  yellow  fever  expert,  recognized  a 
few  of  the  cases  on  the  day  of  my  arrival.  4ie-4s-ex- 
tremely  cautious,  and  will  only  make  a  positive  diagnosis 
in  cases  in  which  albumen  is  exhibited  in  combination 
with  the  usual  symptoms  which  accompany  the  disease. 
On  the  recommendation  of  Dr.  Guiteras,  our  isolation 
hospital  was  established  a  mile  and  a  half  from  Siboney, 
and  in  less  than  three  days  it  contained  more  than  one 

^  -^J--^       \\JL*JVU(J(jl4&    **-*  **  ^      ^TP^** 

hundred  yellow  fever  patients,  among  them  General 
Duffreld,  of  Michigan,  and  Professor  Victor  C.  Vaughn, 
of  -the  University  of  Michigan. 

"  During  my  first  visit  to  the  front  I  found  two  hun 
dred  fever  patients  near  the  First  Division  Hospital,  most 
of  them  under  shelter  tents,  others  lying  on  the  moist 
ground  with  nothing  but  a  wet  blanket  to  protect  them. 

* '  The  appearance  of  yellow  fever  cases  in  such  a 
short  time,  in  such  large  numbers,  and  originating  in  so 
many  different  localities  simultaneously  proved  a  source 
of  surprise  and  alarm  to  the  medical  officers.  They 
realized  the  danger  and  the  necessity  for  the  employ 
ment  of  most  energetic  measures,  but  this  could  not  be 
done  without  a  hearty  co-operation  on  the  part  of  the 
general  in  command. 

1 '  Major  Lagarde  applied  to  General  Shafter  for  a 
detail  of  a  company  of  infantry  to  aid  him  in  fighting  the 
disease.  His  request  was  promptly  denied,  under  the 
pretence  that  all  of  the  troops  available  were  needed 
more  at  the  front  than  in  the  rear.  This  action  left  the 
major  powerless  in  checking  the  extension  of  the  disease. 


320  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

Fortunately,  Major- General  Miles  arrived  in  the  nick  of 
time,  and  with  him  Colonel  Greenleaf,  chief  surgeon  of 
the  army  in  the  field. 

' '  Colonel  Greenleaf  made  the  same  request  of  General 
Shafter  for  troops  to  aid  him  in  gaining  control  of  the 
disease,  but  it  was  ignored  as  peremptorily  as  that  of 
Major  Lagarde.  He  now  turned  to  General  Miles,  who 
placed  at  his  disposal  not  only  a  battalion,  but  a  whole 
regiment  of  colored  troops. 

' '  The  work  of  sanitation  was  then  taken  earnestly  in 
hand.  At  present  there  are  about  eight  hundred  cases 
of  yellow  fever  here.  Fortunately  the  disease  is  of  a 
mild  type,  the  number  of  deaths  being  small.  General 
Miles  has  done  everything  in  his  power  to  aid  the 
medical  officers  in  limiting  and  weeding  out  the  disease. ' ' 

Correspondents  with  the  army  gave  similar  testimony, 
declaring  that  no  precautions  were  taken  to  ward  off 
yellow  fever  from  the  troops  ;  that  ambulances  and 
supply-wagons  were  used  to  carry  sick  refugees  and 
afterwards  employed,  without  disinfection,  for  the  con 
veyance  of  our  wounded  ;  and  that,  if  those  in  charge 
had  specially  desired  to  infect  the  regiments,  they  could 
not  have  adopted  more  effective  methods.  Only  the 
fortunate  circumstance  mentioned  by  Dr.  Senn,  that  the 
type  of  fever  proved  to  be  an  extremely  mild  one,  deaths 
being  few  and  convalescence  rapid,  saved  the  army  from 
a  disaster  greater  than  that  of  war. 

As  the  days  went  on  and  the  number  of  the  sick 
rapidly  increased,  the  public  excitement  grew,  enhanced 
by  the  persistent  charges  that  red  tape  and  official  in- 
competency  were  largely  responsible  for  the  reprehensi 
ble  state  of  affairs.  As  regards  this  condition,  further 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  321 

evidence  was  given  on  August  4  by  the  Rev.  Drs.  Henry 
C,  McCook  and  Joseph  Krauskopf,  who  had  just  returned 
from  a  visit  to  Santiago  on  behalf  of  the  National  Relief 
Commission.  Dr.  McCook  gave  the  following  account 
of  his  experiences  : 

'  *  The  army  was  in  an  awful  condition.  The  medical 
supplies  were  almost  exhausted,  some  of  the  most  im 
portant  remedies  being  absolutely  run  out.  Many  of 
the  doctors  were  sick.  Of  the  sick  men  in  camp  there 
was  not  one  on  a  cot.  There  were  no  supplies,  not 
even  a  change  of  clothing  for  the  men  that  were  stricken. 
They  lay  on  the  ground  in  their  blankets,  which  the 
rains  kept  constantly  in  a  damp  or  soaked  condition. 
Once  or  twice  a  day  came  the  torrential  rains  to  drench 
them,  and  make  them  even  more  miserable  than  they 
would  be  from  the  sickness  alone.  Hundreds  of  men 
with  dysentery  and  typhoid  lay  in  this  wretched  condi 
tion.  With  one-quarter  of  the  army  on  the  sick-list  and 
a  large  part  of  the  remainder  convalescent,  with  pesti 
lence  among  them,  with  the  sun  smiting  them  by  day, 
and  the  rains  keeping  them  damp  in  spite  of  the  sun, 
with  nature  exhausted  after  the  long  battle,  with  inad 
equacy  of  supplies  and  hospital  equipments  and  clothing, 
and  with  lack  of  variety  of  food,  the  army  was  facing 
a  terrible  situation. 

' '  It  was  but  the  natural  result  of  this  awful  condition 
of  affairs  that,  as  we  went  among  the  soldiers,  we  heard 
this  appeal  on  all  sides  :  '  Do  you  know  the  President  or 
the  Secretary?  Won't  you  tell  him  for  God's  sake  to 
take  us  away  from  here  ?  We  are  worn  out,  broken 
down,  and  we  never  will  get  well  until  we  get  a  breath 
of  other  air. '  They  were  all  anxious  to  get  away,  for 
they  felt  that  to  stay  there  would  mean  death. 

21 


322  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

' '  Yet  there  was  remarkable  resolution  left  in  the  men, 
for  all  that.  I  believe  if  there  had  been  a  call  to  fight 
the  troops  would  have  been  found  ready.  The  condi 
tions  that  surrounded  them  appalled  them  more  than  the 
prospect  of  battle  could  have  done.  They  were  dis 
couraged  and  drooping,  but  if  they  had  heard  the  bugle 
they  would  have  gone  in  with  a  good  deal  of  vim. 

' '  We  at  once  went  about  the  work  of  relieving  the 
suffering  that  existed.  Too  great  credit  cannot  be  given 
to  Major  Summers,  the  surgeon,  who  went  with  us  on 
the  Resolute.  He  simply  threw  red  tape  to  the  winds. 
No  sooner  had  we  landed  than  surgeons  of  the  various 
commands  came  to  the  ship  for  medicines  and  other 
supplies.  The  government  stores  were  in  charge  of 
Major  Summers,  but  he  told  the  surgeons  to  take  what 
they  wanted.  He  comprehended  that  the  first  thing 
was  to  relieve  the  distress,  and  he  didn't  stop  to  con 
sider  requisitions  and  other  forms  of  red  tape.  He  told 
the  surgeons  he  would  take  their  receipts  the  following 
day,  and  they  helped  themselves  to  what  was  needed. ' ' 

Dr.  Krauskopf  gave  similar  testimony,  stating  that 
fearful  blunders  had  been  made,  and  that  the  medical 
supplies  and  delicacies  sent  by  the  Commission  had 
arrived  just  in  time  to  save  many  lives.  ' '  The  troops 
are  all  weak  and  totally  unfit  for  work,"  he  said. 

These  converging  testimonies  as  to  the  scandalous 
condition  of  affairs  in  the  army  at  Santiago,  and  the  de 
nunciation  of  government  officials  that  followed,  at  length 
aroused  the  War  Department  to  action.  On  August  3 
General  Shafter  called  the  commanding  and  medical 
officers  of  the  army  together  for  conference,  and  read 
them  a  cable  message  which  he  had  just  received  from 
Secretary  Alger,  ordering  him,  on  the  recommendation 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  323 

of  Surgeon- General  Sternberg,  to  move  the  army  to  San 
Luis,  in  the  interior,  a  higher  and  presumably  healthier 
location. 

This  order,  while  apparently  sufficient  to  meet  the 
situation  in  the  opinion  of  the  officials  named,  proved 
the  reverse  of  satisfactory  to  the  army  leaders,  from 
whom  it  called  forth  energetic  protests.  Colonel  Roose 
velt  was  the  first  to  give  voice  to  the  prevailing  senti 
ment  in  the  following  letter  to  General  Shafter  : 

"  MAJOR-GENERAL  SHAFTER, — Sir  :  In  a  meeting  of 
the  general  and  medical  officers  called  by  you  at  the 
palace  this  morning  we  were  all,  as  you  know,  unani 
mous  in  our  view  of  what  should  be  done  with  the  army. 
To  keep  us  here,  in  the  opinion  of  every  officer  com 
manding  a  division  or  brigade,  will  simply  involve  the 
destruction  of  thousands.  There  is  no  possible  reason 
for  not  shipping,  practically,  the  entire  command  north 
at  once. 

1  *  Yellow  fever  cases  are  very  few  in  the  cavalry 
division,  where  I  command  one  of  the  two  brigades, 
and  not  one  true  case  of  yellow  fever  has  occurred  in 
this  division,  except  among  the  men  sent  to  the  hospital 
at  Siboney,  where  they  have,  I  believe,  contracted  it. 
But  in  this  division  there  have  been  fifteen  hundred  cases 
of  malarial  fever.  Not  a  man  has  died  from  it,  but  the 
whole  command  is  so  weakened  and  shattered  as  to  be 
ripe  for  dying  like  rotten  sheep  when  a  real  yellow  fever 
epidemic,  instead  of  a  fake  epidemic  like  the  present, 
strikes  us,  as  it  is  bound  to  do  if  we  stay  here  at  the 
height  of  the  sickness  season,  August  and  the  beginning 
of  September.  Quarantine  against  malarial  fever  is  much 
like  quarantining  against  the  toothache. 


324  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

"All  of  us  are  certain,  as  soon  as  the  authorities  at 
Washington  fully  appreciate  the  conditions  of  the  army, 
to  be  sent  home.  If  we  are  kept  here,  it  will  in  all 
human  possibility  mean  an  appalling  disaster,  for  the 
surgeons  here  estimate  that  over  half  the  army,  if  kept 
here  during  the  sickly  season,  will  die.  This  is  not  only 
terrible  from  the  stand-point  of  the  individual  lives  lost, 
but  it  means  ruin  from  the  stand-point  of  the  military 
efficiency  of  the  flower  of  the  American  army,  for  the 
great  bulk  of  the  regulars  are  here  with  you. 

"The  sick-list,  large  though  it  is,  exceeding  four 
thousand,  affords  but  a  faint  idea  of  the  debilitation  of 
the  army.  Not  ten  per  cent,  are  fit  for  active  work. 
Six  weeks  on  the  north  Maine  coast,  for  instance,  or 
elsewhere,  where  the  yellow  fever  germ  cannot  possibly 
propagate,  would  make  us  all  as  fit  as  fighting  cocks, 
able  as  we  are  eager  to  take  a  leading  part  in  the  great 
campaign  against  Havana  in  the  fall,  even  if  we  are  not 
allowed  to  try  Porto  Rico. 

* '  We  can  be  moved  north,  if  moved  at  once,  with 
absolute  safety  to  the  country,  although,  of  course,  it 
would  have  been  infinitely  better  if  we  had  been  moved 
north  or  to  Porto  Rico  two  weeks  ago.  If  there  were 
any  object  in  keeping  us  here,  we  would  face  yellow 
fever  with  as  much  indifference  as  we  face  bullets,  but 
there  is  no  object  in  it.  The  four  immune  regiments 
ordered  here  are  sufficient  to  garrison  the  city  and  sur 
rounding  towns,  and  there  is  absolutely  nothing  for  us 
to  do  here,  and  there  has  not  been  since  the  city  sur 
rendered.  It  is  impossible  to  move  into  the  interior. 
Every  shifting  of  camp  doubles  the  sick  rate  in  our 
present  weakened  condition,  and,  anyhow,  the  interior 
is  rather  worse  than  the  coast,  as  I  have  found  by  actual 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  325 

reconnoissance.     Our  present  camps  are  as  healthy  as 
any  camps  at  this  end  of  the  island  can  be. 

' '  I  write  only  because  I  cannot  see  our  men  who  fought 
so  bravely,  and  who  have  endured  the  extreme  hardship 
and  danger  so  uncomplainingly,  go  to  destruction  with 
out  striving,  so  far  as  lies  in  me,  to  avert  a  doom  as 
fearful  as  it  is  unnecessary  and  undeserved. 

* '  Yours  respectfully, 

"THEODORE  ROOSEVELT, 

'  *  Colonel  Commanding  first  Brigade. ' ' 

This  energetic  demand  broke  the  ice  of  military  eti 
quette.  The  remaining  leading  officers  of  the  army  were 
thoroughly  in  sympathy  with  Colonel  Roosevelt  in  this 
view,  and  expressed  their  sentiments  in  an  unusual  and 
decisive  manner.  This  took  the  form  of  a  sort  of  ' '  Round 
Robin"  communication  to  the  commanding  general, 
signed  by  all  the  general  officers,  saying  that  the  army 
* '  must  be  moved  at  once  or  perish, ' '  that  to  move  it  to 
the  interior  would  be  as  bad  as  to  leave  it  where  it  was, 
and  that  any  one  who  stood  in  the  way  of  its  removal 
north  would  be  responsible  for  its  virtual  destruction. 
It  read  as  follows  : 

"We,  the  undersigned,  officers  commanding  the 
various  brigades,  divisions,  etc. ,  of  the  army  of  occupa 
tion  in  Cuba,  are  of  the  unanimous  opinion  that  this 
army  should  be  at  once  taken  out  of  the  island  of  Cuba 
and  sent  to  some  point  on  the  northern  sea-coast  of  the 
United  States  ;  that  it  can  be  done  without  danger  to 
the  people  of  the  United  States  ;  that  yellow  fever  in  the 
army  at  present  is  not  epidemic  ;  that  there  are  only  a 
few  sporadic  cases  ;  but  that  the  army  is  disabled  by 


326  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

malarial  fever  to  the  extent  that  its  efficiency  is  destroyed, 
and  that  it  is  in  a  condition  to  be  practically  entirely  de 
stroyed  by  an  epidemic  of  yellow  fever,  which  is  sure  to 
come  in  the  near  future. 

' '  We  know  from  the  reports  of  competent  officers  and 
from  personal  observations  that  the  army  is  unable  to 
move  into  the  interior,  and  that  there  are  no  facilities 
for  such  a  move  if  attempted,  and  that  it  could  not  be 
attempted  until  too  late.  Moreover,  the  best  medical 
authorities  of  the  island  say  that  with  our  present  equip 
ment  we  could  not  live  in  the  interior  during  the  rainy 
season  without  losses  from  malarial  fever,  which  is  almost 
as  deadly  as  yellow  fever. 

' '  This  army  must  be  moved  at  once  or  perish.  As 
the  army  can  be  safely  moved  now,  the  persons  respon 
sible  for  preventing  such  a  move  will  be  responsible  for 
the  unnecessary  loss  of  many  thousands  of  lives. 

"Our  opinions  are  the  result  of  careful  personal  obser 
vation,  and  they  are  also  based  on  the  unanimous  opinion 
of  medical  officers  with  the  army,  who  understand  the 
situation  absolutely. 

"J.  FORD  KENT,  Major-General  Volunteers,  Com 
manding  First  Division,  Fifth  Corps. 

"J.  C.  BATES,  Major- General  Volunteers,  Command 
ing  Provisional  Division. 

' '  ADNA  R.  CH AFFEE,  Major-  General,  Commanding 
Third  Brigade,  Second  Division. 

"SAMUEL  S.  SUMNER,  Brigadier- General  Volun 
teers,  Commanding  First  Brigade  Cavalry. 

"WiLL  LUDLOW,  Brigadier- General  Volunteers, 
Commanding  First  Brigade,  Second  Division. 

"ADELBERT  AMES,  Brigadier- General  Volunteers^ 
Commanding  Third  Brigade,  First  Division. 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  327 

"LEONARD  WOOD,  Brigadier- General  Volunteers, 
Commanding  the  City  of  Santiago. 

'  *  THEODORE  ROOSEVELT,  Colonel  Commanding  Sec 
ond  Cavalry  Brigade." 

Many  of  the  critics  of  the  War  Department  held  that 
the  slowness  of  action  on  the  part  of  that  branch  of  the 
government  was  due  to  a  purpose  of  questionable  char 
acter.  General  Miles  was  at  that  time  in  the  island  of 
Porto  Rico  at  the  head  of  a  large  army,  which  seemed 
more  than  sufficient,  in  view  of  the  feeble  opposition,  to 
make  a  rapid  conquest  of  the  island.  The  War  Depart 
ment,  nevertheless,  proposed  to  reinforce  him  with 
General  Wade's  division  of  troops,  and  held  back  a 
number  of  transports  for  that  purpose.  The  critics  of 
the  Department  declared  that  this  expedition  was  wholly 
uncalled  for,  and  that  the  movement  was  based  upon 
political  instead  of  military  reasons.  It  was  spoken  of 
as  a  picnic  at  the  expense  of  the  government  for  the 
pleasure  of  the  soldiers,  who  were  expected  to  respond 
with  ballots  instead  of  bullets. 

The  sarcastic  comments  of  the  press,  in  connection 
with  a  message  from  General  Miles,  saying  ' '  Do  not 
send  me  any  more  troops,"  put  an  end  to  the  proposed 
expedition,  while  the  emphatic  action  of  the  generals  at 
Santiago  broke  up  the  leisurely  movement  of  depart 
mental  routine,  and  roused  the  officials  to  a  realizing 
sense  of  the  situation.  The  transports  which  had  been 
intended  for  Wade's  men  were  ordered  to  proceed  with 
all  haste  to  Santiago,  and  those  which  had  been  used 
for  Miles' s  army  were  sent  to  the  same  point,  the  whole 
being  held  sufficient  to  carry  from  twelve  thousand  to 
fifteen  thousand  men.  All  clothing  and  bedding  likely 


328  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

to  be  infected  were  ordered  to  be  destroyed,  all  men 
who  were  suffering  from  yellow  fever  or  other  infectious 
diseases  to  be  left  behind,  and  every  precaution  to  be 
taken  for  the  safe  and  healthy  carriage  of  the  men  to 
their  destination. 

The  convalescent  camp  selected  was  at  Montauk  Point, 
Long  Island,  where  a  tract  of  land  three  miles  square 
had  been  secured.  It  was  said  to  possess  many  sanitary 
advantages,  including  excellent  drinking  water,  a  lake 
of  considerable  dimensions,  and  facilities  for  fresh-water 
bathing. 

Adverse  criticism  soon  found  new  food  for  comment 
in  the  way  the  direction  to  take  precautions  for  the  safe 
and  healthy  carriage  of  the  men  was  carried  out.  The 
transport  Concho,  which  reached  Hampton  Roads  on 
August  i,  with  officers,  non-commissioned  officers,  and 
nurses,  was  found  to  be  in  a  most  horrible  condition, 
due  to  the  lack  of  water,  food,  and  medicine  on  the  ship. 
There  was  no  ice  on  the  steamer  and  no  water  except 
the  stale  supply  taken  on  in  early  June  at  Santiago. 
The  only  food  consisted  of  coarse  army  rations  utterly 
unfit  for  sick  men  to  eat.  Of  medicine,  there  was  only 
a  scant  supply  of  quinine,  camphor,  and  sulphur.  For 
thirty-eight  hours  the  bodies  of  three  dead  men  lay  un 
covered  under  the  saloon,  yielding  a  terrible  stench. 
The  health  officer  at  Hampton  Roads  refused  permission 
to  bury  these  on  shore,  and  the  ship  had  to  put  to  sea, 
two  others  dying  in  the  meantime.  * '  I  believe  if  the 
men  had  had  proper  food  and  medicines  all  of  them 
would  have  been  alive  to-day,"  said  one  of  the  staff  on 
board.  '  *  I  never  saw  such  blundering  in  my  life. ' ' 
'  The  food  given  the  sick  men  would  have  sickened  well 
men,"  said  the  doctor  in  charge.  "  Men  who  had  just 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  329 

recovered  from  yellow  fever  should  have  had  better  food 
than  hardtack  and  beans. ' ' 

The  condition  of  the  Concho  should  have  served  as  a 
useful  object-lesson  in  the  conveyance  of  the  sick  sol 
diers  to  Montauk  Point,  but  those  in  charge  do  not 
seem  to  have  availed  themselves  of  the  lesson.  Follow 
ing  the  Concho  came  the  Seneca,  marked  by  little  less 
scandalous  conditions.  Other  transports  open  to  severe 
criticism  were  the  Breakwater,  the  Santiago,  the  Comal, 
and  the  San  Marco.  It  was  evident  not  only  that 
"some  one  had  blundered,"  but  also  that  some  one 
kept  blundering.  And  a  new  series  of  blunders  cropped 
out  at  the  Montauk  Point  camp,  where  the  first  soldiers 
who  landed  found  no  preparations  for  their  reception, 
while  the  excellent  water  promised  was  conspicuously 
absent.  Days  passed  before  proper  tentage  was  pro 
vided  and  the  camp  was  supplied  with  palatable  water, 
while  the  food  supply  was  composed  of  the  ordinary 
army  rations,  no  delicacies  suitable  for  the  sick  being 
provided. 

The  situation  at  Camp  Alger  called  for  as  radical 
measures  of  relief  as  that  at  Santiago.  Here  were 
twenty  thousand  men  exposed  to  unsanitary  conditions 
and  visited  by  a  serious  epidemic  of  typhoid  fever.  It 
was  not  until  August  2  that  an  order  for  their  removal 
to  a  healthier  location  was  given,  the  old  battle-site  of 
Manassas  being  chosen  for  their  new  camp.  The  march 
was  conducted  in  the  bungling  fashion  which  seemed  to 
have  become  epidemic  in  the  army,  the  officers  in  charge 
erring  seriously  through  ignorance  or  carelessness.  The 
troops  were  moved,  but  their  food-supplies  were  not 
moved  with  them,  the  supply-wagons  starting  twelve 
hours  after  the  march  began,  so  that  the  men  went  to 


330  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN. 

bed  hungry  and  their  rations  failed  to  reach  them  until 
sunrise  of  the  following  day.  The  medicine-chests  were 
similarly  wanting,  and  in  the  whole  movement  the  lack 
of  a  directing  head  was  painfully  apparent. 

The  soldiers  at  Chickamauga  soon  proved  to  be  no 
better  off.  Sickness  appeared  and  increased  there  until 
the  camp  was  a  veritable  pest-hole,  the  water-supply, 
never  very  abundant,  growing  daily  more  and  more  con 
taminated,  until  it  seemed,  if  something  were  not  speedily 
done,  that  all  the  soldiers  present  would  be  prostrated 
with  typhoid  fever  and  other  dangerous  diseases.  In 
truth,  sickness  had  invaded  and  was  increasing  in  all  the 
camps,  and  immediate  action  for  relief  was  imperatively 
necessary. 

The  disposition  in  the  public  press  to  hold  the  War 
Department  responsible  for  all  these  evidences  of  careless 
ness  and  incompetency  was  perhaps  unwarranted.  In 
experienced  and  negligent  subordinates  have  a  habit  of 
blundering  in  spite  of  the  wisest  and  most  judicious 
orders,  and  for  such  delinquencies  as  that  shown  in  the 
march  to  Manassas  only  the  officers  in  charge  could  justly 
be  held  responsible.  The  lack  of  suitable  supplies  on  the 
transports  was  perhaps  due  to  a  similar  cause.  Yet  when 
we  consider  the  many  and  varied  evidences  of  incompe 
tency  and  neglect,  we  cannot  but  consider  the  general 
directing  head  in  some  degree  culpable, — in  how  large 
a  degree  only  a  full  investigation  can  determine. 

After  detailing  the  criticisms  to  which  Secretary  Alger 
was  subjected,  we  must  in  justice  let  him  speak  for  him 
self,  quoting  from  a  letter  written  by  him  on  August  13, 
and  which  described  the  great  and  multifarious  labors  of 
the  Department  during  the  war  : 

"There  is  nothing  young  men  in  robust  health  are  so 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  331 

prodigal  of  as  their  health  until  it  is  gone.  Men  go  into 
camp  feeling  that  they  can  stand  anything  and  every 
thing,  and  cannot  be  made  to  believe  to  the  contrary, 
and  are  stricken  with  disease.  Every  effort  has  been 
made  from  the  beginning  to  furnish  every  camp  with  all 
appliances  asked  for,  but  of  course  the  commanding  offi 
cers  in  the  field  are  the  ones  who  have  the  direct  charge 
of  these  men. 

' '  For  instance,  one  army  corps  commander  has  given 
orders,  and  enforces  them,  respecting  sanitary  affairs, 
and  he  had  to-day  but  a  fraction  over  two  per  cent,  on 
the  sick-list.  Others  have  been  less  successful,  and  the 
consequence  is  typhoid  and  other  fevers  have  been  bred 
and  spread  to  a  considerable  extent.  One  regiment  in 
the  Chickamauga  camp  has  a  colonel  who  enforces  sani 
tary  rules  in  his  regiment,  obliging  the  men  to  boil  all 
the  water  they  drink,  keeping  the  camp  cleanly,  and  the 
result, — less  than  twenty-five  sick,  and  his  camp,  too,  in 
as  unfavorable  a  place  as  any  in  the  command.  Others 
more  favorably  situated  have  ten  times  that  number  on 
the  sick-list.  One  of  the  regiments  of  the  last  call,  not 
yet  removed  from  its  State,  sends  bitter  complaints  of 
typhoid  fever. 

"  Concerning  the  Santiago  campaign,  when  the  ships 
left  Tampa  they  had  on  board  three  months'  provisions 
and  an  abundance  of  hospital  supplies.  They  had 
lighters  to  unload  with  at  points  of  debarkation.  These 
lighters  were  lost  in  severe  storms  on  the  way.  As  soon 
as  we  were  notified  of  the  fact  two  tows  of  lighters  were 
sent  from  Mobile  and  New  Orleans,  which  were  also  over 
taken  by  storm  and  lost.  The  navy  supplied  us  with 
lighters,  and  one  of  these  was  wrecked.  The  army  dis 
embarked,  getting  off  a  portion  of  its  supplies  and  medi- 


332  THE   WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

cal  stores,  and  immediately  marched  to  the  front  to  fight 
the  Spaniards. 

' '  The  great  difficulty  of  landing  supplies  subsequently 
was  that  the  wind  sprang  up  every  morning  at  ten  and 
made  a  high  surf,  rendering  almost  impossible  the  use  of 
small  boats,  with  one  lighter,  which  was  all  they  had  left 
for  this  purpose.  Of  the  packers  who  were  employed, 
sixty  per  cent,  soon  fell  sick,  and  heavy  rains  falling  every 
day,  the  roads  (if  they  could  be  called  such)  became 
impassable  for  vehicles,  and  pack-animals  had  to  be  em 
ployed  to  carry  food  to  the  army,  which,  being  extended 
to  the  right  around  Santiago,  increased  the  distance  from 
the  coast  every  day  and  made  the  task  more  difficult.  .  .  . 

' '  Everything  that  human  ingenuity  could  devise  has 
been  done  to  succor  that  army, — not  the  ingenuity  of  the 
Secretary  of  War,  but  the  result  of  the  combined  counsel 
of  those  who  have  had  a  life-long  experience  in  the  field. 
That  some  men  have  been  neglected  on  transports 
coming  home  there  is  no  doubt, — all  against  positive 
orders,  due,  perhaps,  to  carelessness  and  negligence, 
but  largely  on  account  of  not  having  the  medical  force 
to  spare  (many  of  whom  were  sick)  from  the  camp  at 
Santiago.  Many  medical  officers  sent  with  transports 
were  taken  ill  on  the  way  home. ' ' 

This  chapter  may  be  suitably  closed  with  the  recital 
of  an  incident  that  formed  part  of  the  series  of  events 
described.  On  July  23  Colonel  Roosevelt  wrote  to 
Secretary  Alger,  with  the  approval  of  General  Wheeler, 
asking  him  to  send  the  cavalry  division,  ''including  the 
Rough  Riders,  who  are  as  good  as  any  regulars,  and 
three  times  as  good  as  any  State  troops,  to  Porto 
Rico."  This  division,  with  the  other  regiments  of 
Rough  Riders,  would  make  nearly  four  thousand  men, 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  333 

1 '  who  would  be  worth  easily  any  ten  thousand  national 
guards  armed  with  black  powder  Springfields  or  other 
archaic  weapons. ' ' 

This  communication  brought  a  tart  reply  from  the 
Secretary  of  War,  sent  in  the  form  of  a  cable  message, 
after  the  date  of  the  "  Round  Robin."  It  said, 

*  *  Your  letter  of  23d  is  received.  The  regular  army, 
the  volunteer  army,  and  the  Rough  Riders  have  done 
well,  but  I  suggest  that,  unless  you  want  to  spoil  the 
effects  and  glory  of  your  victory,  you  make  no  invidious 
comparisons.  The  Rough  Riders  are  no  better  than 
any  other  volunteers.  They  had  an  advantage  in  their 
arms,  for  which  they  ought  to  be  very  grateful. 
"R.  A.  ALGER, 

"Secretary  of  War." 

The  sharpness  of  this  rebuke  was  not  uncalled  for 
in  the  character  of  Colonel  Roosevelt's  letter,  but  the 
making  public  such  a  reply  to  a  private  letter  exposed 
Secretary  Alger  to  severe  animadversion  in  the  hostile 
press,  which  seemed  disposed  to  attribute  it  to  spite  at 
Roosevelt's  implied  criticism  of  the  War  Department  in 
his  communication  to  General  Shafter.  However  that 
may  be,  we  cannot  but  look  upon  the  outspoken  colonel 
as  the  right  man  in  the  right  place  when  we  consider  the 
quick  and  important  effect  of  his  action. 


CHAPTER   XIX. 

THE   INVASION   OF    PORTO    RICO. 

THE  movements  of  the  Spanish  navy  proved  the  dom 
inating  influences  in  the  war  with  Spain.  Had  military 
considerations  alone  ruled,  Havana  would  have  been  the 
main  point  of  attack  in  Cuba,  but  the  fact  that  Cervera's 
fleet  took  refuge  in  the  bay  of  Santiago  centred  the 
movement  of  invasion  about  the  city  of  that  name.  The 
city  of  Manila,  through  the  presence  of  a  Spanish  fleet 
in  its  harbor,  became  a  second  central  point  in  the  war. 
And,  thirdly,  the  movement  of  Camara's  fleet  from 
Cadiz  to  Port  Said  gave  rise  to  a  projected  naval  expe 
dition  against  Spain.  This  was  deferred  on  account  of 
Camara's  hasty  return,  but  the  purpose  was  not  aban 
doned,  and  almost  at  the  last  days  of  the  war  a  powerful 
fleet  under  Admiral  Sampson  was  held  ready  to  proceed 
against  the  Spanish  coast.  The  only  event  in  the  war 
not  dominated  by  naval  exigencies  was  the  invasion  of 
Porto  Rico.  At  an  early  date  in  the  war  the  conquest 
of  this  valuable  island  became  a  settled  purpose  of  the 
administration.  The  invasion  was  deferred  from  time  to 
time  for  reasons  connected  with  the  Santiago  campaign, 
yet  the  occupation  of  this  island  before  the  conclusion  of 
the  war  was  held  to  be  indispensable. 

As  it  was  proposed  to  send  an  army  to  Porto  Rico 
large  enough  to  effect  a  rapid  conquest  of  the  island,  its 
departure  was  delayed  until  after  the  surrender  of  Santi 
ago,  in  order  that  a  part  of  the  experienced  regiments 
334 


THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN.  335 

at  that  place  might  be  employed.  Those  under  Major- 
General  Miles,  commander-in-chief  of  the  expedition, 
were  ready  to  sail  on  July  18,  but  a  detention  for  several 
days  took  place,  due  to  delay  on  the  part  of  Admiral 
Sampson  in  furnishing  the  requisite  naval  escort  ;  a  re- 
missness  which,  whatever  its  cause,  brought  him  severe 
blame.  To  complete  the  expedition,  a  large  body  of 
troops  were  to  be  sent  from  the  United  States  under  the 
command  of  Major- General  John  R.  Brooke,  sailing  from 
Charleston,  Tampa,  and  Newport  News. 

For  several  days  Miles' s  troops  sweltered  in  the 
crowded  transports  under  a  tropical  sun  while  waiting 
the  promised  escort.  It  was  not  until  the  2ist  that  they 
finally  set  sail,  some  four  thousand  in  number.  The 
expedition  from  Charleston,  numbering  about  three 
thousand  men,  was  already  under  way,  and  fears  were 
entertained  that  it  might  reach  the  point  of  rendezvous 
in  advance  of  the  naval  support.  A  similar  force  set  sail 
from  Tampa,  while  General  Brooke,  with  five  thousand 
three  hundred  men,  left  Newport  News  a  week  later. 
It  was  proposed  that  these  should  be  followed  by  others, 
making  a  total  force  of  about  thirty-five  thousand  men. 
Supplies  in  abundance  were  forwarded  with  the  troops, 
and  a  strong  corps  of  engineers  accompanied  the  army, 
with  a  large  store  of  engineering  machinery  and  equip 
ment  for  road-  and  bridge-building.  The  authorities  did 
not  intend  to  repeat  the  mistakes  which  had  so  seriously 
imperilled  the  success  of  the  Santiago  expedition. 

It  was  not  publicly  known  to  what  port  the  expedition 
was  directed,  but  general  surprise  was  felt  on  learning 
that  on  Monday,  the  25th,  four  days  after  sailing,  Miles' s 
transports  had  entered  the  harbor  of  Guanica,  in  the 
southwestern  section  of  the  island,  and  at  almost  the 


336  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

farthest  possible  remove  from  the  port  of  San  Juan. 
This  was  not  the  point  originally  determined  upon,  but 
the  commander-in-chief,  for  satisfactory  reasons,  decided 
during  the  voyage  to  change  its  destination.  In  the 
lead  of  the  escort  was  the  Gloucester,  the  little  con 
verted  yacht  which  had  made  so  noble  a  record  in  sink 
ing  the  Spanish  torpedo-boat  destroyers  at  Santiago. 
After  her  came  the  Massachusetts,  the  Yale,  and  the 
Columbia,  escorting  the  transports,  whose  tardiness  had 
kept  the  expedition  so  long  upon  the  sea. 

The  harbor  of  Guanica  is  a  picturesque  place,  a  broad 
level  of  meadow  land  extending  from  the  shore-line  of 
its  placid  bay  to  a  background  of  high  mountains.  The 
village  consisted  of  about  a  score  of  prettily  painted 
houses,  with  a  sugar-mill  on  the  right  and  a  block-house 
some  two  miles  distant  on  the  left.  The  Spanish  flag 
floated  on  a  small  log  house  upon  the  beach. 

Sounding  constantly  as  she  went,  the  Gloucester 
pushed  boldly  into  the  harbor,  from  which  there  soon 
came  back  to  the  fleet  the  sound  of  her  6-pounder  guns. 
On  reaching  the  village,  she  had  sent  her  launch  ashore, 
with  about  thirty  sailors  and  a  Colt  rapid-fire  gun. 
Rushing  to  the  house  that  flew  the  flag  of  Spain,  in  a 
minute  the  active  tars  had  it  down  and  the  stars  and 
stripes  floating  in  its  place,  while  a  hearty  cheer  greeted 
the  first  display  of  this  emblem  on  Porto  Rican  soil.  In 
a  few  minutes  more  there  came  a  sharp  patter  of  bullets 
from  a  squad  of  soldiers  hid  among  the  houses  of  the 
town.  The  rifles  of  the  Americans  answered,  and  the 
guns  of  the  Gloucester  quickly  joined  in,  following  the 
fugitives  with  6-pounder  shot  as  they  broke  and  fled 
towards  the  hills.  The  result  of  the  skirmish  was  four 
Spaniards  killed  and  not  one  American  wounded. 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  337 

The  men  of  the  Gloucester  were  warmly  cheered  for 
their  useful  service  as  the  other  ships  came  up  the  bay, 
and  the  landing  of  the  troops  was  quickly  under  way, 
the  men  forming  into  companies  and  occupying  points 
of  vantage  in  the  vicinity  on  reaching  shore.  A  strong 
detachment  was  sent  out  to  reconnoitre  Yauco,  a  small 
place  about  five  miles  inland,  which  formed  the  terminus 
of  the  railroad  from  Ponce,  fifteen  miles  due  east.  A 
high-road,  whose  condition  was  the  reverse  of  promis 
ing,  led  to  the  latter  place,  but  from  Ponce  to  San  Juan 
extended  a  military  road,  eighty- five  miles  long,  in  admi 
rable  condition,  and  thoroughly  adapted  for  the  passage 
of  artillery  and  army  wagons. 

On  the  27th,  two  days  after  Guanica  was  reached,  Com 
mander  Davis  set  out  with  the  Dixie,  Gloucester,  An 
napolis,  and  Wasp  to  blockade  the  port  of  Ponce  and 
capture  lighters  for  the  use  of  the  army.  Here  no  re 
sistance  was  encountered,  the  Spanish  having  evacuated 
the  place,  which  surrendered  to  Commander  Davis  on 
demand,  the  American  flag  being  raised  in  the  early 
morning  of  the  28th.  Sixty  lighters  and  twenty  sailing- 
vessels  were  captured,  and  the  people  received  the 
American  troops  with  wild  enthusiasm.  Soon  after 
General  Miles  reached  the  place,  with  transports  convey 
ing  General  Ernst's  brigade,  of  Wilson's  division,  which 
was  at  once  landed,  and  was  received  with  an  ovation  by 
the  citizens. 

The  scene,  indeed,  was  among  the  most  remarkable 
of  the  war.  As  the  ships  entered  the  harbor,  they  were 
surrounded  by  boats  filled  with  citizens  shouting  ' '  Viva 
Americanos. ' '  The  flags  of  all  nations  but  Spain  floated 
from  the  houses,  and  the  streets,  balconies,  and  roofs 
were  filled  with  joyous  people,  of  every  class  of  society, 

22 


338  THE   WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

loudly  cheering  General  Miles  and  the  American  flag. 
There  did  not  seem  to  be  a  Spanish  sympathizer  in  the 
town,  and  the  people  fraternized  with  the  soldiers  as  if 
they  were  overjoyed  at  the  idea  of  becoming  citizens  of 
the  United  States. 

General  Ernst's  brigade  at  once  started  for  the  town 
of  Ponce,  three  miles  inland,  which  capitulated  as  readily 
as  its  port,  the  Spaniards  retreating  towards  the  moun 
tains,  and  the  people  welcoming  the  troops  with  the 
warmest  enthusiasm.  Generals  Miles  and  Wilson  were 
cheered  to  the  echo  when  they  entered  the  town,  in 
which  they  were  received  by  the  mayor  and  the  British 
consul,  who  acted  in  behalf  of  the  Spaniards  in  deliver 
ing  the  city  into  their  hands.  Stepping  on  to  the  balcony 
after  the  ceremony,  they  were  received  with  such  a  roar 
of  cheers  that  the  modest  conquerors  hastily  withdrew. 
"The  island,"  said  Mayor  Colon,  "would  now  enjoy 
peace  and  prosperity,  and  the  best  citizens  were  glad  the 
Americans  had  come." 

General  Miles  then  issued  the  following  proclamation  : 
"In  the  prosecution  of  the  war  against  the  kingdom 
of  Spain  by  the  people  of  the  United  States,  in  the 
cause  of  liberty,  justice,  and  humanity,  its  military  forces 
have  come  to  occupy  the  island  of  Porto  Rico.  They 
come  bearing  the  banners  of  freedom,  inspired  by  a 
noble  purpose,  to  seek  the  enemies  of  our  government 
and  of  yours,  and  to  destroy  or  capture  all  in  armed 
resistance.  They  bring  you  the  fostering  arms  of  a  free 
people  whose  greatest  power  is  justice  and  humanity  to 
all  living  within  their  fold.  Hence  they  release  you 
from  your  former  political  relations,  and  it  is  hoped  this 
will  be  followed  by  your  cheerful  acceptance  of  the  gov 
ernment  of  the  United  States. 


THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN.  339 

"The  chief  object  of  the  American  military  forces 
will  be  to  overthrow  the  armed  authority  of  Spain  and 
give  the  people  of  your  beautiful  island  the  largest 
measure  of  liberty  consistent  with  this  military  occupa 
tion.  They  have  not  come  to  make  war  on  the  people 
of  the  country,  who  for  centuries  have  been  oppressed, 
but,  on  the  contrary,  they  bring  protection,  not  only  to 
yourselves,  but  to  your  property  ;  promote  your  pros 
perity  and  bestow  the  immunities  and  blessings  of  our 
enlightenment  and  liberal  institutions  and  government. 

"  It  is  not  their  purpose  to  interfere  with  the  existing 
laws  and  customs  which  are  wholesome  and  beneficial  to 
the  people,  so  long  as  they  conform  to  the  rules  of  the 
military  administration,  order,  and  justice.  This  is  not 
a  war  of  devastation  and  desolation,  but  one  to  give  all 
within  the  control  of  the  military  and  naval  forces  the 
advantages  and  blessings  of  enlightened  civilization. ' ' 

The  capture  of  Ponce  was  an  important  step  towards 
the  subjugation  of  the  island.  It  is  the  second  city  of 
the  island,  with  a  population  of  twenty-two  thousand, 
and  a  jurisdiction  numbering  forty-seven  thousand.  Playa, 
the  port,  has  about  five  thousand  population,  and  has  a 
spacious  harbor,  into  which  vessels  of  twenty-five  feet 
draught  can  enter.  Ponce  was  founded  in  1600  by  Ponce 
de  Leon,  whose  name  it  bears.  It  possesses  a  number 
of  handsome  edifices,  and  occupies  one  of  the  healthiest 
and  most  agreeable  situations  on  the  island. 

The  first  opposition  to  our  troops,  beyond  that  of  the 
skirmish  at  Guanica,  occurred  on  the  succeeding  day  at 
Yauco,  near  which  the  Spaniards  ambushed  eight  com 
panies  of  Massachusetts  and  Illinois  regiments.  The 
enemy  was  repulsed  and  driven  to  a  ridge  a  mile  away, 
from  which  a  body  of  cavalry  charged  the  advancing 


340  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

infantry.  They  in  turn  were  driven  back  and  retreated 
to  Yauco,  leaving  four  dead  on  the  field.  No  Americans 
were  killed  and  only  three  were  slightly  wounded.  On 
the  following  day  Yauco  was  occupied,  and  the  troops 
from  Guanica  began  an  overland  march  upon  Ponce. 
So  far  not  a  man  had  been  killed  on  the  American  side. 

The  business  of  Ponce,  momentarily  checked,  was 
soon  in  full  tide  again,  those  citizens  who  had  fled  to  the 
woods  and  hills  with  their  valuables  quickly  returning, 
and  banks  and  stores  being  opened  for  trade.  The 
competition  of  the  merchants  for  the  American  dollar 
was  matched  by  the  competition  of  the  people  for  the 
American  flag,  the  stock  of  flags  on  hand  being  soon  so 
reduced  that  General  Miles  felt  it  necessary  to  cable 
home,  * '  Please  send  any  national  colors  that  can  be 
spared,  to  be  given  to  the  different  municipalities." 
On  the  3ist  he  telegraphed  as  follows  : 

"Volunteers  are  surrendering  themselves  with  arms 
and  ammunition.  Four-fifths  of  the  people  are  over 
joyed  at  the  arrival  of  the  army.  Two  thousand  from 
one  place  have  volunteered  to  serve  with  it.  They  are 
bringing  in  transportation,  beef,  cattle,  and  other  needed 
supplies.  The  custom-house  has  already  yielded  four 
teen  thousand  dollars.  As  soon  as  all  the  troops  are 
disembarked,  they  will  be  in  readiness  to  move." 

On  the  same  day  the  town  of  Juan  Diaz,  eight  miles 
from  Ponce  on  the  road  to  San  Juan,  was  occupied,  the 
people  greeting  the  American  flag  with  the  same  enthu 
siasm  as  at  Ponce.  A  similar  feeling  was  manifested  at 
Yauco,  whose  mayor  issued  a  grandiloquent  proclama 
tion,  saying, — 

' '  This  is  a  day  of  glorious  remembrance  for  each  son 
of  this  beloved  isle,  because  for  the  first  time  there  waves 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN.  341 

over  it  the  flag  of  stars,  planted  in  the  name  of  the 
United  States  of  America  by  the  major-general  of  the 
American  army,  Senor  Miles." 
He  concluded  with, — 

' '  Citizens,  long  live  the  government  of  the  United 
States  of  America.  Hail  to  its  valiant  troops  !  Hail, 
Porto  Rico,  always  American  ! 

1 '  El  Alcalde,  FRANCISCO  MAGI  A. 

"YAUCO,  PORTO  Rico,  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA." 

Thus  far  the  Spaniards  had  shown  no  disposition  to 
make  a  stand  against  the  Americans,  though  they  might 
have  attacked  with  effect  some  of  the  small  American 
garrisons.  Colonel  Hulings  held  Juan  Diaz  with  but 
two  companies,  who  might  have  been  flanked  and  cut 
off  by  the  Spaniards  ;  yet  they  were  not  molested,  nor 
were  any  of  the  little  detachments  which  he  sent  out  for 
reconnoitring  purposes,  though  the  fields  of  tall  sugar 
cane  bordering  the  roads  offered  abundant  opportunities 
for  ambushes. 

There  was  reason  to  believe,  however,  that  the  Span 
iards  were  preparing  to  give  the  Americans  a  warm  re 
ception  at  Aibonito,  where  the  military  road  to  San  Juan 
crosses  the  mountains,  a  point  which  presents  excellent 
opportunities  for  defence.  General  Miles  received  in 
formation  that  this  road  had  been  mined  by  the  enemy, 
who  had  also  hidden  explosives  in  the  wayside  bushes. 
These  defences  lay  between  Juan  Diaz  and  Aibonito,  at 
which  town  was  a  considerable  body  of  troops  prepared 
to  offer  a  stout  resistance.  Miles,  therefore,  determined 
to  foil  them  by  a  change  of  plan,  and  to  approach  San 
Juan  by  a  different  route. 


342  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

In  pursuance  of  this  new  plan,  movements  were  made 
in  various  directions,  troops  being  advanced  on  lines  east 
and  west  of  the  imperilled  situation.  Their  outposts 
in  a  few  days  were  twenty  miles  to  the  north  of  Ponce, 
the  several  movements  being  so  co-ordinated  that  the 
Spaniards  at  Aibonito  were  likely  to  find  themselves 
beset  on  every  side,  and  in  danger  of  capture  unless  they 
should  make  a  hasty  retreat  upon  San  Juan. 

General  Brooke,  with  a  force  of  twelve  hundred  men, 
proceeded  on  transports  to  Arroyo,  whence  his  advance, 
on  August  5,  reached  the  town  of  Guayama,  on  the 
eastern  side  of  the  island,  due  south  from  San  Juan. 
They  found  here  a  Spanish  force  of  about  five  hundred 
men,  but  a  mere  skirmish  sufficed  to  drive  them  out,  the 
sole  loss  being  one  Spaniard  killed  and  two  or  three  on 
each  side  wounded.  From  there  the  line  of  march  lay 
to  Cayey,  farther  inland,  a  position  from  which  the 
military  road  to  San  Juan  could  be  seized  beyond  the 
points  where  mines  had  been  placed. 

This  movement  to  the  east  was  paralleled  by  one  to 
the  west,  General  Roy  Stone  occupying  Adjuntas,  to 
the  north  of  Ponce,  and  reaching,  by  the  4th,  the  town 
of  Utado,  fifteen  miles  farther  inland  and  near  the  centre 
of  the  island.  The  road  between  these  places  was  not 
adapted  to  the  transportation  of  wagons  and  artillery  ; 
but  General  Stone  soon  had  a  force  of  five  hundred 
natives  at  work,  making  the  way  passable.  His  route 
lay  towards  Arecibo,  on  the  northern  coast,  where  trans 
ports  could  meet  him  with  the  guns  and  wagons,  and 
whence  a  railroad  and  a  good  dirt  road  extended  to  San 
Juan. 

The  important  town  of  Coama,  midway  between  Ponce 
and  Guayama,  remained  unoccupied,  but  the  advance 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  343 

was  rapidly  approaching  it,  a  reconnoitring  party  of 
about  twenty  men  advancing  to  the  suburbs  on  the 
evening  of  August  i.  Here  they  opened  fire  on  the 
volunteer  pickets,  who  immediately  fled.  The  town  was 
not  taken,  however,  until  the  gth,  when  General  Ernst's 
brigade  advanced  upon  it,  while  the  Sixteenth  Pennsyl 
vania,  under  Colonel  Hulings,  made  a  flank  movement 
through  the  mountains  and  struck  the  Aibonito  road 
half  a  mile  beyond  the  town,  thus  cutting  off  the  retreat 
of  the  garrison.  The  Spanish  force,  one  hundred  and 
fifty  in  number,  was  captured. 

Other  events  of  passing  interest  took  place  elsewhere. 
An  advance  guard,  reconnoitring  northwest  of  Guanica, 
came  upon  a  strong  Spanish  force  in  the  hills  near 
Hormigueros,  north  of  Mayaguez.  A  sharp  encounter 
took  place,  the  enemy  being  dislodged  with  considerable 
loss.  The  American  loss  was  two  killed  and  fourteen 
wounded.  From  that  point  a  march  on  Mayaguez,  a 
place  of  some  importance  on  the  western  border  of  the 
island,  was  contemplated.  At  Cape  San  Juan,  the  north 
eastern  point  of  land  on  the  island,  a  landing  had  been 
effected,  and  the  light-house  was  held  by  forty  American 
sailors,  who  were  attacked  by  a  force  of  eight  hundred 
Spaniards  before  daybreak  on  August  9.  They  were 
driven  back  by  shells  from  the  Amphitrite,  the  Cincin 
nati,  and  the  tug  Leyden,  suffering  severely  for  their 
temerity. 

Thus  on  the  south,  the  west,  and  the  east  the  Amer 
ican  forces  were  pushing  forward  into  the  island,  meeting 
with  scarcely  any  resistance,  and  received  by  the  natives 
with  a  flattering  greeting  at  all  points. 

The  Spanish  leaders  seemed  to  have  based  their  sole 
hopes  of  a  successful  resistance  on  the  garrison  of 


344  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

Aibonito,  on  which  mountain  stronghold  General  Miles 
was  moving  his  troops  from  several  directions.  By  the 
nth  a  cavalry  advance  reached  a  point  within  three 
miles  of  the  town,  where  it  was  fired  upon  by  the  Span 
ish  outpost,  strongly  posted  with  artillery  on  a  high  hill 
that  commanded  the  military  road.  A  sharp  skirmish 
took  place,  none  of  the  Americans  being  injured.  By  the 
1 3th  the  invading  army  had  gained  favorable  positions 
in  all  quarters.  General  Schwan  had  reached  Mayaguez, 
General  Henry  was  within  fifteen  miles  of  Arecibo,  Gen 
eral  Brooke  had  advanced  beyond  Guayama,  and  was  on 
the  point  of  attacking  a  strong  Spanish  position  on  the 
road  to  Cayey.  An  artillery  duel  had  just  taken  place 
with  a  strongly  posted  Spanish  force  near  Coamo.  At 
Aibonito  the  enemy's  batteries  on  the  heights  had  been 
shelled  on  the  i2th.  General  Wilson  was  moving  to 
turn  the  right  flank  of  the  Spanish,  whose  rear  was 
threatened  by  General  Brooke.  All  was  ready  for  what 
might  have  proved  a  severe  and  sanguinary  battle,  when 
news  reached  the  island  and  spread  to  the  camps  that 
put  an  end  to  all  hostilities.  ' '  Cease  action  !' '  shouted 
Lieutenant  McLaughlin,  riding  up  to  a  battery  that  was 
about  to  fire  on  the  Spanish  works  before  Guayama. 

* '  Why  ?' '  came  the  wondering  question. 

' '  The  war  is  over, ' '  was  the  reply.  * '  A  peace  protocol 
was  signed  at  Washington  yesterday,  and  all  is  at  an 
end." 

It  came  in  time  to  save  the  Spaniards  from  inevitable 
defeat.  In  a  week  more  the  whole  of  Porto  Rico  would 
probably  have  been  in  American  hands. 

The  tidings  of  the  treaty  of  peace  put  a  stop  to  several 
active  movements  of  hostility  elsewhere.  At  Manza- 
nilio,  in  Cuba,  a  severe  bombardment  was  in  progress, 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN.  345 

which  continued  through  the  afternoon  and  evening  of  the 
i2th,  and  was  resumed  on  the  morning  of  the  I3th.  The 
town  was  summoned  to  surrender,  the  authorities  being 
given  three  hours  in  which  to  capitulate.  When  a  flag 
of  truce  appeared  on  the  Spanish  side,  the  natural  im 
plication  was  that  they  were  ready  to  treat.  But  when 
it  reached  the  American  ships,  their  commander  was 
handed  a  cable  message  from  General  Shafter  to  the 
effect  that  peace  had  been  declared  and  that  hostilities 
must  cease.  The  guns  had  fired  their  last  shots. 

Another  engagement  was  in  progress  at  the  port  of 
Caibarien,  on  the  north  coast  of  Santa  Clara,  whither 
the  Mangrove  had  gone  to  protect  the  landing  of  a 
Cuban  expedition.  She  found  here  the  Spanish  gun 
boat  Hernan  Cortes  and  a  smaller  gunboat,  which  were 
anchored  near  the  shore  in  shoal  water.  The  Mangrove 
had  only  two  6-pounders,  while  the  gunboats  were  much 
better  armed,  and  there  were  several  pieces  of  artillery 
mounted  on  shore.  Yet,  in  despite  of  this  superiority 
of  force,  the  little  tug  made  an  attack  on  the  Spanish 
boats,  reply  being  made  from  ship  and  shore  with  artil 
lery  and  Mauser  rifles.  The  Hernan  Cortes  carried 
two  4.7-inch  guns,  whose  shells  exploded  all  about  the 
Mangrove. 

Suddenly  there  appeared  flags  of  truce,  one  on  the 
small  gunboat  and  two  on  shore,  and  a  boat  put  off  with 
a  Spanish  officer  on  board.  On  reaching  the  Mangrove, 
he  announced,  ' '  Peace  is  proclaimed,  and  I  have  in 
structions  for  your  commanding  officer  from  the  military 
commander  of  this  district. ' '  This  commander  had  been 
telegraphed  information  of  the  fight,  and  had  at  once 
sent  word  that  peace  was  restored  and  the  fight  must 
cease. 


346  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

The  final  and  the  most  successful  shots  from  Morro 
Castle,  Havana,  were  fired  on  the  morning  of  August  12 
at  Commodore  Howell's  flag-ship,  the  San  Francisco,  the 
monitor  Miantonomoh,  and  the  yacht  Sylvia,  then  on 
blockade  duty.  The  ships  had  orders  not  to  attack  the 
batteries  and  turned  to  get  out  of  range.  As  they  did 
so,  a  10-  or  1 2-inch  shell  struck  the  stern  of  the  San 
Francisco,  tearing  a  hole  about  a  foot  in  diameter,  and 
making  a  complete  wreck  of  the  commodore's  quarters. 
His  bookcase  was  smashed  to  fragments.  No  one  was 
injured.  Before  the  day  closed,  the  peace  protocol  was 
signed  and  the  long  blockade  was  at  an  end. 


CHAPTER    XX. 

THE   SIEGE   OF   MANILA. 

THE  war  with  Spain  had  two  widely  separated  fields 
of  action, — the  islands  of  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico  in  the 
Atlantic  and  the  Philippine  Islands  in  the  Pacific,  nearly 
half  the  circumference  of  the  earth  intervening.  In  the 
former  field  warlike  events  were  far  more  varied  and 
continuous,  and  therefore  we  have  given  undivided  at 
tention  to  these  after  describing  the  great  victory  in 
Manila  Bay.  We  must  now  return  to  the  Philippines, 
where,  though  the  American  forces  were  quiescent,  there 
had  been  no  small  degree  of  warlike  activity  on  the  part 
of  the  natives. 

In  the  preceding  chapters  concerning  the  Philippines 
mention  has  been  made  of  the  compact  that  ended  the 
rebellion  at  the  close  of  1897,  and  the  rise  of  the  rebels 
again  in  1898.  This  second  outbreak  did  not  become 
active  until  after  May  24,  on  which  day  General  Agui- 
naldo  and  twelve  others  of  the  insurgent  leaders  landed 
at  Cavite,  having  come  from  Hong- Kong  on  the  despatch- 
boat  McCulloch.  The  return  of  this  able  leader  at  once 
gave  vitality  to  the  insurgent  movement,  and  a  bold 
advance  against  Manila  was  made.  At  that  time  there 
were  said  to  be  thirty  thousand  natives  in  the  field, 
though  they  were  poorly  supplied  with  arms. 

On  the  night  of  the  24th  the  insurgents  made  a  recon- 
noissance  in  force  against  the  Spanish  outposts,  and 
found  them  to  be  protected  by  guns  which  had  been 

347 


348  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN, 

turned  landward  from  the  shore  batteries.  During  the 
succeeding  days  they  were  actively  aggressive,  the  prin 
cipal  engagement  being  on  the  left  branch  of  the  Zapote, 
which  they  waded  during  a  typhoon,  stormed  the  banks 
for  several  miles,  and  drove  the  Spaniards  from  their 
trenches  with  knives.  Other  fights  took  place  around 
Manila,  the  insurgents  apparently  having  an  ample 
supply  of  arms  and  ammunition,  given  them  in  part  by 
Admiral  Dewey.  One  result  of  their  operations  was  a 
large  number  of  prisoners,  about  eighteen  hundred  in 
all,  whom  they  brought  into  Cavite.  In  addition,  two 
batteries  had  been  taken  and  the  whole  province  of 
Cavite  was  in  their  hands.  By  May  31  they  had  taken 
several  places  in  the  vicinity  of  the  city,  whose  suburbs 
they  were  attacking,  and  which  they  encircled  for  a  dis 
tance  of  seven  miles.  The  Spanish  authorities  had 
offered  a  reward  of  twenty-five  thousand  dollars  for 
Aguinaldo,  dead  or  alive,  an  appeal  to  treachery  which 
fortunately  failed  in  its  effect. 

Admiral  Dewey,  fearing  a  massacre  if  the  city  should 
be  taken,  set  limits  to  the  advance  of  the  insurgents, 
forbidding  them  to  cross  the  Malolele  River,  seven  miles 
south  of  Manila.  They  were  told  that  if  they  should 
seek  to  disobey  this  order,  the  gunboat  Petrel  would  be 
stationed  there  to  bombard  them.  He  was  not  willing 
to  permit  ' '  hordes  of  passionate  semi-savages  to  storm  a 
civilized  metropolis,"  and  determined  to  hold  them  in 
check  until  the  American  troops  should  arrive.  Mean 
while,  the  Spaniards  felt  themselves  to  be  in  a  serious 
strait.  On  June  3  Captain- General  Augustin  cabled  to 
Madrid  : 

"The  situation  is  very  grave.  Aguinaldo  has  suc 
ceeded  in  stirring  up  the  country,  and  the  telegraph- 


THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN.  349 

lines  and  railways  are  being  cut.  I  am  without  commu 
nication  with  the  provinces.  The  province  of  Cavite 
has  completely  rebelled,  and  the  towns  and  villages  are 
occupied  by  numerous  bands. 

' '  I  am  striving  to  raise  the  courage  of  the  inhabitants, 
and  will  exhaust  every  means  of  resistance  ;  but  I  dis 
trust  the  natives  and  the  volunteers  because  there  have 
already  been  many  desertions.  Bacoor  and  Imas  have 
already  been  seized  by  the  enemy.  The  insurrection 
has  reached  great  proportions,  and,  if  I  cannot  count 
upon  the  support  of  the  country,  the  forces  at  my  disposal 
will  not  suffice  to  hold  the  ground  against  two  enemies. ' ' 

Aguinaldo,  on  landing,  had  issued  three  proclama 
tions.  One  of  these  based  his  return  on  the  failure  of 
the  Spaniards  to  carry  out  their  promised  reforms  and 
the  support  offered  by  the  United  States.  He  proposed 
to  act  as  dictator  until  the  islands  were  completely  free, 
when  a  constitutional  republic,  with  president,  cabinet, 
and  congress,  would  be  established.  The  second  procla 
mation  forbade  all  peace  negotiations  with  the  Spaniards, 
and  the  third  forbade  robbery  and  acts  of  violence.  The 
prisoners  in  his  hands  were  well  treated. 

On  the  1 2th  a  despatch  from  Dewey  said,  ' '  There  is 
little  change  in  the  situation  since  my  telegram  of  June  3. 
Insurgents  continue  hostilities  and  have  practically  sur 
rounded  Manila.  They  have  taken  two  thousand  five 
hundred  Spanish  prisoners,  whom  they  treat  most  hu 
manely.  They  do  not  intend  to  take  the  city  at  the 
present  time.  The  health  of  the  squadron  continues 
excellent.  The  German  commander-in- chief  arrived 
to-day.  Three  German,  one  British,  one  French,  one 
Japanese  men-of-war  in  port.  Another  German  man-of- 
war  is  expected." 


350  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

By  the  2Oth  of  June  the  insurgents  had  taken  four 
thousand  Spanish  and  one  thousand  native  prisoners, 
and  had  closed  in  on  the  city  until  it  was  very  closely 
besieged.  On  the  I2th  they  had  proclaimed  in  Old 
Cavite  the  establishment  of  a  provisional  government,  a 
declaration  of  independence  of  Spanish  authority  being 
read  and  General  Aguinaldo  elected  president.  The 
new  president  informed  Mr.  Williams,  the  United  States 
consul,  that  this  action  was  taken  merely  for  purposes 
of  cohesion,  and  that  the  insurgents  desired  to  make  an 
American  colony  of  the  Philippine  Islands.  He  declared 
that  no  other  country  should  possess  the  Philippines 
without  fighting  for  them,  and  that  if  the  United  States 
declined  the  proffered  gift,  an  independent  republic  would 
be  founded. 

Day  by  day  the  situation  of  the  Spaniards  in  Manila 
grew  more  desperate.  On  June  23  Augustin  cabled  as 
follows  to  Madrid  : 

' '  The  situation  is  still  grave.  I  continue  to  maintain  my 
position  inside  the  line  of  block-houses,  but  the  enemy  is 
increasing  in  numbers  as  the  rebels  occupy  the  provinces, 
which  are  surrendering.  Torrential  rains  are  inundating 
the  intrenchments,  rendering  the  work  of  defence  difficult. 
The  numbers  of  sick  among  the  troops  are  increasing, 
making  the  situation  very  distressing  and  causing  in 
creased  desertions  of  the  native  soldiers.  It  is  estimated 
that  the  insurgents  number  thirty  thousand  armed  with 
rifles  and  one  hundred  thousand  armed  with  swords,  etc. 
Aguinaldo  has  summoned  me  to  surrender,  but  I  have 
treated  his  proposals  with  disdain,  for  I  am  resolved  to 
maintain  the  sovereignty  of  Spain  and  the  honor  of  the 
flag  to  the  last  extremity." 

Yet,   despite   the   confessedly  desperate   situation   of 


THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN.  351 

Augustin,  he  contrived  to  hold  his  own  against  the 
natives  during  the  succeeding  month,  the  Spaniards, 
though  driven  from  their  outpost  works,  holding  on  to 
their  interior  intrenchments  with  obstinate  valor.  It 
began  to  appear  as  if,  despite  the  impetuosity  of  the 
natives,  they  could  not  succeed  in  their  purpose  without 
American  aid.  They  were  now,  however,  in  possession 
of  artillery,  and  had  the  city  almost  completely  invested, 
while  there  was  much  sickness  among  the  defenders  and 
food  had  grown  very  scarce.  On  the  other  hand, 
anarchy  appeared  to  have  broken  out  among  the  natives, 
and  Aguinaldo's  position  as  dictator  was  by  no  means 
assured.  The  restraint  exercised  by  the  Americans  over 
the  insurgents  was  thought  to  have  caused  much  irrita 
tion  among  the  latter,  and  decreased  their  desire  to 
become  citizens  or  subjects  of  the  United  States. 

Admiral  Dewey,  during  these  operations,  maintained 
a  position  of  masterly  inactivity,  keeping  a  controlling 
hand  over  Aguinaldo  and  his  native  forces,  but  desisting 
from  any  hostile  movement  towards  the  city  other  than 
that  of  the  blockade.  He  was  waiting,  doubtless  with 
impatience,  the  arrival  of  the  troops,  whose  coming  had 
been  so  annoyingly  delayed,  and  his  position  was  a  very 
trying  one,  requiring  the  exercise  of  the  highest  judg 
ment  and  discretion. 

The  first  expedition  of  troops,  conveyed  by  the  cruiser 
Charleston,  entered  Manila  Bay  on  the  3Oth  of  June. 
On  the  2oth  it  had  reached  Guahan,  or  Guam,  the  largest 
of  the  Ladrone  Islands,  a  group  belonging  to  Spain. 
The  chief  town  of  this  island,  St.  Ignacio  de  Agano, 
was  defended  by  two  forts,  which  were  summoned  to 
surrender  by  a  shot  from  the  Charleston.  Never  was 
there  a  more  amusing  capture  of  a  town.  The  com- 


352  THE   WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

mandant,  who  knew  nothing  of  the  war,  supposed  the 
shot  to  be  a  friendly  salute,  and  sent  off  a  boat  to  the 
Charleston  with  regrets  that,  being  out  of  powder,  he 
was  unable  to  return  the  salute.  He  was  soon  undeceived, 
and  the  governor  and  other  officials  of  the  island  were 
taken  on  board  and  brought  to  Cavite,  a  force  being  left 
in  charge  of  the  captured  town.  On  July  6  the  troops 
were  unloaded  from  the  transports  at  Cavite,  and  the 
first  step  was  taken  towards  an  assault  on  Manila  by  land. 

Dewey,  meanwhile,  maintained  the  blockade,  but  not 
without  a  cause  of  irritation  in  the  attitude  of  the  Ger 
mans,  who  had  sent  thither  a  far  larger  fleet  than  any 
other  nation,  and  were  thought  to  have  intentions  of 
interfering  in  the  settlement  of  the  Philippine  question. 
What  seemed  an  open  indication  of  such  a  purpose  was 
manifested  on  July  6,  when  the  insurgents  informed 
Dewey  that  the  German  gunboat  Irene  had  refused  to 
permit  them  to  attack  the  Spaniards  on  Grande  Island, 
in  Subic  Bay. 

Admiral  Dewey  had  hitherto  maintained  an  attitude 
of  diplomatic  friendliness  towards  the  Germans,  but  this 
reported  interference  called  for  decisive  action,  and  the 
cruisers  Raleigh  and  Concord  were  at  once  sent  to  in 
vestigate  the  affair.  On  entering  the  bay,  the  Raleigh 
fired  upon  the  forts,  on  observing  which  the  Irene  slipped 
her  cable  and  steamed  out  by  the  other  channel.  No 
resistance  was  made  by  the  Spaniards,  and  the  garrison, 
thirteen  hundred  in  number,  was  quickly  surrendered. 
The  Spanish  seemed  endeavoring  to  defend  the  bay  by 
submarine  mines,  in  order  to  hold  it  as  a  place  of  ren 
dezvous  for  Camara's  fleet,  supposed  to  be  on  its  way 
from  Spain.  On  returning  to  Manila,  the  commander 
of  the  Irene  explained  that  he  had  interfered  ' '  in  the 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN.  353 

cause  of  humanity, ' '  and  offered  to  hand  over  to  Admiral 
Dewey  the  refugees  he  had  brought  from  the  island. 
These  Dewey  declined  to  receive.  The  action  of  the 
Germans  created  much  irritation  in  the  United  States, 
where  many  considered  it  little  short  of  an  act  of  war. 
But  this  feeling  subsided  when  later  despatches  gave  the 
details  of  the  affair.  Admiral  Dewey' s  despatch  con 
tained  no  indication  that  he  considered  the  action  of  the 
Irene  as  important. 

The  second  American  expedition  from  San  Francisco 
reached  Manila  Bay  on  July  19,  and  the  disembarkation 
immediately  began,  the  troops  landing  at  Paranajo,  two 
miles  south  of  Manila,  the  cruiser  Boston  being  detailed 
to  cover  the  landing.  The  troops  of  the  first  expedi 
tion,  under  General  Anderson,  were  still  at  Cavite, 
though  on  the  igth  the  First  California  Regiment  was 
pushed  forward  to  Janbo,  two  miles  from  the  Spanish 
lines.  General  Francis  V.  Greene,  the  leader  of  the 
second  expedition,  took  command  of  the  advance,  Gen 
eral  Anderson  remaining  in  Cavite.  As  regards  the 
condition  of  affairs  in  Manila,  reports  came  that  the 
inhabitants  were  reduced  almost  to  a  state  of  starvation, 
new  supplies  of  food,  either  by  land  or  water,  being  cut 
off,  and  the  old  stock  nearly  exhausted.  Abattoirs  for 
the  slaughter  of  horses  and  dogs  were  opened.  Sick 
ness,  due  to  the  wretched  food  and  impure  water,  and 
aggravated  by  the  rains,  which  fell  daily  in  torrents,  was 
said  to  be  very  prevalent,  and  Manila  to  have  reached 
almost  the  extreme  limit  of  its  powers  of  resistance. 
The  condition  of  affairs  found  on  the  surrender  of  the 
city,  however,  indicated  that  these  reports  greatly  exag 
gerated  the  situation,  the  people  showing  no  evidence  of 
the  work  of  famine. 

23 


354  THE   WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

Dewey  still  waited.  A  third  expedition,  under  Gen 
eral  Merritt,  military  commander  of  the  Philippines,  was 
nearly  due,  and  the  monitors  Monterey  and  Monadnock 
were  well  on  their  way.  He  had  no  desire  to  capture  the 
city  till  assured  of  his  ability  to  hold  it,  and  to  control 
the  natives  if  they  should  attempt  to  make  trouble.  On 
the  25th,  Merritt  arrived  in  the  Newport,  accompanied 
and  followed  by  a  number  of  transports,  the  strength  of 
the  expedition  being  about  five  thousand  officers  and 
men.  He  at  once  took  command  of  the  land  forces, 
establishing  his  head-quarters  in  Cavite  arsenal. 

It  was  a  season  of  storm.  Rains  of  unusual  heavi 
ness  fell  daily,  and  high  winds  made  the  waters  of  the 
harbor  so  rough  that  it  was  impossible  to  land  the  troops, 
who  remained  on  the  transports  for  a  week  or  more  after 
their  arrival.  The  Spanish  commander  in  the  city  took 
advantage  of  this  opportunity  to  make  an  attack  in  force 
on  the  American  troops,  perhaps  with  the  hope  of 
driving  them  back  before  they  were  reinforced. 

The  attack  seems  to  have  been  precipitated  by  a 
movement  of  General  Greene  to  extend  his  lines.  On 
the  3ist  of  July  his  trenches  faced  the  Spanish  works, 
extending  some  three  hundred  yards  from  the  beach  and 
joining  the  insurgent  lines  on  their  left  flank.  This, 
however,  was  a  feast  day  of  the  natives,  who,  regardless 
of  military  considerations,  withdrew  into  their  camp, 
leaving  the  right  flank  of  the  Americans  exposed.  Two 
companies  of  the  Tenth  Pennsylvania  and  the  Utah 
Battery  were  ordered  to  fill  the  gap,  but  before  they 
could  fairly  do  so  the  Spaniards  were  upon  them,  three 
thousand  strong. 

It  was  an  excellent  opportunity  for  a  surprise,  a  trop 
ical  typhoon  raging  and  the  rain  descending  in  blinding 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  355 

torrents,  yet  the  Pennsylvanians  stoutly  held  their  ground 
in  the  face  of  a  fierce  fire,  which  they  briskly  returned. 
The  Utah  Battery  was  dragged  to  the  front  through  mud 
axle-deep,  and  poured  in  a  destructive  enfilading  fire  on 
the  enemy.  The  alarm  rapidly  spreading,  the  First 
California  was  rushed  to  the  point  of  danger,  with  two 
companies  of  the  Third  Artillery,  armed  with  rifles. 
The  charge  of  the  enemy  had  carried  them  to  the  top 
of  the  trenches  by  the  time  these  reinforcements  arrived, 
but  the  fire  proved  too  severe  for  them  to  face  and  they 
fell  back  in  disorder.  Several  desperate  charges  were 
made  with  the  same  result,  and  in  the  end  the  Spanish 
soldiers  retreated  into  the  bush,  from  which  they  kept 
up  an  incessant  fire  on  the  road  leading  to  Manila,  along 
which  they  seemingly  expected  the  Americans  to  ad 
vance.  But  the  latter  had  exhausted  their  ammunition 
and  made  no  attempt  to  follow  the  enemy. 

The  fight  was  renewed  on  the  night  of  August  i,  and 
again  on  the  succeeding  night,  but  no  infantry  charges 
were  made,  the  enemy  confining  themselves  to  the  use 
of  artillery,  to  which  the  Utah  Battery  replied.  The 
loss  in  the  three  days'  fighting  was  fourteen  killed  and 
forty-four  wounded,  the  Spanish  loss  being  much  heavier, 
though  the  numbers  were  unknown. 

This  vigorous  effort  to  check  the  American  advance 
had  proved  an  utter  failure,  and  the  fall  of  the  city  was 
evidently  near  at  hand.  On  the  4th  of  August  the  Mon 
terey  entered  Manila  harbor.  The  Monadnock  was  ex 
pected  in  a  few  days,  and  the  time  had  arrived  to  bring 
the  long  period  of  suspense  to  an  end. 

The  final  operations  began  on  August  7,  when  Admiral 
Dewey  and  General  Merritt  sent  a  joint  notice  to  the 
Spanish  commander,  giving  him  forty-eight  hours  to 


356  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

remove  non-combatants  preliminary  to  a  bombardment  of 
the  city.  They  had  a  new  man  to  deal  with.  Governor- 
General  Augustin  had  withdrawn  from  military  control 
on  the  plea  that  Spain  was  sending  him  no  help.  He 
was  succeeded  by  General  Jaudenes,  from  whom  came 
a  courteous  reply  to  the  American  note,  thanking  the 
commanders  for  their  humane  sentiments,  but  stating 
that  he  had  no  place  of  refuge  for  the  large  number  of 
sick  and  wounded,  women  and  children,  who  were  within 
the  walls.  During  the  interval,  the  German  residents 
and  many  of  those  of  other  countries  took  the  oppor 
tunity  to  leave  the  city  on  the  war-ships  of  their  respec 
tive  nations. 

On  the  Qth,  at  the  end  of  the  period  granted,  a  second 
joint  note  was  sent  to  General  Jaudenes,  demanding  a 
surrender  on  the  ground  of  the  hopeless  condition  of  the 
Spanish  forces  and  the  suffering  in  store  for  the  sick  and 
the  non-combatants  in  case  of  assault.  In  reply,  time 
was  asked  to  communicate  with  Madrid  by  way  of  Hong- 
Kong  ;  but  this  respite  was  refused,  and  the  ships  began 
to  strip  for  action,  a  second  respite  being  granted  until 
noon  of  Wednesday,  the  loth.  All  the  boats  and  wood 
work  that  could  be  spared  from  the  ships  were  sent  to 
Cavite  Navy- Yard,  splinter  nets  were  spread,  guns 
cleaned  and  oiled,  and  other  preparations  made.  The 
foreign  war-vessels  in  the  harbor  took  positions  to  ob 
serve  the  action,  the  British  and  Japanese  ships  anchor 
ing  near  our  fleet,  the  German  and  French  taking  posi 
tions  opposite.  Thus  they  seemed  to  separate  into  two 
groups,  the  friendly  and  the  lukewarm. 

On  Wednesday  morning  the  ships  were  cleared  for 
action  and  the  men  at  their  quarters,  when  a  signal  came 
from  the  Olympia,  "  Action  postponed."  General  Mer- 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN.  357 

ritt  had  found  that  the  army  was  not  ready.  It  was  un 
derstood  by  this  time  that  the  Spanish  resistance  would 
be  in  form  only,  sufficient  to  preserve  the  honor  of  their 
arms,  but  the  American  leaders  took  no  chances  and 
prepared  to  meet  a  stubborn  resistance  if  it  should  come. 

The  truce  now  continued  until  Saturday,  the  1 3th.  At 
8.45  A.M.  on  that  day  the  fleet  got  under  way,  the  Con 
cord  taking  her  position  on  the  north  end  of  the  line  and 
the  Monterey  standing  in  close  to  the  Lunetta  battery. 
The  Charleston,  Baltimore,  and  Boston  faced  the  same 
battery  farther  out,  and  the  Olympia,  Raleigh,  and  Petrel 
took  positions  opposite  the  Malate  forts.  With  them 
were  the  McCullough  and  the  Callao,  the  latter  a  gun 
boat  captured  from  the  Spaniards. 

At  9. 30  the  Olympia  opened  fire,  followed  quickly  by 
the  Petrel  and  the  Raleigh,  while  the  little  Callao,  which 
had  steamed  close  in  shore,  opened  briskly  from  her  sin 
gle  rapid-fire  gun.  The  first  shots  all  fell  short,  as  if 
with  the  purpose  of  satisfying  Spanish  honor  without 
loss.  But  no  signs  of  surrender  came,  and  the  ships 
began  to  fire  with  better  aim.  Clouds  of  smoke,  dust, 
and  flying  fragments  rose  above  Malate,  on  which  the 
whole  attack  was  directed,  and  it  was  evident  that  the 
position  would  soon  be  made  untenable.  No  reply 
came,  and  no  shots  were  fired  at  the  Lunetta  and  Pasig 
batteries,  which  continued  silent.  At  10.50  the  Olympia 
signalled,  c '  Cease  firing, ' '  and  the  Spaniards  were  asked 
by  the  international  code  signal  if  they  had  surrendered. 
The  result  was  not  known  in  the  fleet  until  2. 30  p.  M.  , 
when  the  Olympia  set  the  signal,  '  *  The  enemy  has  sur 
rendered,"  and  wild  cheers  of  exultation  broke  from  the 
crews. 

While  the  ships  were  thus  engaged,  a  more  sanguinary 


358  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

contest  was  taking  place  on  shore.  The  Utah  Battery 
kept  time  with  the  ships  in  playing  on  the  Malate  works, 
which  answered,  though  rather  feebly.  In  less  than  half 
an  hour  after  the  bombardment  began  General  Greene 
decided  on  an  advance,  signalling  to  the  ships  to  cease 
firing.  They  kept  on,  however,  the  heavy  rain  render 
ing  the  signals  invisible.  All  the  morning  rain  had 
been  pouring  down  in  sudden  gushes,  but  in  spite  of 
this  the  troops  sprang  forward  at  the  word,  moving 
swiftly  along  the  beach,  with  colors  flying  and  band 
playing.  A  creek  lay  in  their  way,  but  they  plunged  in 
it  and  waded  across.  At  eleven  o'  clock  the  Malate  fort 
was  occupied,  the  Spanish  flag  hauled  down,  and  the 
American  flag  waving  above  its  walls. 

The  hardest  fighting  was  done  by  the  right  wing,  led 
by  General  McArthur,  with  the  Astor  Battery,  his  attack 
having  no  support  from  the  guns  of  the  fleet.  The  Cali 
fornia  troops,  galled  by  a  hot  fire  from  Spanish  sharp 
shooters  in  houses  on  the  right,  charged  into  the  Ermita 
suburb,  where  a  stubborn  contest  took  place  in  Calle 
Real  with  the  Spaniards,  who  had  barricaded  the  streets. 
They  were  attacked  and  driven  out  with  pistols,  the 
clearing  of  Calle  Real  ending  the  assault.  About  noon 
a  white  flag  was  floating  over  the  city  walls,  indicating 
that  the  struggle  was  at  an  end.  The  loss  on  the  Amer 
ican  side  had  been  eight  killed  and  forty  wounded.  The 
Spanish  loss  was  much  greater,  though  the  number  was 
unknown.  Before  the  surrender  the  gunboat  Cebu,  in 
the  Pasig  River,  was  set  on  fire,  and  several  smaller 
boats  were  destroyed. 

Flag-Lieutenant  Brumby  went  ashore  about  noon  and 
had  an  interview  with  General  Jaudenes  concerning  the 
terms  of  capitulation.  General  Merritt  subsequently 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN.  359 

joined  in  the  conference,  the  terms  agreed  upon  being, 
in  brief  outline,  the  following  : 

Surrender  of  Manila  and  its  suburbs. 

Officers  to  retain  their  swords  and  personal  effects,  but 
not  their  horses. 

Men  to  surrender  their  arms,  prisoners  of  war  being 
supplied  from  the  treasury  fund  until  exhausted,  then  by 
the  Americans. 

The  safety  of  life  and  property  of  Spaniards  to  be 
guaranteed  as  far  as  possible. 

The  question  of  transporting  the  troops  to  Spain  to 
be  decided  by  the  American  government,  and  that  of 
returning  their  arms  to  the  soldiers  to  be  left  to  the 
decision  of  General  Merritt. 

All  public  property  to  be  surrendered  and  banks  to 
continue  in  business  under  existing  regulations. 

Under  these  terms  about  seven  thousand  soldiers  were 
surrendered  as  prisoners.  The  insurgents  were  not  per 
mitted  to  take  part  in  the  attack  on  the  city,  being  kept 
in  the  rear  of  the  Americans.  After  the  surrender  they 
were  forbidden  to  enter  Manila  unless  unarmed,  fear  of 
violence  being  entertained. 

As  soon  as  the  terms  of  capitulation  were  signed, 
Lieutenant  Brumby  hastened  to  lower  a  Spanish  flag, 
as  an  indication  of  the  end  of  Spanish  dominion  over 
Manila.  The  flag  lowered  was  a  large  one  that  waved 
over  Fort  Santiago  in  the  northern  portion  of  the  walled 
city.  As  it  descended,  and  the  Stars  and  Stripes  rose 
in  its  place,  tears  flowed  from  the  eyes  of  many  of  the 
observers.  It  meant  the  end  of  a  once  vast  colonial 
empire  of  the  Spanish  nation.  The  event  was  greeted 
by  the  guns  of  the  fleet  and  loud  cheers  from  all  the 
Americans  within  view. 


36o  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

An  event  succeeded  that  roused  some  severe  criticism 
in  the  United  States,  the  departure  of  General  Augustin, 
with  his  family  and  suite,  on  the  German  war-steamer 
Kaiserin  Augusta,  which  left  the  harbor  immediately 
after  the  surrender.  It  was  looked  upon  as  in  line  with 
the  general  discourtesy  with  which  the  Germans  had 
been  charged  throughout  the  blockade  of  Manila.  But 
later  advices  showed  it  to  have  been  done  with  the 
concurrence  of  Admiral  Dewey,  and  the  feeling  sub 
sided. 

With  a  proclamation  by  General  Merritt,  announcing 
a  military  occupation  by  the  United  States  of  the  island 
of  Luzon,  the  protection  of  all  inhabitants  in  their  per 
sonal  and  religious  rights,  and  the  retention  of  existing 
laws  until  notice  of  change,  the  circle  of  military  affairs 
in  the  Philippine  Islands  ceased.  The  taking  of  Manila, 
indeed,  was  the  final  military  and  naval  event  of  the  war. 
The  peace  protocol  had  been  signed  the  day  before,  and 
the  war  with  Spain  was  at  an  end. 


CHAPTER    XXI. 

FROM   WAR   TO    PEACE. 

THE  war  of  1898  was  in  some  respects  a  singular  one. 
It  was  fought  entirely  outside  the  two  countries  con 
cerned, — that  is,  if  we  consider  the  colonies  of  Spain  as 
no  part  of  the  country  itself.  It  was  fought  almost  en 
tirely  by  the  navy,  there  being  but  one  battle  on  land  in 
which  large  armies  took  part ;  yet  throughout  the  war 
less  than  a  score  of  men  lost  their  lives  on  the  ships  of 
the  United  States,  and  not  a  ship  was  seriously  injured, 
while  the  navy  of  Spain  was  practically  annihilated.  It 
was  a  war  in  which  all  the  successes  were  on  one  side, 
all  the  failures  on  the  other,  and  in  which  the  entire  loss 
of  life  in  battle  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  was  but 
a  few  hundred  men.  That  of  Spain  it  is  impossible  to 
estimate. 

But  while  the  war  did  not  touch  the  mainland  of  the 
two  countries  concerned,  its  effects  made  themselves 
strongly  felt  there.  To  the  United  States  it  seemed  to 
bring  prosperity  and  glory.  Industry  advanced,  com 
merce  increased,  values  grew,  and  money  and  food  be 
came  superabundant ;  while  the  eyes  of  Europe  for  the 
first  time  became  fully  opened  to  the  greatness  of  the 
republic  of  the  West,  and  came  to  look  upon  it  as  a 
new-world  power,  to  be  taken  seriously  into  account  in 
all  future  rearrangements  of  the  status  of  the  nations. 
Four  months  of  war  had  surprisingly  changed  the  rela 
tions  of  the  United  States  with  the  great  powers  abroad. 

361 


362  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

To  Spain,  on  the  other  hand,  it  brought  loss  and 
degradation.  That  country  came  out  of  it  shorn  of  her 
most  valuable  colonies,  overloaded  with  debt,  virtually 
bankrupt,  and  greatly  lowered  in  rank  among  the  na 
tions.  While  the  United  States  obtained  all  the  money 
needed  in  the  war  from  her  own  people  at  a  low  rate  of 
interest,  and  took  a  large  part  of  it  directly  from  her 
treasury,  Spain  sought  in  vain  to  borrow  from  the  capi 
talists  of  the  world,  who  refused  to  trust  their  money  in 
such  doubtful  hands.  Yet,  if  she  could  have  borrowed 
millions,  they  would  have  been  of  little  use  to  her  ;  for, 
beyond  sending  one  fleet  across  the  ocean  to  be  annihi 
lated,  she  was  obliged  to  let  the  war  be  fought  by  the 
forces  in  her  colonies,  the  soldiers  sent  over  in  previous 
years  to  subdue  the  insurrections.  These  once  con 
quered,  Spain's  power  of  defence  in  her  colonies  was  at 
an  end,  for  she  was  utterly  unable  to  come  to  their 
aid. 

Such  were  the  respective  conditions  of  the  two  coun 
tries.  Some  relation  of  the  events  that  took  place  in 
each  during  the  war  comes  here  in  place,  as  leading  to 
the  terms  upon  which  peace  was  granted.  In  Spain  a 
persistent  system  of  falsification  prevailed.  The  news 
papers  were  not  permitted  to  tell  the  truth,  and  it  was 
only  through  indirect  channels  that  a  knowledge  of  the 
true  state  of  affairs  made  its  way  among  the  people. 
The  country  was  so  deeply  permeated  with  the  elements 
of  revolution,  so  many  diverse  factions — Carlists,  repub 
licans,  anarchists — stood  ready  to  rise  against  the  gov 
ernment,  that  the  rulers  dared  not  admit  the  losses  of 
their  arms,  lest  they  should  be  driven  in  disgrace  from 
the  land. 

And  yet  the  revolution  that  impended  was  not  a  result 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  363 

of  Spain's  misfortunes  in  war,  but  of  her  misgovernment 
and  oppression  in  peace.  The  majority  of  the  people 
were  said  to  be  absolutely  without  interest  in  the  war, 
being  so  affected  by  the  misery  that  prevailed  at  home 
as  to  take  no  concern  in  the  affairs  of  the  colonies. 
Hunger  and  destitution  were  the  controlling  forces  ;  the 
bread  question  was  far  more  prominent  than  the  war 
question,  and  the  outbreaks  that  took  place  and  the 
troubles  that  threatened  were  instigated  by  starvation 
rather  than  war.  Spain  was  in  a  state  of  ferment  which 
threatened  every  social  and  political  institution  of  the 
land,  and  the  government  was  in  no  condition  to  prose 
cute  a  war  abroad  while  at  home  she  seemed  trembling 
on  the  verge  of  a  volcano.  Her  wisest  statesmen  felt 
that  the  contest  was  hopeless,  but  feared  the  effect  of  a 
confession  of  defeat.  And  the  fatal  Spanish  spirit  of 
procrastination  was  by  no  means  absent,  uselessly  pro 
tracting  the  struggle  when  every  day  added  to  the  diffi 
culties  of  the  situation  and  the  chances  of  a  sterner 
penalty  being  imposed  in  the  end. 

A  few  words  will  suffice  to  indicate  the  financial  ability 
of  the  United  States  to  prosecute  the  war.  As  a  pre 
liminary  to  the  contest,  $50,000,000  were  taken  in  one 
sum  from  the  treasury  to  aid  in  the  work  of  preparation. 
At  the  end  of  the  contest  the  treasury  held  more  than 
$200,000,000  in  gold.  The  total  direct  cost  of  the  war 
was  about  $130,000,000,  to  provide  the  funds  for  which 
without  disturbing  the  ordinary  financial  operations  of 
the  government  a  war-loan  of  $200,000,000  at  three  per 
cent,  interest  was  offered  to  the  people,  care  being  taken 
that  small  subscriptions  should  be  given  the  preference 
and  that  it  should  be  in  every  respect  a  popular  loan. 
The  loan  was  taken  with  the  greatest  avidity,  the  offers 


364  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

made  amounting  to  the  vast  sum  of  $1,325,000,000,  or 
nearly  seven  times  the  amount  of  the  issue.  Nearly 
three  hundred  thousand  subscriptions  were  received,  the 
books  closing  on  July  14,  and  the  loan  was  distributed 
to  the  small  bidders,  the  upper  limit  of  allotments  being 
$4500,  while  nearly  half  the  total  amount  went  to  sub 
scribers  for  $500  and  under. 

To  provide  funds  for  the  repayment  of  this  loan  and 
the  meeting  of  the  war  expenses  a  new  internal  tax  law 
was  passed  by  Congress,  embracing  stamp  taxes  on  a 
great  variety  of  legal  and  business  documents,  license 
taxes  on  places  of  amusement,  bankers,  and  brokers,  and 
taxes  on  legacies,  fermented  liquors,  tobacco,  tea,  and 
mixed  flour.  The  law  went  into  effect,  except  in  the 
case  of  the  last-mentioned  items,  on  July  i,  1898.  It 
promised  to  yield  in  no  great  time  sufficient  funds  to  pay 
all  the  expenses  of  the  war. 

The  ability  of  the  United  States  to  meet  all  demands 
likely  to  be  made  upon  its  resources,  in  war  or  peace, 
was  shown  in  a  statement  issued  in  July  from  the  Gov 
ernment  Bureau  of  Foreign  Commerce,  whose  statistics 
indicated  an  extraordinary  development  of  American 
commerce  during  the  fiscal  year  ending  July  i,  1898. 
This  statement  showed  that  the  exports  of  the  United 
States  during  that  year  had  enormously  exceeded  the 
imports,  and  that  these  exports  consisted  of  articles  of 
manufacture  to  a  degree  greatly  exceeding  those  of  any 
preceding  year. 

Mr.  Frederick  Emory,  who  prepared  the  report, 
referred  to  this  trade  development  as  "an  American 
invasion  of  the  markets  of  the  world. ' '  In  his  view  the 
United  States  was  no  longer  merely  the  '  *  granary  of  the 
world,"  since,  while  its  export  of  agricultural  products 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN.  365 

was  extraordinarily  great,  its  sales  abroad  of  manufactured 
goods  had  greatly  extended,  in  spite  of  obstructions  and 
discriminations  in  foreign  countries.  ' '  Notwithstand 
ing,"  he  said,  "that  organized  effort  to  reach  foreign 
markets  for  our  manufactures  is  as  yet  in  its  infancy,  the 
ability  of  the  United  States  to  compete  successfully  with 
the  most  advanced  industrial  nations  in  any  part  of  the 
world,  as  well  as  with  those  nations  in  their  home 
markets,  can  no  longer  be  seriously  questioned. ' '  We 
are  being  converted,  he  said,  ' '  slowly  but  surely  from  a 
people  absorbed  with  the  internal  development  of  a  virgin 
continent  into  one  of  the  great  commercial  powers  of  the 
world,  with  the  international  interests  and  responsibilities 
which  such  a  position  naturally  implies." 

The  war  with  Spain  promised  to  add  greatly  in  its  re 
sults  to  our  position  and  interests  as  a  world  power,  by 
giving  us  valuable  colonial  possessions  in  near  and  dis 
tant  seas.  One  of  these  new  possessions,  the  Hawaiian 
archipelago,  while  not  directly,  was  indirectly  a  result 
of  the  war.  This  important  group  of  Pacific  islands  had 
for  several  years  been  waiting  to  be  accepted  or  rejected 
by  the  United  States.  A  request  from  Hawaii  for  an 
nexation  several  years  before  had  been  declined  by  Presi 
dent  Cleveland.  The  subject  of  annexation  was  brought 
up  again  in  1898,  passed  the  House  in  the  form  of  a 
resolution,  and  was  passed  by  the  Senate  with  a  two- 
thirds  vote  on  July  6.  President  McKinley  immediately 
signed  the  resolution,  and  the  long  contest  over  Hawaii 
was  at  an  end. 

On  the  yth  Secretary  Long  gave  orders  for  the  de 
parture  of  the  cruiser  Philadelphia  from  Mare  Island  for 
Hawaii  with  the  important  news.  The  Philadelphia  had 
taken  no  part  in  the  war,  being  under  repair  since  its  be- 


366  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

ginning.  She  was  now  given  the  distinguished  honor 
of  carrying  the  flag  of  the  United  States  to  those  islands, 
and  by  this  act  including  them  within  the  American 
Union.  The  duty  of  hoisting  the  flag  was  assigned  to 
Admiral  Miller,  then  in  command  of  the  Pacific  Station, 
the  President  appointing  a  commission  to  frame  laws 
suitable  for  the  new  acquisition  of  the  United  States.  The 
Philadelphia  sailed  on  the  2yth,  and  the  ceremony  of  final 
annexation  took  place  on  August  12,  by  an  interesting  co 
incidence  on  the  very  day  on  which  the  protocol  of  peace 
with  Spain  was  signed.  The  ceremony  of  raising  the 
flag  and  formally  proclaiming  the  Hawaiian  Islands  part 
of  the  United  States  was  a  simple  one,  Admiral  Miller 
wisely  not  making  it  an  occasion  of  ostentation,  in  view 
of  the  fact  that  the  loss  of  their  independence  was  bit 
terly  opposed  by  the  natives  of  the  islands.  Few  of 
them  witnessed  the  ceremony  of  flag-raising,  and  the 
small  number  who  appeared  turned  their  eyes,  filled  with 
tears,  away  from  their  flag  as  it  came  slowly  down,  to  be 
replaced  by  the  standard  of  the  United  States. 

The  ceremony  took  place  at  noon,  in  the  presence  of 
the  authorities  and  all  the  people  of  Honolulu  except  the 
natives.  As  the  Hawaiian  standard  fluttered  downward 
to  the  earth,  Admiral  Miller  gave  a  signal,  the  sound  of 
a  bugle  was  heard,  and  from  the  ground  rose  a  magnifi 
cent  American  flag,  hailed  with  cheers  as  it  unfurled  and 
floated  out  on  the  air,  and  the  inspiring  notes  of  the 
4  *  Star- Spangled  Banner' '  rang  out  from  the  band  of  the 
Philadelphia.  The  President's  proclamation  was  then 
read,  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  United  States  was 
administered  to  President  Dole  and  his  Cabinet,  who 
for  the  time  being  continued  in  power,  the  Hawaiian 
National  Guard  took  the  oath  at  their  barracks,  and 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  367 

the   ceremonies   ended.     The   republic  of   Hawaii   had 
become  part  of  the  United  States  of  America. 

Returning  to  affairs  more  immediately  connected  with 
the  war,  some  reference  to  the  attitude  of  the  powers  of 
Europe  seems  here  demanded.  Though  these  powers, 
in  common  with  the  other  civilized  nations  of  the  earth, 
had  declared  neutrality  between  the  warring  nations, 
some  degree  of  hostility  to  one  or  the  other  parties  con 
cerned  seemed  to  underlie  their  sense  of  international 
obligations.  The  attitude  of  Germany  appeared  to  indi 
cate  that  a  desire  to  share  in  the  partition  of  the  Philip 
pine  Islands  was  strongly  entertained  in  that  country, 
and  many  of  the  newspapers  of  Germany  and  France 
were  strongly  pro- Spanish  in  their  comments  on  the  war. 

Rumors  of  a  purpose  of  intervention  on  the  part  of 
the  European  powers  were  from  time  to  time  set  afloat, 
and  the  statement  was  made  that  several  of  these  powers 
had  it  in  view  to  try  and  make  a  European  question  of 
the  hostile  relations  between  Spain  and  the  United 
States,  dealing  with  these  powers  as  they  had  dealt  with 
Crete  and  Greece.  If  such  a  design  was  seriously  enter 
tained,  dread  of  how  the  United  States  might  receive  a 
movement  of  this  character  stood  seriously  in  the  way 
of  an  attempt  to  put  it  into  effect.  And  the  attitude  of 
Great  Britain  was  an  equally  serious  obstacle  to  any  such 
project.  That  country  not  only  was  not  to  be  drawn  into 
any  scheme  of  interference,  but  could  not  even  be  trusted 
to  remain  neutral.  There  was  the  strongest  reason  to 
believe  that  it  would  aid  the  United  States  in  resist 
ance  to  Continental  coercion,  and  the  powers  of  Europe 
did  not  dare  to  array  against  them,  in  a  transatlantic 
matter,  the  British  fleet.  However  all  this  be,  and 
whether  or  not  such  a  project  was  entertained  as  has 


368  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

been  asserted,  no  open  indication  of  any  such  purpose 
was  made,  and  the  war  remained  strictly  confined  to  the 
two  powers  concerned.  In  truth,  the  real  sentiments 
entertained  by  Germany  and  France  towards  the  United 
States  remained  undivulged,  the  views  afloat  being 
mainly  based  on  newspaper  utterances,  not  on  official 
acts. 

This  being  the  case,  and  Spain  being  forced  to  depend 
on  her  own  weak  self,  only  one  course  stood  between 
her  and  ruin,  a  request  for  peace.  Such  a  request  the 
United  States  had  obviously  no  thought  of  making,  and 
the  continued  series  of  reverses  to  the  arms  of  Spain 
made  it  evident  that  the  longer  the  war  was  permitted  to 
continue  the  greater  would  be  her  final  loss.  It  is  the 
custom  in  modern  wars  for  the  conquering  nation  to 
make  its  defeated  enemy  pay  the  cost,  and  the  ' '  bill  of 
expenses' '  was  running  up  at  a  rapid  rate.  Spain' s  only 
hope  lay  in  an  immediate  peace,  yet  she  seemed  to  be 
the  last  of  the  nations  to  perceive  this,  and  permitted 
the  war  to  drift  on  long  after  wisdom  dictated  a  yielding 
of  her  pride  and  a  request  for  the  most  favorable  terms 
she  could  obtain. 

The  first  move  of  Spain  in  this  direction  was  made  on 
July  26,  three  months  after  the  outbreak  of  the  war, 
through  the  intermedium  of  M.  Jules  Cambon,  the 
French  ambassador  to  the  United  States.  This  gentle 
man  called  on  President  McKinley  at  three  o'clock  in 
the  afternoon  of  that  day,  with  the  statement  that  he 
had  been  instructed  by  the  Foreign  Office  at  Paris  to 
make  a  tender  of  peace  to  the  United  States  on  the  part 
of  the  Spanish  ministry.  M.  Cambon  had  been  simply 
authorized  to  open  peace  negotiations,  but  his  powers 
were  soon  extended  to  enable  him  to  act  as  the  repre- 


THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN.  369 

sentative  of  Spain  in  obtaining  conditions  from  the 
United  States. 

After  full  consideration  in  cabinet  meetings  and  in  con 
ferences  with  M.  Cambon,  a  synopsis  of  the  conditions 
upon  which  the  United  States  would  consent  to  an 
armistice,  pending  the  conclusion  of  a  treaty  of  peace, 
was  formulated  and  transmitted  to  Spain.  It  was  in 
effect  as  follows  : 

The  President  waived  for  the  time  being  the  question 
of  demanding  a  pecuniary  indemnity  from  Spain,  but 
required  the  relinquishment  of  all  claim  of  sovereignty 
over  or  title  to  the  island  of  Cuba,  and  the  immediate 
evacuation  of  that  island  ;  the  evacuation  and  cession  to 
the  United  States  of  Porto  Rico  and  other  islands  held 
by  Spain  in  the  West  Indies  ;  and  the  cession  of  an 
island  in  the  Ladrone  group.  The  city,  bay,  and  harbor 
of  Manila  were  to  be  held  by  the  United  States  until  a 
commission,  to  be  appointed  by  the  two  countries  con 
cerned,  had  decided  on  what  should  be  done  with  the 
Philippines,  and  had  concluded  a  final  treaty  of  peace  on 
the  basis  above  indicated. 

Spain  dealt  with  these  terms  with  considerable  delib 
eration.  On  August  i  the  Cabinet  at  Madrid  held  a 
long  session,  ending  in  a  despatch  to  Washington  for 
1 '  further  explanation  of  some  difficult  points. ' '  There 
was  the  best  of  reasons,  however,  for  believing  that  the 
Spanish  government  had  no  intention  of  continuing  the 
war,  since  that  must  result  in  the  loss  of  all  the  Philip 
pines,  and  possibly  a  demand  for  a  large  money  indem 
nity,  while  if  the  terms  were  quickly  accepted  the  United 
States  would  perhaps  limit  its  demand  to  a  coaling  and 
naval  station  in  the  Philippines. 

Later  instructions  to  M.  Cambon  were  to  the  effect 
24 


370  THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN. 

that  Spain  was  anxious  to  retain  possession  of  Luzon, 
the  principal  Philippine  island,  to  have  her  troops  depart 
from  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico  with  all  the  honors  of  war, 
and  to  have  the  right  to  remove  all  war  material  from 
those  islands.  She  also  asked  to  be  relieved  from  paying 
the  debt  incurred  on  account  of  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico. 
This  last  proposition,  which  would  have  saddled  Cuba 
with  a  debt  of  $550,000,000,  incurred  in  the  effort  to 
subdue  its  inhabitants,  the  United  States  was  very  little 
likely  to  accept,  and  the  French  ambassador  was  given 
to  understand  that  this  country  would  neither  modify  its 
propositions  nor  consent  to  enter  upon  peace  negotia 
tions  until  Spain  had  fully  accepted  the  conditions  pro 
posed. 

Finding  that  no  better  terms  were  to  be  had,  the 
Spanish  Cabinet,  at  a  meeting  held  August  7,  accepted 
those  offered.  Though  this  information  was  at  once 
made  public  in  the  United  States,  the  answer  itself  was 
two  days  in  reaching  Washington,  it  coming  via  Paris, 
and  requiring  to  be  twice  translated,  put  into  cipher,  and 
again  deciphered.  As  the  paper  was  a  long  one,  enter 
ing  into  considerable  detail,  all  this  took  time,  and  it 
was  not  presented  to  the  President  by  M.  Cambon  until 
5.30  P.M.  of  August  9.  As  the  answer  proved  to  be  a 
practical  acceptance  of  the  American  terms,  the  Presi 
dent  directed  a  protocol,  or  preliminary  basis  of  a  treaty 
of  peace,  embodying  the  propositions  made,  to  be  drawn 
up  and  submitted  to  M.  Cambon  as  the  representative 
of  Spain.  This  decision  was  communicated  by  M. 
Cambon  to  the  government  at  Madrid,  from  which  came 
an  immediate  reply  authorizing  the  French  ambassador 
to  sign  the  protocol  on  behalf  of  Spain. 

It  was  expected  that  the  protocol  would  be  signed  and 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  371 

the  war  end  on  the  loth,  but  the  French  ambassador 
preferred  first  to  transmit  its  full  text  to  Madrid,  that 
there  might  be  left  no  room  for  misunderstanding,  his 
request  gaining  force  from  the  fact  that  a  few  verbal 
changes  had  been  made  in  the  text.  Secretary  Day  as 
sented  to  this  request,  and  the  protocol  was  converted 
into  cipher  and  cabled  to  Madrid.  Authority  to  sign 
came  back  by  cable,  and  the  final  ceremony  of  signing 
took  place  about  4  P.M.  on  August  12,  at  which  day  and 
hour  the  war  with  Spain  came  to  an  end, — for  no  doubt 
was  felt  that  the  armistice  would  end  in  formal  peace, 
Spain  being  helpless  to  resist  any  demands  that  the 
United  States  was  likely  to  make. 

The  text  of  the  protocol,  the  signing  of  which  was 
immediately  followed  by  a  proclamation  from  President 
McKinley  suspending  hostilities,  was  as  follows  : 

"  His  Excellency  M.  Cambon,  Ambassador  Extraordi 
nary  and  Minister  Plenipotentiary  of  the  French  republic 
at  Washington,  and  Mr.  William  B.  Day,  Secretary  of 
State  of  the  United  States,  having  received  respectively  to 
that  effect  plenary  powers  from  the  Spanish  government 
and  the  government  of  the  United  States,  have  established 
and  signed  the  following  articles,  which  define  the  terms 
on  which  the  two  governments  have  agreed  with  regard 
to  the  questions  enumerated  below,  and  of  which  the 
object  is  the  establishment  of  peace  between  the  two 
countries,  namely  : 

* '  ARTICLE  i .  Spain  will  renounce  all  claim  to  all 
sovereignty  over  and  all  her  rights  over  the  island  of 
Cuba. 

"  ARTICLE  2.  Spain  will  cede  to  the  United  States 
the  island  of  Porto  Rico  and  the  other  islands  which 
are  at  present  under  the  sovereignty  of  Spain  in  the 


372  THE   WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

Antilles,  as  well  as  an  island  in  the  Ladrone  Archipelago, 
to  be  chosen  by  the  United  States. 

"ARTICLE  3.  The  United  States  will  occupy  and 
retain  the  city  and  bay  of  Manila  and  the  port  of  Manila 
pending  the  conclusion  of  a  treaty  of  peace,  which  shall 
determine  the  control  and  form  of  government  of  the 
Philippines. 

1 '  ARTICLE  4.  Spain  will  immediately  evacuate  Cuba, 
Porto  Rico,  and  the  other  islands  now  under  Spanish 
sovereignty  in  the  Antilles.  To  this  effect  each  of  the 
two  governments  will  appoint  Commissioners  within  ten 
days  after  the  signing  of  this  protocol,  and  these  Com 
missioners  shall  meet  at  Havana  within  thirty  days  after 
the  signing  of  this  protocol  with  the  object  of  coming 
to  an  agreement  regarding  the  carrying  out  of  the 
details  of  the  aforesaid  evacuation  of  Cuba  and  other 
adjacent  Spanish  islands,  and  each  of  the  two  govern 
ments  shall  likewise  appoint,  within  ten  days  after  the 
signature  of  this  protocol,  other  Commissioners,  who 
shall  meet  at  San  Juan  de  Porto  Rico  within  thirty  days 
after  the  signature  of  this  protocol,  to  agree  upon  the 
details  of  the  evacuation  of  Porto  Rico  and  other  islands 
now  under  Spanish  sovereignty  in  the  Antilles. 

"ARTICLE  5.  Spain  and  the  United  States  shall  ap 
point  to  treat  for  peace  five  Commissioners  at  the  most 
for  either  country.  The  Commissioners  shall  meet  in 
Paris  on  October  i  at  the  latest,  to  proceed  to  negotia 
tions  and  to  the  conclusion  of  a  treaty  of  peace.  This 
treaty  shall  be  ratified  in  conformity  with  the  constitu 
tional  laws  of  each  of  the  two  countries. 

* '  ARTICLE  6.  Once  this  protocol  is  concluded  and 
signed,  hostilities  shall  be  suspended,  and  to  that  effect 
in  the  two  countries  orders  shall  be  given  by  either  gov- 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  373 

ernment  to  the  commanders  of  its  land  and  sea  forces  as 
speedily  as  possible. 

*  *  Done  in  duplicate  at  Washington  ;  read  in  French 
and  in  English  by  the  undersigned,  who  affix  at  the  foot 
of  the  document  their  signatures  and  seals.  August  12, 
1898." 

The  ceremony  of  signing  was  one  of  some  interest, 
and  its  chief  incidents  may  be  given  in  a  few  words. 
The  President,  whose  deep  interest  in  everything  relating 
to  the  war  made  him  desirous  of  seeing  its  concluding 
event,  had  expressed  a  wish  to  be  present  at  the  signing, 
and  was  informed  by  Secretary  Day  that  he  had  arranged 
with  M.  Cambon  for  the  performance  of  this  ceremony 
at  four  o'clock.  In  consequence  it  took  place  at  the 
White  House,  instead  of  at  the  State  Department,  as  had 
been  previously  arranged. 

At  five  minutes  to  four  o'  clock  the  Secretary  of  State 
made  his  appearance,  coming  through  a  heavy  downpour 
of  rain.  He  was  accompanied  by  the  three  Assistant  Sec 
retaries,  Mr.  Cridler  bringing  the  two  copies  of  the  pro 
tocol  which  had  been  prepared.  Ten  minutes  later  M. 
Cambon  and  his  secretary,  M.  Thiebaut,  appeared  at 
the  north  entrance,  and  were  ushered  into  the  Cabinet- 
room,  where  Secretary  Day  formally  presented  them  to 
President  McKinley  and  the  others  present. 

There  was  no  delay  in  the  work  to  be  done.  The 
document,  as  stated,  had  been  prepared  in  duplicate,  the 
text  being  given  in  parallel  columns,  one  English,  the 
other  French  ;  one  having  the  first  column  in  English, 
the  other  in  French.  The  latter  was  first  signed,  ' '  M. 
Jules  Cambon"  on  the  upper  line,  "William  R.  Day" 
on  the  lower.  In  the  other  copy  the  signatures  were 
reversed.  The  latter  copy  was  to  go  into  the  archives 


374  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN. 

of  the  State  Department,  the  former  to  be  transmitted  to 
Madrid.  When  it  came  to  attaching  the  seals,  it  was 
found  that  though  wax  had  been  provided,  no  means  of 
heating  it  were  on  hand,  and  this  was  finally  done  by  the 
aid  of  a  candle  found  in  a  common  candlestick  in  the 
President's  bedroom. 

President  McKinley  strongly  expressed  his  satisfaction 
at  the  conclusion  of  the  ceremony,  and  earnestly  thanked 
the  two  French  gentlemen  for  their  useful  services  in 
bringing  about  the  result.  Congratulations  were  ex 
changed  among  all  present,  followed  by  the  President 
affixing  his  signature  to  the  proclamation  announcing 
the  armistice,  and  the  passing  around  of  a  box  of  the 
White  House  cigars.  As  a  souvenir  of  the  event, 
Assistant  Secretary  Moore  secured  the  pen  with  which 
the  signing  had  been  done.  Within  a  brief  period  tele 
grams  were  being  sent  to  Cuba,  Porto  Rico,  and  Hong- 
Kong  ordering  the  cessation  of  hostilities,  and  before 
the  day  ended  the  news  of  peace  had  spread  around  the 
earth.  From  Hong-Kong  a  swift  British  steamer  sped 
away  at  full  speed  to  carry  the  welcome  news  to  Manila, 
before  which  far-off  city,  a  few  hours  afterwards,  the  final 
battle  of  the  war  was  fought.  The  Hispano-American 
war  ended  with  the  falling  of  that  city  of  the  Eastern 
seas  into  American  hands. 


CHAPTER    XXII. 

FINAL    CONSIDERATIONS. 

OUR  history  is  practically  ended.  We  set  out  to 
describe  the  war  with  Spain,  and  have  carried  that  for 
ward  to  its  concluding  event.  The  signing  of  the  pro 
tocol  was  equivalent  to  concluding  a  treaty  of  peace,  for 
there  was  no  question  but  that  this  would  be  its  ultimate 
result.  A  dozen  loose  threads  of  consequences  of  the 
war  remained  floating  in  the  air,  but  these  we  can  merely 
name  ;  in  what  they  will  end  is  for  the  future  to  decide. 

The  conclusion  of  the  war  did  not  put  an  end  to  the 
hostile  relations  between  the  native  inhabitants  of  the 
Spanish  colonies  and  the  Spanish  soldiers  and  residents. 
The  people  of  Porto  Rico  manifested  the  same  bitter 
hatred  against  the  Spaniards  as  animated  the  Cubans, 
and  the  close  of  hostilities  between  the  contending  par 
ties  was  followed  by  violence  on  the  part  of  the  natives, 
largely  instigated  by  reports  of  outrages  committed  by 
the  Spanish  soldiers  in  their  retreat.  The  town  of  Cota 
was  burned  and  the  Spanish  residents  were  obliged  to 
fly  for  their  lives,  while  throughout  the  surrounding 
country  the  terror-stricken  Spaniards  appealed  to  the 
Americans  for  protection.  This  was  given  where  pos 
sible,  and  two  newspapers  which  violently  called  for 
vengeance  were  suppressed,  but  it  was  not  easy  to  pre 
vent  individual  examples  of  persecution.  The  turmoil, 
however,  could  only  continue  until  the  evacuation  by  the 
Spaniards  and  the  full  American  occupation  of  the  island. 

375 


376  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

In  Cuba  the  insurgents  remained  in  arms,  and  it  was 
evident  that  some  degree  of  hostile  relations  would  per 
sist  between  them  and  the  Spanish  soldiers  until  the 
evacuation  was  completed  and  a  temporary  American 
protectorate  established.  Commissions  were  appointed 
by  the  President  to  proceed  to  these  islands  and  arrange 
for  them  a  form  of  government,  to  continue  until  their  final 
status  should  be  decided.  The  commissioners  appointed 
for  Cuba  consisted  of  Rear-Admiral  W.  T.  Sampson  and 
Major-Generals  M.  C.  Butler  and  James  F.  Wade  ;  those 
for  Porto  Rico  were  Rear- Admiral  W.  S.  Schley,  Major- 
General  John  R.  Brooke,  and  Brigadier- General  W.  W. 
Gordon.  Captain-General  Blanco  headed  the  Spanish 
commission  for  Cuba  and  Captain- General  Macias  that 
for  Porto  Rico. 

Congress  had  resolved  that  Cuba  should  be  indepen 
dent,  but  as  the  conditions  there  became  better  under 
stood  serious  doubts  were  entertained  of  the  ability  of 
the  insurgents  to  maintain  a  civilized  form  of  govern 
ment.  Many  of  them  were  ignorant  negroes.  Knowl 
edge  of  political  affairs  was  sadly  lacking  among  them, 
and  a  large  number  of  the  inhabitants,  alike  of  Spanish 
and  of  Creole  birth,  fearing  anarchy  in  place  of  settled 
government,  were  anxious  for  the  United  States  to  retain 
possession  of  the  island.  It  seemed  not  improbable  that, 
in  view  of  the  considerable  depopulation  of  Cuba  during 
the  war,  an  influx  of  Americans  might  replace  the  van 
ished  inhabitants,  and  the  island  in  this  way  eventually 
come  under  American  control.  In  any  event  an  Ameri 
can  protectorate  would  probably  need  to  be  long  main 
tained,  for  the  people  were  evidently  unfit  to  govern 
themselves. 

The  disposal  of  the  Philippine  Islands  was  an  equally 


THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN.  377 

pressing  problem,  this,  by  the  terms  of  peace,  being  left 
to  the  decision  of  a  commission  of  five  members  from 
each  country,  who  were  to  meet  for  consideration  of  the 
subject  not  later  than  October  i.  The  American  com 
missioners,  as  appointed  by  President  McKinley,  were 
the  Secretary  of  State,  William  R.  Day,  Senators  C.  K. 
Davis,  of  Minnesota,  William  P.  Frye,  of  Maine,  and 
George  Gray,  of  Delaware,  and  Hon.  Whitelaw  Reid. 

As  to  what  should  be  done  with  the  Philippines,  a 
wide  difference  of  opinion  prevailed  in  the  United  States. 
Many  called  for  a  retention  of  the  whole  group  ;  many 
others  opposed  retaining  any,  looking  upon  an  extension 
of  American  dominion  to  those  distant  waters  as  a  dan 
gerous  experiment.  The  probability  seemed  to  be  that 
the  island  of  Luzon  would  be  annexed,  while  the  remain 
ing  islands  might  be  left  to  Spain  to  be  governed  under 
strict  regulations  devised  by  the  Commission.  The 
old  unjust  and  cruel  rule  would  certainly  not  be  per 
mitted. 

As  in  the  West  Indies,  so  in  the  Philippines,  there  was 
a  native  element  to  be  dealt  with  that  was  likely  to  give 
trouble  unless  its  wishes  were  considered  in  the  settle 
ment.  The  reports  of  irritation  of  the  natives  against 
the  Americans  were  exaggerated  or  unfounded,  and  at  a 
conference  with  their  leaders  they  expressed  their  full 
willingness  to  co-operate  with  the  Americans  and  to  sur 
render  their  arms  if  assured  that  the  islands  would  remain 
an  American  or  a  British  colony  or  protectorate.  But 
they  positively  refused  to  remain  under  Spanish  rule, 
and  declared  that  they  dared  not  disarm  until  they  knew 
who  were  to  be  their  future  masters.  Aguinaldo,  in  an 
interview  held  with  him,  said  that  he  was  in  command 
not  of  an  army,  but  only  of  an  unruly  rabble,  and  was 


378  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

earnest  in  his  desire  that  the  Americans  should  give  the 
Philippines  a  free  and  liberal  government,  to  whose 
establishment  he  would  lend  his  full  support. 

On  August  20  an  imposing  naval  demonstration  took 
place  in  the  harbor  of  New  York,  the  leading  war- vessels 
of  the  West  India  fleet — the  battle-ships  Iowa,  Indiana, 
Massachusetts,  Oregon,  and  Texas,  and  the  cruisers 
New  York  and  Brooklyn — entering  the  harbor  on  that 
day,  where  they  were  received  with  an  ovation  that 
amply  testified  to  the  admiration  of  the  people  for  the 
battle-scarred  ships,  their  commanders  and  crews. 

Rewards  were  dealt  out  freely  to  the  heroes  of  the 
navy.  Dewey,  as  already  stated,  had  been  early  made 
a  rear-admiral.  The  same  reward  was  given  Sampson, 
Schley,  and  Howell,  Sampson  being  advanced  eight 
numbers  on  the  navy  list  and  Schley  six,  so  that  Samp 
son  outranked  Schley,  instead  of  being  subordinate  to 
him  as  previously.  Rewards  were  dealt  with  a  liberal 
hand  to  other  officers  of  the  navy  and  army,  the  three 
months  of  war  giving  to  many  worthy  officers  an  advance 
in  rank  greater  than  they  were  likely  to  have  attained  in 
twice  that  many  years  of  peace. 

The  very  valuable  service  rendered  by  the  navy  in  the 
war,  and  the  disposition  of  European  powers  to  add 
steadily  to  their  strength  upon  the  sea,  could  not  fail  to 
give  rise  to  a  desire  to  add  largely  to  the  strength  of  the 
American  navy,  and  fit  it  for  possible  contest  with 
stronger  powers  than  Spain.  Though  five  new  battle 
ships  were  nearly  completed,  and  three  more,  with  four 
monitors,  had  been  ordered  in  the  recent  session  of  Con 
gress,  this  was  thought  to  be  insufficient  to  meet  the  new 
requirements  arising  from  the  recent  war.  The  Board 
of  Experts,  which  includes  the  chiefs  of  all  the  bureaus 


THE  WAR   WITH   SPAIN.  379 

of  the  Navy  Department,  agreed  upon  a  general  pro 
gramme  of  additions  to  the  navy  to  be  recommended  for 
consideration  by  Congress  at  its  next  session. 

This  programme  embraced  the  construction  of  fifteen 
sea-going  fighting  ships.  Three  of  these  were  to  be 
battle-ships  of  greater  tonnage  and  speed  than  any  now 
in  the  navy,  their  displacement  to  be  13,000  tons  and 
their  average  cruising  speed  19  knots.  Their  main  bat 
teries  were  to  be  composed  of  four  1 2-inch  rifles,  and 
their  secondary  batteries  to  include  fourteen  to  sixteen 
6-inch  rapid-fire  guns.  There  were  also  recommended 
three  first-class  armored  cruisers  of  12,000  tons  dis 
placement  and  22  knots'  speed,  to  be  covered  with  heavy 
armor  from  stem  to  stern,  and  to  mount  four  8-inch  rifles 
in  turrets  and  ten  or  twelve  6-inch  rapid-fire  guns  in 
broadside.  Nine  other  cruisers  were  provided  for,  three 
to  be  second-class  protected  and  armored  ships  and  six 
third-class  protected  ships.  The  building  of  a  number 
of  troop-ships  for  colonial  service  was  also  recommended, 
to  be  capable  of  carrying  twelve  hundred  soldiers,  with 
their  supplies  and  baggage.  These  were  deemed  neces 
sary  in  view  of  the  newly  acquired  colonial  possessions 
of  the  United  States. 

That  the  United  States  would  need  a  larger  standing 
army  in  the  future  was  equally  evident,  though  it  was 
felt  that  great  dependence  would  need  to  be  placed  on 
the  National  Guard,  the  latter  to  be  much  better  trained 
and  disciplined  than  heretofore.  By  this  means  a  large 
and  effective  army  could  be  made  available  at  short 
notice  and  at  small  cost  in  case  of  exigency.  As 
regarded  the  volunteer  army  raised  for  the  war,  steps 
were  taken  immediately  after  the  signing  of  the  protocol 
for  disbanding  a  large  number  of  the  troops,  though  the 


380  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

requisites  of  garrison  duty  in  the  newly  acquired  terri 
tory  rendered  it  necessary  to  keep  a  considerable  con 
tingent  of  them  for  some  time  under  arms. 

The  suggestion  was  made  that  the  United  States 
should  add  to  its  official  corps  a  General  Staff,  such  as 
is  employed  by  European  governments,  to  take  charge 
of  military  matters  in  times  of  peace  and  keep  the  army 
in  a  fixed  state  of  readiness  for  war.  In  such  a  case  the 
lack  of  material,  awkwardness,  and  inefficiency  displayed 
in  the  early  days  of  the  war  with  Spain  would  not  be 
likely  to  recur  in  future  conflicts,  and  even  a  hastily 
levied  army  could  be  put  into  the  field  more  quickly 
and  under  far  better  conditions  than  in  the  instance  here 
under  consideration. 

As  regards  the  formation  of  a  large  standing  army, 
which  some  advocate,  the  recent  action  of  the  Czar  of 
Russia  gives  voice  to  the  feeling  which  is  widely  enter 
tained  concerning  the  military  establishments  of  Europe. 
He  advocates  a  reduction  of  these  immense  armies  as 
crushing  and  dangerous  elements  of  the  body  politic  and 
as  threatening  obstacles  in  the  way  of  the  development 
of  settled  conditions  of  peace.  It  is  sincerely  to  be 
hoped  that  the  international  conference  to  this  end  pro 
posed  by  him  may  yield  the  desired  result.  Whether 
it  does  or  not,  the  movement  of  the  Czar  is  a  decided 
step  in  the  right  direction,  and  the  disarmament  which 
he  suggests  cannot  fail  in  the  end  to  come. 

Complaints  as  to  the  treatment  of  the  sick  soldiers 
continued,  severe  blame  being  laid  on  the  War  Depart 
ment,  the  chorus  of  detraction  spreading  until  it  affected 
the  press  of  the  country  like  an  epidemic.  To  what  ex 
tent  this  blame  was  deserved  could  not  be  decided  in 
the  heat  of  the  moment,  and  needed  to  be  left  for  later 


THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN.  381 

and  cooler  consideration  and  a  possible  official  investiga 
tion.  Much  sickness  prevailed,  not  only  among  the  sol 
diers  brought  home  from  Cuba  and  encamped  at  Mon- 
tauk  Point,  but  also  in  the  home  camps  at  Manassas  and 
Chickamauga,  while  the  supply  of  food  was  said  to  be 
absolutely  unadapted  to  the  needs  of  the  sick,  the  water 
to  be  contaminated  with  disease  germs,  and  the  other 
requisites  lacking  or  inadequate  to  the  situation.  To 
overcome  the  difficulty  new  camps  were  established  in 
healthier  locations,  to  which  the  sick  soldiers  were  re 
moved,  and  steps  were  taken  to  provide  them  with  suit 
able  food  and  shelter.  The  lack  of  proper  care  and 
attention  may  have  been  in  a  measure  unavoidable,  but 
there  was  certainly  much  neglect  and  inefficiency,  for 
which  some  one  was  to  blame,  and  official  red  tape  in 
many  instances  seems  to  have  set  aside  the  dictates  of 
common  sense  and  humane  sentiment. 

A  few  words  on  the  probable  effect  of  the  war  on  the 
nations  concerned  and  we  have  done.  Spain  has  lost 
all,  or  nearly  all,  her  remaining  colonies,  but  whether 
this  is  likely  to  prove  an  injury  or  an  advantage  to 
her  it  remains  for  time  to  decide.  The  colonies  of 
Spain  for  several  centuries  immensely  exceeded  in  extent 
those  of  any  other  nation,  yet  history  yields  no  evidence 
that  any  benefit  was  ever  derived  from  this  vast  colonial 
dominion.  Even  in  the  early  days,  when  gold  flowed 
in  rich  streams  into  the  coffers  of  Spain,  this  wealth 
served  to  enrich  the  commercial  nations  surrounding 
her,  not  herself.  In  fact,  her  colonies  proved  a  deadly 
incubus,  draining  off  her  energy  and  yielding  nothing 
of  value  in  return.  Absorbed  in  the  government  of 
these  distant  possessions,  the  home  interests  of  Spain 
were  sadly  neglected,  industry  remained  stagnant,  com- 


382  THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN. 

merce  undeveloped,  and  while  the  nations  around  were 
making  immense  strides  forward  in  prosperity,  Spain, 
once  foremost  among  them  all,  sank  steadily  into 
decadence. 

It  may  be  that  the  loss  of  her  colonies  will  prove  to 
her  a  blessing  instead  of  a  curse.  Having  no  interests 
to  care  for  abroad,  she  may  devote  new  attention  to  her 
interests  at  home,  and  develop  her  natural  resources 
until  in  time  she  regains  something  of  her  old  rank 
among  the  nations.  Whatever  be  the  effect  of  the  loss 
of  her  colonies  upon  Spain,  it  cannot  but  prove  a  bless 
ing  to  the  colonists  themselves,  who  have  escaped  from 
the  most  severe  and  crushing  of  despotisms,  and  taken 
their  place  among  the  free  and  self-governed  people  of 
the  earth.  The  colonial  policy  of  Spain  was  from  the 
first  to  the  last  a  cruel  and  barbarous  one,  and  the  moral 
sentiment  of  mankind  long  ago  demanded  that  it  should 
be  brought  to  an  end.  The  United  States  has  proved 
the  evangel  of  liberty  and  prosperity  to  the  manumitted 
peoples. 

As  regards  the  effects  of  the  war  upon  the  United 
States,  they  are  likely  to  be  much  less  important.  The 
war  was  but  a  passing  incident  -in  the  history  of  this 
country,  not  a  vital  problem.  It  has  given  us  an  in 
creased  knowledge  of  our  strength  and  resources,  and 
won  us  a  new  and  high  respect  in  Europe,  but  has  added 
little  to  these  powers  and  resources.  It  has  given  us 
island  colonies,  but  what  benefit  these  are  likely  to  bring 
us  it  is  too  soon  to  say.  We  have  stepped  into  what 
some  designate  a  dangerous  imperial  position,  but  this 
simply  means  that  our  growing  interest  in  the  concerns 
of  the  world  has  been  unmasked  by  the  events  of  the 
war,  not  that  these  three  months  of  hostilities  have 


THE  WAR  WITH   I   PAIN.  383 

brought  us  any  new  strength  or  higher  importance. 
They  have  but  swept  away  the  mist  of  misconception 
and  revealed  c  mportance  to  the  powers  of  the 

world.  It  must  soon  have  manifested  itself  in  any  event. 
Two  results  may  be  spoken  of.  The  war  has  had  a 
valuable  effect  in  removing  the  shreds  of  ill  feeling  re 
maining  between  the  North  and  the  South,  and  welding 
the  two  sections  of  our  country  into  one  strongly 
cemented  Union  ;  and  it  has  aroused  a  strong  sentiment 
of  affinity  between  the  Anglo-Saxon  peoples  of  the  earth 
which  may  in  the  end  prove  a  leading  factor  in  the  his 
tories  of  the  nations.  The  English-speaking  peoples 
have  grown  mighty  and  all-pervading  with  the  passage 
of  the  years,  and  with  joined  hands  they  would  be  all- 
powerful.  But  it  is  in  peace,  not  in  war,  that  the  great 
republic  of  the  West  is  destined  to  prevail.  It  is  with 
the  olive-branch,  not  the  sword,  that  it  should  stand 
before  the  world.  It  may  again  be  forced  into  war,  as 
it  has  been  forced  by  Spain,  but  peace  is  its  mission, 
industry  its  interest,  prosperity  its  goal ;  and  the  inva 
sion  of  the  world  which  in  the  future  it  is  destined  to 
make  will  be  that  of  commerce,  not  of  arms  ;  of  thought, 
not  of  force  ;  of  the  beneficent  products  of  the  soil  and 
the  mill,  not  the  direful  harvest  of  fire  and  sword. 


THE    END. 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 


Renewed  books  are  subject  to  i 


RECEIVED 


1  °  '67  -e  -• 


OEC  6  -  '65 


FEB2B197004 


RFCEIVED 


FFR1V67-RAM 

1  OAN  OFPTV- 

I^IZI 

•3T* 

w^mL-*. 


TACKS 


